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Summary
The French space effort is the third most important in the world after those of the USA and 
the former Soviet Union in terms of spending and programmes. France is closely involved 
in the European space effort coordinated by the European Space Agency, but scientific and 
industrial activities are not spread evenly amongst participating European nations and French 
space policy and the French space industry are the European leaders. This thesis examines 
the domestic national mechanisms of the making of French space policy in order to show 
how policy making originates in different components of the French high-tech complex and 
from various motivations.
The overall French space effort is composed of closely interrelated military and civil 
activities, the nature of which evolved rapidly during the 1980s and early 1990s as a result 
of the renewal of interest in military space triggered by SDI and the Gulf War and by the 
internal dynamic of the civil space sector's evolution towards commercial ‘maturity’. The 
thesis examines the interface between the state and both the military and civil sectors, as well 
as their own interactions, and reveals how the state has encountered problems of power and 
control in its relationship with the military and scientific/industrial agencies managing the 
implementation of space policy.
In the late-1980s and early 1990s, space activities on the European collaborative level and on 
the national French level came to be increasingly questioned as economic recession caused 
ever closer scrutiny of the costs involved. In France this coincided with attempts by 
government to reform the relationship between the national space agency - the Centre 
nationald’etudes spatiales (CNES) - and the state, and with increased interest by the armed 
forces in the spatial modernisation of French defence. The making of French space policy 
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1. Introduction
One of the particularly interesting features of French sp ace  activities is that until 
recently, no-one seem ed to be actively against them, in contrast, for example to 
government indifference to space and public ignorance of space  activities in 
Britain. More accurately perhaps, there appears to have been a  consensus in 
France in favour of space  born of the lack of debate in public opinion and of the 
enthusiasm  and influence of pro-space lobbies. Such tacit support for space 
activities from French popular opinion was notably dem onstrated in the mid-1980s 
by a  survey conducted for the 1985 Ecole Nationale d'Administration conference 
on space. This reputable Gallup poll revealed that 85% of those questioned felt 
that France should participate in the conquest of space, in comparison with a  
lower but still positive figure in favour (54%) in 1979. 39% of those questioned 
were in favour of a  tenfold increase in funding for French sp ace  (as opposed to 
52% against).1
This positive attitude on the part of the French public towards space seem s 
to have been a  fairly perm anent feature of the popular conception of space policy 
during the later 1980s, since an opinion poll conducted by the Ireq consultancy in 
May 1990 found that 80% of those questioned found it still acceptable after the 
end of the Cold War that France should spend money on sp ace  and that 90% felt 
that space would bring important techological advances to France.2 75% of 
correspondents thought that space  was important for French trade and 70% felt 
that space  would in general be profitable for France, whilst ‘only’ 60% felt that it 
w as important in maintaining jobs. More generally, sp ace  w as seen  to be a  good 
thing for French and European prestige.(90%), and, in term s of the image of the 
state in directing this popular activity, 85% felt that the s ta te  w as playing a  
com petent role.3 Throughout the 1980s therefore, it would seem  that French 
space  indeed enjoyed a  positive image in popular opinion, being considered 
‘worthwhile’ in a  variety of ways, important and generally prestigious. However, 
the Ireq consultancy poll of May 1990, although showing the faithfulness of the 
French public to their country’s  space  effort, w as nevertheless somewhat behind 
the evolution of informed opinion on space, which, while still considering French 
space policy to be important w as less convinced than French citizens overall that it 
w as being m ade in an appropriate and com petent way.
In this Introduction we will firstly address the issue of the real importance of space 
to France (as distinct from its importance in the eyes of the general public), and 
secondly examine the interest of French sp ace  to students of French politics and
1
secondly examine the interest of French space  to students of French politics and 
society, before moving on to discuss the aims and scope of the thesis in its 
investigation of the making of space  policy. We will then se t out the methods, 
sources and plan of the thesis.
The plan of this chapter will thus be the following :
-1 .1 . The importance of space to France
-1 .2 . The importance of space  to analysts of French politics and society 
-1 .3 . The aims and scope of the thesis 
-1 .4 . Methods, sources and interviews 
-1 .5 . Plan of the thesis
1.1. The importance of space to France
Space has been and still seem s to be important to France for a  variety of reasons, 
of which the foremost are firstly a  concern for the developm ent of French science 
and technology in general (a large proportion of the funding for which goes to 
space), secondly a  concern for the m aintenance of the technological credibility of 
French defence through space and related technologies, and thirdly, a  concern for 
prestige conferred through high profile high-tech achievem ents. We shall look 
briefly in turn at each of th ese  three motivations for France’s  interest in space, 
before discussing how the French attitude to the importance of sp ace  can be 
expected to differ from that of the superpowers.
1.1.1. High-tech industry and space
Modernisation - of the economy, of the political system, of society in general - has 
been a  recurrent (if not constant) concern of governm ent in France, arguably since 
the Enlightenment and the Revolution and certainly since the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, when defeat by Prussia and industrial competition with Britain 
and Germany led the French to consider their w eaknesses to be the result of 
outdated structures of production and thought.4 A belief in the contribution to be 
made to modernisation by space a s  a  high-tech sector is part of the background to 
France’s enthusiasm  for space activities.
Post-1945, under the Fourth Republic, government interest in 
modernisation of society and the of economy becom e even more committed a s
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the Liberation and its ideals of social reform were conjugated with the necessity for 
reconstruction and a  change of Constitution. Furthermore, the rise of technocracy 
within government and bureaucracy provided the sta te  with an elite with whom to 
modernise infrastructures, production and society.5 The Gaullist regime of the 
early Fifth Republic (1958-1969) reinforced the will of the  French sta te  towards 
modernisation through its concern for Grandeur, by forcing France to com pare 
herself with the most successful and most advanced nations in the international 
community and by attempting to emulate their perform ance in industry, science 
and all other fields. De Gaulle's 'certaine idee de la France' initiated the full 
development of the military and civil nuclear program m es, encouraged French 
science and technology to attempt to attain independence in com puter technology, 
and of course stimulated the nascent space secto r through orders for missile 
launchers.
In the 1980s, in term s of science and industry, the French and European 
reaction to the SDI programme was not limited to perceiving it a s  solely a  military- 
strategic threat, and an indirect strategic threat at that. The potential scientific, 
technological and industrial implications of SDI were understood very rapidly 
(President Mitterrand's proposal of the EUREKA program m e signalled the reaction 
of European industry), and the desire to avoid the creation of a  1960s style 'defi 
americain' in high technology is evident.6 The belief that prosperity com es 
through efficient industry (and increasingly high-technology industry in particular) 
has led to a  high level of aw areness in France and in other European countries 
that high technology industries such as  sp ace  are apparently more than ever 
essential to the well-being of society in the face  of the combined technological- 
economic imperialism of the United States and  Japan . On the level of the 
European Communities' action, this realisation is evidenced by the proliferation of 
Research and Development programmes in i nformation technology, 
telecommunications, biotechnology and o ther fields.7 Industrially and 
commercially, the late 1980s and early 1990s have se en  the movement of national 
econom ies in Europe towards the single m arket of 1993 and the constraints upon 
national industrial solutions that Union implies. There is debate  over whether 
Maastricht and European Union will signify thie final death  o f exception frangaise'
- the characteristically French approach to s ta te  intervention in science and 
industry that w as characterised in 1966 by th e  OECD a s  'a  special relationship', 
the go-it-alone economic policy of 1981-83 and  most generally, the dirigisme’ and 
'etatisme'that has been supposed, since Colbert, to inform French industrial 
policy.
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Below, we turn to a discussion of the importance of space for French defence.
1.1.2. Defence and space
In the post-war decades to the late 1960s and the creation of France’s missile- 
borne nuclear deterrent, military interest in space w as a  simple matter of 
encouraging French technologists and industrialists to develop and produce the 
necessary  ballistic vectors and electronic guidance system s. After something of a 
pause during the 1970s, the 1980s w itnessed a  reactualisation of concern over 
space-based  and space high-tech asp ects  of warfare. The world of the post-SDI 
declaration w as more than ever concerned with questions of the efficacity of 
defensive and offensive space-based  system s, and the effects their development 
and deployment may have on the scientific and defence capabilities of specific 
nations. For France, the threat of ‘Star W ars' m enaced the credibility of the 
independent nuclear strike force (the Force Nucleaire Strategique, or FNS), and 
thus led to considerable debate over the need for and the opportunity of 
modernisation of the nuclear and spatial com ponents of French defence policy.
On the military-strategic level, post-Cold War developm ents in European security 
have led to reassessm en ts  of the roles of the French and British deterrent forces 
and of their spatial elem ents. The Gulf war in 1991 also taught France that state- 
of the-art space telecommunications and intelligence-gathering system s were 
increasingly necessary  for the French arm ed forces if they w ere to retain their 
autonomy of decision and action ran d  that she  needs to accelerate her military 
space programme and to develop more satellites, either nationally, in limited 
collaboration or on a  fully European scale.
1.1.3. 'Grandeur1 and space
The notion of Grandeur, as  applied specifically to France, connotes in general 
term s the adherence to 'une certaine idee1 of France which magnifies her 
importance in the world, or at least maintains that France h as  a  special role to play 
in the international system .8 The literature review that follows looks at a  number 
of analyses of Grandeur and of the theory of the symbolic nature of politics which 
give a  theoretical background to this aspect of space  activities. The essential 
feature of the notion of Grandeur which leads it to be included in our study is the 
fact that it contains elem ents which can transcend the normal cost-benefit criteria 
of political decision-making in public policy. In this way, G randeur a s  a  motive for
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certain choices of government can be useful in explaining phenom ena which on 
first analysis seem  paradoxical or contradictory. This is not to say that it can, or 
will be called upon a s  a  deus ex machinaXo resolve problematic issues.
The application of the notion of G randeur to the space  programme is of 
course derived from the links established between the developm ent of the Force 
de frappe and the original Gaullist interpretation of the G randeur of France as  
based  essentially on military independence. In the 1970s and 1980s however, it 
cam e to be increasingly recognised that prestige would be created for France 
through her mastery of civil space applications otherwise associated uniquely with 
the superpow ers. In 1986 the catastrophic effects of the Challenger Shuttle 
d isaster9 on the American space industry deprived satellite constructors and users 
of this launch facility and thrust the French/European rocket Ariane into the 
limelight of space as  a  commercial sector, emphasizing France’s  (apparent) 
technological advance.
It is tempting to overstate the potential role of G randeur a s  a  link between 
governm ent and high-technology in France, but any reasonable hypothesis about 
the functions of space in French government and society must accept that space 
sector activities have both practical and symbolic efficacy.10 France's 
characteristic concern to create and maintain ‘grandeur’ and her particular geo­
strategic position in the international system  m akes her interest in the acquisition 
of prestige and influence through the space effort correspondingly idiosyncratic in 
comparison with the motives of the superpowers.
1.1.4. The singularity of France and space
France's experience of her space effort cannot be straightforwardly com pared with 
that of the United States, or with that of the Soviet Union, nor a sse sse d  according 
to the sam e criteria. France's development of her space effort has always been 
undertaken in reaction to the space activities of the superpow ers, and has never 
been a  policy of simple across-the-board emulation aimed at recreating a  'mini' 
U.S. space  sector in France whose successes, costs and constraints would be 
susceptible to the sam e criticisms applicable to Nasa, and in the sam e way. The 
exam ple of the Ariane programme shows how France's aims in space  have been 
to acquire credible autonomy in 'strategic' technologies and to exploit the errors of 
Soviet and US space policy.11
If the stimulus in the 1960s to de Gaulle's developm ent of a  space 
capability w as the American and Soviet Sputnik-induced space  race, and if the 
'model' of development that existed for French space  planners w as indeed that
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provided by Nasa, France w as nevertheless not 'competing' with the U.S. or the 
Soviet Union. France's competitors or peers in the second division of space 
activities were initially Britain, and then, with the abdication of British interest in 
space  capabilities independent of the U.S., her partners in the European space 
science and technology organisations.12 In the 1980s and 1990s, a s  the 'third 
space  power*, France's near-competitors and near-peers in space  are essentially 
still those countries in the second division - the European nations of the ESA, 
emerging space powers such a s  India, China, Japan  and Brazil - who cam e late to 
the developm ent of their space  industries, whilst the U.S. still represents world 
leadership in space technology.13 It is because of this 'difference' of ambitions 
between the American and French space efforts that it is subtly misleading to 
apply the traditional criticisms of the U.S. space  program m e to the activities of 
either CNES or the ESA.1*
As Walter A. McDougall has pointed out in his 'political history of the Space 
Age', the American space effort has been handicapped since its inception by its 
responsibility for protecting the non-communist world against Soviet aggression.15 
This burden of responsibility, and the complications which it has entailed for N asa 
/ DoD relations illustrates one of the subtle 'differences' betw een the French and 
U.S. experiences of space which also presents som e similar features between the 
two enterprises (although on close examination the difference is greater than the 
similarity, at least for the past and recent period). Like the U.S. space 
programme, French space w as initially heavily (and is still, but to a  lesser extent,) 
involved in the development of mijitary space  capabilities ensuring the credibility of 
French nuclear deterrence or French military autonomy in general. During the 
period of the 1960s, (and also, but to a  lesser extent, in the  1970s and 1980s) it 
can be said that the French military space effort w as concerned solely with 
providing an umbrella for France (with all the cost and technical obstacles this 
implies for a  medium-sized nation), but since the strategic upheavals of the late 
1980s and early 1990s, however, the geo-diplomatic door has been opened for 
the extension of French military space  expertise to Europe a s  a  whole.16
This example illustrates two divergences between apparently similar 
structuring conditions of the French and American space  sectors. Firstly, U.S. 
policy was determined by a  total W est-East military-strategic rivalry with the 
U.S.S.R. and the necessity of leadership in a  bipolar contest, w hereas French 
programming w as informed by what may be term ed 'sufficiency' vis-a-vis either of 
the space/nuclear superpowers. Secondly, American policy has been 
consistently 'national' with unavoidable international responsibilities, in contrast 
with the purportedly 'European' committment of the French space  effort and its
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truer more narrowly national ambitions. In comparison with the U.S., France can 
be argued to have enjoyed some advantages in the politics of its space system, 
despite som e problems caused by greater cost constraints, since French national 
expertise and capabilities in space have been able to feed on European space 
activities and funding w hereas the US space  effort has always relied on national 
funding but with the implicit responsibility for the defence of the whole 'free 
world'.17
The relationship between the French state and its space sector is not the 
sam e a s  the relationship between British governm ents and the British space effort, 
nor is it even the sam e as  that between Bonn/Berlin and German space activities. 
The bottom line of French space program m es is ultimately geo-political and 'geo- 
diplomatic', and France's geopolitical concerns are determ ined by concerns which 
are arguably special to France, by considerations of her place in the world or her 
'rank' in the international community. France's policies are informed by an 
underlying desire to express French national pride in French genius, but are 
applied to reality in a  context which is dominated by the 'relativity' of France's 
material and financial m eans, and by the 'relativity' of her technological 
achievem ents in space com pared with those of the U .S.18
1.2. Importance of the topic for analysts
The French space  effort or programme and the policy which determ ines the 
developm ent of French space activities (however we call them) are of interest a s  a 
topic for academ ic analysis for a  number of reasons, of which three concern 
respectively the size, nature and performance of the programme. The topic is of 
importance because the intensity of French interest in promoting the space  sector 
is a  characteristic feature of France which distinguishes the country from other 
European nations. The topic is of importance because  the traditional nature of 
French govenm ent has been centralising, Jacobin and technocratic and the s ta te’s 
relations with an agency are of interest for the light they throw on the development 
of governm ent and its approach to public policy. The topic is also of importance 
because  of the difficulties encountered by the space  sector in its ‘m ature’ period of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s and the way in which changes in the attitude of 
governm ent towards space activities and the space agency may indicate changes 
in the nature of the French s ta te’s traditional characteristics. In the following three 
short sections of the Introduction we examine these  aspects of the importance of 
French space as  a  topic for analysis.
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1.2.1. Space as a feature of ‘I ’exception frangaise’
France is well-known for her space programme, and it is well known that France 
has a space effort which places her high in the rankings of ‘space powers’. In the 
Gaullist period, France’s proud claim to have become, and then to remain the 
world’s third space nation, mirroring the prestige of her nuclear achievements, was 
a reflection of the prestige that such a position conferred. More recently, in the 
1970s and 1980s, it is arguable that the simple chauvinistic motivations for 
France’s investments in space activities have declined somewhat in favour of a 
greater variety of justifications, but nevertheless, the space effort, and France’s 
leading position at the head of the non-superpower space nations are still features 
of France’s difference, or ‘exception’
More detailed consideration of French spending on space (specifically the 
funding for the space agency) will be given in following chapters, but here the 
singular position of France’s commitment to space within Europe and in 
comparison with a wider range of spacepowers is illustrated by some simple 
comparative statistics :
| European Space Expenditures 1991
Space Space Space
Country expenditure expenditure expenditure
(MAU) as % GNP per cap. ($)
Austria 22.3 0.0136 2.94
Belgium 97.8 0.0496 9.94
Denmark 22.2 0.0171 4.31
Finland 7.1 0.0056 1.42
France 1220.0 0.1018 21.63
Germany 802.0 0.0513 10.34
Italy 656.0 0.0572 11.49
Ireland 5.0 0.0115 1.34
Netherlands 93.5 0.0326 6.25
Norway 23.4 0.0222 5.55
Spain 96.6 0.0183 2.46
Sweden 73.4 0.0309 8.70
Switzerland 46.3 0.0203 7.00
UK 205.9 0.0203 3.60
Total Europe 3371.5 0.072 14.3
(Source lEuropeau.Space Directory 1221, Sevig Press, 19>93)
As can be easily calculated from this first table of comparative figures, overall 
French space expenditure for 1991 represented 36% of total European spending. 
French expenditure was 50% higher than that of Germany, the second largest
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spender, and twice that of the third largest spender, Italy. Per capita, and in 
terms of % of GNP devoted to space, France’s singular position amongst her 
closest European neighbours is even more marked, since she spends 
proportionately twice as much on space as Germany and Italy. French 
enthusiasm for space stands in stark contrast to the United Kingdom’s meagre 
financial outlay, which amounts to 6% of total European spending, a fifth of 
France’s spending proportionate to GNP and one sixth of French spending ‘par 
citoyen’.
As the leading spender on space in Europe, and the leading country in the 
ESA, France is demonstrably in a different league to her European comparator 
nations. In comparison with other space powers, the value of her spending on 
space may seem less exceptional, but proportionately to population and national 
wealth, France’s commitment to space still sets her apart, as  the next table of 
figures shows :





































(Source rEuropean Space Directory 1993. Sevig Press. 19•93)
Total French spending on space in 1991 was thus slightly greater than that of 
Japan, despite Japan’s significantly larger GNP and population, bu only one 
quarter that of the United States. In fact, the comparison with the US is the only 
one where France does not come out on top, but as we have already argued, the 
French space effort is not really to be compared with those of the US and the ex- 
USSR, since it should be considered different in nature.
1.2.2. French sp ace  and the concep t of th e  'grand programme'
The French space effort and French space policy provide analysts with an 
interesting case  study of a characteristically French public policy approach: the
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grand programme.19 The concept of the grand programme itself actually 
predates the creation of the Centre national d ’etudes spatiales (CNES), or French 
national space  agency, in 1961, so we will look first at the idea and then at its 
practical manifestations in the form of the S pace centre. The expression 'grand 
programme' has traditionally been used in France since the Second World War to 
describe a  particular form of state intervention in technologies of industrial and 
economic importance. Fundamentally, the intervention thus described is 
characterised by the new ness of the technology involved and by a  number of 
qualifications concerning the nature of the technology. Naturally, not all new 
technologies in France becom e the object of grand programme action. To qualify 
as  a  potential candidate for a  grand programme , the technology therefore h as  to 
be new and to be deem ed of great socio-economic interest, a s  well a s  being 
beyond the reach of unaided market forces. Although the technology itself is 
new, the work required in a  grand programme is essentially developmental rather 
than pure research (or 'prospective). The way in which the ’grandprogramme’ 
approach to public policy has been applied to sp ace  allows conclusions to be 
drawn not only about this particular application, but also about the French s ta te ’s  
approach to public policy in general.
The grand programme approach generally involves the creation by the 
state of agency organisations entrusted with the responsibility of carrying out the 
grand programme in question for government. The institutions and individuals 
entrusted with the execution of the programme have necessarily to exercise both 
technical and administrative com petence in the developm ent of the technology.
In a  se n se  they mediate betw eerrthe technology and the political authority 
represented by the state 's  desire for development and results. B ecause of their 
special role and responsibilities, these  scientific 'technocrats' are generally 
grouped in a  single organisation created by a  law entrusting it with the mission of 
carrying out the programme. This organisation is generally an Etablissement 
public a caractere economique et commercial (EPIC), of which CNES is arguably 
the major example. EPIC organisations usually have two principal distinguishing 
features. Firstly, they are theoretically independent of centralised financial control 
(for exam ple interministerial discussion of the science/research budget), since 
their budget allocations are decided outside the normal circuits of spending 
departm ent annual budget negociations. Secondly, the EPIC is generally the sole 
interlocutor between the state and the industry of the technology under 
development. Such features of autonomy and monopoly of expertise tend to give 
rise to problems of power and control in state-agency relations.
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A final feature of space as a grand programme is the burden it places on 
state funding for civil science and technology funding. State spending on space 
will be examined in detail in subsequent chapters, but the graph below gives an 
indication of how space has been absorbing a high and increasing percentage of 
overall government civil research and development funding (Budget civil de 
recherche et de developpement - BCRD) :











1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986  1987 1988 1989 1990  1991 1992 1993 1994
(Source : adapted from CNES and French govt, statistics)
1.2.3. S pace  and the  French approach  to m odernisation
The final aspect of the French space programme which is of interest to analysts is 
that examining space policy may allow insights into the French approach to 
modernisation. In the French debate over modernisation, one can distinguish a 
number of major themes. Three of these themes are the modernisation of 
society, the modernisation of industry, and the modernisation of the state. In the 
field of public policy, attempts to bring about these different kinds of modernisation 
may coincide chronologically, as during the Fourth Republic, and particularly the 
Fifth Republic when new technocratic methods of government were combined with 
a new Constitution and a desire to escape from the social, industrial and economic 
backwardness which had contributed to France's defeat in 1940 and plagued
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reconstruction after the Liberation. Policies of modernisation may coincide in the 
fields to which they are applied, for example the modernisation of French industry 
and technology which was stimulated by de Gaulle's vision of French 
independence in the 1960s also contributed to the modernisation of French 
society through a  transformation of attitudes towards science and technology in 
general. In the late 1980s and during the 1990s a  major concern of government 
in France has been the role of the state in society, and more specifically, the 
extent to which the state should be present in all areas. This concern is usually 
d iscussed in term s of an opposition between moins d'etat ('less state') and plus 
d'etat ('more state'), or in another formulation, I'etat modeste versus I'etat 
ambitieux. The rhetorical solution to this particular conundrum is usually that 
there should be mieux d'etat ('better state'). 'L'etat ambitieux' is the classic 
dirigiste French state intervening in society, industry and science in voluntarist 
fashion, w hether directly or through an intermediary scientific/industrial institution 
such a s  a  national space agency. The concept of 'mieux d'etat' in the context of 
state-agency relations reflects government concerns to foster efficiency in its 
m anagem ent at one remove of important and costly sectors such a s  space . The 
injection of a  qualitative aspect into the debate ('mieux d'etat) fits well with the 
idea of progress that the state is supposed to represent and nurture. The notion 
of 'better state ' also dovetails with the policy that is intended to bring it about, 
namely the modernisation of public administrative structures and practices or 7a 
modernisation administrative. ’
The grands programmes and the agencies which run them occupy an 
interesting intermediate position between governm ent and  the sta te  on the one 
side and industry and society on the other. Grands programmes and EPICs enjoy 
a  m easure of autonomy from the state, since they are  se t up by the sta te  to 
m anage long-term initiatives whose technical param eters e scap e  the normal 
expertise of government and whose financial requirem ents go beyond the normal 
budgetary procedures. Grand programme agencies such a s  the Commissariat a 
i'energie atomique (CEA) and the Centre national d'etudes spatiales are 
'overseen' by government through the channel of tutelle'or ministerial supervision. 
Technical tutelle is exercised by the ministry or ministries whose responsibilities 
are seen  to be the most closely linked with the activities of the agency and its 
programmes. Indirect financial tutelle can also originate from the Finance 
ministry. B ecause of the complex and varied nature of the activities which make 
up the overall space effort, the tutelle for CNES has often been divided between 
ministries and has often switched as  governm ents reshuffle their ministerial 
portfolios. Such a  'fluidity' of the tutelle for the sp ace  sector has perhaps
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contributed, along with the considerable capacity of CNES to propose policies to 
government, to a  situation in which the regulatory and evaluatory control of the 
space  agency has been somewhat lacking, and where ‘modernisation’ of the 
relationship between state and EPIC is required.
The late 1980s and early 1990s have seen  a  progressive questioning of the 
activities of CNES and the space sector, a s  evidenced initially by a  number of 
critical official reports on the space sector. In the perspective offered by Dyson 
(1986) on state action and its motivations in the communications sector, it is 
possible to see  an interest on the part of the state in inquiry into the activity of a  
given sector a s  an attempt to impose authority over it within a  context of brokerage 
politics. The immediate motivation for such a  concern in the late 1980s in the 
space  sector is the cost of the French space effort and the perceived monopoly of 
technical expertise enjoyed by CNES rendering difficult the controlling activities of 
the sector's tutellary authorities.
B ecause space  seem s to be particularly important to France, and because an 
analysis of the French approach to what can be thought of a s  an example of 
French ‘exception’ is a  useful contribution to our knowledge of France, research 
into the making of French space policy should be of interest to students of French 
politics and society.
1.3. Aims and scope of the thesis
The agencies, actors and organisations which interact in various ways to produce 
what is perhaps simplistically termed French 'space  policy' form a  highly 
complicated system  of forces whose overall coherence has som etim es been 
questioned. The thesis aims to describe and examine th ese  agencies, actors and 
organisations and analyse their making of policy in both the civil and military 
sectors of the French space effort. Through revealing the reality of the p rocesses 
at work in what is commonly assum ed to be a  monolithic, self-contained 'space  
programme' led by a  similarly well defined 'space  policy' we hope to show the real 
complexity of the French space effort.
The ambition to look at a  broad range of factors which enter into the 
definition of the French space effort, (and thus of space  policy in the most 
com prehensive sen se  of the term), naturally precludes a  single-discipline 
investigation of the problem. Such a  single-discipline study might well be 
appropriate for looking at party political differences over sp ace  policy in France or
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for researching the reaction of the French financial community to the need for 
rocket and satellite insurance schem es; a  narrowly sociological enquiry for 
example might look at the social and educational background of major decision 
m akers in the space sector. Such exam ples illustrate three possible studies of 
the making of French space policy on the ‘micro’ level of Investigation, but this 
thesis aims to look at policy-making in a  wider perspective.
Space entertains a complex relationship with government precisely 
because of the varied nature of inputs to overall space  policy, which range from 
military, industrial, scientific-technological and prestige concerns to, (increasingly), 
financial and budgetary constraints on space funding. In addition to this 
multiplicity of inputs, the particular status of the agencies set up in the early 1960s 
to m anage the civil space programme and the French arm s industry has further 
complicated the definition of policy and the conduct of individual program m es by 
providing independent sources of expertise on space  technology.
For th ese  reasons, the thesis concentrates on examining the activities of 
the civil and military space sectors, in order to dem onstrate how overall sp ace  
policy is constructed from a  variety of sources and for a  variety of motivations.
The thesis looks at the French national space  agency CNES and exam ines its role 
a s  an EPIC leading a  grand programme, what its activities are and how they are 
funded, and how it interacts with government. The thesis also exam ines the 
elaboration of ‘military space policy’ in the Defence Ministry, the Etat-Major des 
Armees (EMA) and the Delegation Generale pour I ’Armement (DGA), and show s 
how military and civil space co-exist in practice and in policy.
The 1980s are the essential period of interest for the thesis. Discussion of 
space  policy is not restricted exclusively to this period however, since in order to 
understand contemporary developments, there is a  need to com pare the 1980s 
with earlier situations. The choice of the 1980s is not moreover merely dictated 
by a  desire to study this particular decade: the years between 1979 and 1988 
represent the development of CNES and space  policy initiated by the 20 February 
1979 Conseil Restreint sur I'Espace which decided to reform CNES and to 
produce and commercialise Ariane, and the 1988 modifications of Ministerial 
responsibility for CNES and the reforms of the PTT. From 1988 to 1991, th ese  
reforms were set in motion, only to be complicated by the Gulf War, by econom ic 
recession, by cabinet re-organisations and by a  change of government
Without elaborating the issues of political science raised by Kolodziej's 
ideas on the elite/non-democratic nature of the arm s industry20 or the 
philosophical fears expressed by Ellul about the 'absurdity' of the technological 
system  as  a  whole, which might both apply to som e extent to space,21 premonitory
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disquiet about the logic of the French space effort w as resum ed by the French 
space  practioner and analyst Andre Lebeau in the following terms: 'Encore faut-il 
que cette logique a long terme soit maitrisee et explicite. Or, le moins qu'on 
puisse dire est qu'elle ne I'est guere actuellement, tant la technique spatiale 
presente davantage les apparences d ’une force qui va que celles d'un phenomene 
soumis a une intention strategique22 Lebeau’s  implicit concern w as that the 
internal dynamics of the space sector were neither transparent nor totally 
controlled by the state, which would wish even more to shape the space industry 
(military and civil) in ways furthering its own governing credibility. Through an 
examination of the various agency, government, strategic and cost ‘logics’ which 
drive the making of policy and the development of the space effort, the thesis aims 
to provide an understanding of the ‘coherence’ of policy and of the ‘accountability’ 
of policy makers.
What the thesis does not aim to do
The study does not intend to give an exhaustive treatm ent of the economic and 
financial aspects  of the French space sector, neither does it intend to limit its 
enquiries to the single issue of the military-civil interface, fascinating a s  these 
topics are in their own right. The thesis does not aim to exhaustively present the 
relationship between public and private in the sp ace  industry any more than it 
pretends to deal with the distinctions to be drawn betw een purely national and 
European space  ventures. Elements from all of th ese  fields are obviously 
integrated into the research and analysis, but the interdisciplinary and synthetic 
nature of the enquiry (and of space) preclude extrem e detail in any of the 
contributing issues. The aim is to combine analyses of different but related 
issues. The thesis assum es as  background to its analysis of the dom estic 
national m echanism s of policy inspiration and formulation that space  activities are 
generally accepted to be ‘high-tech’, and that France is involved in European and 
other international cooperation in space.
1.4. Methods, sources and interviews
To understand the multiple facets of space activities and space policy, it is 
necessary  to look at analyses of ‘grandeur*, defence and high technology, theories 
of the state, of public policy and technocracy, of science and industry policy and at 
the official documentation produced by the space  sector, a s  well a s  interviews with
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practioners and experts in an attempt to obtain inside information. The 
multifarious nature of the sources and of the interviews conducted in the course of 
the research for the thesis reflects the complicated nature of the issue in question.
1.4.1. Methods
Methodologically, the nature of the subject being investigated has had obvious 
consequences for the approaches adopted in fieldwork research, both in term s of 
interviews and to a  lesser extent in the acquisition of docum entary information. In 
the military sphere, the confidentiality of many aspec ts  concerned with the nuclear 
deterrent and with the development of space strategy has constrained official 
readiness to divulge matters which are classified 'confidentiel defense '. However, 
there is sufficient material accessible in the public domain which, when combined 
with information gleaned from personal interviews and research, gives a  
com prehensible picture of the realities of what is hidden behind official rhetoric. It 
is perhaps worth stressing that numerous analysts of French arm s industry issues 
and of French high technology have bem oaned the relative ‘impenetrability’ of the 
arm s-aerospace-high tech complex, ranging from individual scholars and the 
investigators of the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and 
Technological Choices to the authors of the National Committee for the Evaluation 
of R esearch’s study on space policy.23
1.4.2. Sources
Material on French space can be found in a  variety of forms, of which the national 
press, the specialised press, official publications and promotional publications are 
the main sources. Academic studies of the political implications of French space 
policy are however relatively few and far between, a s  the literature review will 
reveal.
The National press.
Day to day and week to week information on developm ents in the French space  
sector can be gleaned from the national p ress in France and Britain and from the 
specialised aerospace publications, (mainly British and American), which cover 
world-wide aeronautics and space matters. The British p ress deals with French 
space questions under such varied headings a s  'European news' and 'Science 
and technology'. The principal sources are The Financial Times. The Times. The
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Independent and The Guardian. The Economist provides an habitually succinct 
occasional weekly coverage. In France of course, journal de reference oblige , 
Le Monde covers space sector developm ents under a  variety of rubrics reflecting 
the complexity of the issues involved. Com m m entators such a s  Jean-Frangois 
Augereau, Maurice Arvonny, Michel Colonna d'lstria, Jacq u es  Isnard et al report 
on space on the 'Science', 'Research', 'Aerospace', 'Business' and 'Defence' 
pages. Of the other national dailies Liberation provides a  customarily refreshing 
slant on m atters under the headings of 'Space' and 'Science', whilst Le Figaro 
gives a  generally somewhat sensationalist treatm ent of events. Of the weeklies, 
Le Point and L'Express have devoted special reports to French space  activities.
Below, we consider the specialised press.
The Specialised press.
This general journalistic coverage is complemented by the more detailed and 
technical treatm ent given by the specialised professional weeklies. These 
m agazines are essentially concerned more with the strictly aeronautical aspects 
of aerospace but have developed expertise on space  technologies and politics. 
Thus Aviation W eek and S pace Technology has reports devoted to space 
technology, commercial space, SDI, and satellite communications a s  well a s  
occasional longer features on items such a s  Soviet space  advances, and 
European launch program recovery. Flight International covers space  m atters 
under the headings of defence, spaceflight and industry, a s  well a s  headline 
treatm ents of events and them es such a s  Ariane launches and ESA projects. 
A erospace America has lesser coverage in the relevant sections 'Space science' 
and 'A erospace Europe'. Spaceflight, the monthly organ of the British 
Interplanetary Society, deals with space new s and prospective projects a s  well a s  
publishing occasional articles on aspects of space policy by experts such a s  Roy 
Gibson. Interavia aerospace review (published monthly in English, French, 
German and Spanish versions) also has occasional coverage of space  matters. 
The European Space Agency produces two publications dealing with its activities: 
the ESA Journal contains scientific and technical material while the ESA Bulletin 
is aimed at a  slightly wider audience and contains articles on the legal, 
commercial and financial dimensions of the Agency's programmes. In France, 
Air et Cosmos is the only equivalent of the English language aerospace weeklies 
along with UAeronautique et I'Astronautique. but reports and comment on
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governm ent decisions and space technology are also found in m agazines and 
periodicals such as  Sciences et Vie. Sciences et Avenir. La Recherche and 
Sciences et Techniques.24 Of these, the most serious reporting is found in La 
Recherche . whose coverage of space is assured  by Alain Dupas and in Sciences 
et Techniques. which deals with the industrial aspects  of space  applications.
To a  certain extent all these sources belong to what might be term ed a  'space 
lobby'; they are therefore 'interested parties' a s  far a s  any evaluation of the 
objectivity of their analyses is concerned. It must nevertheless be pointed out 
that their treatm ent of space m atters is generally well-balanced, although with a  
tendency to favour more rather than less funding for any given project ceteris 
paribus. Their main contribution is in the factual detail that they provide on 
contemporary developments.
Official sources of information
Information about CNES is found in the Centre's own Annual Reports, pamphlets 
and newsletters such as  La Lettre du CNES  and also in docum ents published by 
La Documentation frangaise. Information about the DGA is presented in its 
publicity publications produced by the Service d'information etdes relations 
publiques des armees (Sirpa) and in armed forces reviews and periodicals such 
a s  Defense Nationale and Armees d'Auiourd'hui. The main source of official 
documentation tends however to fce the parliamentary publications of the 
Assemblee Nationale and the Senat. These Avis, Rapports and Rapports 
generaux originate from the multiple commissions (or committees) which 
scrutinise government proposals and culminate in the elaboration of the projets de 
Loi (or bills). The projets de Loi de finances for the various ministries involved in 
space  activities are particularly interesting provided that they furnish 
comprehensible breakdowns of funding (which is not always the case).
Particularly revealing, but naturally difficult to obtain are  confidential docum ents 
from government, such as  the Rapports confidentiels annuels - Industrie compiled 
by the Ministere de I ’Economie et des Finances, to which access  has nevertheles 
been obtained.
Other sources.
Other sources of information come from a  wide range of quasi-governmental and 
commercial publications. Quasi-governmental sources include the trade
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organisations Prospace, Novespace and GIFAS which publish promotional 
material on the aerospace and space  industries. Purely commercially orientated 
promotional material is produced by Arianespace and Spot Image and by all the 
major space sector firms such a s  Matra, SEP, Aerospatiale and Thomson.
Comment on the orientations of space policy and on the factors which combine 
to determ ine the direction of the French space  effort are to be found occasionally 
in a  wide variety of journals, of which only the major ones can be mentioned here. 
S pace Policy deals with all aspects of space matters, but seem s curiously devoid 
of articles discussing specifically French aspects  of space  matters. SfiSCfi 
Markets deals with the more strictly commercial details of satellites and launchers. 
Military considerations on the role of space  are covered in France by a  number of 
journals of which the most influential are Defense Nationale. Strateqique and 
Etudes polemoloaiaues (since October 1990 m erged with Strateqique). The 
implications of space activities for international relations are occasionally 
analysed in Politioue Etranaere. The World Today and International Affairs, and, 
less frequently, in other international relations journals.
1.4.3. Interviews
The interviews, numbering some thirty in total, were conducted over the period 
October 1987 to May 1993. Most of the interviews took place in Paris, a s  this is 
the sea t of most high-level non-technical authority in the m anagem ent of the 
space  sector, although a  useful opportunity to d iscuss m atters informally with 
representatives of various commercial and sta te  sp ace  organisations w as afforded 
by the Bordeaux Technospace Trade Fair in D ecem ber 1988. Similarly in 
D ecem ber 1988, the Western European Union (WEU) Conference on Scientific 
and technical aspects of arms control verification bv satellite provided a  more 
general forum for discussing military space m atters than formal interviews with 
DGA and EMA officers and other Defence Ministry officials. The table overleaf 
gives a  list of the main interviews conducted while researching the thesis. The list 
is not exhaustive, since it gives only the principal interviewees of meetings with 




N am e/rank Position /  O rganisation Interview date
Dominique David Directeur de la Fondation d ’Etudes 
pour la Defense Nationale (FEDN)
November 1987
Andre Brigoux FEDN November 1987
Helene Amaud CERI/Sciences Po. Paris November 1987




Colin Cameron Western European Union (WEU) 6 December 1988
Bruno Petit Controleur general des 
Armees/Ministere de la Defense
9 December 1988
IPA Roger Peuron Service d'information et de presse 
! des armees (Sirpa)
14 December 1988
Martin Boyle Scientific Attache, British Embassy 
in Paris
3 February 1989
Alain Simon Conseiller pour les Affaires 
! militaires/CNES
9 February 1989 
and 24 May 1993
Daniel Pichoud Ingenieur general des Armees/ DGA 2 March 1989
Amiral Bonnot Secretaire general de la Defense 
nationale/SGDN
13 April 1989
Colonel Ferrere SGDN 13 April 1989
Colonel Eleu de la 
Simone
Division Plans-Programmes- 
Espace/EMA-Ministere de la Defense
19 April 1989
Lt.-Col. Bouchard Plans-Programmes-Espace/EMA 19 April 1989
Daniel Sacotte Directeur du Cabinet du ministre /  
MRT
26 May 1989
Amiral Sanguinetti Retired 1 September 1989
Jean Gruau Inspecteur general /  CNES 22 November 1989 
and 24 May 1993
Frangoise Praderie Departement Terre Oceans 
Environnment Espace (TOEE)/MRT
13 December 1989
Dom. Vidal-Majdar TOEE/MRT 13 December 1989
Christophe Frank Administrateur a l’A.N, Service de 
l’informatique, de la prospective et 
du developpement technologique
3 April 1990
Edwige Bonnevie Conseiller pour les Affaires 
strategiques DGE/DGA
3 May 1990
Michel Glass Delegue general adjoint /  DGE 28 May 1990
Jacques Serris Delegue general adjoint /  DGE 28 May 1990
Alain Joxe Directeur d ’etudes EHESS (By telephone) 
June 1990
Regine Thomas Coordination generate Olympus, 
Ministere des Affaires etrangeres
14 June 1990
Marc El Nouchi Responsable du bureau Espace, 
Recherche, PTT /  Direction du 
Budget-Ministere des Finances
3 July 1990
Eric Preiss Direction du Tresor, Ministere des 
Finances
23 September 1991
Pierre Claret de 
Fleurieu
Administrateur au Senat, membre du 
Secretariat de POPECST
21 April 1992 and 
25 May 1993
Laurent Fourquet Responsable du bureau Espace., 




1.5. The Plan of the th es is
The thesis com prises three main sections: the first section contextualises recent 
and current developm ents in the making of French space  policy analytically, 
historically and practically, and sections I! and III exam ine th ese  development in 
the civil side of the sector (I) and the military elem ents of the space  effort (II). The 
concluding chapter of the thesis is an ‘evaluation’ of the significance and 
importance of changes in the making of policy during the 1980s and early 1990s 
and com m ent on how the latest developm ents reflect on the direction of the space 
programme. Overall, including this introduction, the thesis is m ade up of eleven 
chapters, which in more detail, have the following content.
C hapters Two, Three and Four of the first section se t out the background to 
the making of French space policy in the 1980s by examining the academ ic and 
other literature dealing with or related to space (Ch. 2.); by presenting the history 
of the French space effort a s  it developed during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
from military dominated origins to cooperation betw een civil and military (Ch. 3.), 
and by analysing the structure, major firms and m arkets of the French and 
European space  ‘industries’ a s  they stand now (Ch. 4). C hapter Two, in 
reviewing the literature of various kinds which informs an academ ic understanding 
of sp ace  in France looks at analyses of ‘grandeur1 and high-technology a s  a  
background to much of the motivation behind French space  policy, exam ines 
theories of the state and of French public policy, a s s e s s e s  the contributions of 
studies of science and technology policy in France to space  and  looks at the most 
important of the official oversight reports which have criticised the m anagm ent of 
the sp ace  sector. Through the variety of the topics which it investigates, the 
Literature review underlines the pluridisciplinarity of the perspective of this thesis 
to an issue - the making of space policy - whose analysis appeals to many 
different explanatory approaches.
C hapters Five, Six and Seven of the second section of the thesis consider 
the relationship between the civil space agency CNES and government, 
examining CNES’ role a s  a  semi-autonom ous state  agency, its organisation, 
objectives, activities and funding (Ch. 5.), and how governm ent has interacted 
differently with the Centre at different times during the period 1979-1992 (Chapters 
6. and 7.).
Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten of the third section of the thesis consider the 
military aspects  of the overall French space effort, and how inputs from defence
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strategy (Ch. 8.), the organisation of space bodies and planning in the military 
establishm ent (Ch. 9.) and military-civil collaboration in industry (Ch. 10.) inform 
the making of military space policy.
After C hapter Eleven, which provides the concluding analysis of the making 
of policy, there follow a  Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms, Appendices 
detailing minor CNES subsidiaries not examined in the main body of the thesis 
and CNES Statute docum ents. T hese statute docum ents bring together all the 
laws, decrees and government regulations which have governed and currently do 
govern the space  agency’s activities. The final com ponent of the thesis is the 
Bibliography.
We will now move on to examine previous literature on French sp ace  activities 
and other related topics in the Literature Review.
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Notes to Chapter 1.
2
LTLsnace- un d6fi pour la France. Actes du Colloque, Association des anciens 61£ves de l’ENA, Paris, 
1986, pp. 10-20. CNES also undertook a study of public awareness of the space programme in 1979- 
80 which was less enthusiastic about space, this difference prompted a remark at the ENA conference 
that CNES had 'bienfait sa propagande' (Andr6 Lebeau, in UEspace: un D6fi p o u t  la France, p.72.).
Ireq, L’image des activites spatiales aumts du grand public (Ireq. Charenton, July 1990).
3 Estimez-vous qu'en France, I’Etat remplit bien ou mal son role en matiire d'activitis
spatiales ?
Tres bien 73%
Plutot bien 12% 85%
Plutot mal 10%
Tris mal 3% 15%
Sans reponse 2%
Total 100% 100%
Adapted from Ireq, L’image des activity spatiales aupits du grand public (Ireq.Charenton. July 
1990).
4 For example Ernest Renan's La R6forme intellectuelle et morale, published in 1871 after France's 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian war and the events of the Commune, and also Claude Digeou’s, Lacrise 
allemande de la pens6e frangaise.
5 The Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) was created in 1945 as a training institution few the elite 
of a modernised technocratic civil service.
6 'Le defi amiricain was a term coined in the 1960s by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber to describe the 
challenge posed to France by US technological superiority. See Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques, Le 
d6fi amfticain. Denoftl, 1967.
7 ESPRIT, RACE, FAST, COST, COMETT etc.
8 The expression 'une certaine idee' comes from General de Gaulle: 'Toute ma vie je me suis fait une 
certaine idee de la France... Le sentiment me Tinspire aussi bien que la raison', M6moires de Guerre: 
1' Appel 1940-1942. Plon, 1954.
9 Challenger Shuttle disaster, 28 January 1986. Thus during the mid-1980s, the French space industry 
received two stimuli to development: SDI in the military sector, and increased demand for Ariane 
launches in the civil sector.
10 In terms of ’Grandeur’, although the break up of the Soviet Union and the consequent weakening of 
the Soviet space effort has promoted the French national space programme to the status of second 
only to that of the USA, the reunification of Germany has created financial problems few the European 
Space Agency's collaborative ventures. The cost of reunification to be borne by Bonn has provoked 
reluctance from Germany to continue past levels of funding for ESA programmes such as Ariane V, 
Herm&s and Colombus, and France's strong industrial stake in the development of these systems has 
been threatened with loss or spiralling costs for France.
11 In the case of Ariane, the US error was the 'all shuttle' decision, which even without the grounding of 
the shuttle post-Challenger disaster led to over-costly launches for satellites and enabled the French 
(and Europeans) to exploit this niche in the space sector.
12 More latterly, with the development of an space effort independent of US licensing, Japan has also 
started to become a competitor.
13 Only in certain specific activities, such as Ariane, do France and Europe purport to 'compete' in space 
with the U.S., either in terms of technical achievements or in terms of services provided.
14 The French desire in the 1960s to apparently 'go it alone' in the nuclear and space sectors was a 
function both of de Gaulle's distrust of the Americans and of the fear of a 'technology gap' between
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Europe and the U.S.. The readiness of the French state to undertake such an individualistic policy of 
national technological advance was based on the confidence, shared throughout government, science 
and technology, that French technocracy was capable of taking up the challenge posed by America's 
progress in the space race. The special relationship between the French state and technocratic science 
has been chronicled in Gilpin's classic analysis of French science and technology in the 1960s,
(Gilpin, Robert, France in the Age of the Scientific state. Princeton, Princeton UP., 1968. This 
special relationship was based in part on the French desire to react to the strategic and technological 
gap they perceived between them and the U.S. (Recent research suggests that the French may after 
all have had help from the U.S.)
15 McDougall, Walter A., The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. (Basic 
Books, New York, 1985), p.429.
16 in the 1990s France may find herself providing the basis for the spatial defence of Europe, just as the 
U.S. guaranteed the strategic nuclear defence of the West during the Cold War, with the difference 
that France will be able to call on technical and monetary assistance from European partners.
17 SDI could be seen in this context as the first attempt by the US to involve other countries in the costs 
of their own nuclear/spatial defence.
18 See Aubini&re, Robert, Realisations et projets de la recherche spatiale frangaise, Revue de Defense 
nationale. November 1967, pp.1736* 1750. A particularly revealing difference of opinion between the 
British and the French in the 1960s over their committment to space technology was that concerning 
the need for launcher (or missile) independence from the United States. The U.K. decision to 
abandon the Black Arrow programme (and eventually to propose Blue Streak for Europeanisation) 
announced Britain's position of relying on the U.S. for the space technology necessary for ho1 nuclear 
deterrent The French however, whose position was determined by the absence of a natural special 
relationship with the Americans and by the unnatural animosity created by de Gaulle's views on 
American hegemony, were obliged to go it more or less alone in the nuclear sector, although recent 
research suggests that the Americans actually helped the French nuclear programme in the 1970s 
(Richard Ullman of Princeton) and to cooperate with the U.S. in space only on satellites, preferring to 
develop an autonomous launcher programme.
19 Fa- a treatment of the notion of the grand programme, see P. Cohendet and A. Lebeau, Choix 
technologiques et grands programmes civils (CPE/Economica, 1987).
20 Kolodziej, E. A., Making and Marketing Arms. Princeton, 1987.
21 Ellul, J., Le Bluff technologique. Hachette, 1988.
22 Lebeau, A., Vers l'expansion de la technique dans le syst&me solaire ?, Le Monde Diplomatique. 
(January 1987), pp.8-9.
23 Interview, Office parlementaire administrator (21 April 1992). See also Chesnais, Francois, (ed), 
Comn6titivitg intemationale et d6penses militaires. CPE/Economica, 1990 for criticisms of die 
unwieldy nature of French National accounting statistics, and McLean, Alasdair, Western European 
Military Snace nolicv. Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1992, p.6. (A rather thin treatment of French military 
space), and Comite national d' evaluation de la recherche, (CNER), Evaluation du programe spatial 
frangiis-(i992).
24 Since 1989 known as Sciences et technologies.
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Section I LITERATURE, HISTORY AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
In the first major section of the thesis we review the literature (Ch. 2.), the history 
(Ch.3.), and the economic background (Ch.4.) to French space.
2. Literature review
This thesis seeks to fill a gap in the literature dealing with French technology and 
government in recent decades. The gap is created both by the scarcity of French 
academ ic studies of the French space effort and by the rarity of works aiming to 
explain the making of French space policy to the wider French or British public. 
The analysis of French space policy that we set out in this thesis relies thus (at 
least initially) on an eclectic range of sources and approaches. This 
pluridisciplinarity is the result of two characteristics of the issue in question; firstly 
the wide-ranging complexity of space  policy, and secondly, the general nature of 
the literature already devoted to certain aspects  of French space activities.
The available literature can be classified in two main ways; by subject matter 
and by the nature of the publication involved. This classification is made 
necessary  by the absence of a closely defined body of literature dealing 
specifically with space policy, by the range of approaches and sectors in question, 
and by the rapidity with which developm ents can occur.1
The them es and concepts that the thesis explores have been presented in the 
Introduction. As individual fields of enquiry they form the main body of the 
literature review. This chapter will thus deal with the five fields of study w hose 
analyses have to be drawn together and applied to the wider issues raised by an 
investigation of the making of French space policy. T hese fields of study and the 
plan of the chapter are thus the following :
- 2.1. The symbolic nature of politics and the concept of ‘Grandeur’
- 2.2. The state and public policy in France, and technocracy
- 2.3. Industrial policy in France and modernisation.
- 2.4. The organisation of French science and technology
- 2.5. General analysis of French space activities and ‘oversight reports’
- 2.6. Conclusion
These ‘fields of study’ will be discussed in the order in which they appear above. 
This order reflects a  movement from the most general background to the making 
of space policy (symbolic politics and grandeur), through theories of the French 
state and its organisation of industry, science and technology, to the most specific 
analyses of French space activities.
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2.1. The sym bolic nature of politics and the concep t of ‘G randeur’
The ambition of this review of literature on symbolic politics and grandeur is to 
show the variety of ‘prestige factors’ which create the general background to the 
development of high technology activities such a s  the nuclear industry and the 
space effort. It is against this backdrop that French space  policy is made.
2.1.1. The symbolic nature of politics
Standing behind much of the literature on G randeur is the notion of the symbolic 
use of politics, to use the title of Murray Edelman's 1946 work on this subject.2 
An initial quote from Edelman can go a  long way to showing the essen ce  of the 
concept and its relevance as  a  background to our concerns: 'Political forms thus 
come to symbolise what large m asses of men need to believe about the state to 
reassure them selves. It is the needs, the hopes, and the anxieties of men that 
determine the meanings. But political forms also convey goods, services and 
power to specific groups of men. There is accordingly no reason to expect that 
the m eanings will be limited to the instrumental functions the political forms 
serve.'3 As Edelman goes on to stress, his book is about the capacity of political 
forms to serve a s  'm eans of expression' for 'm ass publics' and the ways in which 
they accord benefits to particular groups. For Edelman, the conventional study of 
politics looks at how people get what they want through their relations with 
government, w hereas his analysis 'concentrates on the m echanism s through 
which politics influences what they want, what they fear, what they regard as  
possible, and even who they are '.4 There is no implication, at least in the early 
s tages of Edelman's analysis, that elites manipulate political myths and rituals to 
serve their own purposes, but as the argum ents are developed it becom es evident 
that there is an (at the least) ambiguous relationship between a reas  of political 
myth and groups related to those areas. Thus 'Administrative agencies are to be 
understood a s  economic and political instruments of the parties they regulate and 
benefit, not of a  reified "society", "general will", or "public interest". At the sam e 
time a s  they perform this instrumental function, they perform an equally important 
expresssive function for the polity as  a  whole: to create and sustain an impression 
that induces acquiescence of the public in the face of private tactics that might 
otherwise be expected to produce resentment, protest and resistance.'5 Such an 
idea may well be applicable to the activities of the French national space agency.
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We will now move on to look at three well-known approaches to the concept of 
Grandeur which go som e way to linking it with som e of the concerns relevant to 
our enquiry into the making of French space policy. These three treatm ents of 
G randeur deal with its relationship with international policy, security, and the 
internal and external ideological effects of a  foreign policy based  on Grandeur. In 
order of publication they are: Edward A. Kolodziej's French International policy 
under de Gaulle and Pompidou: the politics of G randeur. (1974)6; Philip G. 
Cerny's The Politics of Grandeur. Ideological aspects  of de Gaulle’s  foreign 
policy.7 (1980); and Michel L. Martin's 1981 Warriors to M anagers: the French 
Military Establishment since 1945 8
We will look at Kolodziej first, then Martin, and finally Cerny.
2.1.2. Grandeur and Technology - France as a Middle-range Power ?
Kolodziej looks at what he calls French 'global policy'9 during the period 1958- 
1974, a  policy aiming to change patterns of alignment and power relationships 
between states. Global policy is presented a s  a  broadly based  activity combining 
strategic, economic and diplomatic policy areas. Kolodziej s e e s  a  complicated 
two-way relationship between these specific, concrete policies and 'larger' global 
aims. Thus France's global policy is 'a  m eans of achieving its narrower national 
foreign policy goals',10 just as the global aims are an object of French foreign 
policy. An interrelationship that is not analysed in any depth is that betw een 
domestic and foreign policy, except to the extent that in the study 'relevant 
domestic constraints on policy are noted'.11 The study is placed firmly on the 
level of national, intergovernmental relations, rather than spreading into the 
ramifications of personal, group, or corporative connections. Such relationships 
are perhaps increasingly characteristic of space  cooperation between the various 
space agencies of the European countries and between space and electronics 
firms both within, and increasingly outside, industrial consortia.
It is in the treatm ent of technology and GrandeurXhat Kolodziej's analysis 
impinges most directly on our concerns. One of his conclusions, that 'French 
efforts on behalf of a multipolar international system  largely did not produce the 
results expected by the Gaullists of increasing France's influence, status or 
independence vis-a-vis the superpowers, its European partners, or Third World 
s ta tes’12 is justified by France's limited resources and the constraints posed by 
other countries. The lack of success  which France experienced in freeing its 
foreign policy from 'exterior control' is symptomatic of the 'narrow limits within
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which a  middle-range power must work to shape its relations with the 
superpowers'. This argument echoes our belief that a s  a  background to the 
domestic workings of space policy, the technological ambitions and international 
cooperation of the French space programme represent in som e ways an attempt 
to escape constraints of limited resources and the rank of a  middle-range power.
Much of Kolodziej's brief treatment of technology relies on Robert Gilpin's 
France in the age of the scientific s ta te , published in 1968, whose contribution to 
our enquiry will be evaluated later.13 Although he notes that the French Force de 
Frappe w as a  strategic response to a  perceived security problem justified by 'an 
elaborate rationale . . .  built on military, diplomatic, psychological, economic, 
technological and scientific grounds'14 Kolodziej d o es  not really develop the 
scientific and technological aspects of Grandeur beyond brief expositions of 
French attitudes towards Euratom and towards possible collaboration with the UK 
and USSR, and the field of technology is left open to the further research called 
for in the preface. However, despite these omissions, Kolodziej's demonstration 
of France’s attitudes towards nuclear technology and grandeur suggests that 
space activities may well be considered to be of similar nature in term s of their 
military, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological and scientific 
motivations, and is thus of interest to us in providing an elem ent of background to 
the national m echanism s of policy.
Grandeur and modernised security.
Moving on to Michel Martin's Warriors to M anagers, w hose first chapter is devoted 
to the consideration of Grandeur and security, we find an analysis somewhat 
different to that of Kolodziej, at least in term s of the scope of its aims. Unlike 
Kolodziej, Martin does not seek  to present a  study of French international policy in 
term s of sources and goals. Rather, in its treatm ent of foreign policy Warriors to 
M anagers hopes to 'define the guiding principles, the underlying philosophy...of 
French external policies in order to suggest the kind of environment in which the 
roles and tasks of the military establishment were specified'.15 Taken as  a  whole, 
Martin's work is a  study of the French military establishm ent a s  an organisation 
being transformed by the technological modernisation of its forces.
Martin's conclusion to his sociological exploration of the changing nature of the 
French armed forces is that change was m onocausal - technological 
modernisation - but that a  'dualistic technological environment'16 explains 
variations in the changes wrought in the different arm ed services. The 
environment of intensive technological change w as created in the early 1960s by
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the two upheavals of colonial disengagem ent and the decision to assum e a  
strategy of nuclear defence. These two changes marked what we might term a 
shift in the locus of Grandeur. As Martin puts it; 'a s  the curtain was drawn over 
colonial domination, it becam e clear that the country's grandeur had to be 
nourished from other sources.'.17 These other sources were independence and 
military might. Martin argues that by guaranteeing an independent national 
defence the Force Nucleaire Strategique (FNS) w as a  m eans by which the Fifth 
Republic attained the twin goals of prestige and security.
Martin's analysis thus looks at the effects of the technological modernisation of 
the arm ed forces on the structure and organisation of the forces them selves as 
well a s  situating this modernisation within the context of wider concerns of 
Grandeur, security and economic development. Although constantly alluded to 
as  a  motor of organisational change, technology is never explicitly illustrated 
beyond the example of the nuclear deterrent force. In fact, since the 'deterrence 
logic'18 is equated with the technological exposure of the arm ed forces this would 
appear to be Martin's "technology". Given the importance of this technology as  
an effective instrument in the achievement of the concerns of the French state it is 
a  pity that its exact nature and effects are not m ade clearer.
Martin’s analysis is of particular interest to the concerns of this thesis since 
the later 1980s and early 1990s have arguably w itnessed a  considerable move on 
the part of the French armed forces to modernise their structures, equipment and 
thinking, initially under the stimulus of SDI and subsequently a s  a  result of the 
catalysing effect of the Gulf War. -  A principal feature of this modernisation has 
been the development of the space-related aspects  of French defence, to such an 
extent that space  has seem ed to be becoming a  new military ‘fetish’.
The domestic purposes of Grandeur.
It is for the links that it establishes between foreign and dom estic policy and 
G randeur that Cerny's The Politics of G randeur is of special interest to us. If 
Martin works within a  framework where potentially antagonistic objectives can be 
reconciled in special circumstances, Cerny's analysis show s how the definition of 
one objective in special terms can facilitate the achievem ent of the others. Cerny 
shows how the pursuit of Grandeur was a  function of an ultimately domestic 
purpose.19
Cerny points out that, in general, 'political institutionalisation and economic 
development' have been taken together a s  a  reified process of 'Modernisation',20 
but that notwithstanding different historical and socio-economic contexts, the
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objective of 'authority legitimation' is indispensable for the kind of national 
integration de Gaulle w as seeking to achieve. Foreign policy is the 'specific 
instrument par excellence'21 used by elites for this purpose. This is because of 
the nature of foreign policy affairs: to be involved in them m eans that one must be 
a nation-state; foreign policy is nebulous and remote and can only be evaluated 
with difficulty by the individual; and foreign policy issues 'transcend the 
complexities of the relationship between the individual and the state '. Thus 
foreign policy can play this ideological role because 'in addition to its rem oteness 
and its symbolic potency... it appears to escap e  the zero-sum  perceptual 
framework of the allocation-of-resources problem which dom inates dom estic 
politics.'.22
In the conclusions of his 'framework for analysis', Cerny se ts  out the context of 
de Gaulle's pursuit of Grandeur: 'In a  world where opposition no longer takes the 
form of a  clearly defined conflict situation, but rather operates, a s  it were, 
according to a  complex matrix of forces, foreign policy leadership becom es a  key 
locus for symbolically charting a course through th ese  forces - or at least, in the 
symbolic sen se , for being seen to be courageously and independently attempting 
to chart such a  course.'.23 The way in which France w as involved in the 
institutional aspects  of this matrix of forces constrained Gaullist moves to maintain 
strategic and economic independence to limited symbolic areas. At the sam e 
time, France's ability to work within the system  constraining her independent 
action - the FNS in the context of bi-polar strategic balance for exam ple - 
increased the symbolism of Gaullist policies.
Cerny's analysis of the politics of Grandeur is based  on the Atlantic Question, 
which, a s  he points out is a  case  study rather than a  wider study of all the arenas 
of French foreign policy activity. Other potential ca se  studies suggested  by Cerny 
are; monetary relations between France and the USA; the German problem; the 
recognition of China; and French attitudes towards the UN. The Atlantic question 
is an issue-area which combines different elem ents of the Grand Design, a s  is 
made clear by the introduction of the 'specific policy area ' of science policy a s  an 
example of possible contradiction between policy goals. The exam ple Cerny 
gives is taken from Gilpin's France in the Age of the Scientific State, illustrating 
how France engages in cooperative science projects a s  supplem ents to her 
national programmes, for instance in the space sector. These contradictions and 
paradoxes do not ultimately endanger the Grand Design since the overall dynamic 
of the pursuit of G randeur is seen to be coherent. Nonetheless, our study of the 
complexities of the making of space policy within France seem s to fit well a s  a
30
contemporary 'specific policy a rea1 against the background of Grand-Design 
issues.
The explicit treatment of the issue of science and technology in The Politics of 
Grandeur is limited to a  short section devoted to a  discussion of w eapons and 
technology in the context of Franco-American relations. Here again, as  in 
Kolodziej, considerable reference is m ade to Gilpin. France's ambition, created 
by a  desire to possess independent nuclear forces and US refusals to help with 
technology w as to achieve independence in nuclear technology and related 
defence capabilities but also in government-supported scientific research in 
general.24 For Cerny, 'The symbolic significance of the FNS ... goes well beyond 
its impact on science, technology or even defence per se. It also symbolises a 
new authority structure'.25 More generally, the 'military and space  program m es'26 
had a  symbolic (Gilpin s tresses  psychological) effect on French society and its 
modernisation. Social, economic and institutional effects facilitated France's 
m etam orphosis into an advanced industrial society. Taking Cerny’s analysis of 
nuclear technology as  a  background to the present sta te  of interaction between 
French government and technology, we would argue now that the French space 
programme in the 1980s w as torn between an 'heroic', 'symbolic', 'Grandeur- 
orientated' role in French society inherited from the 1960s and (to a  lesser extent) 
from the 1970s, and a  new 'mature' phase in its development based  on realistic 
a ssessm en ts  of its military, technological and economic utility to the nation.
Making and Marketing Arms.
Edward A. Kolodziej's 1986 contribution to the analysis of the ideological functions 
of the arm s industry in the Fifth Republic is of considerable interest here. His 
Making and Marketing Arms, the French experience and its implications for the 
International system 27 follows on in many ways from his earlier 1970s study of the 
French approach to Grandeur, but by focusing on a  specific sector of industrial 
and commercial activity he concentrates his analysis on the relationships between 
these  activities and the 'ideology' lying behind French government actions. Thus 
he exam ines the links between the arms sector, national independence, military 
autonomy and the em ergence of a  new world order in the Fourth and Fifth 
Republics. He d iscusses the nexus of influences linking 'Arms' and the Welfare 
State, and 'Arms' and the state itself, and investigates the effects of the politics of 
arms transfers on the 'arms oligarchy' and democratic norms. Kolodziej 
approaches the issue of arms production and arm s sa les since 1945 within a  twin
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perspective framework. The first of these  perspectives is the effect of a  strong 
arm s sector on the place of France within the International system , and the second 
concerns the influence of successful arms production and exports on the very 
political institutions of the Fifth Republic.
Within the context of making and marketing arm s as  a  tool of French 
systemic designs on establishing France's position internationally a s  more than 
just another medium-sized power, Kolodziej's argum ent is that France's role as  a 
major arm s supplier 'has contributed to multipolarity, giving it [France] legitimacy 
and voice in a  Gaullic idiom'.28 Especially in the Fifth Republic's experience, 
France's inability to encourage the decentralising, multipolar trends of international 
relations has created a  situation where 'the transfer of arm s and military 
technology is still the preferred instrument of French international policy'29. This is 
fundamentally because 'It accords well with an autonom ous military strategy...and 
it is consistent with welfare goals and efforts to bolster France's economic 
position'.30
In term s of the political legitimation of the government of the Fifth Republic, 
Kolodziej sta tes that 'The stability of France's governing institutions and the very 
legitimacy of the French Fifth Republic have been progressively linked since 1958 
to the success  of French arm s and arms sales'.31 This legitimation of the political 
structures of contemporary France is closely linked with the modernising role of 
the arm s high-technology sector on France's industry and society. ‘Making and 
marketing arm s' combines a  variety of both domestic and external government 
objectives, a s  Kolodziej implies; T h e  political support and legitimacy of the Fifth 
Republic also partially depends on the ability of a  new leadership class to maintain 
a  com petent arm s industry capable of simultaneously servicing France's welfare, 
security and foreign policy goals and of motoring the modernisation and the reform 
of French socie ty '32
Setting aside any wider moral considerations, such a  situation is however, 
not without its disadvantages, despite the efficiency with which the production and 
sale of arm s contributes to the overall welfare of French society. Kolodziej 
identifies the domestic dangers of entrenched elites and of businesss and 
bureaucratic interests in the arms industry, whose essentially private, corporatist 
concerns have to be reconciled with the objectives of the sta te  for itself and for 
France. Similarly, on the external level, the model of behaviour presented by the 
French experience of arm s is in fact creating the conditions for an undermining of 
the independence and autonomy of action that arm s transfers have traditionally 
aimed at achieving. This is because in the short-term France's security interests 
becom e functions of world markets in arms technology, and in the long-term, the
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imitation by developing countries of France's example of exploiting the arms 
industry and arm s sales undermines both the markets and the strategic balance of 
the multipolar international system  fashioned by France to her advantage. 
Kolodziej's conclusion is thus that the su ccess  of making and marketing arms 
carries within it the seed s of its own failure a s  an enduring aim and instrument of 
French policy.
The symbolic nature of much of the politics of high-tech sectors is a  well 
recognised element in much consideration of the relationship between the French 
state and science and industry. The surprisingly restricted am ount of study 
devoted to the space sector, (although explained by the traditional interest of 
com m entators in the French nuclear adventure, both military and civil), has 
becom e increasingly aberrant in the 1980s a s  state funding for the civil space and 
nuclear sectors (for example) gradually converged. Kolodziej’s  Making and 
Marketing Arms is interesting for our study of space in the way that it establishes 
links between the activities of a  high-tech sector and problems of governance, and 
how strategies may contain the potential for ‘dysfunctioning’, thereby creating new 
tensions and difficulties.
As intimated above, symbolic politics and grandeur form a  large part of the 
background to the French space effort in the way they account for many of the 
original and som etim es enduring motivations of France’s  interest in space. 
Edelm an’s approach suggests how national prowess in space  could provide 
‘belief’ in France for a  m ass public, and also how agency interests might diverge 
from the initial objectives set by government. Kolodziej, Martin and Cemy show 
how France has used the nuclear modernisation of her arm ed forces and her arms 
industry a s  instruments of influence and prestige in the international context, but 
also how they provide domestic political returns. Kolodziej’s  later study also hints 
that such strategies may also contain potential political drawbacks for the state, for 
instance through problems with entrenched elites.
We will next examine more closely the literature dealing with som e features of the 
nature and role of the French state which can inform an analysis of a  national 
interest in space  activities.
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2.2. The state and public policy in France, and technocracy
It is useful to set the background to analysis of space sector activities in France - 
activities in which the French state is heavily involved in term s of policy making 
and industry - by discussing the nature of the French state, and, briefly, how it 
may be thought to differ from other models of government and society. We will 
then move on to consider the relevance of concepts of ‘technocracy’ to the study 
of space policy.
2.2.1. Dyson's theory of the state
The standard treatment of the modern W estern state is that given by Kenneth 
Dyson in his The State Tradition in W estern Europe (1980). The analysis of the 
French state that Dyson gives s tresses  various features which combine naturally 
to form the background to French attitudes towards the m anagem ent of the 
modernising process in industry and society.33
For Dyson, France is an example of a  'state society' (rather than a  'market 
society') characteristic of which are a  'public and problematic role of the 
intelligentsia' and a  tendency to suffer from social stalem ate (stalem ate society) 
because of the inefficiency of the bureaucratic state. Dyson d iscusses briefly the 
Hoffmann/Crozier thesis34 of France a s  a  stalem ate society, in which T h e  French 
state is viewed as  combining technocratic arrogance in certain elite corps with a  
pervasive bureaucratic inefficiency' and where the system  is paralysed over long 
periods of time until charismatic leaders effect overdue reforms. Although he 
finds this analysis somewhat exaggerated, Dyson accepts that it sh ed s  light on the 
French 'administrative model of action' which (in contrast to Anglo-Saxon 
practices) tends to bring about change in society through 'a regulatory 
interventionist administraton, which claims a  monopoly of rationality, with periodic 
crisis'.
It could be argued that the periodic crisis of such a  'regulatory 
interventionist administration' occurs at different levels at different tim es - thus the 
societe bloquee of the 1960s saw its crisis in the upheavals of Mai 68, and the 
blockages of the Post and Telecommunications sector cam e to crisis and reform in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Likewise, it is possible for us to se e  the crisis in 
confidence of government in the space sector of the sam e period a s  an example 
of blockages which the state  has been attempting to resolve by the institution of 
commissions of inquiry and the implementation of reforms.
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The action of the state (or how it intervenes in society) is considered by 
Dyson as  part of a  discussion of the state as  a  Tool of Analysis', in which the 
'generalising', 'integrating' and 'legitimating' functions of the state are evaluated. 
Dyson s tresses  the 'existence in France of a  philosophy of the state a s  an 
integrative conception' which through institutions such a s  the Ecole Nationale 
d'Administration and the French Planning Commission 'attempt to proselytise 
"modernising" values a s  part of a  conception of coherent, purposive sta te  action’. 
Indeed, 'France represents a  case  of institutional concentration; the bureacracy is 
the repository of the state tradition'.35 Further still, because  of this importance of 
the bureaucracy, 'the state tradition has been associated  with the idea of a  zone of 
authority independent of the Assembly and the parties and interest groups'.36 
Although such patterns date back both to Colbert and to the Revolution, it is since 
1958 that the trend has becom e particularly striking. During the early years of the 
Fifth Republic, de Gaulle launched a  number of the long-term grands programmes 
of scientific-technological-industrial development, (such a s  nuclear arm s and 
power and space), which were fostered and directed by state agencies such as  the 
CEA (nuclear) and CNES (space). During the Fifth Republic, governm ent (initially 
under the stimulus of de Gaulle) has encouraged the implementation of policy 
through the administration via the gradual replacem ent of the 'Republique des 
Deputes' (and an 'Etat conflictuet') by an 'Etat gestionnaire' and 'fonctionner run 
by the public bureaucracy. Writing from the standpoint of 1980 and persisting 
divisions between different groups of technocrats, Dyson w as relatively sceptical 
about the extent to which this new 'Republique des fonctionnaires' has led to 
greater cohesion of policy, although he concedes that 'a  capacity for public 
leadership and initiative exists within the French bureaucracy, a  capacity to 
formulate and sustain a  policy through to implementation'. However, a s  he 
immediately points out, failed policies like that of the Plan Calcul are also the fruit 
of the sam e technocratic bureaucracy.
The capacity to formulate and sustain policy through to implementation 
obviously implies public sector structures, whether structures which failed to 
maintain the French computer industry in the 1960s, which created the nuclear 
deterrent and nuclear power in the 1960s and 1970s, or which launched and still 
direct the space  industry. As a  state society, France is much interested in the 
different natures and legal characters of these structures or institutions, which form 
part of the state. The main division between institutions is whether they represent 
the 'police power* or the 'sen/ice public' element of the state 's  activities. Refering 
to Rolland's discussion of the organisation of t h e 'service public!, Dyson mentions 
the two main forms of direct provision; either en regie, or through an etablissment
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public.37 Provision en regie, is, a s  Dyson expains it, provision by a  part of the 
general services of the state, but with separate financial accounts, w hereas 
etablissements publics are 'detached branches of the general services of the 
state ' possessing separate legal personality and financial autonomy.38 Dyson 
s tresses  that in France, the activities of the public sector in general and  of 
etablissements publics in particular are considered in relation to 'an idea of the 
inherent functions of the state and a  body of public law relating to the state and its 
organs'. The French national space  agency is an example of an etablissement 
public.
Despite the traditional intervention in industry by the French state, and the 
close linkage between the idea of the state, extensive public sector industry and 
the concept of 'public service' activity, Dyson also warns that 'doubts have 
em erged about the capacity of the centralised sta te  apparatus to handle the 
problems of a  an increasingly complex industrialised society that has been 
subjected to new competitive pressures from the international market'.39
Our interest in this part of Dyson's theory is that it is this capacity of the 
state in its various European forms to cope with contemporary developm ents in 
high technology industry and the international economy that seem s currently in 
question in such sectors a s  telecommunications, aerospace, defence and 
computers. The evolution of the sectors (threatened by competition from Japan  
and by recession) in term s of their internal dynamics and characteristics and the 
changing international context tends to lead to conflicts of interest betw een 
different sectoral actors and the state.
The French national space agency is just one such example of an 
etablissement public a caractere industriel et commercial which in term s of its 
statu tes and the spirit of public law and 'public service' which informed its creation 
should be a  model of indirect provision to society. However, in the framework 
drawn up by Dyson and the idea that the early Fifth Republic entrusted 
program m es to state bodies acting in tandem  with corporatist interests, it is 
possible to see  that the make-up of CNES as  a  corporatist body of engineers and 
‘scientist administrators’ nowadays produces conflicts between sta te  and corporate 
interests, and between state and sectoral m anager (CNES), because  the sectoral 
m anager may have been ‘captured’ by sectoral interests and interests of state and 
industry are no longer compatible.
In a  sen se , the analysis of theories of the state (and the patterns of 
government intervention that they reflect) given in The State Tradition forms the 
theoretical background to the more practically oriented analyses of European 
communications policy that Dyson and Peter Humphreys have m ade and edited in
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the 1980s.40 In particular, Dyson's opening chapter on 'W est European S tates 
and the Communications Revolution' in The Politics of the Communications 
Revolution (1986) is useful for the light it sheds both on the confusion of 
government responses to changes in telecommunications and on the confusion of 
analyses of the s e c to r :
the responses of West European governments to the communications 
revolution seem to display little consistency at the level of either ideology or 
policy, for instance towards deregulation or European collaboration. At the 
same time, behind the articulation of rhetoric and doctrine - the displays of 
symbolic politics that often serve to disguise a sense of political unease - a 
common and less heroic process of relearning the arts of statecraft is underway. 
Communications policies, and the theories underlying them, are not being 
analysed and assessed in their own right as technical issues by government. 
They are being accepted or rejected or changed as instruments of a 
fundamental political strategy - to regain a governing competence and to 
maintain ideological and governmental credibility.41
Dyson exam ines three competing theses about the evolution of communications 
policies; the first is that changing national policies reflect the change and 
developm ent of international markets, the second that they reflect the interaction of 
governmental political ideology and domestic policy sectors, and the third that they 
represent a  changing relationship between the law and politics in W estern Europe.
Not unsurprisingly perhaps, a  mix of these  different th eses  on the evolution 
of policy em erges as the most satisfactory general explanatory perspective, with 
the proviso that the 'main bias' o tgovernm ent policy is nevertheless isolated.
The 'main bias' that Dyson identifies is 'governments' problems of policy 
implementation as  they find them selves caught between new external forces and 
more turbulent domestic politics in communications . . .  governm ent's search  to re­
establish a  governing com petence along with maintaining its ideological credibility. 
Government is motivated by threats to the autonomy of state action and 
consequently its ability to act effectively'.42
The analytic tool that best reveals the 'main bias' of governm ent action is 
the study of the policy process, or the second of the competing theses. For 
Dyson, the policy process approach allows an appreciation of what he term s 
'statecraft', and draws attention to the role of ideology and issues of identity in 
policy; 'The perspective of statecraft helps us to isolate the specifically political 
rationale behind policy choices'.43 In the study of the communications sector, 'the 
specifically political rationale' encom passes such features as  the use of 
deregulation to deal with 'overmighty subjects' or 'failed national cham pions', and 
can explain cross-national collaboration and domestic pooling of efforts a s  a
37
m eans of countering 'the enemy from without' (in other words US technological, 
economic and cultural hegemony).
In the communications revolution, Dyson s e e s  stages of policy described by 
him as  'From heroism to brokerage'. 'Heroism' consists of state enthusiasm  for 
the introduction of the new communications technologies and the encouragm ent of 
policies and industry to obtain this. The later s tage of 'brokerage' reflects the 
eventual need for government to trade off different interests against one another 
and to reassert its own inflence over competing sources of authority such as  
national champions. Symbolic politics and legitimation strategies can be seen  as 
a  supplem entary weapon for the state in its action to m anage the developm ent of 
the sector, and a  m eans of compensating for the loss of credibility entailed in the 
setting up of new commissions of inquiry or new regulatory bodies.
The concept of statecraft is useful in our consideration of the action of the 
French state in the space sector. Although less important in commercial terms 
than the communication sector and its various actors, the space  industry, CNES, 
the DGA and the various other organisations involved in the space  sector 
represent a  non-negligeable aspect of technology and industry for governm ents 
concerned with national competitivity, prestige and budgetary rigour. The 
m echanism s of ministerial direction, tutelle, and inspection arguably display 
features of the transition from 'heroic policy' to brokerage politics identified by 
Dyson in the communications sector, and this is an issue which will be discussed 
later in the thesis .
2.2.2 Technocracy and space
'Technocracy and space ' is essentially the bottom line of W alter A. McDougall's 
studies of what he term s the 'Political history' of the 'Space age'. The major 
exposition of these  ideas was given in The H eavens and the Earth: A Political 
History of the Space Age , published in 1985. During the preparation of this 
longer study, McDougall addressed two particular aspects  of the politics of space 
technology in two articles appearing in 1982 and 1985 respectively. These 
articles reflect them es developed in The H eavens and the Earth and are worthy of 
brief presentation.
In the first of these articles, 'Technocracy and Statecraft in the Space Age - 
Toward the History of a  Saltation', McDougall introduces the idea that the advent 
of Sputnik and the consequent development of the S pace age operated a  change 
in the relationship between states and technology. 44 The 'saltation' referred to in 
the article's title describes the 'abrupt discontinuity' within the gradually increasing
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importance of science and technology for governm ents which 'transformed 
governm ents into self-conscious promoters, not just of technological change but of 
perpetual technological revolution'. 45 In describing the literature on the impact of 
space technology on International politics, the political role of science and 
scientists, the relationship of the state to technological change and political culture 
and values in nations of high technology (or what he defines a s  'the loci of 
revolutionary change in the space age'), McDougall concludes that the 
contradictory claims of those who denigrate space  activities and those who claim 
they have effected a  transformation of state-science relations need both to be 
m oderated. 46
Central to the analysis is the notion of 'technocracy', which is defined as  'the 
institutionalisation of technology for state purposes, involving the organisation and 
funding by the state of a  national infrastructure for the acceleration of technological 
change on the assumption that its own foreign and dom estic goals will be served 
by the products of such change'.47 Technocracy w as the theory and the m eans 
by which the state was supposed to lead scientific and technological development 
in the S pace age, and apparent American su ccess  in so doing led other countries 
not directly involved in the Cold War and the Space Race into starting their own 
space program m es. Justifications for this emulation of the U.S. involved strategic 
considerations (for example the French desire for independent deterrence), but Me 
Dougall s tre sse s  that 'the univeral impulse to involvement in space w as 
economic'.48 The massive state committment to the promotion of science and 
technology was, for McDougall, the cause of a  change in the nature of the state - 
or a s  he puts it: 'if complex new technologies are sponsored by the state  itself, 
then the state, whatever its ideology, becom es "revolutionary".'.
Such a  change in the nature of the sta te  leads regimes to try to "socialise" 
'new system s' in ways which strengthen their own position. At this point in his 
argument, McDougall evokes Gilpin's use of the example of de Gaulle's ambitions 
to regain France's grandeur through technology, 'without ceasing to be France' A9 
This example is used to suggest that Gaullist technocracy w as used a s  an 
instrument of domestic politics, enticing the French into legitimating the Fifth 
Republic by a  "captivating vision" of France in the year 2000. The idea that 
technocracy is a  tool of internal politics also leads McDougall to ask  whether it 
reveals 'the em ergence of a  "revolutionary centrism" offering technological, not 
ideological or social, change to play midwife to a  future a s  secure and bountiful, 
but less threatening, than that offered by either a  socialist Left or a  laissez faire 
Right.'.50
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In considering the failure of this technocratic promise, Technocracy and 
Statecraft' recognises the real difficulty of measuring the effects of space  age 
technology, and the divisions of opinion between those who saw  the space  race as  
'ceremonial waste', and those who maintain that sp ace  technologies can have high 
benefit-to-cost ratios. McDougall believes that what he term s 'the journalistic 
debate on fall-out from the space program', (or w as the non-stick pan really worth 
it ?) has diverted attention from the real impact of the space  effort, namely 'The 
role of space research a s  the intellectual, institutional, or financial progenitor of 
revolutionary developm ents in micro-miniaturisation, computers, optics, materials 
processing, robotics, lasers, solar power cells, and more . . .  The advent of the 
technological fix, streamlined large system s-m anagem ent techniques, compromise 
of values embodied in once autonom ous social institutions, the dom inance of 
government by political and social engineering . .  .'51 In the current context of 
'perpetual and rapid progress', McDougall asserts  that all s ta tes  have becom e 
"backward" on a  permanent basis, and that 'leading nations justify their ever- 
accelerating pace of innovation by the need to maintain military and economic 
security' despite the fact that this progress may 'undermine the values that make a 
society worth defending in the first place'.52
Having presented relevant aspects of the literature on public policy and 
technocracy, we shall now investigate what has been written on sta te  intervention 
in industry concerning French high-tech in general and, where possible, French 
aerospace.
2.3. Industrial policy in France and modernisation
The overall debate over liberalism versus etatisme/sta\ism/dirigisme in France in 
the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s informs part of the general background to 
the m anagem ent of the space effort. The space sector cannot simply be 
explained however by considering it a s  a  simple expression of industrial policy or 
of science policy, the nature of space activities is, a s  we have already suggested, 
more complicated. The debate on whether France is dominated by statist 
intervention in the economy has tended to focus primarily on high-technology 
industry policy, arguably the single general field of public policy most similar in its 
concerns to the space sector.
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2.3.1. 'We can make the Ariane, but we can't make washing machines'
Taking the recent studies of Rand Smith, Green, Gourevitch, Cohen and Hayward, 
it can be seen  that commentators stress a  number of common features in their 
discussion of the statist/liberal divide.53 The underlying common features are 
firstly trade and economics, secondly industrial policy and technological 
dependence, and thirdly modernisation. The overlying common features that 
these analysts identify as  complicating the solution of the problems of trade, 
industry and technology are the dilemmas of elitism versus democracy, and the 
difficulty for France of attaining independence in an interdependent world 
economy.
Most com m entators identify a  gradual trend away from the strictly traditional 
interventionist French policy a  la Colbert: Rand Smith identifies a  move in the 
1980s away from classic sectoral industrial policies to what he term s 
'environmental' policies targeting firms and industry in general rather than specific 
com panies and sectors.54 Diana Green se e s  Socialist m easures to favour IT as  
an example of 'the difficulties of reconciling the instinct for dirigisme with the 
economic and political imperatives of liberalisation'.55 Gourevitch characterises 
the French approach a s  essentially ‘neo-mercantilist’, a  formulation which does 
perhaps best reflect the natural tendencies of French high-tech com panies, the 
grands corps techniques and the political estab lishm ent56
If shift away from traditional dirigisme there has been, then the move has 
been effected under two different-pressures, firstly that of conforming with the 
patterns se t in the international system, and secondly, the realisation that 
traditional planning and state-led development of sectors is 'naturally' inappropriate 
in certain high-tech sectors such as  IT. Rand Smith's study, (aptly entitled for our 
purposes 'We can make the Ariane, but we can't make washing machines'), 
concludes finally on the 'ineptness' or ill-adaptedness of the hand of the state  in 
industrial performance. Cohen highlights the confusion and bewilderment of 
Giscard/Barre policies for 'managing a  good recession' in the late 1970s, their 
avowedly liberal policies only serving to reinforce the etatist model of economic 
policy.
W here the state has been successful indeed is in sectors where the activity 
has been shielded from the market, such a s  the nuclear power programme or 
telecommunications. In these activities, at least until the recent past, the 
traditional m ethods of dirigiste intervention have retained a  degree of efficiency, 
although, a s  the example of IT provided by Diana Green shows, the 
telecommunications sector will soon no longer be protected from market forces
41
and from the rapid changes so inimical to succesful state m anagem ent. The state 
has also been able to apply liberalism as  a  prop to its dirigiste tendencies, thus for 
example the appeal to the theory of liberalism legitimates the designation of 
priority sectors in a competitive market, tacitly legitimating at the sam e time the 
sta te 's  m easures to protect the sectors in the national interest. Conversely, for 
sectors such a s  steel, liberal theory can be used to justify the implementation of 
run-down policies and the refusal of government aid.
2.3.2. ‘High-tech Colbertism’
The regular "waltz" of the pedeges (or frequent change of heads) of state owned 
com panies and the apparent abandonm ent of the so-called 'ni - ni principle' of 
neither privatisation nor nationalisation by the Rocard government served to 
remind us in the early-1990s of the importance in France of state enterprise and of 
the continuing debate over the future of the French approach to the 'economie 
mixte'. 57 Two of the major challenges facing French industry and technology are 
arguably the rigours of competition in the European Single Market and criticism of 
the place of traditional French approaches to 'industrial policy' within an integrated 
(and generally liberally inclined) European economy. Two contributions in 1991 
and 1992 to the ongoing analysis of French and European high technology by 
Cohen, de Boissiere and Warusfel illustrated differing viewpoints on the place of 
"voluntarism" in industrial-technological developm ent.58
Elie Cohen's Le Colbertisme high-tech looks at the traditional French 
desire to marry the encouragem ent of high technology and economic common 
sense, and concludes that past practices are in fact nowadays detrimental to the 
attainment of the objectives of independence and modernisation conventionally 
assigned to high-tech industrial projects such a s  Concorde, the TGV and the 
Minitel. After his earlier studies of the exercise of power of and in industrial 
groups and following examinations of the motivations and success  of State 
intervention in the modernisation and crisis of French industry, Cohen now 
branches out into a  consideration of various 'grands projets technologiques'as  
exam ples of 'le colbertisme high-tech'.59
Of the many definitions he gives of high-tech colbertism, the following best 
illustrates Cohen's approach; " Le colbertisme high-tech est la forme historique 
qu'a prise / ’intervention de I'Etat-nation arme du monopole de I'interet general dans 
ses relations avec les industries dites de pointe de I'apres-guerre a nos jours".
This vision of state intervention in high-tech industry and the structures it implies 
are now to be considered as  inappropriate in a  system  of mature high-tech sectors
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in which, moreover, government action is limited both by the insufficient 
proportions of purely national econom ies and by the political obsolescence of such 
patterns of state intervention.
Such a  conclusion concerning the current perniciousness of modern-day 
"Colbertism" is based  on Cohen's interpretation of the example of the state-led 
modernisation of the French telephone system  in the 1970s and 1980s and of 
other attem pts to implement copy-cat growth and improvements in other related 
fields of telecommunications such a s  cabling, satellites and the Minitel. Cohen 
identifies High Definition TV as  a  project on a  European scale susceptible of 
serving a s  a  test case  for the extension of France's colbertist model of high-tech 
intervention to the European level. The problems inherent in the HDTV project 
(described a s  'une polyphonie desaccordee') illuminate for Cohen the way in 
which France would be wrong to try to impose on European technological 
cooperation a  form of intervention which is ill-suited to anything but a  nationalistic 
ambition for the success of domestic cham pions and scientific and commercial 
prestige.
The French space programme, which is our particular interest, is of course 
another example of high-tech colbertism which may well experience the sam e 
problems identified by Cohen in the program m es he examines.
In La Nouvelle frontiere de la technologie europeenne. De Boissiere and 
Warusfel, in a  treatment of more or less the sam e phenom ena, but from the 
viewpoint of European, rather than narrowly French technology, reach the 
conclusion that 'une Europe qui aura preserve son autonomie surun nombre 
significatif de creneaux porteurs sera en mesure de continuer a ecrire elle-meme 
son propre a v e n i r Being able to define her own future, (as the authors put it) is 
not the sam e a s  being independent - the best-case scenario still possible for 
Europe is Tautonomie dans I'interdependance', or freedom of manoeuvre within a 
world economic system dominated by American and Jap an ese  technology.
Through an analysis of the su ccesses  and failures of European technology 
since the 1960s (Euratom, Unidata, Ariane, Airbus, Eureka, Esprit, HDTV etc), de 
Boissiere and Warusfel dem onstrate their scepticism concerning current EC led 
technology programmes such as Esprit and nationally inspired initiatives such as  
Eureka. Moreover, in the pessimistic assessm en t they present of current 
European strategies, when the deficiencies of such technology program m es are 
com pounded by the negative effects (as they see  them) on overall European 
com petitiveness of the Single Market, Europe will go down the path of 
technological (and ultimately political) dependency. It is for these  reasons that
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technology is seen  as  the 'frontier' to be defended in order to protect European 
society and culture.
The strategy for protecting European technology that the authors advise is 
'une action conjointe sur le marche, les structures et la societe qui peut seule 
permettre a I'Europe de mettre en oeuvre un modele original et efficace de 
developpement technologique'. Past failures in European attem pts to promote 
technology have in this analysis been caused  not by any inherent and ineradicable 
w eakness in the technologies in question but by the application of inappropriate 
and incomplete strategies. De Boissiere and Warusfel criticise what they see  as  
current reliance within Europe on market forces a s  a  m anager of technological 
development, and identify the Single Market a s  a  potentially fatal blow to Europe's 
technological future. By acting as  an inappropriate continental version o f 'hyper- 
liberalisme anglo-saxon', 1993 will create risks of weakening European 
independence through increasing the EC’s permeability to technological 
competition.60
If 'regulation concurrentielle'or 'strategie de marche' is a  necessary  but not 
sufficient elem ent of a  successful European technology promotion, what more is 
needed ? De Boissiere and Warusfel propose what they call 'strategies de 
structures' and 'strategies de societe'. Adapting the terminology of the economist 
Frangois Perroux,61 the authors distinguish between 'effetde structure' and 
'emprise de structure' together describing the existing organisational structures of 
industry nationally and in its links with industry abroad, and 'preference de 
structure', or the preferred industrial structure to be attained through voluntarist 
political action. Europe must thus implement a  policy o f 'preference de structure' 
which will safeguard her technological autonomy. This of course is industrial 
policy by another name (de Boissiere and Warusfel propose the term "macro- 
management"), a  concept apparently regaining som e credibility within the EC 
Commission and in France, (did dirigisme ever really suffer in France under the 
influence of the V ague liberate"?), a s  the authors underline with a  quote from 
Roger Fauroux, Michel Rocard's Industry minister.62
'Strategie de societe', or the third elem ent of Europe's overall strategy of 
technological development is the most idiosyncratic feature of La Nouvelle 
frontiere de la technoloaie europeenne. and perhaps the most typically French 
aspect of the analysis, appealing as  it does to more philosophical notions such as 
'la technologie dans les tetes', Timmoralite technologique', 'democracy', 'freedom' 
and 'responsibility'. The gist of the concept is that technology must be used  for 'le 
service de I'homme' and 'le combat pour un nouvel humanisme'.
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Leaving this somewhat nebulous idea behind, we are left with de Boissiere 
and Warusfel's recommendations for technology in Europe, namely a  combination 
of international market forces and a  'preference de structure' - or strategic political- 
bureaucratic (technocratic?) regulation on a  Community-wide scale rather than 
nation by nation.
It is here that the w eakness of de Boissiere and W arusfel's argument 
appears, since despite the detail and insights into the su ccesses  and failures of 
French and European technology which form the basis of their study, their 
conclusion is essentially uncontroversial and seem s to fudge the issue of the real 
balance to be established between market forces and central implementation of a 
'preference de structure'. Cohen, admittedly with the advantage of publishing a 
year later than de Boissiere and Warusfel (fashions tend to swing in thinking on 
these issues) seem s to come down more decisively against the transposition of 
high-tech Colbertism from the French national level to the European arena, at least 
in part because he s e e s  the European Commission a s  more durably against 
industrial policy than do de Boissiere and Warusfel. Another advantage of 
Cohen's analysis is that he identifies the full subtlety of the French position over 
European high-tech industry.63
Cohen's study also seem s to incorporate the argum ent of La Nouvelle 
frontiere de la technoloaie europeenne that som e form of intervention is always 
desirable by considering 7a rhetorique industrialists' a s  a  periodic reassertion of 
now illusory Nation-state ambitions, rather than a  still justified principle of public 
policy. In echo of Michel Crozier, whose ideas on Etat moderne. Etat m odeste 
reputedly informed Michel Rocard's thinking on the modernisation of French 
government and society64, Cohen calls for the ‘Etat colbertiste ‘to become an ‘Etat 
modeste'.
2.3.3. ‘Modernisation’
Reflecting the topicality of the concept in academ ic and political writing of the early 
1980s, the 1985 Conference of the Association for the Study of Modern and 
Contemporary France w as devoted to Modernisation. In the introduction to the 
Conference proceedings (France and Modernisation^ John Gaffney identifies the 
possibility that the nature of modernisation has changed in the 1980s, reflecting a 
more conflictual and divisive context within which the process and its policies must 
protect France's interests : 'the 1980s have taken France, along with the rest of 
W estern Europe, into a  technological race in which there will be winners and 
losers, and which will establish a  league table which will inform the political and
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social developm ents of the next century’.65 Gaffney goes on to describe how 
there is an agreem ent in French politics around the concept of modernisation : ‘. . .  
all the mainstream French political actors are poised to maintain and accelerate 
France's position. And 'modernisation' is the unquestioned organising principle of 
that competitiveness.’ Moreover, ‘modernisation’ is not only to be m easured in 
term s of France's performance, its ability to com pete or cooperate with its 
economic giant of a  neighbour W est Germany, or even with its more distant and 
economically even more gargantuan competitors, Japan  and the United States, 
but in term s of the strength of the desire for change, translated now unequivocally 
for the first time into political orientations and policy initiatives’66 Gaffney reflects 
here the contemporary consensus in France over the need for further 
modernisation and over the place of high technology in the process.
Pascal Petit's analysis of modernisation and the French economy since 
1945 se e s  the election of the socialists in 1981 as  marking a  strong return to the 
ethos of modernisation after a  period in the mid- and late-1970s when, under the 
pressures of the Oil Crisis, the guiding principle of industrial policy had been 
'industrial redeployment'.67 The failure of this liberally-inspired policy of 
withdrawal from declining and uncompetitive sectors led the socialists to attempt 
modernisation through political and administrative decentralisation and, 
industrially, via a  programme of nationalisations accom panied by the reform of 
labour relations. This policy itself foundered in turn on the economic difficulties 
caused  by France's go-it-alone policy of expansion in the early 1980s, which led to 
the application of financial 'rigour1 and France's return to monetary and macro- 
economic orthodoxy. It is from the mid-1980s that one can date what Petit 
describes a s  'Modernisation's new clothes' or a  'paradoxical response to the 
challenge of the "will to modernise". Petit's view is that 'We can s e e , . . .  in the 
modernisation policies advocated by the French government, the desire to 
reconcile a  system  of Keynesian-type support given to national economic activity 
(the stimulation of investment, preferential purchasing, even the creation of 
integrated networks of production) with a  gamble on the innovative abilities of the 
chiefs of industry (commitments in a reas  of new products and innovations within 
the range of older activities)'.68 It is at this stage that the 'will to modernise' (in 
Petit's phrase) intersects with the 1980s debate on dirigisme and liberalism in the 
French state and economy.
Indeed, the consensus over modernisation identified in France and 
Modernisation echoes the increasing convergence of macroeconomic thinking 
between Left and Right in France in which the Socialists and the Opposition seem  
to agree on the advantages of budgetary rigour and of market solutions. In a
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recent special number of the Revue francaise d'Administration publique comparing 
public sector- and private sector-m anagem ent, Guy Crespy (director of corporate 
strategy at CEA-lndustrie69, and a  former advisor to the Industry minister) has put 
forward the view that the investment behaviour of the public and private sector in 
France has tended to converge since 1985, after considerable divergence in the 
1960s (under the influence of Gaullist industrial policy) and again during the early 
1980s under the Socialists. Crespy implies that the economic climate plays a  role 
in determining the style and scale of state intervention in industry, meaning that in 
times of relative prosperity the public sector can be expected to exist on the sam e 
basis as  the private sector, but that in times of recession government investment 
may be motivated more by political objectives than by economics. Crespy also 
identifies however, a trend for the state to be less and less able to intervene in 
industry with m assive investment program m es in specific sectors because of the 
increasing internationalisation of public sector com panies
Similarly, Ambroise Laurent {Conseiller referendaire a la Courdes 
Comptes70) has considered the need for m anagem ent evaluation and increased 
efficiency in the public sector a s  an indispensable feature of 7a modernisation du 
service public'. 71 Laurent identifies the absence of assessm en t of the 
m anagem ent and financing of various exam ples o f 'service public1 a s  being a  
major handicap to the efficiency and accountability of their activities. Considering 
the Commissariat a I'energie atomique (CEA), the Groupement industriel des 
armements terrestres (GIAT) and la Poste, Laurent s ta tes  the general principle 
that when monopoly positions are threatened by new technology or by European 
integration, or when their funding becom es too onerous, sta te  organisations are 
progressively given greater and greater m anagem ent autonomy in the hope that 
new (non-governmental) sources of finance will be forthcoming. The case  of the 
GIAT ordnance factory ('arsenal') which w as transformed into a  societe nationale 
in June 1990 illustrates the occasional necessity for a  change of statutes when 
state establishm ents can no longer be maintained within their traditional roles by 
the application of more efficient m anagem ent techniques 72
For som e analysts, such a s  Ezra Suleiman, the natural corollary of state  
disengagem ent in France is a  need for more regulation of increasingly private 
industry 73
Turning from the wider context of industrial policy which provides part of the wider 
context in which French space policy is made, in the next section we shall narrow 
the focus of this review of literature to see  what light studies of French
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science policy have thrown on the development of the French space effort and on 
the making of space policy.
2.4. The Organisation of French Science and Technology.
Studies dealing exclusively with science policy and the organisation of science 
and technology in France are, as  has been remarked, relatively scarce. We shall 
look at the main contributions to the analysis of French approaches towards 
science and technology in general, and where appropriate, evaluate their 
treatment of space  activities in the light of our concerns.
2.4.1. The 1960s- ‘pour une politique scientifique’
The 1960s were a  period of growing interest in science policy studies a s  it becam e 
increasingly evident that science and technology were of prime importance in the 
achievem ent of industrial and military influence. The mid-1960s saw  the 
publication of three important works on French science. These were: Pierre 
Piganiol and Louis Villecourt, Pour une politique scientifique. (1963)74; OECD, 
Review of National science policy - France. (1966)75; and Robert Gilpin, France in 
the Age of the Scientific state. (1968). Piganiol and Villecourt's call for a  
concerted attempt to implement a  rational strategy for the advancem ent of science 
and technology w as one of the earliest such appeals, and the studies by the 
OECD and Gilpin have becom e almost indispensable source books for analysts 
of more contemporary science policy problems.
Pour une politique scientifique looks at three issues. Firstly it looks at scientific 
progress in term s of its nature and repercussions and its political, economic and 
social importance in a  'grand etat moderne'. Secondly, it describes the 
development, organisation and structure of French science and looks at the policy 
for its encouragem ent. Thirdly, it investigates what lessons may be drawn from 
other countries.
The collaboration between Piganiol and Villecourt w as brought about in 
Decem ber 1958 by the reorganisation of science and technology structures 
prepared in part under the Fourth Republic and implemented under de Gaulle; 
their views can therefore be attributed a quasi-official status. The preface to their 
work, contributed by the Nobel laureate Andre Cournand, warns the reader not to 
expect a  dogmatic presentation, since science policy, like economic policy, 
develops a s  a  result of the two opposing influences of 'planification et
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liberalisme'76 They go on to conclude that 'Face a la Recherche, dans 
I'immediat, la politique est le grand interiocuteur.77.
Pour une politique scientifique's  treatment of the space  sector is necessarily 
brief since CNES had only been formed a  year before the publication of Piganiol 
and Villecourt's reflections. Space research is dealt with together with nuclear 
research under the heading of 'Les grandes institutions scientifiques 
gouvemementales' since both these  sectors enjoyed substantial sta te  funding 
and depended on central organisations responsible to the Prime Minister. The 
contrast between the CEA, created in 1945, and sp ace  research, whose first 
coordinating body was set up in 1959, is em phasised. The authors rapidly trace 
the creation of the Comite de recherches spatiales, (January 1959), its four sub­
committees, (late 1960), the definition of space  research program m es as ’actions 
concertees’ of priority national interest and their inclusion in the May 1960 
Program-Law for Research. They point out that the experience of a  single year of 
the Space Research Committee revealed the inadequacy of its powers and the 
consequent need for a  coordinating body with greater administrative, legal and 
technical resources, as  well a s  diplomatic expertise to facilitate international 
cooperation. The body created w as CNES, which w as created in Decem ber 
1961 and started activities in March 1962.
'An Original relationship between Science and Society'.
The next important work on the organisation of science in France w as the Review 
of National science policy - France in 1966. In undertaking its survey of French 
science policy the OECD was hopeful that because France had gone ’further and 
faster...in the concerted effort to use the power of organised science in the service 
of economic and social development' any information which could be gathered 
about France's 'original relationship' between scientific activities and development 
would lead to a  better understanding of the problems facing all OECD member 
countries. The review traces the influences that eventually led to the 1958 reform 
of science policy structures and gives a  detailed description of the structures 
created by this reorganisation existing in 1966. The principal elem ents that 
should be retained from this section are firstly the parallels between the new 
science planning structures and those of the economic plan, secondly the concept 
of a coordinated state science budget, thirdly the mixing of scientists and 
politicians in bodies such a s  the CCRST,78 and finally the division of responsibility 
between civil science agencies and military research bodies such a s  the CASD 
and the DRME.79 These notions are all of consequence for the subsequent
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development of scientific activities in general and for the nature of the space 
sector.
Our enquiry into the underlying motivations of space  policy is concerned with 
several of the them es brought out in the OECD study. The early 1960s saw 
moves towards the harmonisation of scientific and political objectives; during this 
period, within the framework of the Fourth plan (1962-65) 'combined' state-private 
activities were fostered and, the OECD notes 'As a  result of the experimental 
program m es undertaken as  priority activities, wide opportunities were opened up 
to space research .80 The extent to which current space  program m es harmonise 
political and military concerns with the dynamic of scientific and technological 
development is a  them e which merits exploration. Similarly, the third stage in the 
evolution of French science policy identified by the OECD a s  the encouragem ent 
of 'national science programmes for the main economic sectors '81 reflects the 
contention that space policy represents an attem pt to m odernise society.
Science and Modernisation.
Robert Gilpin's France in the Age of the Scientific sta te  continues the them es 
developed by Piganiol and Villecourt and the institutional analyses of the OECD 
review but also combines them with more ideological considerations concerning 
the 'originality' of the French approach to science and  society identified by the 
OECD. For example, Gilpin starts from the assertion m ade in 1964 by Pierre 
Cognard that French independence was threatened by the scientific dominance of 
the USA and concludes that 'The basic issue raised by the statem ent of this 
French concern is the future of the nation state in the age of scientific 
technology'.82 For Gilpin, the Force de Frappe and the sp ace  programme are 
'merely the most dramatic and outer manifestations' of F rance's attempt to 
becom e a  scientific nation-state.83 The reorganisation of scientific and para- 
scientific institutions is likewise an expression of French desire to 'make science 
an instrument of French economic, military and political objectives'.84 Indeed, the 
technology gap and its ideological exploitation and consequences is a  matter of 
primarily political concern, with, one might add, important economic stakes at risk 
and considerable social consequences. France's position in the world league of 
technological nations w as such that Gilpin identifies two 'dilemmas' complicating 
her attempt to reduce the technology gap. These dilemmas are firstly the risk of 
losing traditional French values in copying American patterns of science 
organisation and secondly losing sovereignty through the European cooperation 
necessary  to challenge US scientific resources.
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Gilpin's theoretical perspective on the space and nuclear program m es is that 
the French believed them capable of 'providing a  dem ocratic society with the 
necessary  leverage for reforming scientific, educational, and economic 
institutions'.85 Chapter Nine is devoted to a  consideration of 'Defence, Space, 
and Atomic power'. The treatment s tresses  the military aspects  of the nuclear 
and space  programmes, taking its cue from a  view expressed  in Le Progres 
scientifique in March 1966 that 'scientific research contributes in the highest 
d eg ree '86 to the defence of a  modern country. Commenting on the difficulties of 
distinguishing between civil and military research, Gilpin presents the 'ambiguity' 
of the CEA and CNES, remarking that CNES has the dual imperatives of national 
security and international prestige a s  its raisons d'etre.
According to Gilpin, in developing their space  sector 'the French are  motivated 
not merely by disinterested scientific curiosity but by the desire for national 
prestige and the belief that there is an intimate connection between space 
research and technological advance in the modern world.'87 The huge resources 
required for space research necessitate European cooperation and the 
concertation of military and civilian programmes. The question of resources and 
returns is addressed  by Gilpin in term s of 'spinoffs' and 'crowding out', against the 
backdrop of the strategic and prestige imperatives. Although he d o es  state  the 
difficulty of reaching 'definite answ ers' in the 1960s concerning France's space 
and nuclear ambitions, Gilpin does arrive at the tentative conclusion that th e  most 
beneficial aspect of the French military and space  program s is their psychological 
impact. The development of a  domestic nuclear striking force and space  
technology is symbolic of France's commitment to becom e a  modern scientific- 
technological society.'88 The risks that France is running in the pursuit of this 
strategy of modernisation are of course the deflection of resources from civilian 
research perhaps yielding greater economic benefit and secondly, the threat that 
such technological nationalism might pose to European science cooperation.
Such, then, are the three main studies of French science and technology 
published in the 1960s. They are important in that they are the first 
considerations of the new relationships between science and the sta te  and 
between military and civil science that were ushered in with the Fifth Republic. 
They are useful to our enquiry into contemporary space  policy to the extent that 
they se t out how the initial space activities were perceived at the time of their 
implementation. On a  general level, these works can be criticised for 
characteristics which are at the sam e time virtues. For example, the "closeness" 
of their analysis to the events they are commenting upon is simultaneously a 
positive and a  negative feature since they have only a  relatively limited amount of
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data  and experience. The approaches are also "dated" in the sen se  that they 
reflect the science policy and industrial economic preoccupations of the 1960s. 
The three studies share the advantageous and disadvantageous feature of 
treating space  as  a  part of the overall framework of science policy. Space 
activities are thus situated in their context but do not form the object of any 
intensive investigation.
Our present study hopes to fill som e of the lacunae left by th ese  studies and to 
develop som e of the them es which their analyses suggest.
2.4.2. The 1970s - changing perspectives on science and society
The two major works from the 1970s dealing with French science and technology 
that we will consider here are; OECD, Changing priorities for government research 
and developm ent. (1975)89; and Pierre Papon, Le Pouvoir et la Science en France 
(1978).90 As before, their treatment of the space sector is partial, so mention will 
also be m ade of a  number of articles bringing complementary information.91
Social goals and technological objectives.
The chapter on France in Changing priorities for governm ent R & D notes how 
science policy w as for the first time becoming integrated with economic objectives 
in the Sixth Plan (1971-75) against a  background of centralised decision making 
for R & D and interministerial discussion of the global research budget in the 
1960s. Moreover, as a  general phenom enon throughout the m em ber countries in 
the 1970s government R & D w as becoming subject to ceilings rather than target 
levels of expenditure, with choice between sectors being forced on decision 
makers.
On the level of science policy analysis, the OECD study deals with a  number of 
concepts useful to our study of space policy. In a  discussion of the problems of 
comparing national priorities for state R & D the distinction is m ade between 
'national goals' and 'objectives'. The OECD definitions are that national goals are 
'statem ents of highly desirable conditions towards which society should be 
directed.'; and that objectives are 'the stated purpose of an organisation or an 
individual capable of planning and taking action to gain intended ends'.92 
Examples of national goals are : National security and big science; economic 
development; community services and the advancem ent of science. Their 
formulation is a  'political process involving all elem ents in our society, especially
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the makers of public opinion and the political leadership.'. In the view of the 
OECD goals are too general to be used a s  the basis of R & D evaluation. 
Objectives, however can be so employed since they are combined to achieve the 
national goals. Thus national security and big science are served by the 
objectives of defence, civil nuclear and civil space, and economic developm ent is 
encouraged through the fostering of agriculture, mining, manufacturing and 
economic services. The notion of 'higher order1 psychological-political-popular 
goals served by 'lower-order1 technocratically attainable objectives confirms our 
background context of the probable role of French space  activities in the 
attainment of symbolic-psychological objectives such as  Grandeur.
Towards social and commercial utility.
Robert Gilpin writing in 1975 arrived at an assessm en t of France's technological 
strategy during the 1960s that s e e s  the French experience a s  essentially a  
failure.93 He sta tes that 'science policy in France has been first and foremost a  
product of France's international position'.94 During the 1960s this position 
translated itself into attem pts to achieve technological and military independence. 
In attempting to create an American style military industrial complex a s  Gilpin 
maintains w as the case, the growing w eakness of industrial research and 
technology w as neglected, leading to the realisation in the 1970s of the need to 
encourage industry in the face of competition from W est Germany. The failure of 
France's strategy of independence in technology is explained by Gilpin with 
reference to a  number of factors.
Firstly, the social and monetary upheavals of 1968/69 disrupted France's 
'scientific-technological effort'. Secondly, there w as 'general disappointment' in 
the results of government R & D policy - Gilpin gives space a s  an example: 'The 
huge investment of funds in space  has led to no significant scientific or 
commercial results; the preponderance of these  funds went into the establishm ent 
of large ground facilities such a s  the G uyana base, w hose utility has yet to be 
proven.'.95 Thirdly, the French were unable to m anage the complex p rocesses of 
technological innovation because of inadequate human skills and capital and lack 
of m anagem ent expertise. From these factors, Gilpin derives three prescriptions 
for 1970s France: managerial and scientific elites must be com petent to m anage 
the complexities of centralisation of science and technology policy; projects should 
not be undertaken merely for reasons of prestige and independence, 'social and 
commercial utility' should be included as  well; and finally, French ambitions in 
technology should conform more with the country's resources. Thus Gilpin’s
53
updating of his 1968 study draws conclusions similar to those arrived at by Pierre 
Papon writing a  decade after the publication of Gilpin's original work.
Technological and industrial strategies.
In an article published in 1975, Papon put forward his view that French 
governm ents' attem pts to encourage technological research had been inefficient 
through lack of a  real grasp of the scientific and industrial p rocesses at work.96 In 
his study he identified the absence of a  'technological and industrial strategy* and 
defines the national research strategy as  a  mere 'pseudo-doctrine'.97 The point is 
m ade that 'scientific policies were largely subordinated to strategic or prestige 
objectives' and that the Major Program m es underachieved because  their 
development w as hindered by lack of a  proper industrial policy. Furthermore; 'the 
technology policy then prevailing w as based  in part on a  simplified view of the 
m echanics of technological innovation and its dissemination'.98 In addition to 
these  handicaps, Papon implies that whatever su ccesses  the Major Program m es 
achieved were hindered in their industrial developm ent by the 'anachronistic 
structures' of French industry and by French inability to cope with the problems 
inherent in high technology products.
As one of the Grands Programmes, Space com es under Papon's scrutiny, but 
only briefly. He m akes the following points: that initially CNES w as intended to 
improve the scientific and technological level of French space  activities a s  well as 
developing aerospace industrial competitivity; that the scientific achievem ents of 
CNES in 1975 were deem ed worthwhile although in term s of the overall 
orientation of the space  programme 'excessive ambition' and 'changes of direction' 
had confused its objectives.
Papon's Le Pouvoir et la Science en France, published in 1978, aim s to analyse 
France's 'systeme de la recherche scientifique et technique et...ses relations avec 
les autres institutions sociales et en particulier avec les pouvoirs politiques'.99
It is within the context of this detailed survey that Papon ad d resses  the question 
of French space  activities, along with those of the CEA and the European 
organisations that CNES and the CEA are linked with by virtue of their 
international collaboration. The political aspect of space  activities is heavily 
em phasised. For Papon, the political issues at risk have influenced space  policy 
throughout its history: in 1958 the Comite de recherches spatiales w as created 
because of Tenjeu politique que semblait representer la recherche spatiale surle  
plan international'10°; in 1978, politics were still the primary motivation because  
the industrial implications of space program m es were still seen  to be ’d'une
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ampleur limitee'. Against this backdrop of the dom inance of political incentives 
for the development of the space industry, Papon’s analysis brings out a  number 
of features such as  the external relations responsibilities of CNES (in liaison with 
the Quai d'Orsay) and the material dependence of CNES on the military for 
launcher rockets until 1967.
The c loseness of the links between CNES and other ministries and  between 
space policy and other a reas of concern to government is indicative of the 
perceived nature and importance of the space  sector at different s tag es  in the 
development of the space programme. For example, although initially tied to the 
Ministry of National Defence and the DGA, CNES acquired autonomy and true 
civilian status through the Diamant launcher programme. The situation is 
complicated more however by the fact that the Ariane project w as strongly 
supported in its infancy also by the Defence ministry. Papon reiterates his 1975 
assertion that CNES has been pulled in too many directions (by forces of 
attraction within France, not to mention the European dimension) to allow a  
harmonious overall orientation of policy to evolve. He d oes identify one particular 
trend that stands out: l a  politique spatiale estdevenue de moins en moins un 
problems de politique scientifique, elle est de plus en plus un problems politique 
ay ant des implications industrielles et intemationales.101 Moreover; 'le 
programmme spatial est reste un element a part de la politique scientifique car 
ses prog ram mmes n'ont jamais ete coordonnes avec ceux des autres organismes 
de recherche'.102 Another feature which se ts  space policy aside from other areas 
of governm ent activity is also stressed: the fact that the Elysee considers such 
matters to belong to its 'domaine reserve' because  of their implications for 
national prestige.
Papon's final com m ents on the sta te 's  attem pts to m anage science during the 
1960s and 1970s are worthy of inclusion here a s  a  conclusion. He s ta tes  that 
'Les dirigeants de la Ve Republique ont...presque totalement minors /'importance 
des problemes technologiques et surtout de la necessite d'un effort continu et de 
longue duree'.103 He concludes: l a  science est restee sans gouvernement et la 
politique de la recherche, faute d'un grand dessein, est devenue affaire 
d'administration. ' .104 This is a  somewhat extreme position to take, and indeed 
might seem  paradoxical, given the overall acceptance of the idea that the French 
state is aw are of the importance of science and technology and tries to encourage 
them. Nevertheless, the expression 'faute d'un grand dessein' seem s to 
properly imply the existence of uncoordinated isolated goals and strategies.
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2.4.3. The 1980s : problem s of technology and innovation
In May 1984, Professor Jean -Jacques Salomon of the Conservatoire National des 
Arts et Metiers (CNAM) w as invited by the then Minister of Industry and  Research 
Laurent Fabius to draw up a  report on the state of French technology policy.
During the ministerial changes of the second half of 1984 consequent on the 
departure of Piere Mauroy from Matignon and his replacem ent a s  Prime Minister 
by Fabius, the report was lost or at least forgotten, until published in 1986 a s  Lq 
Gaulois. le Cow-boy et le SamouraT jointly by the Ministers du redeploiement 
industriel et du commerce exterieur and the new Ministere de la Recherche et de 
la technologies05 The report w as somew hat shocking and unwelcome because 
of its iconoclastic assertion that French innovation in technology had actually been 
decreasing since the 1970s, and that the traditional flagships of French science 
and technology, the nuclear and space  programmes, far from being the comforting 
presences of the past had becom e 'le signe meme de notre vulnerability en 
matiere d'innovation technique' 106
Salom on's point in making this accusation w as that the technological 
su ccesses  of the past had all essentially been tied to captive markets, but that the 
future would be based increasingly on the invention and production of high-tech 
consum er products. His conclusion was that the sta te  w as not intervening 
effectively in the direction of science, technology and innovation policy; 7a 
contradiction de notre politique de recherche et d'innovation n'est pas tant dans les 
objectifs que nous nous donnons que dans les modalites d'intervention'S07 His 
recom m endations were that it was generally necessary  to redefine the divisions 
between the responsibilities of the state and those of the market in order to weigh 
against the 'tropisme dirigiste'108. In term s of research and innovation, Salomon 
identified only three domains where the state could still in his view play the roles of 
banker, entrepreneur and client. These were basic research, military R & D and 
'heavy' technologies such a s  space. This tends to give a  som ew hat contradictory 
air to Salom on's analysis since he at one and the sam e time criticises the workings 
of grands programmes a s  inefficient and wasteful and concludes that som e 
sectors require grand programmes, despite these  drawbacks. Such an argument 
underlines the political motives behind high-tech in general and grands 
programmes in particular, and highlights the contradictions to be revealed in our 
study of the space  sector between political motivations and som e of the 
developing economic and industrial characteristics of space  activities. S pace 
com bines the need for strategic vision beyond the capabilities of the free market 
and the need for ‘commercialisation’ which cannot really be provided by the state
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agency CNES : 'Ni les grands programmes ni les agences technologiques (par 
exemple la CEA) ne sont faits pour diffuser des produits ou des processus 
nouveauxen dehors deleurssecteurs'™ 9
The next and final section of this Literature review considers various studies 
specifically focussed on the French space effort published during the 1970s,
1980s and early 1990s. The most recent studies are reports on the content and 
conduct of space  policy called for in the recessionary days of the turn of the 
decade, when the space programme cam e to be actively questioned for the first 
time.
2.5. General analyses of French space activities and ‘oversight reports’
We will first look at the literature dealing with the French space  effort in a  general 
way. The num ber of works involved is surprisingly low, only som e half-dozen 
spanning a  fifteen year period. Their approach is general in term s of the analysis 
offered and in term s of the field of space activities under consideration. In effect 
they deal with the French space sector in the context of European cooperation. 
The generality of the argum ents they develop, whether journalistic, documentary 
or academ ic, m eans that little needs really to be said here by way of commentary, 
except that many of the them es that they cover are to be looked at more closely in 
our own analysis.
2.5.1. The 1970s : optimism
Jacques Tassin 's Vers I'Europe spatiale. written in 1970, d iscusses the problems 
of the European space science and technology organisations founded in the 
1960s.110 It analyses the cau ses  of the difficulties experienced by France in the 
context of European cooperation. Tassin draws up a  num ber of implicit 
guidelines for the success of French and European space activities. These 
guidelines are a s  follows: 'pour la France, I'Europe spatiale doit se charger de 
certaines realisations d'interet general, dont la France seule pourrait difficilement 
assurer le financement'111 but that nonetheless, 7a politique spatiale frangaise ne 
peut etre qu'europeenne'.112 Given this situation, Tassin maintains that the 
question of European space technology will not be resolved satisfactorily unless it 
is considered a s  part of European technology "tout court".113 Starting from the 
agreed failure of ESRO and ELDO to overcome problems of bureaucratic inertia
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and lack of political will, Tassin brings out the them es that make international 
collaboration in space difficult: the division of the work between states; the huge 
costs which force cooperation; and the strategic importance of high technology, 
perhaps the most fundamental cause  of government interest in space. As Tassin 
remarks: 7/ s'agit d'utiliser la recherche spatiale comme une des avenues du 
progres technologique'.^4 Moreover; VEspace n’estpas un cas isole, c'est un 
echantillon et un catalyseur. C'est le domaine de pointe par excellence.'.115 But 
the crucial importance of space does not go without attendant problems - as  
Tassin points out - in terms of industrial policy, European space activities took 
their place am ongst the major issues of the period. Budgetary problems led to 
concern in European countries over the feasibility on grounds of cost of space 
activities when seen  as  merely one more example of high technology spending.
2.5.2. The 1980s : the challenge of space
The late 1970s seem  marked by an even greater paucity of literature dealing with 
French space  activities on any level, perhaps reflecting a  period of consolidation in 
space  policy. However, the appearance in 1982 of a  Cahier frangais devoted to 
Les Enjeux de I'Espace witnessed an apparent renewal of interest in space  
m atters.116 Conceived by Andre Lebeau, professor of space  technology and 
program m es at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers, this issue groups 
together som e thirty articles on space related issues.
In VEspace: ouverture pour la recherche scientifique',U7 Roger-Maurice 
Bonnet, Director of research at the CNRS, describes space  science a s  a  field that 
will revolutionise science and technology in general, although four sectors are the 
most concerned: Astronomy, the study of the Solar system , Earth sciences and 
biology, and materials science. For Bonnet, space  research is an indispensable 
elem ent of our very culture, in addition to which 'constamment s'affirme ie role 
moteurde la recherche scientifique spatiale dans le developpement des 
technologies d 1avant-garde1118 The present strength of France's position in world 
space  activities is due in Bonnet's view to the success with which the French have 
developed satellites for scientific applications, thus acquiring techniques which 
can be transferred to other fields.
The considerable market that exists for satellite telecommunications and 
satellite television, (two applications upon which the French are concentrating), is 
pointed out in Jean-Louis Astor's contribution in which he notes the reasons that 
lead nations to consider such applications of space technology: *Les besoins 
toujours croissants en liaisons de telecommunications conduisent - pour des
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raisons d'efficacite, d'independance politique ou d ’economie a moyen terme - de 
plus en plus de pays (ou groupes de pays) a se doter d'un systeme independant 
de telecommunications par satellite.119 The Direct Broadcasting by Satellite 
(DBS) system  is similarly presented by Pierre Usunier of Aerospatiale's space 
and ballistic system s division. 120
Another article in this section worthy of mention is that which deals with 
teledetection by satellite. As the editors of the Cahier point out, this is a  field 
where the potential financial rewards are "gigantesques" and in which the French 
are well placed to reap the rewards, given their ambitious Spot Satellite 
programme. Aline Bats-Chabreuil of CNES, who presents the technology and 
organisation of Spot and other such satellites describes th ese  activities a s  
marking a  new stage in the integration of space  technology into the commercial 
world.121
Finally, Alain Dupas presents a  brief overview of the military applications of 
sp ace .122 Although to the post-SDI observer this treatm ent may now seem  
som ew hat dated, despite premonitions within the publication of possible US 
involvement in Star Wars technology, mention of it must be included to do justice 
to the spread  of areas of interest in space already identified in the early 1980s.
The section of the Cahier dealing with the commercial and industrial aspects  of 
space activities considers more specifically the different elem ents combining to 
make up French space programmes, industry and policy. Thus Jean-M arie Luton 
describes French space policy and CNES.123 Unfortunately, the presentation of 
the policy is limited to a  simple 'historique' of the developm ent of sp ace  activities 
with a  few details of the ministries participating in CNES affairs and the financing 
of program m es.124
We have now presented the most important articles in Les Enjeux de TEspace. 
This som ew hat lengthy treatment is justified despite the shortcomings of the 
analyses offered because this collection of views current in or em anating from 
France d o es  represent the most complete and available coverage of many of the 
major aspects  of French space activities. Published in the early 1980s and thus 
of direct relevance to our study of recent space policy it differs from Tassin in that 
it deals specifically with the French experience and integrates som e discussion of 
industrial and commercial issues.
1986 saw  the publication in France of two works popularising knowledge of the 
conquest of space  and of the impact of space activities on everyday life. These 
were L’E space en heritage by Andre Lebeau,125 and Bernard Chabbert’s  Les fils 
d’Ariane.126 Disappointingly, Lebeau’s contribution to the overall debate  on 
space policy is relatively small in this work since much of the book is taken up with
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a  history of rocketry and other such subjects of more technical and historical than 
policy interest. However, he does isolate two p h ases in the developm ent of the 
French space  sector over the last twenty five years. During the first phase the 
role of economic and market forces was negligible, the main motivations for space 
activities being prestige and the support of international science along with what 
Lebeau term s 'arriere-pensees militaires. The second phase w as marked by the 
em ergence of the concept of applications and the developm ent of applications 
programmes. Thus from the mid-1960s it w as economic and strategic objectives, 
along with a  concern to foster pure research that motivated the French space 
effort. In this period, the arriere-pensees militaires had evolved into military- 
strategic concerns with precise aims, typically involving information gathering and 
telecommunications. Importantly, Lebeau maintains that 'Les considerations de 
prestige ont a peu pres disparu'.127 Although he does not go very deeply into 
the commercial, industrial and socio-economic aspects  of space, Lebeau thus 
isolates the mid-1960s a s  an important s tage in the evolution of the space sector; 
they marked ie  debut d'une phase capitale dans le developpement de la 
technique spatiale...I'assujetissant a la fourniture de services et...amorgant son 
integration au systeme socio-economique'.128
Bernard Chabbert's Les Fils d'Ariane is concerned more specifically with solely 
French space  activities. The book gives an enthusiastic account of the 
developm ent of the space sector until 1985. Although Chabbert's journalistic 
style m akes for a  stimulating read, the approach leaves serious analysis to be 
desired, notwithstanding several anecdotal details and striking phrases which 
serve to drive home certain points such a s  the technology lag between France 
and the United S ta tes.129 Given the enthusiasm  which the author has for the 
growth of space  activities,the most significant elem ents of his presentation are 
those in which he implicitly criticises French space efforts.130 The perhaps 
unsurprising conclusion that Chabbert derives from this lag in technology is that 
there is still an important political element to the space  effort which at one and the 
sam e time prevents Europe from using the most recent technology (under licence 
from the US) and spurs France on to realise greater technological exploits in the 
race to catch up.
UEspace: un defi pour la France
Apart from th ese  general publications on French space  activities, one work stands 
out for the professionalism of the information and the discussion that it contains.
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This is the printed proceedings of the ENA conference on space  entitled L'Espace 
: un defi pour la France held at the end of 1985.
Published in 1986, Les Actes du collogue: TEspace. un defi pour la France 
brings together all the contributions made at the two-day conference, thus forming 
an almost indispensable source of reference on all m atters pertaining to the space 
sector.131 Contributions fall into five main sections, following the them es of the 
debates: the history and assessm en t of French space  activities; strategic and 
military space  applications; civil applications; financial, legal and insurance 
aspects of the space industry; and France and the European space effort.132
The individual articles and contributions made during the debates of the 
conference by these and other participants would be of sufficient interest to merit 
detailed com m ent and analysis. However, their som ew hat detailed nature m eans 
that it is difficult to synthesise a  global appreciation of the conclusions of the 
conference, and therefore reference will be m ade to the opinions and data 
expressed by participants at the colloque at appropriate stages in our own 
analysis. The overall m essage of the conference w as that space  w as indeed a  
challenge for French industry, technology and finance, a s  well as  an area  of 
expertise in which considerations of national defence were increasingly relevant. 
For Hubert Curien, the then minister for Research and Technology responsible for 
the tutelle of CNES, speaking in the closing round table discussion of the 
conference, the situation was resum ed by a  statem ent which stressed  the 
practical aspects  of space in the 1980s and underplayed the symbolic and 
psychological aspects of such a  motivational high-tech sector.133 It is the 
weighting of this combination of factors - the military, the civil (and the economic) 
and the symbolic - that we will elucidate in our investigation of the making of 
French sp ace  policy during the 1980s.
Cohendet and Lebeau's 1987 study of the nature of major French state 
intervention in civil technology, Choix strategiques et grands programmes civils 
exam ines the rationale of such methods of government action and gives a  brief 
investigation of the example of space a s  a  grand programme-strategy.134 Grand 
programmes are described as ’un mode original d'aide publique a Innovation 
industrielle et a la recherche1, l35ar\ti the authors point out that the grand 
programme is peculiar in that it tends to have greater indirect effects on society 
than other equal volumes of state capital investment. These indirect benefits are 
technological, organisational, commercial and m anagerial/social,136 especially in 
the case  of space  since the special nature of space  activities creates a  large 
variety of spin-offs and interactions : ' les projets spatiauxse presentent...comme 
un carrefour technologique qui exige la synthese de technologies avancees des
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secteurs les plus divers'.137 Cohendet and Lebeau stress the close links between 
government and grands programmes and between the action of grands 
programmes and the state. In term s of power and control, they state clearly that 
'le controle d'un grand programme dont la creation est un acte politique, doit 
demeurer une affaire de gouvernement' 138 In term s of the role and image of 
the state, the authors point out that the grand programme has a  symbolic effect as 
well a s  a  practical one. Indeed, the notion of the grand programme has an 
influence on the 'conscience collective que la France ou I'Europe ont de leur 
capacite et de leur identite'.139 More specifically again ; 'les grands programmes 
ont contribue pour une part a combattre le syndrome du declin et de la defaite 
ineluctable'.140
In their discussion of the case  of the space  programme as  an exam ple of a 
typical grand programme, Cohendet and Lebeau focus particularly on the 
relevance of the grand programme approach to contemporary industrial and 
commercial conditions, despite the fact that grands programmes are not suited to 
new and rapidly evolving market conditions, it would seem  that for th ese  two 
analysts space  does indeed remain an appropriate domain for the grand 
programme approach because of its importance in national defence, and because 
of its capacity to generate new techniques of value to society but w hose cost and 
tim e-scales for development are too great for the market to bear.141
Although all the studies presented above have the merit of dealing with space 
as  the prime concern of their analysis, they still have the disadvantage of 
examining only the most superficial aspects  of the French space  effort. The 
neglect to which they subject the more institutional and theoretical aspec ts  of 
space policy in term s of science and industry policy a s  well a s  defence is to be 
redressed to som e extent by this thesis.
2.5.3. The 1990s : ‘oversight reports’
During the late 1980s and early 1990s attention cam e to be focussed on 
'assessing ' the efficiency and effectiveness of governm ent policy. This general 
movement towards som e kind of 'evaluation'of public policy initiatives included 
science and technology policy and the space sector itself, which, a s  well a s  being 
subjected to increased scrutiny from the newly created  Delegation generale a  
I'Espace in 1989, also becam e (for the first time) the object of investigations by 
various scientific, governmental and parliamentary bodies. The two most 
important analyses of the French space effort were provided in the major studies 
by the Office parlementaire d'evaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques
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(December 1991 )and by the Comite national devaluation de la recherche. 
(Septem ber 1992).142
L'Office parlementaire devaluation des choix scientifiques et 
technologiques (OPECST)
The OPECST w as set up in 1985 by the French parliament (National Assembly 
and Senate  in collaboration) in order to provide deputies and senators with the 
possibility of objective information on scientific and technical questions.143 The 
OPECST investigation of French and European space  policy w as requested  by the 
S enate Finance committee in October 1989 and led to the eventual publication of 
the Report in Decem ber 1991 under the title Rapport sur les Orientations de la 
politique spatiale franpaise et europeenne.144
The Report w as one of the longest and most detailed undertaken at that 
s tage by the Office and involved exhaustive investigations and interviews with all 
those responsible for the definition and m anagem ent of the French sp ace  effort, 
both civil and military. As the rapporteur, Senator Paul Loridant, em phasised in 
his introduction to the Report, the initiation of an inquiry into the conduct of French 
space activities w as very much 'a first', and perhaps because of the new ness of 
the concept of criticising CNES and the national space  effort, the report is 
som etim es som ew hat basic and descriptive in its approach (one of its intended 
uses is of course as  a  source of basic information for unscientifically-minded 
parliamentarians). The report's approach is evidently a  sceptical one, although it 
is coloured heavily by the repeated recognition by the rapporteur of the political, 
strategic and prestige justifications for the m aintenance of a  strong French space  
programme. The essential thrust of the report is that a  balance must be found 
between prestige, commercial and 'public service' (scientific development, satellite 
broadcasting and observation etc) justifications for space  activities. According to 
the report, such a  balance between the different motivations of the sp ace  effort 
necessitates a  more public discussion of the objectives and m eans of space  
policy, and specifically, parliamentary debate on the space  effort and the definition 
of a  Space Program m e law ('ioi de programmation spatiale) which would se t out 
policy and funding in an explicit pluri-annual framework. The report is generally 
positive about the past su ccesses  of the French space  sector and of the French- 
led European industry, seeing the European sp ace  industry as  'respectable' in 
financial, technological and industrial term s when com pared with the US, but 
em phasises that consolidation and greater efficiency in the definition and conduct 
of program m es are required to maintain European space  expertise. Despite the
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fact that the Office rejects the argument in favour of space  that it is a  motor of 
technological development {'une locomotive technologique'), the report still s ta tes 
that space deserves its priority status because of the combination of geostrategic, 
economic, public service and technological advantages that it confers on France.
In addition to general recommendations that the space effort needs to be 
rationalised organisationally and financially, the report raised specific doubts over 
the justification for the manned Hermes space  shuttle/plane and its associated 
Ariane V heavy launcher and Colombus laboratory module. By stressing that the 
motivations for m anned European space  flight are exclusively political and 
prestige-based, the report contributed to the consolidation of cost-based criticisms 
of Hermes which eventually led to its (indefinite) postponem ent in November 
1992.145
Le Comite national devaluation de la recherche (CNER)
The CNER w as set up by decree in 1989 a s  a  result of the dispositions in favour of 
the definition of strategic options in national science and technology policy and for 
the assessm en t ('evaluation) of that policy contained in the 1985 Law on 
Research and technological developm ent.146 The study undertaken by the CNER 
of the space  programme was one of the first, the early interest of the Comite in the 
space sector resulting from the size and prestige of the space  programme, from 
the rate of growth of spending on space, and most generally, because  'le 
programme spatial est devenu un element essentiel de la politique scientifique et 
technologique nationale'.u 7 The final docum ent w as m ade public in Septem ber 
1992 under the title Rapport sur le Programme spatial frangais.
If not damningly critical in its assessm en t of the space  programme, the 
report is nevertheless somewhat sceptical about the efficiency with which CNES 
has been running the French space sector - despite an overall good impression, 
the CNER found that CNES's activities were blighted by problems of organisation, 
funding and project m anagem ent.148 Before we consider the main findings and 
recom m endations of the Comite, it is interesting to note that the report indulges in 
som e sardonic com m ents on the difficulties of obtaining reliable figures, or even 
documentation of decisions from CNES, and complains that it is not often evident 
where responsibilities lie within CNES and between the various administrative 
bodies which make up the space sector.149
The report presents seventeen conclusions and recommendations. 
Concerning the definition and m anagem ent of the space  programme it notes that 
whilst s teps have been taken to normalise the channels for the financing of CNES,
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further overall increases in funding for space  will be impossible without prejudicing 
other fields of research. To help the organisation of funding, the Comite suggests 
that the space programme should be set out in the form of a  long-term plan, that 
CNES should institute proper accounting practices, that project cost evaluation 
should be m ade more accurate, and that CNES should avoid funding activities 
which have reached operational (commercial) status. Concerning the decision­
making structures of the space programme, the report criticises the lack of clarity 
in the patterns of responsibility in the space  sector, questions the involvement of 
CNES in operational and industrial aspects of space  programmes, recom m ends 
that the agency should review its policy of creating subsidiary com panies and 
suggests that CNES could expand its responsibilities to encom pass military space 
programmes. Concerning the broad thrust of space  policy, the report gives 
qualified approval to CNES's scientific programme, and to the Ariane V heavy 
launcher programme, but condem ns Hermes a s  technically and financially 
impossible within the term s of its original specifications.
2.6. Conclusion
We have now looked at the main fields of com m ent and analysis dealing with the 
activities of the French space sector and the context within which French space 
policy is m ade and operates. It can be seen  that space  has a  complex nature 
requiring pluridisciplinary study. -The approaches reviewed are partial in their 
treatm ent of space  activities, although offering useful insights into the way the 
space sector and space  policy should be analysed a s  a  unique object of study.
The way in which we propose to give an overall study of the determ inants of 
French space policy by combining analysis of the Military and Civil sectors and 
their relationship to governmental authority and the S tate has been set out in the 
Introduction, but having now outlined the previous studies of space  in France we 
can set out in more detail how this present treatm ent aims to progress beyond the 
works described above.
The decision to omit detailed consideration of the straightforward international 
diplomacy aspects of the French space effort has already been justified through 
the way in which it provides an uncontroversial background to the domestic 
developm ents in space policy. Almost without exception, the works presented 
above look at the French space effort (indeed, when space  is their primary 
concern) in the narrow perspectives of either defence policy, diplomacy, or
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science policy. This thesis looks at the making of overall space policy in a  wider 
socio-political-administrative context.
The analysis of the determ inants of and making of French space  policy 
developed in the following chapters reveals how the French space effort is made 
up of a  complex interaction of interests, agencies, ambitions and inertias. By 
concentrating on the ways in which inputs to the overall space  effort develop 
separately in the civil and military fields and then coalesce into a  combined 
programme, the study em phasises the disparity of sources for policy making and 
reveals the important roles played by the arm ed forces bodies involved in the 
spatial modernisation of French defence, and by CNES a s  an interface between 
the space  sector and government.
Having established what sources of information and analysis pre-exist the thesis, 
it is necessary, before looking in detail at the different strands of space policy 
since 1979 to synthesise the practical background against which space policy was 
made in the last ten years. Thus the following chapter presents the historical 
background to the French space effort in the 1980s and 1990s by looking at the 
origins and developm ent of civil and military space in the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s.
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p.3. The two year study resulted in the preparation of a confidential'rapport de synthese' presented 
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3. History of the Space Effort 1945-1979
The total period spanned by the French space effort stretches from the immediate 
post-war years to the most recent changes induced by the G eneva disarm am ent 
negotiations, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, economic recession, and the 
continued move towards European Union. Since our study is essentially 
concerned with the period from 1979 to 1992, throughout which we are to trace the 
relationships between the different com ponent elem ents of, inputs to and 
influences on the making of space policy, the Mitterrand years will be considered 
in detail in the subsequent sections. However, the making of civil and military 
space policy in the 1980s and early 1990s cannot be entirely divorced from the 
formative events of the post-war period, particularly the 1960s and 1970s, and this 
justifies the brief chronology presented here of the French space effort from 1945 
to 1979.
In term s of the military inputs to the evolution of the space effort, it is helpful 
to divide this long span of time into some half-dozen sub-periods corresponding for 
the most part to the duration of the Military Law programmes. Thus 1946-1959 
represents the phase of technological preparation for the atomic and missile 
programmes, 1960-64; the first 'loi de programme ', 1965-70 the second 'loi de 
programme', 1971-75 the third 'loi de programmme ' and 1976-1979 the early 
Giscard/Barre years.1
Alongside the development of the military aspects of space strategy, 
organisation and industry, the civil inputs to the definition of policy and the 
elaboration of the space programme also evolved during this period with changing 
attitudes towards science and technology, resulting most notably in the creation of 
the civil national space agency, the Centre national d ’etudes spatiales (CNES) in 
1961, and in 1979, the first launch of the French-led European satellite launcher 
Ariane.
The plan of the chapter is thus the following :
- 3.1. 1946-1959 : The Initial effort
- 3.2. The 1960s : CNES, the Force de frappe and ‘tous azimuts’
- 3.3. The 1970s : Civil and military space in the 1970s - consolidation
- 3.4. Conclusion
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3.1. 1946-1959 : the initial effort.
In the field of ‘Big science’, in France, 1945 saw  the creation of the Commissariat a 
lEnergie atomique (CEA) or Atomic Energy Commission, and 1946 the Parodi 
declaration before the United Nations in which France claimed that the French 
atomic research effort w as purely civil in motivation. Despite this claim, the work 
of the CEA directorate entrusted with military applications produced the first 
French atomic explosion at Reggane in the S ahara  in 1960. In parallel with the 
early developm ent of this atomic expertise, placed ambiguously (in governm ent 
rhetoric at least) between civil and military applications, the birth of the French 
space industry w as purely military. In 1946 the Laboratoire de Recherches 
baiistiques et aerodynamiques (LRBA) at Vernon w as created to work on the 
study and production of ballistic missiles and rocket launchers, profiting from 
captured Germ an V2 missile technology, and under the aegis of the Direction des 
etudes et fabrication d ’armement (DEFA) of the Ministry of Defence, the LRBA 
carried out the armed forces' ballistic missile research programme, which w as 
assigned the objective of developing the liquid-fuelled Veronique rocket.
3.1.1. The 1950s : the choice of vector for the French deterrent
During the 1950s, the French space effort w as essentially concerned with the 
development of launchers to complement the planned atomic w arheads being 
secretly prepared by the CEA. The Veronique programme, initially a  military 
project, eventually provided a  civil launcher for French participation in the 
International Geophysical Year of 1959. One of the major issues of this period 
w as the choice between liquid- and solid-fuel technologies for the missile 
propulsion system s, and the choice made in favour of solid powder engines over 
liquid propulsion stimulated a developing split between military and civil work.
The waning of military interest in liquid-fuelled missile technology that occurred in 
the mid-1950s, which effectively led to Veronique becoming a  civil rocket, w as a  
consequence of both strategic and technical factors. Firstly, there w as a  certain 
amount of confusion as  to whether the yet to be produced atomic w arheads would 
be transported by missiles or by long-range strategic bom bers: 1956 saw two 
contradictory declarations on this subject coming from different actors in the 
military bureaucratic hierarchy, the Secretary of S tate for Air stating that bombers 
would be cheaper and more reliable, and the C hefdEtat Major deciding to 
precede with both bomber and missile vectors.2 Secondly, on a  strategic-
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technical level, Veronique seem ed unlikely to be the most efficient choice of vector 
because  its liquid propellant made the launch phase  time-consuming and 
inappropriate for rapid response to aggression. The affectation of the Veronique 
rocket to civilian service also underlined the possibility of exchanges between civil 
and military functions in the field of space technology.
Continued military interest in launchers w as guaranteed by the political 
decision to develop both Air Force and. Army vectors for the Deterrent force (thus 
reducing inter-service rivalry by using both planes and missiles), confirmed by 
Delegue Ministeriel pour I'armement General Fourquet in May 1957,3 and the 
choice of solid-fuelled rocket motors for the army missiles was confirmed by a 
1958 inquiry headed by Inspecteur-General Girardin. Thus the 1950s showed 
that France w as capable of developing a  range of space  technologies required for 
ballistic missile production, and that exchanges between civil and military aspects 
of the ‘space  sector1 were possible and fruitful.
1959 w as a  crucial year for the French space  effort because it w as marked 
by an overt political declaration of France’s will to becom e a  nuclear power and by 
the beginnings of actual missile production. The initial period of the 1950s, 
dominated by military research into missile and space  technology concluded with 
General de Gaulle's November 1959 speech before the Ecole Miiitaire in which he 
stated France's unshakeable intention to p o ssess  a  nuclear deterrent, whether 
self-m ade or purchased, and outlined the first five-year military programme law 
containing 770 million francs for a strategic missile programme.4 At the sam e 
time the p assag e  into a  phase of active developm ent and production of launcher 
missiles w as confirmed institutionally in 1959 by the creation of the Societe 
d'etudes et de realisation d'engins balistiques (SEREB), a  limited com pany with 
the sta te  as  its majority shareholder in partnership with most of the French firms 
with a  potential or actual interest in missiles and satellite launchers. SEREB had 
a  ten year brief to stimulate and mobilize the nascent space  industry and to 
m anage the production of the first ground-based missiles of the deterrent force. 
This activity w as under the authority { ’tutelle') of the arm ed forces bodies 
responsible for missiles, and after 1962, in cooperation with the newly created 
French national space  agency (CNES).
The return to power of General de Gaulle in 1958 gave renewed impetus to 
the nascent atomic and space industries, through a  heightened aw areness of their 
importance to each other and to France. Already in late 1957, in an indication of 
the importance attached to the atom and space the responsibility for Atomic and 
S pace questions had come under direct Prime Ministerial control, first under Felix 
Gaillard a s  President du Conseil (November 1957), and then, in June 1958, de
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Gaulle himself assum ed authority, before appointing Jacques Soustelle as the 
Ministre delegue aupres du Premier Ministre in January 1959. At the sam e time, 
the Comite de Recherches spatiales w as created  with the brief of evaluating the 
range and nature of French space activites, and of presenting a  report for action to 
the Prime Minister. Headed initially by Pierre Auger, the Committee was attached 
to the influential Delegue General a la Recherche scientifique et technique, at the 
time Pierre Piganiol, co-author in 1963 of Pour une politique scientifique. the 
crucial contribution to France’s debate on the place of science and technology in 
the 1960s which we discussed in the Literature review. In conjunction with the 
first ’Loi de Programmation militaire'oi 1961, the Committee's report determined 
the move towards the creation of CNES and the trends and volume of French 
space  activities until 1965.
3.1.2. 1959 : the Comite de recherches spatiales
C reated by decree on 7 January 1959, the Comite de recherches spatiales w as 
the first institution set up with responsibility uniquely for questions relating to 
space .5 The Committee assisted the Presidence du Conseil and the Delegue 
General a la recherche scientifique et technique. Its composition w as determined 
by the presence of representatives of organisations with technical com petence in 
space  activities or a  specific interest in the applications of space  technology, and 
by governm ent representatives from Ministries involved in space  activities. The 
Committee thus grouped the President of the Comite d ’action scientifique de la 
defense nationale (CASDN), the Director General of the Office national d'etudes et 
de recherches aeronautiques (ONERA), the Director of the Centre national de la 
recherche scientifique (CNRS) and the head of the Paris Observatory. The 
controlling Ministerial authorities were represented by the Director General of the 
’Affaires culturelles et techniques' departm ent of the Foreign Ministry and by an 
official from the Finance Ministry. The Comite w as thus a  prestigious body 
intended to reflect the importance given by de Gaulle to high technoogy and 
space.
The brief of the Comite de recherches spatiales w as threefold: firstly its 
m em bers had to take stock of the capabilities for space  research existing in 
France and were secondly to prepare and present to the Prime Minister a 
programme of space  research; thirdly, the Committee w as to direct the 
implementation of the programme once accepted by the government. The group 
w as also m eant to act as  a clearing house for information, being informed of all 
national and international activities in the field of space research and
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communicating this intelligence to the government. As a  small scale prototype of 
a  national space  centre, the Comite de recherches spatiales w as short-lived.
Even before the legal creation of CNES in D ecem ber 1961, the statutes of the 
Committee were abrogated and replaced by a  new set of regulations. The decree 
of 3 July 1961 in effect brought the Committee under the direct authority of the 
Prime Minister and the Delegation generate a la recherche scientifique et 
technique (DGRST) and much enlarged both its membership and its m issions.6 
The membership, enlarged to 22 in addition to the president Pierre Auger, again 
represented the controlling Ministries but with an increased participation from the 
Foreign Ministry, whose Director General of Cultural and Technical Affairs was 
seconded in his work on the Committee by the head of the Service des Affaires 
spatiales of the sam e Foreign Ministry. R epresentatives from the Delegation 
ministerielle a I'Armement (DMA) and the Defence Ministry numbered four in total 
(Director of the DRME, Director of the Departement Engins of the DMA, Chief of 
General Staff interarmees, representative of the Chief of General Staff of National 
defence). The missions of the Committee were increased, adding an advisory 
capacity to the Prime Minister and and a  role of coordinating interministerial 
interest in space  matters to the responsibilities of assessm en t, planning and 
m anagem ent introduced in the original decree of January 1959.
During 1959 and 1960 institutional moves were thus being made towards the 
creation of CNES following the model created by the United S tates with NASA, an 
agency intended to m anage scientific and technological activities concerning 
space. As well a s  the Comite and SEREB, other interest in space w as 
burgeoning, a s  w itnessed by Professor Etienne V assy's S pace Physics team  at 
the Universite de Paris, and Professor Alfred Kastler's 'Service d'aeronomid in the 
CNRS. The need for a  coordinating body in the field of sp ace  science and 
research that had led to the creation and subsequent enlargem ent of the Comite 
de recherches spatiales continued during 1961 a s  the importance of all aspects  of 
space technology and its applications were increasingly perceived.
3.2. The 1960s : CNES, the Force de frappe and 'tous azimuts’
After what can be called the ‘initial’ period of the immediate post-war era and the 
1950s, when France was still recovering from the destruction of the war and the 
political problems left by occupation and collaboration a s  well a s  coping with the 
debilitating effects of colonial wars, the 1960s were marked by more stability in 
politics and society and by growth in the economy, under the leadership of de
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Gaulle. In military and civil space, much progress w as made. Below we 
consider the creation of the Centre national d ’etudes spatiales in 1961 -62.
3.2.1. 1961-62 : the Centre National d'Etudes spatiales
Prior to the eventual physical creation of CNES in 1962, a  number of laws and 
decrees of 1961 and 1962 defined its objectives, its administrative and financial 
workings and its accountability. Under the influence of de Gaulle, Prime Minister 
Michel Debre and Pierre Guillaumat (from March 1960 Ministre delegue aupres du 
Premier Ministre for space) the project of creating CNES w as approved by 
Parliament, becoming law in December 1961. Officially instituted by the Law no. 
61-1382 of 19 Decem ber 1961, the original form of CNES was established in two 
steps; firstly the initial Act of December 1961, and secondly, the Decree no. 62- 
153 of 10 February 1962 which defined the administrative and financial workings 
of the C entre.7
The first article of Law 61-1382 declared that 'II est institue sous le nom de 
Centre national d'etudes spatiales un etablissement public scientifique et 
technique a caractere industriel et commercial, dote de I'autonomie financiere et 
place sous I'autorite du Premier Ministre'. This is the most succinct definition of 
what might be term ed the 'modele fondateur'ot CNES, and which still contains in 
essen ce  the key to CNES’s role, activities and problems. CNES's objectives were 
five in number: firstly to act as  a  clearing house for information on national and 
international space  matters; secondly to prepare national research programmes for 
presentation to the Comite interministeriel de la recherche scientifique et technique 
(CIMRST); thirdly to undertake the execution of the program m es; fourthly to 
monitor international space cooperation (in partnership with the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs); and fifthly, to ensure the publication of scientific papers dealing 
with space  matters.
Although CNES was set up with the obvious responsibility of managing the 
the space sector for the state, its theoretical accountability to government w as 
clearly set out, in terms of finance and in term s of the monitoring of the agency’s 
decisions and activities. Article 3 of the founding law instituted the autonomy of 
the Centre concerning the m anagem ent of its finances, which were essentially to 
be drawn from the funding envisaged for space research in the Loi de programme 
d'actions coordonnees de recherche scientifique et technique or scientific research 
law of May 1961. Funding was also immediately available through the Fonds de
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developpement de la recherche scientifique et technique of the Prime Minister's 
budget, CNES taking over responsibility for the space  research agreem ents 
concluded within this structure. The theoretical responsibility of the Centre to 
Parliament w as set out in Article 6, which required the submission of an Annual 
report by the Centre on its activities and results to be available before the annual 
budgetary debates  in the Assembly.
The administrative and financial working of the Centre w as exposed in 
considerably greater detail two months later on 10 February 1962 in Decree 62- 
153. Com pared with the composition of the Comite de recherches spatiales, the 
CNES Board of Administration again revealed the desire of the governm ent to 
reflect the pluridisciplinary nature of space activities in the institutions, care  being 
taken to include in representation the fields of science and technology, industry, 
the Ministerial technocracy and the Armed forces. Thus the Conseil 
d'Administration of the new agency was to be com posed of the Director G eneral of 
the CNRS, the Director of the Paris Observatory, the Director of the Direction des 
recherches et moyens d'essais (DRME) at the Army Ministry, four m em bers with 
specific relative scientific or industrial expertise, and three senior civil servants 
representing the principal Ministries involved in the activities of CNES.8
The Comite de recherches spatiales, (modified already in July 1961) w as 
further transform ed into the Conseil de I'Espace through the notable addition to its 
personnel of the very senior Commissaire General du Plan, the Delegue General a 
la recherche scientifique et technique and the President of the Comite d'action 
scientifique de defense. Prestigiously structured in this way, the Conseil de 
I'Espace took on a  consultative role to CNES, whose President w as also its own 
chairman. The Conseil met at the request of the President of CNES in order to 
deliberate on the content and execution of projected CNES programmes, the 
com m ents of the Conseil being taken into account in the final settlem ent of plans. 
Thus assisted  by the Conseil de I'Espace, the President and the Conseil 
d'Administration of CNES were to be answerable to governm ent on a  num ber of 
levels. Firstly, the discussions of the CNES administrators included the 
participation of the Delegue General a la recherche scientifique et technique and 
the Controleur d'Etat. In this way, the scientific interest of CNES activities w as 
monitored at the highest level of the institution's decision making structure, and the 
economic and financial ramifications of its planned and existing program m es were 
examined by the Finance Ministry.9
Furthermore, in accordance with Article 6 of the Founding law, Article 11 of 
Decree 62-153 provided the detail of the procedures involving CNES's 
responsibility to Parliament through its Annual report which w as to be exam ined by
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the Conseil d'Administration before being sent to the Minister attached to the 
Prime Minister and to the Finance Minister before being transmitted by the former 
of th ese  to Parliament itself.10
The financial organisation of the Centre w as to be monitored by a  Contrdleur 
d'Etat reporting to the Ministre delegue and to the Finance Ministry (Article 12), 
with provision being made for the future detailing of this framework in a  joint arrete. 
This joint arrete of 29 August 1963 established that CNES w as subject to the rules 
and regulations of Public accounting, as  set out in the decree dealing with the 
issue of 29 Decem ber 1962. The arrete s tressed  that funding for CNES w as to be 
based  on annual forecasts of receipts and expenses, the forecasts distinguishing 
between costs incurred in the functioning of the Centre and capital investment 
co sts .11 Such a  framework of controls, checks, balances and inspections 
reflected a  belief in the importance of the space  sector and in the need for a  strong 
and autonom ous, (but not necessarily overly-independent) space agency to 
administer its development.
Physically, CNES cam e into existence on 1 March 1962, the seventeen staff 
headed by Director-General Pierre Aubiniere, President Pierre Auger and 
Technical Director Professor Jacques Blamont. Aubiniere w as a  refugee from the 
arm ed forces, being an ingenieurde I'armement w hose former responsibility had 
been that of heading the Direction technique des Engins at the Ministere des 
Armees, whilst Auger was a  civilian scientist who had contributed to the setting up 
of CERN as  well a s  having headed the Comite de Recherches spatiales. Thus 
from the beginning, the two future trends of space  activites, namely national- 
military and civil-European, were present in embryo in the CNES organigramme.
The creation of a  new institution such a s  CNES to m anage the space industry, 
rather than adapting already existing structures such a s  SEREB indicated an 
apparent will on the part of government to move away from the essentially military 
origins of space  technology and the continued influence of the arm ed forces which 
w as being exerted through the development of the deterrent force. As we have 
seen , the one existing civil body concerned with space w as transformed on the 
creation of CNES in order to exercise a  consultative role to the new agency, the 
Comite de Recherches spatiales becoming the Conseil de lEspace.
Under the term s of the Loi 61-1382 CNES w as to be a  state technical and 
scientific establishm ent charged with bringing French space  research up to a  truly 
international level and developing French technological and industrial capabilities 
in aerospace to international competitiveness. CNES also had an industrial and 
commercial brief implied in the second part of its title a s  an Etablissement public 
scientifique et technique a caractere industriel et commercial', but in reflection of
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the weighting of its activities at this early stage in the developm ent of the ‘space 
industry’ w as dependent initially on the Ministry of Scientific research and Atomic 
and Space questions (headed by Ministre d'Etat Gaston Palewski) which 
exercised the tutelle for space matters until February 1965.12
The initial practical development responsibility of CNES was the 
encouragem ent of French satellites and launchers, the government having 
accepted SEREB's December 1961 proposal to develop the Diamant launchers.
In May 1962 an outline agreem ent between the DMA and CNES set out the 
division of responsibilities of the two institutions in the programme under the prime 
contractorship of SEREB. Before the first launch of the Diamant rocket in 
November 1965 and the launch of the first French scientific capsule (A1 Asterix) 
by an American launcher in December 1965, cooperative European space  
activities were initiated with the creation of the European Launcher Development 
Organisation (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) in 
March and June 1962 respectively.
If the creation of CNES by the new Gaullist regime may be seen  a s  an 
institutional innovation representing the s ta te’s desire to involved (indirectly 
through an agency) in the planned development of the space  sector, militarily, the 
early 1960s also witnessed new approaches to planning deriving from Gaullist 
thinking. Institutionally and organisationally, the military program laws were one 
of the major innovations.
3.2.2. 1960-64: The first Loi de Programme and the Force de frappe
During the second period in the development of the space  sector, the influence of 
de Gaulle in the development of the nuclear force simultaneously stimulated 
military and civil space efforts. The period of the first Loi de programme provided 
the earliest and most classic formulation of Gaullist nuclear strategy, the doctrine 
of the ‘national sanctuary’ being elaborated in the early 1960s notably by Armed 
Forces Minister Pierre M essm er and by General Jean  Noiret, Inspector General of 
the Army. In 1963, General de Gaulle voiced the notion of two battles, one in the 
'forward' a reas  of Europe, in which French conventional and possibly tactical 
forces might be engaged, and the second battle representing the defence of 
France itself by strategic nuclear forces.13 Technologically, this doctrine implied 
the need for long-range bombers and fororound-to-ground strategic ballistic 
missiles Csol-sol balistique strategique’ = SSBS) with a  range sufficient to reach 
the presum ed Eastern enemy. The terms of the loi de programme 1960-64 also 
implied the developm ent of sea-to-land long-range ballistic missiles (‘mer-sol
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balistique strategique’ = MSBS) as  part of a  'tronc commun‘ research programme 
with the SSBS missiles. Initially in 1964, the number of ground-based missiles 
was set at fifty-four silos, but by 1971-72, when the first 3000 km range S-2 
missiles were entering service their number had been reduced to a  mere eighteen 
from an intermediate revision in the second programme law to twenty-seven.14
In general, this period shows how the aeronautical elem ent of the Force de 
Dissuasion was ultimately fated to be replaced by rockets and space  rather than 
by air-reliant system s. Despite the place of the long-range bom ber a s  a 
component of the triad of vectors available for the nuclear force, and its survival 
into the 1980s and 1990s, the long-term future of the nuclear force w as soon seen 
to lie in space related technology. In an article by Air Force General Andre Martin 
in 1964 intended to reinforce his service's claim on the 'bombinette\ we can rather 
ironically find one of the early references to the militarisation of space: the main 
thrust of Martin's argument was that the missile could never replace the manned 
plane, an unfortunate conviction somewhat com pensated for by the prescience 
with which he evoked the potential role of space  in information gathering and 
telecommunications.15 With the near simultaneous creation of the Centre national 
d'etudes spatiales (CNES) and the Delegation Ministerielle de I'Armement (DMA) 
in 1961 and 1962,16 the second period of the development of the space  industry 
was marked by the separation of the civil and military establishm ents theoretically 
responsible for their respective sectors, even if the practice of the space  industry 
overall was still marked by the military origins of space technology. This 
institutional separation of the organisations marked the belief that sp ace  was not 
just a  military concern, but that it w as of great civil importance to the economy and 
society as  a  whole.
3.2.3 1965-1970 : the second Loi de programme and ftous azimuts’
During this period France pulled out of practical involvement in the NATO 
Alliance's integrated military structure. This decision, taken in 1966, was intended 
to distance France from a  perceived constraint on her independence of military 
action, and as  such was consistent with the views expressed  earlier by M essmer 
and Noiret and the decision to procure tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.
The strategic doctrine of the ‘two battles’ implying the need for strategic and 
tactical nuclear vectors offered France the option of potential non-belligerency in a 
European conflict since theoretically her troops could remain just beyond the 
frontiers, not becoming involved in actual conflict until the last moment before the 
violation of the sacrosanct national territory. The proposition made in December
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1967 by Air Force General Charles Ailleret that France should develop a massive 
strategic nuclear force capable of dissuading atttacks originating in any part of the 
world may be seen  to be itself a logical extension of the two battles/sanctuarisation 
doctrine.17
The Tous azimuts'- "all points of the com pass" concept suggested  by Ailleret, 
which (perhaps unfortunately for the French space industry) w as never accepted 
as  a  basis for operational planning, would have necessitated the development of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles of 10 000 km range in large series. Ailleret's 
recom m endations were based  on his analysis of the likely geo-strategic 
developm ents of the next two decades. The long term view which w as taken by 
Ailleret, which m eans that his reflections on the future a s  he envisaged it dealt with 
the 1980s, is characteristic of his celebrated article.18
The planning and prospection of future trends that Ailleret supported has 
been echoed in recent structures created within the Ministry of Defence in the mid- 
1980s. Had the 'engins balistiques megatonniques a portee mondiale' called for 
by Ailleret been produced (series production w as planned for 1980, with entry into 
service during 1985-90), the face of the French space  industry might have been 
som ew hat different. Ailleret had no doubts that his recom m endations were 
actually feasible; the effort required had to be carefully evaluated, but was 
imperative if France was to retain her independence of action.
Given perennial concerns over France's independence of action in launching 
missiles against Moscow without relying on American cooperation for navigation 
and positioning data  from US satellites, Ailleret's prescience in indicating the 
'extrapolation spatiale' of his ICBM project in particular and of strategic defence in 
general seem s to have been ignored throughout the 1970s at the cost of the 
credibility of French defence. " Tous azimuts" would have been possible through 
the developm ent of a  large-scale intercontinental missile capability and of spatial 
forces.19
The rejection of Ailleret's 'perspectives hardies' a s  Lothar Ruehl term s them 20 
w as a  negative turning point for the development of the French space  industry and 
for French military space activities. Defence Minister M essm er rejected the 
specifically space  oriented aspects  of 'tous azimuts', unaw are of the future 
importance of military sp ace .21 Air Force General Michel Fourquet, in a  classic 
restatem ent of French nuclear strategy, rejected the notion of ubiquitous threats to 
France in favour of the traditional Soviet m enace. Coming twelve months after 
Ailleret's death in an aeroplane accident, Fourquet's speech  before the IHEDN in 
March 1969, in omitting to make mention of 'tous azimuts' marked the 
disappearance of the concept as  an issue of debate 22 The most positive reaction
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to 'tous azimuts’ cam e from the then President of the Revue de Defense nationale. 
Edmond Combaux, who, in attempting to reconcile the concept with ’le sens de la 
mesure etde la raison' arrived at conclusions which interestingly prefigured 
m easures instituted in the 1980s in civil and military high-tech cooperation in 
Europe.23 Combaux's "reasonable" perspective proposed European concertation; 
an 'espace politique et militaire elargi' in which the French would ring in a  scientific 
renaissance through the fostering of all m eans of developing high technology such 
as  space.24 Indeed, for Combaux, the ‘tous azimuts'concept 'prendra toute sa 
valeur comme doctrine de defense commune de I’Eurooe d’Occident\ 25 
Combaux's subtle analysis of the situation in 1968 w as a s  far-sighted as Ailleret's 
own concept of 'tous azimuts'. Its merit is to have anticipated the cost-constraints 
of the 1980s, extrapolating forwards in time from the 1960s context of an overt 
separation of military and civil space (and a  striking restatem ent of France's need 
to be militarily independent through space), to the situation of the late-1980s and 
1990s where military-civil and international collaboration has been seen  to be 
increasingly necessary  to maintain the technological, economic and political place 
of France and Europe in the world.
Given this strong em phasis on France’s modernisation a s  a  military power 
during the years of de Gaulle, it is indicative of the importance accorded to 
fostering civil space as  well that the French space effort also engaged in the 
multilateral space  science and launcher initiatives of the newly created European 
space organisations such as  ELDO and ESRO. French space  activities also 
undertook bilateral cooperation, for example with the Federal Republic over the 
Franco-German telecommunications satellite programme Symphonie (Convention 
signed 6 June 1967). CNES also collaborated with the US and Soviet space 
programmes. Throughout this early period, CNES's existence a s  a  new institution 
responsible for what w as essentially a  new field of government concern was 
threatened by the presence of existing com petence in the sector, notably the 
considerable military experience of launcher technology and also to a  lesser extent 
the influence of organisations such as  ONERA with know-how in related fields 
which might have been transformed into a  space  agency had the decision not 
been taken in 1961 to create an institution ex nihilo. As an illustration of this 
situation, in 1966 CNES won a struggle to take authority for the Diamant launcher 
programme away from the armed forces bodies involved in its m an ag em en t.
This meant that the political decision to create CNES w as backed up by the 
presence of the political will to support the activities of the new organisation. The 
late 1960s saw  the implementation of the Diamant B programme and the 
establishment of the (civil) Toulouse Space Centre (CST).
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In the background to the debate over tous azimuts, CNES w as evolving 
quietly during the late-1960s, and specifically in 1968 two decrees slightly modified 
the dispositions of Decree 62-153. The effect of these  modifications of CNES’s 
statutes was to extend the range of Ministries involved in CNES activities - an 
indication of the far-reaching nature of space research and industry.26
3.3. The 1970s : consolidation in military and civil space
The 1970s represented the first period of what could arguably be term ed the 
mature phase of French space activities, after the beginnings of developm ent of 
technologies in the 1940s and 1950s and after the ‘heroic’ phase of 
institutionalisation and expansion during the 1960s. Politically and economically, 
the period w as marked by the Pompidou presidency, under which much action 
was slowed by the transition from the Gaullist period to Pompidou (and then 
Pompidou’s illness) and subsequently by the Presidency of Giscard d ’Estaing, 
under which France suffered the effects of the oil crises.
1970 saw  the first assessm en t of CNES progress and the first attem pt since 
the recommendation of the Comite de Recherches spatiaies and its six year plan 
in the early 1960s, to plan future trends in French space  activities. The ‘Aigrain 
report’ presented to the government in March 1970 led to the choice of pursuing 
European collaboration within the context of ELDO and ESRO and of emphasizing 
applications satellites and launchers. The decision to go European w as 
determined by the costs of space programmes, perceived to be beyond the 
capacities of a  medium-sized power such a s  France shaken by the social and 
financial disturbances of 1968-69, and by the belief that by playing a  leading role in 
the development of the European space industry France could retain her 
'autonomie27 in space technology if not the 'capacite autarcique' represented by 
the otherwise shining exam ple of the domestic nuclear programme.
3.3.1. 1971-75: the third Loi de programme- consolidation in military space
The period of the third Loi de programme saw the confirmation of the Fourquet 
doctrine by Defence Minister Debre, and a  certain amount of continuing 
controversy over the choice of delivery system s despite the rejection of the idea of 
producing ICBMs by the Pompidou, Chaban-Delm as and Debre administration in 
1969. The departure of de Gaulle, who was seen  a s  the 'eminence grise'behind 
Ailleret's advocacy of global range arms and the militarisation of space removed
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the last support for the notion of tous azimuts in the preparation of the third Loi de 
programme, although the government covered itself by pledging its will to maintain 
studies and research for future exploitation. For Ruehl, this marked tacit 
acceptance of the impossibility of bearing the financial and technical burden of 
ICBMs.28 The government at the time was effectively avoiding the question of the 
future importance of space in nuclear defenc,e a s  illustrated in a  1970 report to the 
Defence Commission of the National Assembly.29
Ruehl concludes that despite the technical and industrial capacity to 
produce ICBMs, and the existence of credible military justifications for their 
development, financial considerations were the primary cause  for the rejection of 
tous azimuts. The symbolic efficacy (as opposed to its destructive potential) of 
the launcher site on the Plateau d'Albion in Provence w as also confirmed during 
the funding crisis of this period by the installation of a  mere eighteen S-2 SSBS in 
1971 -72, a  third of the initial number called for in 1964.
According to Admiral Sanguinetti, an issue inspired by tous azimuts also arose 
in 1973-74, under the form of a  request by the Etat major de la Marine that the 
replacem ent for the submarine-launched M-20 should have an increased range of 
7000 km and a  single thermo-nuclear warhead, (the M-4 missile having originally 
been envisaged by the DMA under the Pompidou Administration with a  range of 
4000+ km).30 The justification for the increased range dem anded w as that the 
French withdrawal from the integrated military com m and of NATO implied an at 
least theoretical equal appreciation of danger from Soviet and US actions, and that 
in practice, if the real threat w as likely to come from Moscow, longer range 
missiles would allow submarine patrols in waters more easily controlled by France 
than permitted by the 4000 km limit. The rejection of the request w as a  function of 
political u n ease  at its similarities with tous azimuts and because of the DMA's 
interest in developing multiple-warhead technology for the M4.31
The period of the third Loi de programme w as thus a  time of relatively little 
forward movement in term s of either strategy or technology, the preparation of the 
military plan being affected by political, social and monetary uncertainty. In civil 
space, the situation was troubled by the difficulties of the ESRO and ELDO 
organisations, whose French-led restructuring into ESA gave the concentration on 
civil European space activities of the Giscard d'Estaing Presidency.
Giscard d'Estaing's Presidency was marked by two significant debates  over 
strategy and by French efforts towards the commercial developm ent of the 
European Space Agency launcher Ariane. Neither the refinements brought to 
nuclear strategy nor the Ariane programme affected substantially the relationship 
between civil and military space in France which had evolved during the late 1950s
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and the 1960s, namely that of official separation betw een the two sectors 
(represented by the presence of twin technical and scientific agencies in the form 
of CNES and the DGA), but a  persisting historical influence of the military origins 
of the industry overall on the development of the civil sector.
Militarily, France was also involved in som e greater interaction with her 
European neighbours. In 1976 the concept of 'sanctuarisation elargie' was 
considered by the President and his Chief of Staff General Mery; under this 
doctrine the deterrent protection afforded France by her strategic w eapons would 
be extended to NATO allies. In 1980 a  further potential refinement w as voiced, 
namely the 'oeuvres vives' concept targeting specific military and government 
objectives in the USSR. Neither of these notions w as actively adopted, and 
French declaratory policy returned to the traditional statem ent of strategy, with, 
under Mitterrand, a  tendency towards resanctuarisation.32
3.3.2. Europeanisation - consolidation in civil space
Although the initial founding statutes were those of 61-1382 and 62-153, we have 
seen  how these  were preceded by the creation and modification of the Comite de 
recherches spatiales and them selves subsequently adapted on certain points by 
arretes and decrees in 1963 and 1968. Thus by the 1970s CNES statutes had 
reached an initial temporary equilibrium.33 However, the 1970s were a  period of 
rapid developm ents in Space policy and in the nature of the space  industry, a  
phase of early maturity for the sector built up since the late 1950s from exclusively 
military origins to increasing economic, strategic, diplomatic and scientific 
importance. The end of the 1970s thus represented the first settled form of 
CNES’s organisation, administration and functioning after the first rectifications of 
the 1960s and the later additions of the 1970s.
In January 1976 a  number of modifications were m ade to CNES’s statutes, 
reflecting the perceived change in the nature of space  activities more and more 
towards practical applications of technology. The span of ministerial interests 
involved in space  activities w as represented by the large num ber of ‘user’ 
ministries involved in the Conseil des applications advising the Industry and 
research ministry, which exercised authority over CNES 34
W hereas the Conseil exercised an advisory and consultative role in informing 
the Industry and Research Ministry on various implications of CNES activities, the 
appointment of a  government Commissar to oversee the running of CNES 
evidenced a  strong Ministerial desire not to go unaw ares of developm ents within 
the Space Agency. Financially, the Ministry still provided the funding for CNES
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which was supplem ented (article 11) by 'fonds des contrats sur programmes ' 
undertaken with the DGRST or with various Ministerial departm ents involved in 
space applications. This represented the beginning of CNES 'own resources' 
('ressources propres') combined with paym ents for services rendered making up 
the agency's degree of financial independence from its controlling Ministries.35
The international dimension of space activities w as becoming increasingly 
important, given France's dynamic approach to European cooperation, leading to 
the creation of the European Space Agency from ELDO and ESRO. The two 
strands of the French strategy suggested by the Aigrain Report of 1970 were 
expressed  in the Conseils restreints held at the end of 1972 and 1974. In 
November 1972 the government decided to propose the 'Europeanisation' of the L 
III S launcher to its European partners in the troubled ELDO. In October 1974 the 
Diamant programme w as scheduled for abandonm ent along with others because 
of its costs. Bilaterally, the Symphonie satellite w as launched in Decem ber 1974, 
whilst French leadership in ELDO and ESRO led to the resolution of their 
successive 'crises' through the May 1975 creation of the European Space Agency 
(ESA). Over the period of these crises (1971 -73) France w as contributing a  third 
of the CNES budget to cooperative European projects. In 1977, two years after 
the creation of ESA and three years after the decision to undertake the Ariane 
programme, France was contributing 34% of total ESA funds, and no less than 
62.5% of the cost of Ariane was coming from CNES.
3.3.3. Space policy as 'insurance'
The 1970s were primarily the decade of the preparation of Ariane, built for the ESA 
by CNES working as  prime contractor. France's near monopoly of Ariane gave 
the lie to the apparent new all-European face of space  activities. Although it is not 
our purpose here to discuss the European aspects  of French space  policy, it must 
be pointed out that out of the ESA projects, Ariane w as that with the highest 
'independence content' in strategic, military, industrial and commercial term s.36 In 
comparison with the Spacelab for example, in which W est Germany w as 
advocating collaboration with the US and with the limited enthusiasm  of the UK 
who w as only committing herself to a  maritime satellite communications system, 
France's support for Ariane represented the guarantee of strategic launcher 
autonomy from the US and the furtherance of French expertise in ballistics and 
missile propulsion useful for maintaining the credibility of the deterrent force. 
Indeed, because  of the relatively tried and tested nature of much of Ariane's 
technology, the proportion of purely scientific and technological interest in the
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programme w as perhaps all the smaller in comparison with its strategic military 
and commercial importance. Despite rhetoric from France that French space 
policy was European space policy37, it is generally accepted that French motives 
for European cooperation were not motivated solely by a  desire for integration. 
France's space policy during this period was an 'insurance policy' by which she 
contributed to maintaining French national science, industry and defence at levels 
above those which would have possible without cooperation in European space .38
Overall, the later 1970s were characterized by attem pts to foster a  solid 
‘commercial’ basis to the space industry at the beginning of the ‘applications era’ 
that was expected to be opened in the 1980s. Ariane represented the flagship of 
this movement into the provision of space ‘goods and services' a s  it was believed 
that there w as a  ‘market niche’ for a  commercial launcher of the satellites whose 
usefulness had been proven by the successful telecommunications satellite 
programmes such as Symphonie. Military aspects  of space  utilisation apparently 
took a second place in government preoccupations, although som e studies were 
effected by the armed forces into satellite communications. Official positions on 
the militarisation of space stressed  the need for peaceful applications and for the 
restriction of superpow er military applications in favour of the control of space by 
the international commmunity, although how genuine these  were in reality, we 
shall see  in following chapters.
The beginnings of real social and economic effects of space activities on French 
society were inaugurated with the decision of the Conseil economique et social to 
authorize the launch of the SPOT earth observation programme (19 Septem ber 
1977), the establishm ent of a  protocol of agreem ent between the Ministry of Posts, 
Telephones and Telecommunications and the DGA for the m anagem ent of the 
Telecom 1/ SYRACUSE  / telecommunications satellite system  (20 March 1978) 
and the creation of Satel-Conseil (31 July 1978), a  CNES subsidiary acting as  an 
engineering and business consultancy promoting French satellite sytem s and 
services. In 1979, with the approaching readiness of the Ariane launcher a s  a  
‘commercial’ viability the government decided to modify CNES's missions and brief 
in conformity with the expected onset of the era  of 'commercial space'. At the 
Conseil restreint held on 20 February 1979 it w as also decided that Ariane should 
finally be produced and commercialized by a  new body, and that Telecom 1 
should be launched. The first Ariane launch w as effected on 24 Decem ber 1979, 
and the Arianespace CNES subsidiary company was instituted in March 1980.
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3.4. Conclusion
In conclusion we can suggest that the historical context of French S pace in the 
1980s and 1990s is one that melds essentially military origins and a  real and 
continuing link between nuclear deterrence, space  technology and French 
independence with a  gradual waning in the overt military importance of space  
(periodically reversed) in favour of a  move towards commercial applications. 
Pointers for the future development of the the French space effort that we can find 
in the period 1945-1979 include the periodically som ew hat confused relationship 
between civil and military activities, the som etim es problematic interaction 
between the civil space agency CNES and military bodies concerned with space  
technologies such as  the DGA, the continuing debate over the place of sp ace  in 
French defence strategy, and finally the evolving nature of CNES as  an 
Etablissement public industriel et commercial (Epic) and its links with government. 
(The most general feature that this historical background suggests is of course 
France’s use of Europe as  a  context within which to develop national space  policy) 
In analytical terms, over the thirty year period of its operation, CNES's 
history illustrates the complex relationship obtaining between the sta te  and state- 
created ‘Colbertist’ institutions leading semi-autonom ous existences in the high- 
tech sector. Innovations and developments relative to CNES in the 1980s 
indicative of the French state 's  desire to m anage these  trends in the sp ace  sector 
in the best overall interest of French society and France a s  a  nation are examined 
in subsequent chapters.
The following chapter presents the French space industry a s  it has becom e in the 
1980s and 1990s in simple quantitative and structural terms, before the thesis 
moves on to analyse the making of space policy by CNES and governm ent in the 
civil sector and by the DGA and the armed forces establishm ent in the military 
sector.
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Delegue General a la recherche scientifique et technique and the Controleur d'Etat at meetings of 
the CNES Conseil d ‘administration. Henceforth, only the Controleur d'Etat was to attend. Also of 
note in this decree was the fact that the modifications were instituted on the report of the Prime 
Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of the 
Economy and Finance and the Delegate Minister for Atomic and Space questions. Late in 1968, 
Decree 68-853 (25 September) modified the composition of CNES's Conseil d’administration, 
enlarging it to include not only the Delegue General a la recherche scientifique et technique, the 
Director General of the CNRS and that of the DRME but also the head of the National Astrophysics 
Institute, four experts in Fields of activity relevant to the work of the Centre and five civil servants. 
Conseil restreint, 14 May 1970.
Ruehl, Op. cit., p.300
de Bennetot, M., Rapporteur, Rapport de la Commission de D6fen.se nationale. A ssem ble nationale. 
Doc. No. 1372, annexe au proces-verbal de la stance, 2 October 1970, p.39. Pendant la durie du 
troisieme plan, la France ne procedera pas a la construction de missiles de longue portee et se 
limitera apoursuivre a ce sujet, les etudes quelle a entreprises. On sait que le systime de lancement 
d'un missile de longue portee peut etre utilise pour mettre sur orbite des satellites de reconnaissance 
ou de telecommunications dont I'interet militaire na pas besoin d'etre souligne. Le gouvernement a 
decide dans ce dnmaine de ne pas proceder a des fabrications. Quoted in Ruehl, Op. cit., pp.300-301. 
My emphasis added.
Interview, 3 September 1989.
Interview, Admiral Sanguinetti, 3 September 1989.
See Yost, Op. cit., pp.7-9.
This initial temporary equilibrium was between the initial military origins of the industry and the 
state-led creation of a new scientific-technical government agency.
The major decree of this later period was that of 27 January 1976 {Ministere de I'Industrie et de la 
Recherche ) relating to CNES and the overall organization of space r e se a r c h . 34 This decree 
abrogated decrees 68-853 and 62-153 as well as those dispositions creating and modifying the Comite 
des recherches spatiales! Conseil de I'Espace. The principal innovations of this text (within the 
context of science and technology in general having been taken under the wing of the 'Super Ministry' 
of Industry and Research) were firstly to concretize the important notion of 'applications' in space 
activities in terms of the establishment of a 'Conseil des applications spatiales' within CNES, and 
secondly, to balance this with a Comite des programmes scientifiques et techniques. The members of 
the Science and Technology programmes committee were appointed by the Ministry of Industry and
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Research to an advisory capacity to the CNES board of Administration. Their brief was to monitor 
the scientific and technical quality of existing CNES programmes and also to envisage new avenues of 
research and development for the space programmes given the current capacities of French science 
and industry. The Conseil des applications spatiales was instituted in an advisory capacity to the 
Industry and Research Minister. Of interministerial composition, it represented the eight Ministries 
having an interest in space sector activities (especially the practical applications of technology) 
namely Foreign Affairs, Economy and Finances, Defence, Industry and Research itself, Transport, 
Universities, Overseas departments and territories and the PTT Ministry. These representatives 
mainly of what were to become known loosely as the 'user Ministries' accompanied by eight scientific 
and technical experts appointed by the MIR assisted the three principal members of the Conseil, 
namely the Delegue General a la recherche scientifique et technique, the President of CNES and the 
CNES Commissaire du gouvernement. The brief of the Council was to establish bi-annual reports 
and recommendations on the evolution of applications programmes and on the harmonization of 
research spending on them between the different user sectors.
The effects of a decree of August 1977 were essentially to translate the effects of a Ministerial 
reorganization of responsibilities for CNES into the legal texts controlling its institutional existence.
In effect, the break-up of the 'Super Ministry’ of Industry and Research brought CNES under the 
authority of the new Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Artisanat and also under that of the Ministre 
Charge de la Recherche. The opportunity was also taken to fine-tune the composition and briefs of 
the Space applications Council,the representative of the Research Ministry being dropped from its roll. 
Decret 77-978 du 22 aout 1977, Journal Officiel 23 August 1977, p.4392.
The distinction between 'autonomy' and 'autarky' is a nice one.
See, for example, Sillard, Y., and Bouillot, J.-C., 'Ariane, programme europeen de lanceur lourd', 
Defense Nationale. March 1974, pp. 129-139, and Denisse, J.-F., La Politique spatiale de la France', 
Defense Nationale. May 1973, pp. 17-25.
Schwarz, M. European policies on space science and technology, 1960-1978. Research Policy No. 8, 
pp.204-243, p.222.
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4. French and European sp ace  industries in the  1980s
As further essential context to the making of space  policy, this chapter briefly 
presents European and French space industry in term s of its firms and the 
products which they manufacture. The chapter also looks at the m arkets which 
exist for French and European space companies. The period studied is 
essentially that of the 1980s (and early 1990s). The chapter will deal first with the 
structure of the European space industry at the European level, before presenting 
the four major French aerospace firms and their programmes. Finally it will look 
at the markets for space products and services. The chapter will show the 
importance of the French space sector in the European space industry a s  a  whole, 
and give an indication of the ‘economic weight’ of the French space  sector.
This treatment of the background industrial features of the space  sector 
does not intend to give an exhaustive economic and financial analysis of the 
European space industry and the firms which com pose it. Its ambition is rather to 
set the context industrially and commercially for the discussion of th e’ politics’ of 
the French space sector which follows in subsequent chapters.
The plan of the chapter is as follows :
- 4.1. Aerospace industry structure in France and Europe
- 4.2. The major French space firms and their program m es
- 4.3. Space markets and sales
- 4.4. Conclusion
4.1. Aerospace industry structure in Europe and France
The European space sector is heavily concentrated. A relatively small num ber of 
firms more or less heavily specialised in space technologies make up the overall 
sector. In order to look at its structure, it is convenient to divide the firms making 
up the European space industry into three main groups according to the scale 
(large, medium or small) of their involvement in space activities. French firms are 
heavily represented in these groupings, with a  preponderance of larger firms. The 
following tables show these three groupings and the 21 firms which constitute the 
bulk of the European space industry’s activities.1 This classification of the major 
firms excludes the French/European company Arianespace, which although one of
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the crucial actors in the space industry represents in some ways more an 
'interface* between space industry production and the market for space technology 
than a producer itself.
The following tables give an indication of the major European aerospace 
companies :
The major European firms (1991)
I Firms with sales 




i % change 
j 1989-91 |
:
I Aerospatiale 605 1 +18.9
\ Domier 573 + 123.0
\ Matra (MMS France) 557 + 56.9
1 SEP 411 + 5.4
j Alenia 317 + 10.4
i Alcatel Espace 257 + 16.3
\ MBB 250 +20.2






i % change 
1989-91
1 British Aerospace 169 -13.4
j Marconi (MMS UK) 140 + 19.2
j Thomson CSF 115 na
\ Dassa ult A via ti on 108 +231
j BPD Difesa & Spazio 85 +86.8
! MAN Technologie 84 +25.4
ANT-
Nachrichtentechnik
Uinniuuirinnnnji nnn.u, ,r ^
.... ........63...........1 -6.7
f ! : ;







j Fokker 43 ] +0.7
j CASA [ ....... 34..........j +34
! ETC A 30 + 16.3
j Sextant Avionique 26 +52.9
J Saab Space 21 +23.5
j Voivo ....17 j -15
1 Ericsson 10.6 -25.9
(Source The European Space Industry. Euroconsult 1992)
As can easily be seen from the tables, French companies figure prominently in the 
‘first division’ of European space firms, and are well represented in the 
intermediate division of the major firms. The figures for sales illustrate how the 
space industry experienced a period of buoyancy during the late 1980s.
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The structure of the European space industry has recently been changing, 
since starting in the late-1980s, there have been a  number of European m ergers 
and som e attem pts by European firms to buy into the American aerospace 
industry. In Germany, DASA was created out of the 1989 consolidation of 
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Bloehm (MBB), D ornierand Telefunken System  Technik.
In Italy, the 1990 merger of Aeritalia and Selenia created Alenia. In France and 
Britain, Matra Marconi Space was constructed from the space divisions of Matra 
and GEC-Marconi. In Scandinavia, the 1992 m erger of Saab Scania and 
Ericsson space activities created S aab  Ericsson Space.
4.1.1. The French space industry - structure, programmes and employment
The French aerospace industry is com posed of a  small number of large firms and 
a  much larger number of parts and equipment suppliers (equipementiers). The 
large firms are, with the exception of Arianespace, involved in high-tech 
aeronautics / aerospace and defence activities, a s  well a s  in space  programmes. 
According to the Gifas literature on the French aerospace industry, the major firms 






Matra Marconi Space (MMS),
Societe europeenne de propulsion (SEP)
Societe nationale des poudres (SNPE)
Thomson C SF.2
Within this first group of major firms, divisions can be m ade between Arianespace, 
which stands alone as  the sole company concerned with the construction and 
commercial exploitation of launchers, Aerospatiale, Matra and SEP who function 
as  ‘maitres d ’oeuvre’, or prime contractors for large programmes, Alcatel, Dassault 
and Thomson who specialise in electronics, and finally Air Liquide and SNPE who 
provide cryogenic gas, liquid and solid rocket propellants.
Around these major firms, the smaller com ponent and equipment suppliers 
form a  secondary level of industrial expertise, contributing to the program m es 
coordinated by the prime contractors. In comparison with the ten or so major
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firms, the equipementiers number approximately fifty, representing a  third of the 
total firms making up the membership of GIFAS.
The major programmes undertaken by the French space industry since the 
1970s are presented in tabular form overleaf, in order to give som e impression of 
the variety of technologies and projects which provide employment in the space 
sector.
The program m es can be divided into two main kinds: firstly those concerned with 
launchers and shuttles (what CNES refers to a s  ‘le transport spatial), orbiting 
platforms and space station elem ents - ‘orbital infrastructure’; and secondly, 
satellites of various natures.
The table overleaf lists the launcher and orbital infrastructure programmes.
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Overleaf we present the rather longer list of satellite applications programmes 
undertaken by France, either alone or in partnership.
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Programme Objectives 1 Operational 
use
Remarks
I Arabsat Telecoms | 1985 - /  1992 -
:
2 satellites for 
Arab League 
countries
j Argos Data localisation 
and collection
| 1 9 7 8 -/1 9 8 9 - French system 
carried by US 
NOAA satellites
j ECS-Eutelsat\ Telephone and TV liaison
I 1983 - /  1 9 8 4 - /  
| 1 9 8 7 -/1 9 9 0 -
4 satellites 




| 1991 - ERS 1, ERS 2
i Giotto Astronomv i 1985 | Cooperation /  ESA
j Hipparcos Astronomv 1 1989 : Cooperation /  ESA 1
| Intelsat International
telecoms
| 1 9 8 0 - /  1991 - Series of telecom 
| satellites
j Marecs 1 Maritime telecoms 1 1982
j Meteosat j Space meteorology
|





















Probe for study of j 
Mars
1 9 8 8 - /  1989 - Franco-Soviet
cooperation
| Sarsat- Cospas
: i j i\ i| j\ j








Radio astronomy 1988 Franco-Soviet
cooperation
j Spot Earth observation 1986- Spot 1, 2, 3, 4.
j TDF /  TV-SAT I: : Direct satellite broadcasting







1 9 8 4 - /  1985 - /  
1 9 8 8 - /  1991 - /  
1992 -
| National telecoms 
programme led by 






1992 In cooperation 
with US
(Source: various)
Overall, the work on these programmes conducted by small and large firms 
combined in the early 1990s is held to provide employment for some 9,000
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individuals in directly space-related industry alone, to which an even greater 
number of indirectly related jobs must be added in order to reach an estimation of 
the total number of jobs provided in France by the space sector. The most 
favourable estimate puts total employment at 25,000, and slightly more 
conservative analyses conclude that the most valid figure is slightly in excess of 
22,000. The OPECST 'Rapport Loridant' of December 1991 gave the following 
breakdown of employment for 1990 in the overall space s e c to r :
I Overall French space sector emDloyment (1990)
j
j Space industry (strictlv defined) 9,000
i ;
i Induced industrial and service employment 5,000
:
I CNES /  ESA contracts (indirectly space related) 4,300
i |
1 CNES, non-industrial subsidiaries, French staff 
j members of ESA, scientific laboratories
4,000
j Total j 22,300
(Figures are based on CNES estimates and confirmed by EC statistics)
4.1.2. Space ‘industry5 or sp ace  se c to r’ ?
There is some discussion about the use of the term ‘sector’ to describe the 
activities and nature of French space industry. CNES official literature and those 
involved in the French space effort talk easily about the space ‘sector’, but the use 
of the term in this way is both a convenient shorthand and something of a 
dangerous oversimplification of the real complexities of the space sector/industry. 
The economists Frangois Chesnais and Claude Serfati have pointed out in a study 
of French military spending and technological competitivity that in a related activity, 
the terms ‘arms industry’ and ‘military sector’ are precisely no more than 
convenient labels, since arms activities are technically neither an independent 
‘branche’ oi the economy, nor a ‘sector’, in the prevailing definitions of these 
concepts in France.3 The same analysis also easily applies to the ‘space sector’, 
which presents very similar characteristics to those of the ‘arms sector’ which 
motivate Chesnais and Serfati’s remarks, namely the mis-match between ‘space 
activities’ and the classes of industrial activity as defined by the French national 
accounting system, and the civil-military duality of space technologies and the 
firms which specialise in them.
Chesnais and Serfati also stress the difficulties of obtaining statistical 
information concerning the arms industry, in addition to the problems induced by 
the national accounting classifications. They quote both Edward Kolodziej and
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French authors in emphasizing that the attitude of the French government over 
recent decades has made the search for quantitative information more problematic 
in France than in other countries.4
The French ‘space industry’ is similar to the ‘defence industry’ in the way 
the major industrial firms which constitute it undertake both ‘sp ace ’ and ‘non­
sp ace’ related business, just a s  defence industry production originates from 
com panies which combine civil and military activities. In fact, the real, (as 
opposed to analytical) similarities between the French space  and defence 
industries go even further, since many of the space  industry firms are 
simultaneously involved in defence work, either specifically on military space 
programmes, or on other arms projects which share facilities, techniques or 
personnel.
In considering the ‘structure’ of the French ‘space  industry’, and in 
discussing the major firms whose civil and military space  activities go to make up 
the overall French space effort, it would seem  wise to bear Chesnais and Serfati’s 
concept of an arm s industrial ‘m eso-system ’ in mind. In this analysis of the arm s 
sector, borrowed from de Bandt’s interpretation of the notion of Were', stress is 
placed on the commercial-financial and other interrelationships between the 
protagonists in the ‘system ’.5 According to C hesnais and Serfati this kind of 
industrial structure favours the development of a  closed system  of relationships 
exclusively between m em bers of the sector’ and little exchange with the rest of 
the economy. Amongst other exam ples of such confined interchange in the arm s 
meso-system, Chesnais and Serfati cite that of the ‘aeronautics and space 
industry’, in which a  mere three groups employ 70% of the sector’s  personnel and 
account for 75% of sector turnover.6
4.2. The Major French space firms and their programmes
In this section we shall look at four of the major French space  com panies which 
make up the sector. Three of these are included in the tables above in the first 
rank of European space com panies - these  are Aerospatiale, Matra and Sep. The 
remaining com pany of the quartet, Arianespace, is not a  giant of French high-tech 
industry like the others, but is nevertheless the single company which has becom e 
a symbol of the French and European space effort, through its m anagem ent of the 
European satellite launcher Ariane.
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4.2.1. Arianespace
Arianespace is a CNES subsidiary, incorporated in March 1980 as a French 
limited company owned by CNES, thirteen major banks and most of the major 
European aerospace companies.7 It manages the production, marketing and 
launch of Ariane rockets and their services.
Arianespace is nominally an European company, by virtue of the wide 
range of European companies who are shareholders. However, the majority of 
shares are held by the French national space agency, CNES, and by a number of 
French space companies. Total French participation in Arianespace was 
consistently approximately 60% during the 1980s. In addition, the company was 
incorporated under French law. The table below gives the national breakdown of 
Arianespace shareholders in the initial period of the company's existence from 
1980 to 1990:
j Arianespace shareholder structure 1980 - 1990
B \ DK E F GB Irl ! 11 1! PB D S CH
Total national % 











2.2 19.6 2.4 2.7
(Source : Arianespace)
As the table shows, the French interest in the European company is almost three 
times as great as the next national holding, predictably that of Germany. Even 
more significantly, in terms of the real nature of the company, a full 34% of shares 
were initially held by CNES alone. Of the industrial shareholders, the French 
companies SEP and Aerospatiale each took 8.5% each, and MAN of West 
Germany 7.9%. Five French banks together account for 2% of the shares.8
The nature of Arianespace's activities is confusing to the extent that it is 
concerned with funding and managing the production of the rockets and with 
selling and organising their launch, but was not involved in the early development 
of the launcher programmes during the 1970s. Arianespace's operations are thus 
‘commercial’ in that they present a finished space product to the market (satellite 
owners needing launch facilities), where a customer-client deal is struck for the 
launch and launch price. Critics of this system point out that the Arianespace 
company is not a truly commercial enterprise since it has not funded the 
development of the launchers itself, but only pays for the use and maintenance of 
the European Space Agency (ESA) Kourou launch facility in French Guyana. The
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ESA is in fact the legal owner of the Ariane launcher, which w as developed under 
ELDO/ESA supervision between 1973 and D ecem ber 1979, when the first launch 
was successfully made. Even after the setting up of Arianespace in 1980 and the 
signing of a  cooperation agreem ent between the new company and the European 
agency, the ESA was still in charge of the five test launches which proved that the 
launcher was reliable technology, before A rianespace took over for the world's first 
'commercial' launch on 26 March 1984.9
Since the early 1980s, Arianespace has continued to develop the Ariane 
launcher, creating a  ‘family’ of rockets of ever increasing payload, size and 
reliability. The latest in the series are the fully operational Ariane 4 and the yet-to- 
be completed Ariane 5, whose entry into commerical service is planned for the 
sum m er or autumn of 1996. In 1989, Arianespace negotiated the so-called P9 
framework agreem ent with the major industrial com panies involved in producing 
the Ariane 4 launcher for the supply of a  series of 50 such rockets to be delivered 
between 1992 and 2000. Production of this series of launchers w as estim ated at 
18 billion francs for French industry, which is the most heavily involved in Ariane 
programmes.
In 1990, the composition of Arianespace w as changed in order to reflect the 
new industrial directions in which the launcher sector w as moving, namely the 
production of Ariane IV and Ariane V, with different mixes of com panies from the 
early days of 1980 and the first launchers. The modification to the se t up of the 
company also gave more flexibility, by creating a  financial holding company 
(Arianespace participation) alongside the original operating company (Arianespace 
SA). The original participations in the capital had reflected the extent to which the 
individual com panies had expected to be involved in the program m es. Between 
1980 and 1989, when the decision w as taken to modify the structure of the 
company, not only did the value of the company quadruple, but the collaboration of 
the initial com panies also evolved a s  a  function of the development of the 
programmes. The greater involvement of the Italian firms SNIA BPD and Fiat 
Aviazione in particular w as recognised by the redrawing of ownership, since 
overall Italian ownership w as increased from 3.6% to 7.12%. The overall French 
stake in the com pany w as reduced by 2.6%, (despite the entry of SNPE), with the 
CNES participation falling from 34% to 32.34%.
The table overleaf gives the full Arianespace shareholder structure after the 1990 
reorganisation :
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Arianespace shareholder structure after 1990 reorganisation
B i DK ; E J : ......o i l iJrJj 1 t i p b D j1 S 1 CH
Total national %■ 
share o f  capital 433 i 
(1990)
0.67 | 2.38 56.6 3.02
>




Arianespace is of conceptual importance in an understanding of the French and 
European space effort for the ways in which it embodies the twin concerns of the 
promoters of such high-tech industry, namely the concern to acquire prestige and 
autonomy through the ability to do what few others can, and also the desire to 
attempt to make such technology economically profitable, or at the least to obtain 
some return on development costs. The origins of the Ariane programme are to 
be found in the French desire for a European launcher capability independent from 
the US. During the 1960s and the early 1970s, France developed contributions to 
an early version of a European launcher in parallel with the development of the 
national Diamant series of rockets. After the difficulties of the ELDO as an 
organisation and the unsatisfactory technological solutions of the first European 
collaborative rocket project, France was at the forefront of a move to 'Europeanise' 
one of her launcher programmes within the framework of the merger of ELDO and 
ESRO into the ESA. The desire to try to make such costly initiatives pay in some 
way is represented by the desire to 'commercialise' the services provided by 
Ariane - making the market rather than the taxpayer fund the use of the launcher, 
even if the taxpayer, through the state had already contributed 1 bn dollars to the 
R&D of the facility before handing it over to Arianespace.
Arianespace was created because of lobbying from France to the effect that 
an international governmental agency such as the ESA was ill-suited to the 
dynamic management and promotion of a product and services such as those 
represented by Ariane. The original objective of Arianespace was to obtain 30% 
of the world launch market during 1985-1991. Partly because of the problems 
encountered by the American Space shuttle and partly because of the dynamism 
of Arianespace and the relative reliability of the launcher, the company has 
managed to obtain an average 50% of the satellite launch market in competition 
with US commercial launchers such as Thor Delta and Atlas.
The following table illustrates how Arianespace succeeded in steadily raising its 
total sales and earnings in the period 1984-1992 :
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| Arianespace : financial and launch statistics 1984-1992
1984 | 1985 1986 1987 | 1988 1989 1990 1991 I 1992
| Total sales 
\ (million F)
725 1409 1289 940 3672
!l.......... ;
3794 3979 6028
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . j
| 5000




: j 209 303
1 | 























7.0 8.2 ] 13.3 14.1 |1 14.0
............
14.5 15.4 -
1 - figure in brackets = cumulative total
2 - cumulative total includes satellites pre-1984
(Source: Arianespace Newsletter and CNES Annual Reports)
What Arianespace defines as the 'commercial market' is a relatively circumscribed 
sector, amounting in general to not more than an average of twenty satellites to be 
launched per annum. Between 1984 and 1992, Arianespace concluded 101 
contracts with satellite owners and launched 75 satellites using 50 launchers. 
Arianespace's 1992 market forecast put the annual short term commercial market 
at 21 -22 satellites, the medium term market at 18-21, and the long term at 16-18. 
Despite the small numbers of launchers and satellites involved, Arianespace 
officials resolutely present their company's activities as being a 'non-negligable 
source of revenue', stressing the forecast that between 1984 and 2000, 
Arianespace will have accrued revenues to France of the order of 70 bn francs.10
The economists and space analysts Cohendet and Lebeau have pointed 
out that the ‘commercialisation’ of a launcher such as Ariane only represents an 
additional justification for a project whose real objectives are other than purely 
economic.11 These real objectives concern the place of France and Europe within 
the international space community, specifically vis-a-vis the United States.
French support for a European launcher whose development, production and 
commercialisation are dominated by CNES and French industry has reflected a 
strategy of ensuring an important degree of relative autonomy for the European 
space industry and space users from US launcher monopoly, at the same time as 
guaranteeing the creation and maintenance of technical expertise in France. The 
table overleaf gives an indication of how the company has developed its product 
and services, through different launchers, since the first operational flight in 1982 :
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j Ariane Launches 1982-1992
Date Launcher Satellite(s)
3 V5 Sept. 82 Al............... ] i failed
i V6 June 83 A1 j ECS 1 and Am sat P-3B
1 V7 Oct. 83 Al Intelsat VF7
j V8 March 84 A l i Intelsat V
I V9 May 84 A l : Spacenet FI
! V10 August 84 AR3 i ECS and Telecom 1A
j v ii Nov. 84 AR3 \ Spacenet F2 and Marecs B2
j V12 Feb. 85 AR3 i Arabsat A and Brasilsat 1
1 V13 May 85 AR3 i GStar 1 and Telecom IB 1
1 V14 Julv 85 AR2 ! Giotto
j V15 Sept 85 AR3 j Failure - ECS-2 and G-Star 2
j V16 Feb 85 AR2 Spot 1
j V17 March 85 AR3 \ GStar 2 and Brasilsat S2
i V18 May 86 AR2 I Failure - Intelsat VF14
j V19 Sept. 87 AR3 ECS 4 and Aussat K3
| V20 Nov. 87 AR2 ! TV-Sat 1 ....... .. ................
\ V21 March 88 AR3 1 Telecom 1C and Spacenet 3R
3 V22 Mav 88 AR2 : Intelsat VF3
i V23 June 88 AR4 : Meteosat P2 and Pan Am Sat FI
| V24 July 88 AR3 i Insat 1C and ECS 5
1 V25 Sept. 88 AR3 SBS and G Star 3r _
I Oct. 88 j AR2 ! T D F 1
v ‘2 ‘7 ! Dec. 88 i AR4 \ SLS Astra and Skynet 4A
3 V28 i Jan. 89 i AR2 \ Intelsat VF15
j V29 : March 89 j AR44LP 1 MOP 1 and JCSat 1
3 V30 i April 89 AR2 i Tele-X
j V31 ! June 89 ! AR44L DFS-1 and Superbird A
] V32 i July 89 i AR3 Olympus 1
j V33 I Aug. 89 i AR44LP TK'-Sat 2 and / / ipparcos
j V34 I Oct. 89 : AR44LP Intelsat VI
j V35 1 Jan. 90 ; AR40 Spot 2
j V36 i Feb. 90 ! AR44L | Failure - Superbird and BS-2X
! V37 ! July 90 ; AR44L 1 TDF 2 and DFS 2 Kopernikus
j V38 ! Aug. 90 1 AR44LP : Skynet 4C  and Eutelsat II FI
\ V39 i Oct. 90 ! AR44L \ SBS 6  and Galaxy VI
V40 i Nov. 90 ! AR42P Satcom C l and G-Star IV
V41 ; Jan. 91 i AR44L Italsat 1 and Eutelsat IIF2
[ V42 March 91 1 AR44LP Astra IB and MOP 2
V43 April 91 AR44LP Anik E2
I V44 : July 91 AR40 ERS-1
! V45 Aueust 91 AR44L Intelsat VI F5
] V46 Sept. 91 AR44P Anik El
| V47 j Oct. 91 AR44L : Intelsat VI FI
j V48 Dec. 91 AR44L Telecom 2A and Inmarsat II F2
i V49 Feb. 92 AR44L Superbird B1 and Arabsat 1C
3 V50 April 92 AR44L Telecom 2B and Inmarsat 2F4
j V51 July 92 AR44L Insat 2A and Eutelsat II F4
I V52 ; Aug. 92 j AR42P Topex/Poseidon
i V53 Sept. 92 AR44LP Hispasat 1A and Satcom IIIC
1 V54 Oct. 92 AR42P Galaxy VII
V55 Dec. 92 AR42P Superbird A l
Total satellites launched with success = 76
(Compiled from Arianespace Newsletter and CNES Annual Reports)12
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4.2.2. Aerospatiale.
The Societe nationale industrielle aerospatiale (SNIAS), better known as 
Aerospatiale, is a public corporation formed in 1971 by the nationalization of Sud 
and Nord Aviation, and the Societe d'etudes et de realisations balistiques 
(SEREB) which was founded in 1959 to m anage the development of the early 
missile launchers for the deterrent force. SEREB w as added to an essentially 
aeronautical merger to give the nucleus of what later becam e the Ballistic and 
space system s division responsible for the production of French strategic missiles, 
Ariane launchers, satellite 'buses' and a variety of sp ace  system  components. 
Overall, space  and strategic system s activities employ approximately 6000, 2000 
of whom in 1988 were exclusively concerned by the space  business of the firm.13
As a  Societe nationale industrielle, Aerospatiale has a  specific legal status 
and specific rules governing its organisation and functioning, particularly in terms 
of the theoretical inspection of the company by governm ent and the nomination of 
the president directeur general by the Council of Ministers. Since the mid-1980s 
the political instructions given to the firms of the public sector have been to make 
profits and to conduct their affairs in general in such a  way a s  to provide as  
efficient m anagem ent a s  possible.14
During the 1980s and 1990s Aerospatiale has still been heavily involved in 
the developm ent and production and maintenance of deterrent launchers such the 
S3, the M4-M20,the M45 and the cancelled S45 for the military space  sector, and 
in the development and production of Ariane and a  variety of orbital infrastructures 
in the civil sector. Before the financial difficulties encountered by the Hermes 
space  plane, Aerospatiale w as also leading its developm ent programme.
Aerospatiale is Europe's third largest aerospace group behind Deutsche 
A erospace and British Aerospace. Since its creation it has grown constantly in 
tune with increasing dem and for civil and military equipm ent and services. The 
provision of strategic missiles for the defence ministry has represented a steady 
source of income and employment for the group, a s  has its participation in the 
Airbus projects. Space products have gradually increased in importance both 
within the space/defence division of the company, and in term s of their contribution 
to overall turnover. It is often difficult to distinguish between the space and 
defence activities of the space  and strategic system s division because for obvious 
reasons of discretion, the company does not readily disclose separate  figures.
This lack of information at the level of firms is mirrored (and encouraged ?) by the 
absence of distinction between civil and military space  products in national
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accounting statistics.15 However, the figures that can be found for Aerospatiale 
show a decline in the relative importance of 'defence/strategic systems' within the 
division and a increase in the space activities, both civil and military, as  the table 
below illustrates :
j Space and strategic defence systems activities 1979-1991
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(Source : Aerospatiale Annual reports. Euroconsult, La Lettre du CNES. Air et
In 1979, Aerospatiale's space activities were undertaken by the Division des 
systemes balistiques et spatiaux (DSBS), located in Les Mureaux, Bordeaux and 
Cannes, employing 6,000 people in total, and about 1,000 specifically on space. 
DSBS total turnover in 1979 was 2 543 million francs, representing 23% of the 
total turnover of SNIAS (11 000 million F)16 A decade later in 1989, the renamed 
Division des systemes strategiques et spatiaux (DSSS) accumulated sales of 7 
186 million francs (almost a three-fold increase), again representing almost 23% of 
Aerospatiale's total turnover of 31 671 million francs. However, space by 1990 
was employing a greatly increased workforce of 2 ,000 , and its contribution to the 
overall turnover of the group had risen from 4.2% in 1984 to 13.1%.
In 1989, the turnover of the DSSS became predominantly civil-oriented for 
the first time a year after the entire group’s activities had similarly moved from a 
47% civil share of overall turnover to 51 %. This long term evolution of the group's 
activities from military production to civilian projects was accelerated during the 
1980s by the weakening arms market and by the slow but real increase in civil
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programmes such as Airbus and space, in more detail, in 1989 and 1990. the 
total turnover of the DSSS gave the following breakdown by sphere of activity :
DSSS : % turnover by activity
1 .  .......................... |.....1.9.89.....] .1 9 9 0  .^... 199.1.....]....1992
Miiitarv 48 46 40 50
L a u n c h e r s /  H e r m e s  29
S a t e l l i t e s  21
M i s c .  C i v i l  2
33
19 60 50
Total j 100 ; 100
(Source : Luroconsult, Air et Cosmos)
100 100
In 1991 the decline in the proportion of purely IRBM activities within the division 
continued in step with the long term reduction in demand for such systems, 
although 1992 saw a temporary rebalancing of the civil and military sides of the 
division's activities before a projected move towards a 30 : 70 military-civil split in 
1994.17 Such a decline in the military ballistic activities of the group is of concern 
for the group itself and for the French government, who despite the falling demand 
for modernised missile systems are still interested to maintain technical and 
industrial skills in Aerospatiale. An example of the state's desire to see the 
societe nationale protecting the industrial and technical base of the nation was 
revealed by the head of the DSSS, Michel Delaye, who stated in an interview with 
Air et Cosmos in February 1992 that the group was discussing with the Defence 
ministry the best way of safeguarding skills and expertise within the division, 
possibly by bringing forward the M5 and S5 missiles in compensation for the 
shelved S45 .18 The full range of Aerospatiale's involvement in space and IRBM 
systems is presented in tabular form below :
• A erospatiale programmes
Launch veh icles S a te llite s
i N a t i o n a l  
p r o g r a m m e s
i Sounding rockets, Pierres 
\ precieuses iaunchers : 
Diamanr A, Diamant B, B - 
P4.
F R 1 ,  Dl-C/Dl-D, Peole, 
i Eole, D2-A, D2-B, D5-A,
; D5-B, Starlette, Telecom 1, 
1 Spot.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l
p r o g r a m m e s
Europa 2, Europa 3, 
Ariane, Hermes.
Symphonie, COS-B, 
Meteosat, I.U.E., Intelsat 
V, Exosat, Spacebus, 
Marecs, TV Sat/TDF-1 , 
Telecom 2, Arabsat,
Eutelsat 2, Turksat, ISO.__
j M i l i t a r y  
p r o g r a m m e s






Matra was initially a  private limited company founded in 1945 a s  the Societe 
Mecanique-Aviation-Traction, nationalised in 1982 and reprivatised in 1988.
During most of the 1980s Matra w as a  diversified group w hose various divisions 
specialised individually in transport system s (such as  automatic tram and metro 
lines) automobile design (the car/van Espace in conjunction with Renault), military 
electronics, and missile and satellite construction. The firm employed up to 1600 
people on communications, Earth observation and space  science satellites. Since 
1989 Matra’s space activities have been undertaken in conjunction with Marconi 
under the umbrella of the joint subsidiary Matra-Marconi Space. More specifically, 
in term s of its applications programme involvement, Matra is prime contractor for a 
num ber of current satellite programmes such a s  the Spot earth observation 
satellites and the Helios military observation satellite programme. Matra also 
collaborates with British A erospace on satellite manufacture, both through the 
integration of BAe Space system s' com ponents in Matra satellites (e.g. antenna 
reflector assem blies for Telecom 2 satellites) and through provision of com ponents 
for BAe.
Matra was nationalised by the new Socialist administration in 1982, not as 
part of the 1981 nationalisation law but as  an individual com pany (along with 
others), which the new government felt should be under state control because  of 
the nature of their activities. Thus the steel com panies Usinor and Sacilor were 
nationalised, a s  w as Roussel-Uclaf (chemicals), the electronics and computing 
firms ITT France and Cll-Honeywell Bull, and, a s  a  companion for Matra, the 
flagship high-tech defence/aerospace firm Dassault-Breguet. The nationalisation 
took the form of a  51% holding by the state rather than the outright 100% 
acquisition imposed on other nationalised com panies. This w as because  total 
ownership of the whole Matra group was seen  as  wasteful of resources, given that 
the elem ent of Matra which w as specifically intended for state control was the 
defence division. However, because splitting the arm s/defence branch from the 
rest of the group w as deem ed impracticable, without jeopardising the survival of 
the closely linked civil and military activities, the whole group w as acquired on the 
basis of the 51 % controlling interest.
Ideological justifications for the increase of state influence in the economy 
through th ese  nationalisations were two-fold and often complementary, being 
based  on the desire of the new socialist administration to control monopoly 
capitalism and to use nationalised industry as  a  m eans of modernising and
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restructuring the industrial fabric in order to assu re  the future performance of the 
economy. In the nationalisation of the aerospace/defence firms Dassault-Breguet 
and Matra (Engins Matra) the Left combined industrial and moral justifications by 
controlling an important, but in their eyes essentially shameful trade in high-tech 
w eapons of destruction. (One should rem em ber President Mitterrand's visit to an 
Arms trade fair in 1981, when he ordered bom bs and other equipment to be 
hidden from television cam eras filming his progress). The nationalisations 
created a  vast public sector in France, and underlined the importance of the state 
in the development of the French economy in genera! and in high-tech industry in 
particular.19
Matra's overall turnover in 1980, prior to nationalisation w as 3.7 billion 
francs, about 50% of which w as derived from its defence-based activities in missile 
system s and military electronics. In 1981, the Space division of Matra employed
1,000 people and had a  turnover of just over 700 million francs. The then space 
division chairman Noel Mignot made the point that the space activities of Matra 
had an importance within the group as a  whole disproportionate to the (relatively 
small) number of em ployees involved or the turnover of the division.20 The 
justification for this claim was that the space division acted a s  a  quality catalyst for 
the rest of the group, both in terms of the dissemination of high-tech expertise and 
in the training of expert upper m anagem ent personnel21 This is an argument 
which is used within the space sector as  a  whole in favour of maintaining and 
increasing levels of funding, usually claiming that that the space  sector acts a s  a 
school of quality within industry as  a  whole through its rigorous requirements for 
reliability, lightness and strength. A second aspect of the general argum ent is that 
the pluridisciplinarity of space techniques allows them to play a  coordinating and 
catalysing role both within industrial groups such a s  Matra and in the overall 
industrial fabric.22
In 1988, during the Cohabitation period, Matra w as re-privatised by the neo- 
liberally inspired government of Prime minister Jacq u es  Chirac and Finance 
minister Edouard Balladur as  part of a  programme of 'de-nationalisation' intended 
to undo the effects of the Socialist nationalisations of 1981. This denationalisation 
programme w as only partial and w as effected in conditions which have since led to 
considerable debate over the m anagem ent of the 'offre publique de vente'
(OPV).23 Despite the unsettling circum stances of its (political) re-privatisation, 
since 1988, Matra has flourished, and has pursued tactics of continued 
diversification and of alliance seeking outside France. For Matra's chairman, 
Jean-Luc Lagardere, these  tactics are part of a  strategy of risk minimisation aimed 
at insulating Matra from the vagaries of recession in particular sectors of the
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company's activity. The different activities of the different divisions are not directly 
related, except for their common reliance on the use of high-tech. The four main 
activities are roughly equal in their contributions to the total turnover of the firm, 
except for a slight predominance of the automobile/transport branch.
The divisions of the Matra group are Matra Defense, Matra Marconi 
Espace, Matra Communication and Matra Automobile. The contributions of these 
different commercial activities to the group's overall turnover in 1990 was as 
follows:
I Matra - Balance of activities 1990 j
5 i % of turnover
| D efen ce 24 (1979 = 50) |
[S p ace 20
j T elecom /IT 23
j A u to /tra n sp o r ts 33
1 Total 100
(Sources : various)
The diversification and expansion of the group since 1988 has seen the separation 
of the two elements of Matra Defense-Espace and a move towards a more equal 
balance between the military and civil turnover of these closely linked activities. 
Matra has also made acquisitions in the United States, the most important of which 
was the Fairchild Defence and Space Corporation whose activies are highly similar 
to those of the Defence and Space divisions of the group.
Matra's involvement in the space industry has increased since its 
privatisation through association with GEC Marconi and Daimler-Benz in Matra 
Marconi Space (MMS). Matra Marconi Space was created initially in December 
1989 with a retroactive clause considering that the fusion was valid from July 1989 
by the partnership of the two subsidiarized space divisions of Matra, and GEC 
early in 1990 MMS was joined by Daimler-Benz, the British and German 
companies already having each acquired 4.9% stakes in Matra itself on its 1988 
privatisation. The grouping thus created is considered to be Europe's biggest 
satellite payload and ground systems expert, with know-how ranging from design 
and production of satellite platform (bus) and payloads through navigation 
systems, antennae, launcher components and ground stations.
MMS has a turnover of some 3 billion Francs and employs approximately 
2,700. It is incorporated under Dutch law. As the joint subsidiary of Matra and 
GEC, MMS brings together the space related activities of the two firms, with the 
exception of those of Matra's wholly-owned American subsidiary Fairchild Space 
and Defense. MMS as created before the fusion of the Daimler-Benz subsidiary 
Deutsche Aerospace was a joint subsidiary, in which however Matra has the
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controlling interest of 51 % as opposed to 49% for GEC. The retention of a 
controlling interest is a typical feature of Matra's strategy of Europeanisation of its 
activities - characteristic both of the tight hold that Matra's Managing director for 
the last 25 years maintains over the running of the group and of the desire for 
French controlling interests in ’European' groupings. Jean-Luc Lagardere has 
declared the general principle that mergers and fusions will always guarantee 
Matra's own autonomy.24
S p a c e  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  M a t r a  g r o u p
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4.2.4. The Societe Europeenne de Propulsion
The interestingly named Societe europeenne de propulsion (or SEP) is actually a 
French publicly owned company involved in the production of equipment for the 
deterrent force and the civil space industry. SEP's principal activities are the 
development and production of rocket motors for missiles and satellite launchers, 
especially Ariane. In 1988 SEP employed some 4,100 people overall, of which
2,000 were exclusively involved in the strictly 'space' aspects of the company's 
activities. In terms of employment, although the 1980s and early 1990s have 
been a period of industrial and financial expansion for SEP, cost-cutting and 
rationalisation has led to a gradual slimming down of personnel to an expected 
level for end-1993 of 3,650.25
In more detail, SEP's activities are based around the two major 
organisational divisions of its industrial facilities, namely the liquid propellant and 
space division and the solid propulsion and composites division. SEP deals in 
storable liquid propellant UDMH and N2O4 for the first and second stages of Ariane 
IV, and cryogenic liquid oxygen and hydrogen propellants for the third stage of 
Ariane IV and for the main stage of Ariane V. The solid propulsion and 
composite materials division produces solid propulsion Ariane V boosters and 
satellite apogee motors in addition to thermal protection techniques for Hermes.
113
Within the context of the Groupe petite propulsion et equipements SEP also 
provides ground station facilities for the control of satellites such as Spot and 
Landsat and the interpretation of their data.
SEP was created in 1969 by the merger of the state aeronautics company 
SNECMA's 'division missile-espace' and the company SEPR, specialised in jet 
propulsion technology. In 1971, this developing centre of propulsion expertise 
was strengthened by the transfer to it of the industrial facilities of the state funded 
Saint-Louis Laboratoire de recherches balistiques et aerodynamiques (LRBA), 
which had provided the origins of French expertise in ballistic and space science in 
1945. SEP is therefore a state-sector company owned principally by a societe 
nationale involved in the research and development of aeronautical equipment 
('etudes et constructions aeronautiques). In 1988, the ownership of SEP was as 
follows :
% Shareholders o f  Sep
A erosp at ia le




1  5 %
Other
0 %
S n ecm a
4 7 %
(Source : Euroconsult)
Although SEP was initially heavily involved in the development and production of 
the propulsion systems for the early nuclear deterrent IRBMs, since the mid-1980s 
the balance of the company's activities has swayed towards civil space, as a 
consequence both of the rise in orders from the extension of the Ariane 
programmes and the initiation of Hermes, and of the slackening in demand from 
the military sector for new or updated ballistic missile systems. The following table 
shows the evolution of the civil-military balance during the mid-1980s :
SEP Civil space activities
:  1983 I! 1984 i
j




j 1988 1989 1990 j! 1991 1992 ;
j
Space tu rn over  
as % o f  total | 
O
J 0° o ! 45.4 53.8 ! 55.5 j
1 ;
:
56.3 60.5 65.4 78.1 70.5
L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J
j
7
(Source : Euroconsult and European Snace Directory 993)
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Like other state-owned companies in the aerospace sector, SEP has attempted to 
render its management of certain activities more flexible through the creation of 
groupements d'interet economique. To-date, SEP is involved in three GIEs, 
namely the Groupement pour la grosse propulsion a poudre (G2 P), GIE 
Hyperspace, and GIE Europropulsion. By their nature, GIEs represent the joint 
action of two or more firms attempting to rationalise their activities through a fusion 
of existing structures or trying to create new collaborative ventures.
G2P was created by SEP and the Societe nationale des poudres et 
explosifs (SNPE) in order to merge their solid propellant activities, within which 
they were already collaborating in the development of Ariane solid boosters. The 
Europropulsion GIE is also concerned with the development of solid booster 
propulsion, although as an equal partnership between SEP and SNIA-BPD 
working on Ariane V. GIE Hyperspace represents the somehow surprising 
initiative of SNECMA (the major shareholder in SEP) and SEP itself collaborating 
within the structure of a GIE on the preparation of hypersonic propulsion 
techniques. As well as the GIEs, SEP has initiated a joint subsidiary venture with 
Matra through the creation of the company MS2I to merge the optical sensing 
expertise of the two companies. Created in 1989 and employing approximately 
400, the first year of activity of MS2I, (which is owned 65% by Matra and 35% by 
SEP) brought a turnover of 375 million francs.
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0
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j Powder/
I m iss ile s
5 6 9 6 0 0 6 5 7  |I 763 ] 8 2 0  | 8 0 2 9 3 6 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 5 - - -
| Liquid/
! A ria n e
351
i...........................
3 6 9  | 3 4 8  !| 429 | 7 6 1  j
I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !
i 1 1 5 6
1...........................
1 4 0 7 1 6 4 0 2 1 5 0 - - -
j S a te llite  
m otors, 
m a ter ia ls , 
im a g e
I trea tm en t j
5 4 92
!
2 0 7  j: I202j ! 2 2 7  jj 1
3 0 5 2 8 7 3 5 8 3 7 9 - - -
j
I Total 9 7 4 1 0 6 1 1212]j 1 3 9 4  j! 1 8 0 8  i! 2 2 6 3 2 6 3 0 3 3 2 0 3 6 4 4 4 4 4 7  i ______________ _1 4 6 0 0 4 5 3 6 4 3 5 5
(Source : Euroconsult, la Lettre du CNES. various)
According to Euroconsult, SEP's profitability during the 1980s was good: in 1988 
net profits were 77.2 million francs, representing an increase of 60% over the 
figures for 1987.26 In 1990, the net profits were 140 million francs, again 
representing strong growth over the 1989 figure of 104 million 27
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Below, SEP’s activities are summarised in tabular form





Viking motors for Ariane first and 
second stages, HM7 motor for 
third stage. Cryogenic 
HM60/Vulcain motor for Ariane 
V + solid propellant boosters.





I » ..................... ......... ^
Spot propulsion, attitude control, 
solar array systems, ground 
receiving station and data 
treatment station. TDF1 /TVSAT 
electronic control of propulsion 




Eutelsat solar panel deployment j 
systems. Hispasat fuel reservoirs. | 
Various ground stations and data j 
treatment stations for CNES, 
Sweden, Brazil, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, India.
j Militaryj ;
S4 and M5 ballistic missile 
propulsion for the deterrent force. 
Hades tactical missiles
(Sources : various)
4.3. S pace m arkets and sa le s
Having now examined the activities and performance of the major French firms 
which make up the French space industry and which contribute heavily towards 
the European space sector in general, it is now useful to look at the overall 
European space business in terms of markets and sales. The table below 
presents the major statistical measures of the EC aerospace industry during the 
1980s, and overleaf we look at space as an aerospace product group :
| The Aerosoace Industry : Main indicators 1982-1992 :
] (m ECU)
I
I 1982 1983 j 1984 j 1985 ! 1986
!! |
1987 | 1988 1989 1990 j 1991 1992 IIj
| EC Sales
| i
2 4 8 3 5
j
2 5 4 2 5  ]j 2 5 4 2 5 j 2 8 6 5 3  j  3 1 6 6 3 3 2 3 8 2  I| 3 5 2 2 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 7 7 0 6  | 4 6 9 0 2 4 0 5 3 3  |
i Net 
I Exports
j 1 7 0 9  Ii 1 0 2 7  i
:
2 0 5 3  j
1
 2 0 8 1  j  5 8 3 5 1 0 ! 2 8 9 - 3 7 6 - 1 3 8 0  | - 1 7 8 8
j
3 0 1 0  |
| Production
[ j
j 26544 j| 26737 I 27478 Si 30734 j 32246 3 2 8 9 2 | 3 5 5 1 3 4 4 1 6 8 46326 I 45114\i
4 3 5 4 3  I
j Employees
1 ( , 0 0 0 )
I 4 2 3!
L __ I
14 0 2  ]j 3 9 2  |j 3 9 3  }  3 9 8 ! 4 0 5!............ i
| 3 9 9 4 1 3 4 2 2  j 4 1 4 3 9 0  j
(Source: Panorama of EC industry 1994/DEBA)
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4.3.1. Space as an Aerospace product group
EC aerospace production is divided into four product groups or segments, namely 
(in decreasing order of total turnover) aircraft, equipment, engines, and space. 
Although space systems production is the smallest of the four segments of the 
industry, it has been the segment which has shown the most consistent growth 
throughout the 1980s (16.6%).
Through examining the aerospace industry's turnover by product groups 
during the 1980s we can see the progression of the space segment, and contrast it 
with the evolution of the other product groups. The table below shows the trends 
in turnover for the four product groups, and divides them conveniently into military 
and civil components. From the figures it can be seen that the annual increase in 
turnover of the space segment 1980-88 was 16.6%, appreciably higher than the 
increases for the other segments (Equipment 13.5%, Aircraft 9.8%, Engines 
8.5%). In addition, the Space and Equipment segments of the industry have 
increased their share of overall industry turnover at the expense of aircraft and 
engine production (Space: +1.5%, Equipment : +5%, Aircraft: -3.5%, Engines: - 
3%).
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(Source: adapted from European Space Directory 19901
The more rapid growth of the space segment during the 1980s must not however 
obscure the fact that it is the smallest of the four production segments, 
representing 4.7% of total industry turnover in 1988, in comparison with Aircraft 
(50.6%), Equipment (28.1%) and Engines (16.6%). The issue of rate of growth of 
the segment is nevertheless of interest when one considers that the increase in 
space activities 1988/89 was of the order of 31.9%, in comparison with declining 
aircraft and equipment production and solid growth in the engine segment. This 
increase in space systems production raised the proportion of space in total 
industry turnover from 4.7% (1988) to 6.2% for 1989. In 1990, European space 
production reached 3521 ecus, representing a much more modest increase of 
some 3.6% over 1989.
The table below illustrates the extremely rapid growth of the space segment 
in 1988/89 and the relatively less satisfactory performances of the other product 
groups over the same period. At + 42.4%, growth in the total turnover of the 
space segment was more than twice that of the engines segment and eight times 
more than the equipment and aircraft product groups. From the table it can also 
be calculated that total turnover of the space systems segment increased over the 
period 1980-1989 by some 485%.
I T u r n o v e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  P r o d u c t  g r o u p s
I ( M i l l i o n  E C U ) 1980 1989 i 1988/89 1990
\ A i r c r a f t  c o n s t r u c t i o n 11041 24456 4.9 26301 j
j S p a c e  s e g m e n t 643 3120 42.4 3521
I E n g i n e s  s e g m e n t 3998 9108 19.0 10133 |
| E q u i p m e n t  s e g m e n t 4711 13637 5.3 14701 j
: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  _ _S
|  T o t a l  n o n - c o n s o l i d a t e d 20393 50321 j 9.2
...............................................................t
-
I I n t e r i m  d e l i v e r i e s 6257 14204 3.8i " ™r,nnnnmnnr ----- ------------
t
; T o t a l  c o n s o l i d a t e d ,  
i n c l u d i n g  :
14136 36177 | 11.6
< 1
A i r c r a f t  c o n s t r u c t i o n 8360 N/A N/A —  |
! S p a c e  s e g m e n t 467 N/A N/A _ |
\
S h a r e  i n  t o t a l  




\ A i r c r a f t  c o n s t r u c t i o n
_  |
-  4.0
|  S p a c e  s e g m e n t 3 . 2 6.2 31.9 _ |
j E n g i n e s  s e g m e n t 19.6 18.1 9.0 — .  I
I  E q u i p m e n t  s e g m e n t 23.1 27.1 - 3.6 -  i........... ......................
! T o t a l  n o n - c o n s o l i d a t e d 100 100 —  s
(Source : adapted from European Space Directory 1990)
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If one considers the aerospace industry from the perspective of exports, the 
performance of the space segment during the period 1988/89 is again very strong 
- + 224% - although starting from a very low base figure and although they 
represent only 0.3% of total exports. The following table places space exports in 
the context of other market segments’ exports and overall turnover:
I Turnover according to Market segments
| Million ECU 1980 1988 1989/88 
% change
| Public authority R&D 
I contracts
2038 4256 18.2
| Modifications, repairs, 
I maintenance
1055 2564 10.9
I Sales in the EC
a
5362 12015 6.4
3 Exports extra EC 5681 17282 18.7
\..... .......................... ................. *| ....................................................................................... . . . . . . . . . .
i including : I
i Aircraft construction 3720 9889 9.7
SSpace 82 590 224.2
j Engines 1134 4127 24.5





(Source : adapted from European Space Directory 1990)
In order to contextualise these figures, it is again useful to compare them with the 
performance of the United States’ space industry.
4.3.2. US and EC sp ace  m arkets com pared
The Panorama of EC Industry 1992 points out that in contrast to the USA, where 
spending on space in 1989 approached eleven times European funding levels, EC 
space is predominately civil and is thus disadvantaged in comparisons with the US 
by huge DOD space funding. It is interesting to note, as  the Panorama 
emphasizes, that in 1987, whereas US military space funding represented eight 
times total EC space turnover, US civil space spending was only twice that of the 
European Community countries. Comparisons between the US and European 
space efforts have recently also been made by the Commission of the European 
Communities. These comparisons conclude on the existence of a Very significant 
structural disadvantage' suffered by the European space industry which affects its 
commercial competitiveness.
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The following table illustrates the differences between the US and EC space 
industries identified by the European Commission, highlighting particularly the 
considerably greater involvement of government in markets (US = 95%, EC = 
70%), the bias in favour of military markets in the US as a proportion of total 
government orders (53%) and the emphasis on civilian markets in the EC (60%), 
and finally the six-fold difference in the proportional size of the ‘commercial market’ 
between the US (5%) and the EC (30%).
I  The US and European space efforts (1991)
3 I
| US space 
! industry
; EC space 
I industry
S EC as % of 
US
] Total sales 
j  (billion Ecus)_____
j 26 2.5 9.6
j  Government 
j  markets
; ; 
24.7 (95%) 1.75 (70%) 7.1
j
j  - military 








i  Commercial [ 1.3 (5%) !1 0.75 (30%) 57.7
(Adapted from European Commission, The European 
Community and Space. 1992)
Despite the ‘structural disadvantage’ of a small military demand for space 
products, European industry has obtained success in the ‘commercial’ launcher 
market and a respectable performance in the field of commnications satellites, as 
the table below reveals :
I US and EC Sales of commercial space products(1990)
j (Figures in million US space I EC space j EC as % of I
i Ecus) industry industry US
1 Launchers:
j Total sales 1200 560 46.7
j - govt markets 840 84 10
] - commercial 360 476 132j |]
i military as % govt. 60% (720) 5% (28) j 4
i Comsats j:
| Total sales 2230 400 18
- govt, markets 1670 160 9.6
; - commercial 560
: ! 
i ;
240 42.9 !I \ ;
j military as % govt. 65% (1450) I 20% (80) 5.5
] govt, as % total 75% 40% | ]
(Adapted from European Commission, The European 
Community and Space, 1992)
120
4.4. Conclusion
This chapter has presented the industrial background in France and Europe, to the 
making of French space policy, it has shown that the European space  industry is 
highly concentrated, with a  small number of large powerful firms surrounded by a 
much larger number of parts and component suppliers. In comparison with the 
US space industry, the European Community peform ance in markets and business 
is still small, largely because of the considerable diference between the military 
sectors in the US and in Europe, but despite this ‘handicap’, the French led ESA 
programme of Ariane launchers has been a  success, and French and European 
satellite activities are developing strongly.
Despite the smaller size of the European space effort, the ‘limited’ French 
and European successes  achieved in the face of structural disadvantages of size 
and funding show that European space activities can bring positive results. In 
1992 and 1993, when the European Commission was militating in favour of 
increased Community (rather than inter-governmental) control of the ESA- 
dominated European space effort, the 1992 issue of the Panoram a of EC Industry- 
Statistical Supplem ent gave the following description of the European Aerospace 
industry, emphasizing its importance:
The sector is characterised by complex, very high-value products in relatively 
small quantities, a s  well as by long development periods and high development 
costs. This results in a high capital requirement and high investment risks both 
for manufacturers and users. The high technological requirements in the 
military segm ent, intensive international competition in the civil segm ent and 
working in new fields of technology (space flight) necessitate a  particularly high 
level of research and development (high R&D expenditure). As a  result of this 
the aerospace industry is a  high development provider and user of new 
technological p rocesses and products.28
In the following second section of the thesis we examine how the French space 
agency CNES interacts with government in the making of space  policy.
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Notes to Chapter 4
I The figures are adapted from The European Space Industry (Euroconsult, Paris, 1992).
-  GIFAS is the French aerospace industry association, the acronym stands for Groupement des
industries aeronautiques et spatiales.
Chesnais, Franqois, and Serfati, Claude, L’industrie militaire, “une locomotive du developpement 
economique franqais ?”, chapter 6 in Chesnais (ed), Competitivite inlemationale et deoenses 
militaires. CPE/Economica, 1990, p. 180.
4 Ibid., pp. 188-189.
5 Arena, R., de Bandt J., Benzoni, L. (eds.LTraite d’6conomie industrielle. Economica, 1988.
The description of the sector as being ‘the aeronautics and space industry’ is accurate, but also 
indicative of the frequent difficulties of quantitatively separating the two elements o f  aerospace’.
The three groups which make up the aeronautics (and space) industry interpreted in this way are 
Aerospatiale, Snecma and Dassault-Bregue, ibid., p. 184.
In all, there were fifty 'founder shareholders'.
8 Credit Lyonnais 0.5%, BNP 0.5%, Banque Vemes 0.2%, Societe GenSrale 0.4%, Banque Paribas
0.4%.
The American launcher industry is the most voluble critic of the Arianespace approach to commercial 
satellite launching, since they feel that the European launcher is an unfair competitor, benefitting 
unduly from an inherited, fully developed launcher funded by government money.
Charles Bigot, chairman and CEO of Arianespace, speaking at the celebration o f 50 Ariane launches 
and 100 contracts, 18 May 1992, reported in Arianespace Newsletter, June 1992, No.67, p.4.
II Cohendet, Patrick, and Lebeau, Andre, Choix strategiaues et grands programmes civils 1987 p.152.
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I Ariane Launches 1992 - 1994 □
j V56 i May 93 1 A42L i Astra 1C
! V57 i June 93 ; A42P j Galaxy IV
1 V58 j July 93 i A44L j Hispasat IB and Insat IIB
j V59 ! Sept. 93 I A40 I Spot 3
V 60.....................1i Oct. 93 ! A44LP i Intelsat 701
1 V61 ! Nov. 93 i A44LP i Solidaridad 1 and Meteosat 6
! V62 1 Dec. 93 i A44L i DBS 1 and Thaicom 1
j V63 i Jan. 94 j Failed. Turksat 1A and Eutelsat II-F5
j V64 i Summer 94 ! Intelsat 702
! V65 ! Summer 94 I.............................. ji PAS-2 and BS-3N
V66__________ | Summer 94 i Turksat IB and Brasilsat B1
1 V67 ! Summer 94 I Tel star 402
[ ! Zj
13 Since the late-1980s, when industry prospects were very favourable for the space sector, world 
recession in general and decreasing military spending worldwide in particular have tended to squeeze 
employment in the space and defence divisions o f most of the major French aerospace firms. After a 
relatively good year in 1991, when profits and employment remained near their 1989/90 levels and a 
difficult 1992, Aerospatiale was obliged to reduce its overall employment by 1145, including 475 
from the division ‘Defense-Espace’. The 1994 turnover of GIFAS members overall is expected to be 
20-25% lower than in 1991 (See Le Monde 15 January 1992,, p.27, Le Monde. 13-14 September
1992, p. 17).
14 In 1993 Aerospatiale was threatened with privatisation by the new Balladur government, although the
move towards such a privatisation was described as likely to be ‘very progressive’. Le Monde July 8
1993, p.8
13 See Chesnais, Op. cit., p.212, for a brief criticism of the inadequacies o f the ‘Nomenclature d ’activites
et de produits' (NAP).














'Aerospatiale mise sur le missile M5, Hermes et les satellites militaires', Air et Cosmos. No.1364,3-9 
fevrier 1992, pp.10-11.
'Nous definissons actuellement avec la Defense la fagon de maintenir les competences de la division 
dans le domaine balistique strategique, si possible en avangant le progrmme de nouveau missile 
nucleaire strategique naval M5 et de son eventuel derive terrestre S5', Aerospatiale mise sur le missile 
M5, Hermes et les satellites militaires, Air et Cosmos. No.1364,3-9 fevrier 1992, pp.10-11.
In 1982, subsequent to the nationalisations, the public sector in France accounted for thirteen of the 
twenty major industrial groups, 24% of industrial employment, 32% of turnover, 22% of exports, 27% 
of total investment and 50% of research spending.
Les enieux de Tespace. La documentation fran9aise,1982, see the Literature review for a detailed 
treatment of this work.
'une tris large proportion des ingenieurs des grandes ecoles de la Societe sont employes par la 
branche Espace qui constitute done naturellement un vivier de talents et d'experiences que le groupe 
Matra utilise largement soil pour creer de nouvelles activites soit pour pourvoir des postes de 
responsabilite'. Ibid., p. 110.
\  . .  la synergie entre les activites spatiales de Matra, bien que dijficilement quantifiable, est un 
element important dans le developpement du groupe et va bien au-dela de la contribution de I'espace 
au chiffre d'affaires de la societe. Ibid. p. 110. In June 1989 Matra Espace was awarded a quality 
certificate RAQ-1 by the DGA's industrial quality control body, reflecting the attainment by the 
company of the highest quality criteria. See La Lettre du CNES. No. 122, juin 1989, p .l 1.
Shares of many if not all of the twelve firms privatised (and particularly those of Matra) were offered 
at a considerable discount of their 'real' value.
Matra tient toujours a demeurer maitre de son destin et de son developpement. C'est pourquoi tout 
echange de participation nous verra toujours majoritaire chez nous'.
La SEP s'est maintenue en 1992, Air et Cosmos Aviation magazine. No.1409,18-24 janvier 1993,
p. 12.
Euroconsult, Entreprises spatiales europeennes. (Euroconsult, Paris, 1990), p.216.
La Lettre du CNES. No. 132, 26 fevrier 1991, p.9.
Panorama of EC Industry- Statistical Supplement (European Commission, 1993), p. 13-45.
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Section 11 THE CENTRE NATIONAL D’ETUDES SPATIALES AND
GOVERNMENT
The second section of the thesis deals essentially with the Centre national 
d ’etudes spatiales, the civil national space agency set up in 1961-62 by France to 
stimulate the development of French space industry and to ‘m anage’ national 
space  activities for the state. The section com prises three chapters which each 
address different aspects of the space agency’s place in the overall ‘space sector’.
Chapter 5 examines the role and organisation of CNES, its activities, and 
the level and mechanisms of its funding. This analysis shows how the space 
agency benefits from a  special administrative status a s  a  semi-public intermediary 
institution, has had privileged access  to funding and undertakes a  wide range of 
tasks in the execution of its statutory missions.
Chapter 6 examines the interactions between CNES and government 
departm ents which have various interests in space during the period 1979-1988, 
namely the Industry ministry, the Finance and Budget ministry, the Foreign affairs 
ministry and the Science and Technology ministry. This analysis reveals that the 
pattern of tutelle during most of the 1980s was complicated and confused thereby 
allowing the space agency the potential to define its own development.
Chapter 7 examines the change in the interaction between CNES and 
governm ent that was brought about in 1988 and 1989 by the creation of a  ‘Ministry 
of S p ace’ and of other bodies intended to increase the s ta te ’s capacity to monitor 
CNES's role and activities. This^analysis shows how the Rocard administration in 
power from 1988 to 1991 attempted to reform governm ent's interaction with the 
agency in line with its general ambition to modernise and rationalise the state.
The order in which these subjects are addressed  reflects the need to 
understand the nature of CNES as  a  state agency and its activities before 
assessing  how it relates to government in practice. The relationship between the 
space  agency and the state that is revealed in C hapter 6 forms the background to 
the institutional innovations of 1988 and 1989 and the developm ent of 
governm ent’s attitude towards space in the early 1990s which are d iscussed in 
chapter 7.
After this analysis of the way in which space policy and the practice of the 
overall space  effort originate from the civil side of French space  activities, Section 
III of the thesis will investigate the military contributions to French space  deriving 
from defence policy and military strategy, the organisation of French military space 
and the industrial development of the military space program m es. Overleaf 
however, we introduce CNES as  a  state agency leading a  high-tech sector.
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5. CNES Rdle, o rgan isation  and  m iss io n s  , A ctivities, F unding and  
b u d g e ts
In this chap ter we shall look at the role the French national sp ace  agency is 
intended to fulfill by government, then present the organisation of the agency 
which has been developed to carry out this role and  the activities which CNES 
undertakes. The third section of the chap ter a d d re sse s  the issue of CNES 
funding. The structure of the chapter is thus the following :
- 5.1. CNES Role, organisation and missions
- 5.2. CNES Activities
- 5.3. CNES Funding and budgets
- 5.4. Conclusion
5.1. The Role and  o rgan isation  of th e  Centre national d’6tudes spatiales
The shortest and most elegant definition of CNES is that it is an 'organisme public 
scientifique et technique a caractere industriel et commercial'. Short and elegant 
but also som ew hat sybilline, this formulation is completed in article 1 of the CNES 
founding law of 1961 by mention of the two features of 'financial autonomy' and 
attachm ent to the Prime Minister's office.1 CNES is thus something of a  hybrid in 
nature, since it is charged with developing scientific-technical and  industrial- 
commercial activities, and in term s of its independence of action it is 
simultaneously ‘autonom ous’ and under the control of the Prime Minister. Over 
CNES's lifetime, the different contents assigned to each of these  notions, and the 
interplay of precedence between the varied characteristics expressed  in the 
definition have mirrored the form and content of Space policy.
5.1.1. The *etablissment public a caractere industriel et commercial'
The etablissement public a caractere industriel et commercial (EPIC) represents 
an important conceptual characteristic of French science and technology 
development, namely the state 's belief that it can create hybrid high-tech 
organisations combining public-sector statutes and private-sector efficiency.
During the late-1980s and early-1990s there has been som e questioning of this 
belief, doubt being focussed on the 'ambiguity' of the organisational format of the 
EPIC rather than faith being placed in its flexibility.2
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In legal administrative terms, EPICs are one form of etablissement public 
d'iintervention, or public sector economic intervention estab lishm ent. The 
etablissement public antedates the Fifth Republic, but article 34 of the 1958 
Constitution authorises government to create such organisations. There exist a 
num ber of EPICs in the agricultural sector, such a s  the Office national 
interprofessionnel des cereales, and, more importantly, in the industrial sector, 
such a s  CNES, the national marine research organisation Ifremer, the Institut 
national de recherche chimique appliquee, and the Centre d'etudes des systemes 
et technologies avancees. Again in legal administrative term s (the statutes of 
such institutions are determined by 'le Droit administratif), EPICs are 'personnes 
publiques sped ales' and are subject to the principle o f 'specificite fonctionnelle' by 
which the totality of their rights, duties and infrastructures are focussed on a  single 
objective a s  defined in their founding statutes.
EPICs in general are a  form of gestion administrative decentralisee, through 
which the state, or other state structures can m anage an activity.
1Decentralisation' has to be distinguished from 'deconcentration'- (which refers to 
the delegation of authority or to the em powem ent by statute of lower levels to take 
decisions) - since decentralisation implies a  continual overseeing of the 
decentralised authority by the state. Gestion administrative decentralisee 
produces the problem of control (and also potentially the problem of relations 
between separate  decentralised activities). The function of 'oversight' or 'control' 
is terminologically and conceptually defined by the notion o f 1tutelle'.
Technically, 'tutelle' is distinct from what is simple 'subordination 
hierarchique', since the decentralised activities are supposed to enjoy a  degree of 
autonomy from the governmental/state hierarchical superiors from whom they are 
decentralised. However, the definitions of 'EPIC', of 'administrative 
decentralisation' and of 'tutelle' are loose enough to produce ambiguities in the 
exact legal and practical status of som e EPIC institutions such a s  CNES. CNES 
is usually considered to be a standard EPIC, but the actual relationship between 
the space  centre and the state as  defined in its founding law is one in which 
'tutelle' is of an ambiguous nature. Article 1. of Loi n° 61-1382 instituting CNES 
sta tes that the agency is 'place sous I'autorite du Premier ministre'. The fact that 
the founding statutes prefer 'sous I'autorite du Premier ministre' to the more usual 
'sous la tutelle de' or the less restrictive 'sous le contrdle de' implies a  special link 
between the space  centre and the state in the form of the Prime Minister's office. 
Som e legal experts are of the opinion that 'sous I'autorite de' reflects not a  
relationship of decentralisation, but more a  form of administrative 'deconcentration' 
characterised by subordination hierarchique. The differences in interpretation
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which are possible between 'autorite'and 'tutelle' are doubtless sufficient to create 
tensions over the real autonomy of the space centre from government.
5.1.2. The ‘elaboration’ of space policy
The 1961 statutes of CNES stated that the ‘single objective’ of the agency w as to 
prepare, propose to government, and implement national space policy.3 Before 
modifications brought about in the elaboration of policy in the !ate-1980s, (which 
will be examined in the following chapters), CNES w as responsible for the 
preparation of policy initiatives which which were submitted by its Consell 
d'administratlon to its tutellary authorities, who then communicated them to the 
Prime Minister's office. The Prime Minister and the government then transmitted 
these  proposals to the President who discussed them with the Prime Minister and 
the heads of relevant ministries in a  restricted cabinet meeting (Conseil restreint) 
or interdepartmental meeting (Conseil interministeriel). In this way it w as 
essentially the Prime Minister and the Head of State who took the final decisions 
concerning space  policy, on the basis of proposals furnished by CNES.
Depending on the period and on the presidential interest in space matters, the 
m eetings to define space policy usually took place about once every two years.
Thus for example during the 1970s, space  policy w as defined and refined at 
the conseils restreints of 14 May 1970, 30 November 1972, 14 October 1974, 20 
February 1979 and 17 April 1980. At the 1979 meeting it w as decided to 
reorganise CNES, to produce and commercialise the Ariane launcher, and to 
continue the development of Telecom 1. At the meeting of April 1980, it w as 
furthermore decided to undertake preliminary studies for Ariane V.
During the period 1980-1989 there were in total four m eetings of the conseil 
restreint and one conseil interministeriel, presided either by the President of the 
Republic or by the Prime Minister, until in 1989 new m ethods of deciding policy 
were introduced. The table overleaf sum m arises these  m eetings :
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Meetings of Conseils restreints on space policy 1980-1987
Date | Subject
17 April 1980 Conseil restreint chaired by President deciding pursuit of 
preparatory studies for Ariane V.
15 October 1981 Conseil restreint chaired by President, deciding the 
| development of Ariane IV and of Spot 2.
14 June 1984 Conseil restreint chaired by Prime Minister, discussing 
French space policy over 15 year period. Decisions : 
encourage the use of space facilities, products and services; 
prepare launcher capabilities for the 1990s; prepare 
European autonomy in strategic space applications.
1
17 October 1986J Conseil restreint chaired by Prime Minister deciding the 
pursuit of an autonomous European m anned flight 
programme and participation by CNES in Hermes 
! | preparatory programme up to 45% of programme costs.
October 1987 |
........................................................................................................... .................................................................  3
Conseil interministeriel confirming the continuation of j 
Earth observation programme and Spot 3 project. j
(Source : CNES Annual Reports. La Lettre du CNES)
These meetings thus ratified CNES's suggestions for its activities.
5.1.3. CNES Organisation and missions
CNES's statutes, and the missions which they entrust to the agency are reflected 
in the organisation of the Space centre's work and the activities it pursues. From 
an original staff of less than twenty in 1962 housed in the rue de Lille, followed by 
a  period at rue de I'Universite, in 1992 CNES employed som e 2,400, a  
considerable rise from the 1980 level of 1,080, a  high proportion of them being 
engineers from the aerospace and high-tech 'Grandes Ecoles'.4 Now sited in a  
prestigious location overlooking the development a rea  of Les Hailes, the agency's 
central headquarters are still in Paris but operations and technical establishm ents 
exist in Toulouse, the Paris region at Evry, and Kourou (French Guyana) where 
the Ariane rockets are launched. The organisational chart of the agency and the 
activities it runs exemplify both the relations between CNES and the political 
authorities and other branches of government (non-tutellary ministries, other state 
scientific and technical establishm ents for example), a s  well as  the fundamental 
objectives assigned to the high-technology space sector.
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We shall first briefly examine the organisation of CNES, and then consider 
the programmes and other activities themselves.
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(From CNES Annual Reports)
This was the organisational structure of CNES that held through most of the 
1980s. It shows the variety of concerns and activities of interest to the space 
agency, foremost amongst which were the Launcher, Hermes and manned flight 
programmes, whose increasingly central importance to CNES was reflected in 
their attachment to a vice Director General in charge of what was known as ‘space 
transport system s’. In comparison with space transport’s privileged status, the 
other directorates of the agency suffered from their subordinate hierarchical 
position and from competition between themselves, leading to a redrawing of the 
agency’s institutional structure in 1992 in which a different balance of status was 
created.
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(CNES Annual Report 1992)
In this structure, Hermes and Ariane are the responsibility of the Director General, 
and the other activities of the agency are supervised by two vice Director 
Generals, in order to protect their place within the the organisation
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5.1.4. The Conseil d ’Administration
CNES’s governing board, the 'Conseil d'administration1 is made up of nineteen 
members, who are appointed in three different ways. Seven members are 
appointed as state representatives by the Ministries involved in the individual 
space programmes. In 1991-92, these 'Representants de I'Etat' represented the 
Prime Minister (the Secretaire general adjoint de la Defense nationale), the 
Minister of the Economy (the Directeur des Relations economiques exterieures au 
Ministere de I'Economie, des Finances et du Budget), the Budget Minister, the 
Defence Minister (the Directeur des Missiles e td e  I ’Espace at the DGA), the 
Foreign Affairs Minister (the Directeur adjoint des Affaires economiques et 
financieres), and naturally the Industry and Research and Technology Ministers.5 
Respect is paid to democracy through the election of six members by their fellow 
employees representing either unions or pressure groups within the Centre itself.6 
Four members are co-opted to serve on the board because of their special 
expertise in particular fields of activity of the agency; these members currently 
represent the disciplines of meteorology, aeronautical engineering, satellite 
broadcasting and satellite telecommunications. In addition to these members the 
governing board is completed by its President Rene Pellat (appointed November 
1992) who succeeded Jacques-Louis Lions (in post since 1984), and by the 
'Commissaire du Gouvernement', in 1992 Michel Petit, Delegue General a 
I'Espace at the Ministere de la Recherche et de I’Espace (MRE).7
This particular composition of the Conseil d ’Administration creates a 
potential voting imbalance between those members representing immediate 
governmental interests, such as the representatives of the various ministries and 
the Commissaire du gouvernement and those members originating from the space 
agency itself. The table below shows this division of the Council’s membership :











Such an imbalance m eans that in principle the agency representatives can see  
their own views prevail against the numerically w eaker government 
representatives, although government still has the power of veto in the last 
instance through its control over agency funding. This scenario of outright conflict 
between government and agency is of course an extrem e case  of interaction, but 
the structural composition of the Conseil does nevertheless in normal 
circum stances restrict the power of political representatives to influence decisions. 
In addition to their minority position within the council, ministerial representatives 
are of course also handicapped by their lack of technical expertise concerning the 
subjects under discussion which are proposed by the agency.
When approved, the decisions of the Conseil d'administration are put into 
everyday practice by the Direction generale, headed by Jean-Daniel Levi (1992) 
a s  Director General. The Directeur General m anages the work of the 
administrative services of the Direction generale and is assisted  in addition by a  
number of advisors (on science and technology or on military affairs for example), 
by a  planning and forecasting service and by a  public relations office. The 
functions of political control from outside the agency are  exercised by the 
Controleur d'Etat and by the Agent Comptable principal.
Specialised directorates
Below the level of the central administration of the agency 's activities a  number of 
specialised directorates or divisions deal with tasks such a s  the m anagem ent of 
quality control, or International and Industrial affairs and programmes. Thus a  
special post of Vice-Director General exists to supervise strategy, planning and 
industrial and international affairs, and another delegue general adjoint deals with 
applications program m es and research. The launcher and associated 
program m es (Ariane and Hermes) are headed by programme directors who report 
directly to the Director General in reflection the importance of the launcher 
programme for CNES. The Direction des Lanceurs is located at Evry, and the 
Direction responsible for Hermes and for m anned flight forms part of the Toulouse 
Space C entre.8 H eaded by Bernard Estadieu, this Centre Spatial de Toulouse 
created in 1968 groups all the activities of CNES except launchers and thus goes 
a  long way in isolation to contributing to the high-tech reputation of the Toulouse 
a rea .9
The structure and organisation of CNES are complicated, reflecting the 
variety of responsibilities undertaken by the agency in its role a s  an EPIC. As we
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have seen, these  range from managing the Kourou and Toulouse ‘space  stations’, 
to stimulating research in space science in the French scientific community and 
the leadership of the research and developm ent program m es for projects such as  
Ariane V and Hermes.
We shall now examine CNES activities in more detail.
5.2. Activities in the 1980s : ‘Commercialisation’ and cooperation.
During the 1980s, the French space  sector developed in a  num ber of ways within 
the general shift towards attempted ‘commercialisation’ of products and services. 
The Europeanisation of the space program m es w as continued, albeit with fall­
backs to national projects in certain fields. Indeed, over-enthusiasm  on the part of 
CNES for European cooperation, as  exemplified in the agreem ents of The Hague 
in 1987 to pursue the Ariane V, Hermes and Columbus projects created a  double 
aw areness in government that the ambitions of the National S pace agency needed 
to be controlled, and also that national ambitions in space  activities were becoming 
increasingly difficult to cultivate, given the trends towards specialisation of national 
industries and the need to pool funding cross-nationally to m eet huge costs. 
Another major trend of the 1980s w as that of the renewal of overt interest in 
military space  activities. This trend, dealt with in detail below in the section on 
military space, w as initiated essentially by the Strategic Defence Initiative and its 
real, imagined and potential effects on European security in general and on the 
credibility of the French Deterrent force in particular.
5.2.1. Activities and Programmes.10
The activities undertaken by CNES and the program m es that it directs can be 
classified in a  number of ways. An obvious distinction that can be drawn is that of 
the scientific or technological nature of the activity, another concerns the stage of 
maturity of the activity within its lifetime (research-development-production- 
commercialisation for example). Program m es and activities can also be 
considered in term s of the scientific or industrial partners they involve, and a  
classification in terms of national, bilateral, multilateral or 'export' gives an 
international relations perspective to analysis. For this study, we will consider the 
program m es in term s of a  classification combining the practical definition of the 
nature of a  programme in term s of CNES's missions and in term s of the scientific
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or technological content of the project. This approach distinguishes between 
'applications' programmes, 'scientific' program m es and research and technology 
cam paigns.
Applications programmes
Applications programmes are those programmes in which space  activities have 
som e immediate practical use in society a s  a  whole. Current applications 
program m es cover the Ariane family of European satellite launchers, 
telecommunications and observation satellite system s and meteorological and 
data  collection/platform location satellite system s. 'Le transport spatial', a s  the 
launcher programme has com e to be known in CNES parlance, covers the 
operational Ariane I to Ariane IV family of rockets developed by European (in fact 
mainly French) industry for the ESA under the direction of CNES. The production 
of the launchers and the commercialisation of launcher services is m anaged by the 
CNES subsidiary Arianespace. Closely associated with the launcher activities 
currently in application are the three 'grands programmes en developpement' (the 
major program m es in preparation which the ESA and France agreed to undertake 
at the Hague in 1987). These onerous projects are the Ariane V heavy launcher, 
the Hermes space shuttle to be carried by a  version of Ariane V, and the 
Columbus space laboratory representing the ESA contribution to the NASA 
international space  station.
The satellite applications programmes cover the range of techniques using 
satellite technology. Telecommunications are represented by the Telecom 1 
series of satellites and by the preparation of the replacem ent Telecom 2  series. 
Direct broadcasting by satellite is represented by the TDF 1/TV SAT system s and 
also by TDF 2. Data collection and platform location are provided in the Sarsat- 
C ospas system , whose most well-known use is in search  and rescue operations. 
Earth observation includes the SPOT series of satellites ('/a filiere SPO T  )11, 
providing a  satellite photograph service commercialised by the CNES subsidiary 
Spot Image SA. In collaboration with the Direction de la Meteorologie nationale, 
CNES is preparing the second generation of Meteosat satellites for w eather 
forecasting.
Space science
As well a s  the applications programmmes, CNES promotes work on space  science 
research. This is represented by the scientific program m es carried out nationally,
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bilaterally, within the ESA framework or with other groups of countries. CNES 
does not p o ssess  any space  science laboratories itself, its activity in the scientific 
program m es being restricted to the support of research team s and laboratories of 
the CNRS (the French national scientific research organisation,) universities or the 
grandes ecoles and other government research establishm ents. In 1988, the 
national scientific programme effort am ounted to som e 52 million Francs, 
compared with ESA science programmes at 56 million francs and bilateral 
(essentially superpower) cooperation funded at 185 million francs. CNES 
spending on national science programmmes represented 0.8% of the total 
spending of the agency and overall spending on science 8% .12 The program m es 
supported by this funding range from astronomy through geophysics, microgravity 
and oceanography to materials science. The work thus stimulated by CNES 
irrigates som e 60 projects in fourteen laboratories in France.
Research and Technology
The final aspect of CNES activities is represented by the R esearch and 
Technology programmes. Instituted in the early 1980s, these  program m es are an 
attempt to recreate the vitality of the space sector in the early 1970s which was 
perceived at the time as  the grounding for the su ccess  of the industrial 
development of the major programmes such a s  Ariane and SPOT. During the 
1970s however, the proportion of CNES funds devoted to research and technology 
development decreased  during the latter years of the decade a s  funds were 
devoted to the industrial phases of Symphonie, Meteosat, SPOT and Ariane. A 
Conseil restreint (special restricted cabinet meeting of those Ministers directly 
involved in space matters) in October 1981 agreed on the necessity of 
strengthening essential R & D in order to m eet the challenges expected in the 
design and econom ics of space  system s in the period 1990-2000. The fall-out 
from these  research and technology programmes w as also intended to maintain 
the level and competitivity of French industry and to allow the continuing 
improvement of existing applications programmes. To date the medium-term 
pluriannual plans have been implemented, the first for 1983-85 and the second for 
1986-88. In 1988 the 236 million francs devoted to this activity w as split 71% : 
29% in favour of space  vehicles over launchers.13
T hese then are the various scientific and technological/industrial activities 
engaged in by CNES and for which funding is provided either through the 
PTT/MPTE 'budget annexe' (programmes and capital investment) or through the 
Research Ministry/MRT allowance for the operating costs of the agency. CNES is
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also involved in stimulating the economic, financial and industrial aspects of the 
French space sector, and it is to these activities that we now turn.
5.2.2. CNES subsid iaries and Groupements d'interet economique
In its role as the directing force in the development of the French space industry, 
CNES has stimulated the creation of new space sector companies when it has felt 
there to be the need for such structures in industry for the smooth evolution of 
space activities. CNES is involved in subsidiary companies (or filiales), which it 
either partially or wholly owns, and groupements d'interet economique (either GIE 
industriels, or GIE scientifiques). As of 1992, the main subsidiaries in which 
CNES participates numbered seven, and there are four principal groupements 
d'interet economique industriels, as the table below illustrates:
j CNES subsidiaries and groupements d'interet economique
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3 |
| 3 -100%  owned by CLS.
(Source CNES. Rannorts Annuels 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992)
The rationale behind CNES involvement in creating new industry structures such 
as its filiales (subsidiaries) and the GIEs is repeatedly stated in agency 
documentation - the rationale is both a justification of CNES action in undertaking 
responsibilities additional to its traditional role of managing the development of 
industry and a reflection of the belief that the agency should act to stimulate the
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continuing development of the sector. The 1991 report on the activities of the 
agency stated the rationale in terms of a duty to itself maintain and encourage the 
expertise and skills of science and industry, including in such a role the creation of 
‘innovative’ commercial and industrial bodies.14
The groupements d'interet economique were the initial form of CNES's 
ambition to expand its input into the workings of the space sector. As the turnover 
and employment figures presented below reveal, the GIEs are the least 
commercially developed of the agency's ventures, and as  the discussion of their 
members and activities will also show, they are essentially concerned with 
promotional and informational tasks. A cursory analysis of the dates of creation of 
the subsidiaries reveais two periods in which CNES particularly felt the need to 
institute new 'commercial and industrial structures', namely the early 1980s and 
1986-87, as the graph below illustrates :
Creation of CNES filiales and GIES 1978-1991
78 7 9 80 81 82 83 84 8 5 8 6 8 7 88 8 9 9 0 91
□  No. of filiales created 0  No. of GIE created
(Source CNES, Rapports Annueis)
These two periods coincided with government enthusiasms for the use of high- 
technology industry as a catalyst for society and the economy, although in different 
ways. From 1981 until approximately 1984, government thinking on science, 
technology and industry under the Socialists centred on a ‘Jacobin’ approach in 
which central control and direction could channel developments for industrial and 
commercial success. During 1986-87, the prevailing 'ideology' of science and 
industry was the professedly neo-liberal one of the right wing governments of the
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two years of political Cohabitation between an RPR neo-Gauilist Prime Minister 
and a Socialist President. Under the aegis of the particularly liberally inclined 
Industry minister Alain Madelin, with whom responsibility for space was lodged 
during this period, CNES took advantage of this ideology to create technology 
transfer, satellite consultancy and satellite positioning subsidiaries.
The following table gives the latest available employment and turnover figures for 
CNES subsidiary companies and for the groupements d'interet economique (GIE) 
in which the space agency is involved.
j CNES filiales and GIEs : Employment and Turnover (1989 -1992)
J 1989 1990 1991 1992
5 3 Turnover 1 Staff i Turnover ! Staff 1 Turnover j Staff Turnover Staff
JwrwuuuiniujjjLuuuj j -umnnnfwi uujju
I (,000 FF) IJi IW uuuui.1. ■■■■■■■■■ Jj (,000 FF) 1 j (,000 FF) (,000 FF)
i Filiales 
j Arianespace 3794 268 3979.2 270 6028.1 287 4998 287
I CLS Argos 45 i 54 i 69.6 90 79.2 96 39 113
| Intespace 158!! 158! 104 155 93.9 153 205 156
1 Novespace 6!1 81 9.5 10 16.1 10 16 11
j Locstar 4 | 101 -  j 25 - - - -
j Scot Conseil j 15!! 8 1 22.0i 27 24.4 29 27 29
1 Simko 65! 5 9 ! 73.0! 60 84.0 70 97 60
j Spot Image j 140!
i
i
113 165.4 j 108 204.0 180 215 175
1 ftlE 's
juJUJUU.J.JJUU-UUULJ_J
j GDTA 25 191 24.0! 28 23.8 31 22 32
| Prospace i 41 3.6! 4 3.6 4 NA NA
1 Sat- Conseil 61 12| 13.0! 9 10.9 9 5.2 9
| Sat Control 39! 39 j -1 - - - -
| Medes/Imps .111 |
7.0 j 9 6.15 9.5 10.5 10
1 Total 4297! 7421 4470.31 795 6574.1 888.5 5634.7 882
(Source CNES. Rapports Annuels 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992)
The table reveals the four main CNES subsidiaries are Arianespace, Spot Image, 
Intespace and CLS-Argos. These high-profile subsidiaries have the highest 
turnovers of the elements which make up the CNES ‘group’ and are the major 
employers amongst the subsidiaries and GIEs. They differ in nature to the extent 
that Arianespace is concerned with managing the production, sale and launch of 
the Ariane satellite launchers, whereas Spot Image and CLS-Argos market 
satellite-provided services and Intespace commercialises CNES technical facilities 
to industry. We shall now examine these CNES subsidiaries.
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Arianespace
As one of the major firms of the French and European space sector, Arianespace 
is covered in some detail elsewhere in the thesis. It is of interest here for its role 
as the pioneer CNES subsidiary, since it was formally constituted as early as 
December 1980, as the ESA, under pressure from CNES and the French 
government conceded that the Ariane launcher programme would be better 
coordinated by a commercial company than by an international agency. CNES 
initially controlled 34% of Arianespace's shares, a figure which was reduced 
slightly to 32% in 1990 when the financial structure of the company was modified 
in recognition of the changes in the industrial contributors to the Ariane 
programmes over the period 1980-1990. Over and beyond the large shareholding 
that CNES has in Arianespace, the organisations are closely linked by virtue of 
CNES's prime contractorship for Ariane, and by the physical contiguity of the 
CNES direction des lanceurs (launcher division) and the headquarters of 
Arianespace at Evry in the Paris region.
Spot Image
The Spot Image company in which CNES initially had a 39% holding was created 
in July 1982 in order to promote the services of the Spot Earth observation satellite 
and to commercialise the images obtained by the satellite to eventual clients.
CNES has a controlling share of Spot’s capital, the rest of which is held essentially 
by French state and industrial concerns such as the National Geographical 
Institute (IGN), the Bureau of Mining and Geological research (BRGM), the Societe 
europeenne de propulsion (SEP) and Matra (since 1991 - Matra Marconi Space). 
The following table shows the exact ownership of the company :
Shareholders o f  S p o t Im age










The first Spot satellite was not however actually launched until February 1986, 
when the turnover of the company climbed from zero to 15.8 million francs in ten 
months. The Spot 1 satellite was operational until 31 Decem ber 1990, 
overlapping for a year with Spot 2 which w as launched by Ariane in January 1990. 
French industry is producing two further Spot satellites to take over from Spot 2 in 
the mid-1990s. The Spot programme has allowed France to acquire the 
techniques of Earth observation from space and expertise in the reception and 
treatment of satellite observation data on the ground. Part of the motivation for 
the programme was the desire to break the US monopoly on space imaging 
provided by the Keyhole series of military satellites and by the civil Landsat 
satellites (1972). Although the 10m resolution afforded by Spot is not a s  good as  
the 1 -2m provided by Keyhole satellites, it is nevertheless better than Landsat's 
20m definition. Currently, Spot Image com petes with the Landsat /Eosat 
suppliers of satellite images.
The Spot satellites have been developed by Matra, working under the 
direction of CNES. A third of the development costs were provided by the 
Defence ministry, whose Helios military observation satellites are based  on the 
sam e satelite 'buses' (or platforms) and which use similar (if more precise and 
hardened technology). The Spot programme w as initially proposed by CNES to 
the ESA in 1976 for 'Europeanisation' but found little support (except from Belgium 
and Sweden), and was therefore withdrawn to becom e a  national programme with 
contributions from Belgium and Sweden.
Although Spot Image has created American and Swedish com panies to 
help the promotion of the satellite~and its services, the overall turnover for the 
company is still relatively low, although steadily increasing. In 1986, turnover w as 
approximately 16 million francs, rising to 55 million francs in 1987. In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, perhaps because of the increased need for military 
intelligence gathering created by developm ents in Eastern Europe and the Gulf 
area, Spot turnover increased to a  more substantial le v e l: between 1988 and 
1991 turnover rose by 160% from 123 million francs to 204 million francs.
Spot Image





15.8 55 | 123 140 164.5 204 ! 214.7
(Source : CNES Rapports Annuels)
Spot Image is presented by CNES as  a  successful form of commercialisation of 
space services contrasting with the less successful American experience with the
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Landsat satellite and Eosat commercialisation of its images. In the running of 
Spot, CNES is considered to be the 'satellite operator1, and Spot Image the 
'commercial operator'. The Eosat/Landsat approach to the marketing of Earth 
observation services involves the exploitation of the state-owned (via the National 
Ocean and Atmosphere Administration) Landsat satellites by a private joint 
venture between Hughes and RCA (1985). The satellites themselves are 
controlled by the NOAA. the Hughes/RCA Eosat venture managing the sale of 
images and the production (with a government grant of $250 miilion) of a sixth 
satellite. This particular framework for the commercial sale of services from a 
government developed and owned satellite was derived from the Reagan 
administration's enthusiasm for market forces. Relations between the NOAA and 
Eosat have been difficult, because of the divergence between the public 
ownership of the satellites and the commercial rationale of their marketing agency. 
The Spot Image experience is deemed by the French to show the advantage of a 
company which mixes institutional (CNES, BRGM, IGN) shareholders and 
industrial partners in such a way as to retain links between the producers, 
managers and marketers of the system.15
CLS-Argos
CLS-Argos was created in 1986 in order to market satellite positioning and data 
collection services. The shareholders of CLS-Argos are CNES , the French 
Institute for research and exploitation of the sea  Ifremer, and a variety of banks 
and other financial institutions.
% S hareholders o f  C LS-Araos
O ther financial 
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CLS-Argos cooperates with the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), whose satellites carry the French Argos cartridges which 
relay data concerning location and environmental conditions.
i ..... .....
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(Source : CNES Rapports Annuels)
In tespace
Intespace was created in 1983 out of the Laboratoires d'essais spatiaux frangais 
which had been jointly run by CNES and the space industry since 1962. The new 
company Intespace was to provide commercially run space simulation and testing 
facilities to industry. In 1986 its major shareholders were CNES, Sopemea and 
the major representatives of the French space industry, namely Aerospatiale, 
Matra and Alcatel.
% Shareholders o f  In tesp ace
Sopem ea
A ero sp a tia le
CNES
3 9 %M atra A lca te l
9 %  q q z .
The Groupements d'interGt economique industriels
The GIEs are particularly involved in the promotion and encouragement of the 
space industry through the collecting and dissemination of information, through 
publicity actions, through training and through 'valorisation'. As their name 
implies, the GIEs are groupings of state organisations or companies who see  a 
common need or a common advantage in a certain field and who believe that the 
creation of a GIE could contribute to furthering their interests. GIEs function on a 
contribution and a commercial basis in the sense that their members contribute 
funds to the groupement which can also derive funds from its activities. The GIE
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represents a  flexible and economic structure for stimulating the developm ent of the 
space  industry.
GDTA
The Groupement pour le developpement de la teledetection aerospatiale w as 
formed by CNES and the Institut geographique national in 1973 in order to provide 
an organisation capable of developing various remote sensing and training users 
to exploit data  from satellites. The original public sector ('institutional') co­
founders were joined in 1975 by the Institut frangais du petrole (IFP) and the 
Bureau de recherches geologiques et minieres (BRGM) and in 1979 by the Bureau 
pour le developpement de la production agricole. In 1991 the state marine 
research institute also joined the groupement. All six m em bers are thus public 
sector organisations.
Prospace
Prospace w as founded in 1974 for the promotion of the French space  industry 
abroad, market research for space products and services and their 
commercialisation. The organisation has over fifty m em bers and produces 
information and catalogues publicising the products and services offered.
Prospace participates in conferences and trade fairs in order to promote the 
French space  industry abroad.
Satel Conseil
Satel Conseil w as founded in 1978 as  an international consulting group covering 
the technical and commercial aspects  of space communications. Its founder 
m em bers were CNES, Television de France (TDF) and France Cables et Radio 
(for France Telecom). The turnover of Satel Conseil first becam e significant in 
1987, when the groupem ent's participation in the European satellite consulting 
organisation (GIE ESCO) involved it in important contracts, but in 1991 the 
turnover fell back from 13 million francs in 1990 (more than double 1989) to eleven 
million francs.
Overleaf we look at Sat Control.
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Sat Control
Sat Control w as created in January 1986 by CNES, Matra and Aerospatiale as  an 
organisation specialising in satellite ground control stations. In 1989, with the 
rising importance of the Hermes programme for CNES and French industry, Sat 
Control's activities were directed more specifically towards the design of the 
Hermes ground control facilities.
Modes / IMPS
The Institut de medecine et de physiologie spatiales w as se t up in 1990 to 
encourage the development and commercialisation of space  m edecine expertise.
Scientific and technical GIEs and Groupements d’int&r£t public
In addition to the commercial firms (filiales) and the commercially orientated GIEs, 
CNES is also involved in scientific and technical GIEs and groupements d'interet 
public (GIP) such as  Cerfacs (research and advanced training in mathematical 
techniques), the CCVR (mathematical modelling), the Observatoire des sciences 
et techniques (OST), and GIP Ultrasons.
5.2.3. Economic impact of CNES activities
The CNES subsidiary companies, the various Groupements d ’interet economique 
and groupements d ’interet scientifique all represent the ambition of CNES during 
the 1980s to stimulate the French space industry through flexible and innovative 
business ventures. As part of what has becom e known a s  the CNES ‘group’, the 
subsidiaries and GIEs have also contributed to CNES's own financial stability 
through the ‘own resources’ which they have helped to accrue to the agency. As 
will be seen  in the following section of this chapter which deals with CNES funding 
and budgets, the ‘own resources’ of the agency are small com pared with the 
governm ent grant which finances the great majority of CNES undertakings in 
research and development of programmes, in research and technology projects or 
in the funding of the running of the agency itself.
Taking all CNES activities and programmes together, and including the 
contributions to the French space industry which arise from ESA contracts, an
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approximate measurement of the total financial impact of CNES on the French 
space sector can be derived. The graph below (constructed from CNES financial 
statistics) illustrates this total economic influence of CNES from 1979 to 1992.
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(Source : CNES Rapport Annuel 1992)
The graph shows how CNES activities and programmes contributed a steadily 
increasing number and value of contracts to French industry from 1979 to 1990, 
but that since 1990 the value of CNES contributions to industry has almost halved 
through the effects of world economic difficulties and the redefinition of ESA 
programmes such as Hermes.
CNES funding and budgets however have in the past tended to remain relatively 
unaffected by national or international economic difficulties, and it is to a 
consideration of how the agency is funded and at what levels that we now turn.
5.3. CNES Funding and Budgets.
The question of CNES funding and budgets provides a link between the missions 
assigned to the agency in its statutes and the organisation of its structures and 
activities. In this perspective the funding of CNES by the state represents the 
means of accomplishing objectives, and the CNES budgets reflect not only the 
importance accorded to these objectives by the state but also the agency's mix of
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efforts to realise its missions. In addition, as  a  semi-autonom ous institution, 
CNES may set itself other objectives to be fulfilled within the funding given by the 
state or by recourse to finance from the Centre's own resources.
It is not our aim to give a detailed accounting analysis of the financial 
performance of CNES as  a  budgetary organisation. The focus of attention here is 
rather the gross levels of funding made available to CNES through state grants, 
and the distribution made by CNES of these  credits to different activities within the 
space  sector. This quantitative approach also implies a  more qualitative line of 
enquiry to the extent that the different sources of funding for CNES activities and 
the modalities of their payment are worth examination.
In order to place the finances of CNES during the 1980s within their 
historical context, we shall first briefly present the trends in funding over the period 
1963-1978, before looking in more detail at funding and budgets for 1979-1989, 
and finally comparing French national funding for space with that of other 
countries.
5.3.1. Funding 1963-1978.16
1963 w as the first full year of CN ES'Sss existence a s  an operational budgetary 
entity, and its total initial funding am ounted to som e 180 million Francs, of which
6.7 million were destined for the setting up and running of the agency (at that time 
very small), and the rest for the immediate preparation of national and multilateral 
programmes. By 1978, total funding had risen after fifteen years to 1415 million 
Francs with running expenses representing 191.6 million Francs and programmes 
1130 million Francs. Translated into constant 1981 figures, these  levels of 
funding give a  near threefold overall increase from 717.1 million Francs to 2051.6 
million Francs. In terms of trends, the running expenses of the agency reached a 
peak in the early- to mid-1970s concurrent with the expansion of CNES activities 
concerning the original European space organisations and subsequently the ESA. 
This period also marked a  rise in the funding set aside for multilateral cooperation, 
which had grown more slowly than that for national and bilateral programmes 
during the 1960s. Indeed, these programmes reached their peak in 1968 (at 
1458.9 million F), falling to their lowest level of 306.7 million in 1978. After 1978, 
this situation w as reversed, with an increase in funding for national and bilateral 
activities and an initial fall in contributions to ESA programmes.
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5.3.2. Funding and budgets 1979-1992
1979 saw a redefinition of CNES activities characterised by the operational status 
of the Ariane programme. From 1980 the CNES budget was financed from the 
following sources: a state grant; contributions from Ministries involved in certain 
CNES programmes, and, finally, the agency's 'own resources'. In 1979, total state 
funding for CNES amounted to 2,002 million F (1981 base), increasing in 1980 to 
2,754 million F before falling again to 2 240 million F in 1981. From this basis, 
CNES funding and spending in the 1980s rose constantly, apart from a  slight 
hesitation in 1984-85, to reach the 1989 level of 6,453 million F, and 7,187 million 
francs in 1990. These figures are comparable with the civil budget of the Atomic 
Energy Commissariat (CEA - in some ways a sister-institution to CNES) which 
reached a similar level, (6,903 million F), in 1988 and a planned budget of 6,284 
million francs for 1990.18 In 1990, 1991 and 1992, the state grant for CNES 
increased rapidly to 7.2 billion francs, to 8.1 bn francs and then to 8.6 bn francs 
under the influence of increased spending required on European programmes.
The state grant comes from the agency's 'Ministeres de tutelle' themselves 
dependent on the Finance and Budget Ministry's decisions on public spending for 
the year in question. Although these controlling authorities have changed from 
Ministry to ministry over the years, the typical situation is for finance for CNES to 
come in two parts, in accord with the concept of dual tutelle. Thus during the 
1980s CNES's operating costs were often covered by a grant from the Ministry in
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charge of Research/Science and Technology. This money is termed the 
'subvention de fonctionnement' (operating costs) and is relatively minor in 
importance compared with the 'subvention d'investissement' (investment grant) 
typically (in the mid-1980s) transmitted to CNES through the 'budget annexe' of 
the PTT Ministry. In 1979 the funding Ministries were Industry for the investment 
subsidy, and the Secretariat d'Etat a la Recherche for the agency's operating 
costs, whereas in 1980 both operating and investment funding came from Andre 
Giraud's Industry Ministry (1924.4 million F). In 1988 and 1989 and 1990 the 
situation had changed to reflect the evolution of ministerial portfolios and the 
development of the space sector, with state providing the operating costs directly 
and the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications and Space transmitting the 
subvention d ’investissement directly to the agency. The table below summarises 
the sources of the CNES state grant during the 1980s and early 1990s.
j  Funding Ministries for CNES state grant 1 9 8 0  - 1992
\ Year Operating costs grant Investment subsidy grant
[1980 Ministire de I'Industrie Ministire de I’Industrie
| 1981 Minis tire de la Recherche et de 
la Technologie
Minis tire de la Recherche et de 
la Technologie
| 1982 Ministere de i  Industrie et de la 
Recherche




Ministere de I'Industrie et de la 
Recherche
Ministire de I’Industrie et de la 
Recherche
1 1984 Ministere de i  Industrie et de la 
Recherche
Ministire de T Industrie et de la 
Recherchej 1985 Ministire de la Recherche et de 
la Technologie
Budget annexe des PTT
1 1 9 8 6 " Direct from state Budget annexe des PTT
j  1987 Ministire de I'Education 
nationale/Recherche
Budget annexe des PTT
j  1988 Direct from state Budget annexe des PTT
j  1989 Direct from state Ministire des Postes, 




Direct from state Ministire des Postes,




Direct from state Ministire des Postes, 




Direct from state Ministire de I’ Equipement, du 
Logement, des Transports, et de 
I'Espace
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Over the 1980s the increasing revenues accrueing to CNES a s  a  result of 
its operational applications programmes (often run by CNES subsidiaries or 
'fMales') have allowed a  progressive increase in the contribution m ade to the 
budget from CNES 'own resources'. The Ministries which contribute to the CNES 
budget because they have an interest in specific program m es run by the agency 
obviously vary with the programmes current at any time and the stage of 
developm ent that the relevant program m es have reached. In 1980 for example 
other Ministries interested in the SPOT and Ariane program m es added 211.1 
million F to the direct state funding, and a  further 345 million F cam e from CNES 
own funds to make up the total budget of 2513.6 million F. The 1981 budget was 
very similar in terms of overall levels of funding to those of 1979 and 1980 at
2537.7 million Francs, but differed to the extent that the tax regime to which CNES 
w as subjected was modified, making t h e 'subvention Sexploitation1 liable to VAT. 
This w as still the case  in 1989/90 but another reform of the tax/budgetary status of 
CNES is under way, namely the abolition of the 'gymnastique budgetaire assez 
com plexes  of the funding for CNES transiting through the P T T 'budget annexe'. 
This 'rebudgetisation' of funding for space (the trick of the 'budget annexe' is to 
take its contents outside the overall spending restrictions of public expenditure in 
yearly Budgets) marks a  new phase in the developm ent of the space sector a s  
defined by the financial relationship between CNES and the sta te .20
From the levels mentioned in the above paragraphs, overall funding for 
CNES has risen steadily in the period 1979-1989/90 a s  it did over the 1960s and 
1970s. Examination of the annual CNES budgets show how this funding has 
been attributed to different activities, and the changes in the proportions of the 
overall budget accorded to the various activities gives an indication of the 
changing priorities of the agency. The standard budgetary categories used by 
CNES are: I - Multilateral cooperation; II - Bilateral cooperation; III - National 
programmes; IV - Programme support, and V - General operating expenses. A 
num ber of remarks are apposite concerning the trends in the funds attributed to 
these  activities. Firstly, French contributions to the 'multilateral' European Space 
Agency projects declined very early in the 1980s from the 60% of CNES's budget 
required by initial French leadership of the Ariane programme to a  relatively stable 
40%. This figure reflects the usual governm ent authorisation for CNES to 
participate in European programmes up to 45% of their total cost. Secondly, the 
proportion of CNES funding devoted to bilateral projects with the two superpowers 
and with Germany is declining in recent budgets due to two factors; the high (and 
with Hermes/Colombus/ Ariane V potentially rising) French commitments to ESA 
program m es since the Hague agreem ents of 1987, and secondly, the 'repli
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national' in applications programmes. This 'repli national' - a fall-back on national 
programmes - can be explained either in terms of chauvinism and French desire 
for autonomy, or by the leadership of French industry in Europe. The general 
operating expenses finally, as an indication of the position of the agency itself in 
the space sector show a certain fluctuation over the ten-year period, reflecting the 
restructuring and reorganisation of the institution at different junctures in accord 
firstly with the redefinition of its missions and secondly with the changes in 
ministerial tutelle.
Funding 1979-1992 (bn FF)
100.0
10.0
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 *
o  C NES state funding □ CNES self funding ♦ CNES total funds 
(Source : La Lettre du CNES. CNES Annual Reports 1982-1992)21
5.3.3. French spending  on sp ace  in international com parison
As mentioned in the Introduction, France prides herself on being the third space 
power in terms of the capabilities and the extent of her space sector. When 
French space budgets are compared with those of the superpowers there is a 
considerable discrepancy between the financial effort accorded by the United 
States and the former Soviet Union on the one hand and France on the other 
hand. To this extent at least it can be said that the French space programme is 
minor in importance. However, given the consideration that France is not really 
attempting to rival the space superpowers’ technological and industrial prowess in 
any complete way (merely attempting to acquire a level of industrial/technological
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proficiency and a  variety of space services sufficient to afford a m easure of 
independence), a  more appropriate comparison is between France and the other 
countries in the second rank of space powers. Within the second rank there are 
three groups of countries : those involved in the European Space Agency's 
programmes, those in the developing world, and finally, in a  group of its own, 
Japan. We shall consider France in comparison with the USA and USSR and 
then with its ‘com parator’ countries in the ESA.
USA and USSR
The 1992 budget of N asa was $14.3bn, after an initial presidential request for 
$15.7bn. The Department of Defense space  budget rose by a  factor of five during 
the 1980s, reaching $19.2bn in 1991. This is obviously far in excess of what 
France could ever afford, even in combination with other European countries. As 
we have already shown in Chapter 4 in a  consideration of space markets and 
sales, the European Commission estim ated the 1991 US space industry turnover 
to be ten tim es that of all the EC countries combined.22
The space  sector in the ex-USSR has been seriously affected by the 
political uncertainties of the Yeltsin period and w as even threatened during the 
1980s a s  Gorbatchev attempted to force the Soviet space  effort towards 
'profitability' and 'commercialisation' in the form of international cooperation and 
the sale of launcher facilities to the West. The reductions in spending for 
successive Five Year Space Plans in the late 1980s and early 1990s show how 
the space effort of America's great rival of the Cold War years is being reduced to 
more bearable proportions, since 22bn roubles have been assigned to the period 
1991 -95, in comparison with 32bn roubles for 1986-90. It is particularly difficult to 
distinguish between civil and military funding in the Soviet space effort, but despite 
an increasing weighting on civil applications, 55% of the budget in 1990 w as 
devoted to military projects.
French com parisons of the importance of their space  effort are invariably 
drawn with reference to the US and tend to work on two different levels of rhetoric. 
The first comparison to be drawn is often the favourable one that French spending 
on civil space  a s  a  percentage of GNP is close to that of the US, with the ESA 
average slightly lower. This establishes France's pre-em inence and conveniently 
hides the fact that in real figures, French national spending on space  is low 
com pared with US budgets. The second level of discourse however deals with 
this em barrassm ent by comparing total European funding of space with US 
funding. This is more flattering for Europe as  a  whole, and reflects prestige on
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France a s  the prime mover within the European space  effort. As the Rapport 
Loridant pointed out, Europe has gradually been decreasing the spending gap 
between itself and the US, and N asa's 1991 budget w as less than double ESA 
members total spending on space ($13.3bn for N asa and $7bn ESA).23
Europe
The European Space Agency (ESA), created in 1975 from the rem nants of the two 
previous European space organisations, namely the European S pace Research 
Organisation (ESRO) and the European Launcher Development Organisation 
(ELDO) groups together 12 countries interested in the collaborative projects led by 
the ESA.24
Individual countries participate financially in ESA projects proportionately to 
the interest that the projects represent for them. Thus France has consistently 
contributed approximately 60% of the funding for the Ariane series of launch 
rockets and over 40% of Hermes costs, and significantly less, (10%), to the 
Columbus space  station laboratory module which is deem ed particularly important 
by Germany, who supplies 38% of the necessary funding. According to the ESA 
principle of 'juste retour' (or 'fair return'), research and developm ent contracts 
linked to a  specific project awarded to national European space  com panies should 
reflect the overall contribution of their national governm ent to the funding of the 
project. In this way the smaller countries who are  less well provided with 
industrial infrastructures likely to be used in the developm ent of projects still 
benefit from the stimulus of contracts to the value of their contributions.
Conversely, in theory at least, French industry should not receive ESA contracts 
for Ariane in excess of French government contributions for the Ariane 
programme.25
France is the prime mover in the ESA and is the largest contributor to ESA 
cooperative projects. French contributions to ESA are greater in absolute and 
relative magnitude than those of Germany, her closest rival in the ESA, since 
given an initially higher rate of absolute funding, F rance's lower population and 
GNP imply proportionately higher investment in ESA sp ace  per capita and in term s 
of percentages of national wealth.
The table overleaf illustrates France’s high per capita spending on space  and the 
high proportion of GNP she devotes to the s e c to r :
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I Space expenditure as % GNP and per capita (1991)
j; Space expenditure/GNP(%) Expenditure/capita (US$)
1 France 0.0513 21.63
3





:• Japan 0.0340 9.3
(Adapted from European Space Directory 1921)
The graph below shows how France has consistently been the largest contributor 
to ESA space activities in simple monetary terms.26
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(Source : European Snace Directory 1992 figures in current MAU)
As well as being the largest contributor to the ESA joint programmes, France is 
also the European country with the highest spending on purely national space 
projects. French national programmes are considerably more expensive than 
those of either Germany, Italy or the United Kingdom, as the graph overleaf 
illustrates.27
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(Source : European Space Directory 1992 Figures in current MAU)
The comparison to be drawn between the French and German attitudes towards 
space is probably the most appropriate within Europe, to the extent that France 
and Germany were the main instigators of ESA and its collaborative projects and 
also that of the four major European countries involved in space, the French and 
German economies are closer in terms of scale and prosperity to each other than 
they are to those of Italy and the UK. If the figures for ESA contributions and 
national spending are put together, it becomes apparent that the French and 
German attitudes towards national and ESA space are somewhat different.
Whilst contributions from each country to collaborative projects are relatively 
similar, it is also the case that French national spending on space, in addition to 
being higher than ESA contributions, also rose faster during the 1980s than 
French participation in ESA programmes. Germany's national spending, in 
contrast is not only lower than its ESA contributions but also fell during the same 
period in which French spending rose, as the following graph shows :
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(Adapted from European Space Directory 1990 figures in current MAU)
5.3.4. French S pace funding and other sc ience  and technology expenditure
As well as being apparently disproportionate to France's objective rank in the 
world and to the national means at her disposal for the conduct of space ventures, 
the French space effort represents a seemingly disproportionate percentage of 
French spending on scientific research and development. Thus in addition to 
having received continual increases in total funding from government over the 
thirty years of its existence, the budget of the French national space agency 
(CNES) now amounts to an increasing percentage of total state finance for civil 
research and developm ent:




3 0 - -
5.4
9.7
10 - - 9.3
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(Source : Air et Cosmos. 8 June 1991, Le Monde. 24 March 1993, CNES Rapports)
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Increases in funding for CNES have been greater than the growth in the BCRD 
overall as the following table suggests:
Real growth of BCRD 1987-1994












3.6 4.0 1.9 2.4 j 1.2
(Source : Air, fit Cosmos, 8 June 1991, Le Monde, 24 March 1993)
International comparisons can be drawn on the basis of simple OECD statistics on 
science and technology spending. These show that France spends 
proportionately appreciably more of the total civil funding for science and 
technology on space than other comparable nations :
Space programmes as % of civil GBAORD
14 -r
2 --
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
— ♦  EEC — ■ — France — £ — Germany — ^ — UK
(Source : adapted from OECD Science and Technology indicators)
5.4. C onclusion
This chapter has given an indication of the complexity of CNES's role, 
organisation, activities and funding as an etablissement public a caractere 
economique et commercial entrusted by the French state with managing the space 
sector. If we start with the funding and budgets of the agency - the bottom line of 
the state’s attitude towards its agent - we can conclude that spending on CNES 
and the space sector has been a significant component of overall public
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expenditure on scientific research during the 1980s, and before. Similarly, in the 
light of the international comparisons we have drawn between French financial 
commitments to space and those of other European countries, the conclusion can 
be made that space is of particular importance in French science and technology. 
In terms of the levels of funding for CNES during the entire period of its existence, 
the constantly rising state grants evidence a  strong belief on the part of 
government in the importance of CNES's activities.
These activities are, a s  we have shown, varied and complex, involving the 
agency in a  large number of relatively disparate dom ains related to the 
encouragem ent and provision of space high-tech products, services and industrial 
facilities, a s  well as  pure scientific and applied research. In a  sense, the variety of 
CNES's interests, duties and initiatives in the space  effort appears too great to 
afford government with a clear overview (or oversight) of the agency’s 
undertakings. Since the current range of CNES undertakings is implied in the 
statutes of the agency as  an EPIC and in the organisational structure for the 
agency that they prescribe, the implication is that som e reform of CNES (or at 
least updating) is perhaps necessary. As w as revealed in the discussion of 
CNES's ‘hybrid’ nature, the particular form of m anagem ent of a  sector and 
attainment of government-defined goals - ‘gestion administrative decentralisee’ - 
embodied by the space agency can also foster difficulties between the state and 
its agent, specifically, problems of control. The rest of this section of the thesis is 
devoted to a  detailed discussion of the relationship between CNES and the 
government ministries which deal with the agency either a s  users of space 
services or in the exercise of tutelie.
The following chapter exam ines the interaction between CNES and government 
through its links with the various Ministries involved in space  activities during the 
period 1979-1988.
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low compared to payments, Financial Times. 13 July 1988, p.9.
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6. CNES and governm ent 1979-1992 : a com plex interaction
Chapter 5 showed the variety of scientific, industrial and commercial activities 
undertaken by CNES in fulfillment of its legally defined objective of helping define 
and leading French space policy. Here we will examine the interactions with 
government that these activities create for the space agency. In general term s we 
are looking at links between a  'Colbertist originated' sta te  agency and the 
government ‘user-partner ministries’ with which it deals.
Analysing the nature and style of relationships between the space  agency 
and those parts of government which are theoretically responsible for its actions 
reveals the complexity of the links between CNES a s  an EPIC and the state, and 
gives an indication of how the diversity of ministries involved in the tutelle of the 
space sector may create a  fragmented pattern of responsibility and accountability.
Such a  pattern of tutelle may encourage confusion in the overall production 
of space policy, and also, by emphasizing the agency’s monopoly of expertise vis- 
a-vis government, may contribute to creating problems of power and control 
between the state and the sector leader. Examining the theory and practice of 
tutelle can indicate how the agency’s statutes may need revision to reflect 
changing features of its activities, or how the activities of the agency and the way it 
contributes to policy formulation may necessitate reforms to be im posed by 
government in order to reassert government authority.
The laws, decrees and other texts defining the legal status of the Centre 
national d ’etudes spatiales and the nature of its interactions with tutellary bodies 
are presented in the appendix to the thesis dealing with CNES statute documents. 
According to the famous maxims of the French public administration ‘il n ’y  a pas 
de tutelle sans texte’ (no tutelle without a  text) and ‘un pouvoirde tutelle ne se 
presume point’ (tutelle can never be simply assum ed), reference to statu tes is 
often of crucial importance in following the development of the administrative 
status of agencies such a s  CNES.
The plan of the chapter is as  follows :
- 6.1. CNES-State relations - theory and practice of tutelle
- 6.2. CNES and the Industry and PTT Ministries
- 6.3. CNES and the Research and Technology Ministries
- 6.4. CNES and the Finance and Budget Ministry
- 6.5. CNES and the Foreign Affairs Ministry
- 6.6. Conclusion
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6.1. CNES -state relations - theory and practice of tutelle
6.1.1. The theory  of tutelle
In theoretical terms. CNES interacts with government in five main ways. These 
five ways are firstly its interaction with those ministries that exercise political 
tutelle: secondly its interaction with those government entities which exercise 
budgetary tutelle: thirdly those ministries which implement measures of technical 
tutelle. fourthly, interaction with ministries who are users of space products or 
services; and fifthly, its interaction with the Prime Minister's office and the 
Presidency of the Republic in their role in the definition of overall space policy. 
The first diagram below gives a simplified representation of these relationships :
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These categories of interaction overlap somewhat, preventing a simple division of 
ministries and government bodies into users’ on the one side and ‘controllers’ on 
the other. During the 1980s this overlap was increasingly perceived to be the 
source of inefficiencies in governments’ interaction with CNES and the space 
sector, leading in 1988 to the creation of new, more suitable patterns of interaction 
and new forms of tutelle. The diagram below gives a better representation of 
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The differences between the theoretical model of interactions between CNES as a 
state agency and government and the real situation reside essentially in the way in 
which the simple pattern of agency-state interfacing has become complicated by 
the number of ministerial authorities involved in various ways in space activities.
In the terminology of French administrative science, CNES as an EPIC is 
theoretically an example of ‘decentralisation administrative’, through which 
government empowers lower level bodies (by statute) to take and implement 
decisions in a particular field. The process of ‘decentralisation’ is balanced by 
‘surveillance’ and ‘contrdle’ exercised by government in order to ensure that the 
autonomy of agencies is not abused.1 Oversight and ‘control’ of agency activities 
is essentially effected through tutelle by the ministry or ministries responsible for 
the EPIC, but clearly, the more complicated the pattern of tutelle, the greater the 
potential for confusion.
The partial ‘clarification’ of tutelle which took place during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s will be examined in Chapter 7, after we have here analysed the 
ways in which CNES interacted with government ministries during the period 1979- 
1988/89.
6.1.2. Practice : changing tutelle
The ambiguity in nature of relationships between CNES and the various ministries 
with which it interacts seem s to encourage a certain fluidity in the patterns of 
ministerial authority over the agency, since tutelle has tended to change quite 
frequently during the 1980s and early 1990s. The variability of tutelle is doubtless
162
a function partly of changes in government, but is principally determ ined by 
government perceptions of the ‘nature’ of space activities during a  given period. 
Thus the 1960s were marked by the attribution of authority for CNES to Ministers 
and Secretaries of State for Scientific research and Atomic and Space questions, 
in reflection of the certainty that space was first and foremost the handservant of 
the developing deterrent force. In 1969 and during the 1970s, the potential 
importance of industrial aspects of space cam e to be increasingly realised, 
resulting in the somewhat anticipatory transfer of the brief for CNES to various 
successive Ministries of Scientific and Industrial development, of Industry and 
Research, and simply of Industry. The 1979 launch of Ariane, (while CNES was 
under the tutelle of the Industry Ministry) ushered in what w as expected to be the 
‘applications e ra ’, and by implication, a  period in which CNES would be 
increasingly called upon to interact industrially and commercially with an 
increasing variety of ‘user ministries’. However, under the Socialists, perhaps in 
reaction to this 'industrial' treatment of a field considered traditionally to require 
more than the mere interplay of market forces to yield its full value for France, the 
early 1980s firstly saw the tutelle for CNES being placed with Jean-Pierre 
C hevenem ent's 'Super Ministry' of Research and Technology, before witnessing a 
move towards a  reintegration of science/technology with industry in a  subsequent 
Ministry of Industry and Research, which again assum ed responsibility for the 
space agency. After the separation of Industry and Research following the 
departure of Minister Laurent Fabius to Matignon in 1984, Research and 
Technology and CNES tutelle were reunited under Hubert Curien, and the Industry 
portfolio w as transformed into Industrial Redeployment and O verseas Trade. This 
situation lasted until the first period of Cohabitation during which Research was 
subsum ed within the Ministry of Education (as the responsibility of the Minister in 
charge of Higher Education), and Industry w as joined with the PTT and Tourism, 
although still exercising main responsibiliy for CNES. Only in 1988 did any real 
attempt to properly rationalise the pattern of tutelle for CNES becom e evident with 
the creation of the Ministere des Postes, Telecommunications e td e  I’Espace, 
thereby giving CNES a ‘S pace’ Minister for the first time since the 1950s and 
1960s.
The table overleaf shows the succession of ministries which exercised political 
responsibility for CNES during the period 1980 - 1993.
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I C N E S  Tutelle 1980-1993
i Principal Tutelle
1980 -  May 1981 Ministere de 1'Indus trie
May 1981 -  June 1982 Ministire de la Recherche et de la Technologie
July 1983 -  June 1984 Ministire de I'Indus trie et de la Recherche
I July 1984 -  March 1986 Ministire de la Recherche et de la Technologie
I March 1986 -  April 1988
.^............................................. I
Ministire de i'Industrie, des P.T.T. et du Tourisme) 
\ Ministire de I'Education nationale
! May 1988 - May 1991
]
1: : j
Ministire des Postes, Telecommunications et 
Espace (MPTE)/ Ministire de la Recherche et de 
la Technologie
| May 1991 - April 1992
Ii.............................................. j
Ministire de I'Equipement, du Logement, des 
\ Transports et de I'Espace/ MRT
| April 1992 -  March 1993 1 Ministire de la Recherche et de I'Espace
This game of musical chairs played with what might be termed the space portfolio 
during the greater part of the 1980s was caused by a number of factors, some of 
which were narrowly political, some of which had deeper ideological justifications 
and some of which had an economic or organisational inspiration. The narrowly 
political influences are exemplified by such phenomena as infighting within the 
government of the day or within the Socialist Party for the attribution of what were 
seen as prestige responsibilities. For example, to a  certain extent, 
Chevenement's appointment to head a ‘super Ministry’ was as much determined 
by personal motives and by the desire on behalf of the Socialist Party to placate or 
reward his left-wing CERES tendency as by prevailing Socialist Party thinking on 
the 'ideology' of science and technology and 'objective' considerations of 
organisational and administrative efficiency. Similarly, the transfer in 1986 of the 
responsibility for space matters from Alain Devaquet's Research and Technology 
Ministry (Secretariat d 'Etat) to become part of Alain Madelin's Industry Ministry 
was a consequence of Devaquet's weakness in defending his case  for retaining 
his brief rather than by an overriding logic in favour of the change.2 Arguably only 
in 1988 were modifications made to the pattern of tutelle which were truly 
motivated by a desire to clarify the situation in the space sector and to rationalise 
the administrative and financial interaction between CNES and the state.
In abstract terms of administrative science, following CNES's status in 
administrative hierarchies, CNES's links with government, controlling ministries 
and user ministries should exhibit a pattern of exercise of authority by the state 
over its (semi-autonomous) scientific-technological/industrial-commercial agency.
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But the theoretical independence of the agency as  an Etablissement public a 
caractere industhel et commercial establishes the possibility for CNES to try to 
impose its own orientation on government (it is after all entrusted with the 
responsibility of proposing space policy to government) despite the fact that the 
ultimate control of funding remains (theoretically) with the Finance and Budget 
Ministry and ultimate political authority with the Prime Minister and President. We 
have seen one indication of CNES's ‘room for manoeuvre’ in the composition of its 
Conseil d ’administration, which gives the agency a built in majority over 
government representatives. (Another feature which contributes to some 
measure of financial independence is CNES's involvement in ventures such as the 
filiales and GIEs, which brings the agency ‘own funds’).
The degree of equilibrium between autonomy of action and dependency 
enjoyed by CNES is essentially a function of the two characteristic features of the 
management of the space sector. Firstly, given that CNES is accepted as the 
prime mover in the exercise of the space programme, institutionally, its links with 
government are determined by the question of ‘expertise’ : if CNES is the sole 
repository of competence on space activities its independence of action vis-a-vis 
government is increased. If on the other hand CNES expertise can be challenged 
by objective evaluations from other areas, then the practical consequences of 
CNES's autonomy of proposition and of action are restricted.















The second feature is the degree of political/financial autonomy enjoyed by CNES. 
As set out in the section on CNES budgets and spending activites, the space 
agency is funded through the MPTE Ministry budget and through the Research 
/MRT Ministry, as well as having a small amount of 'own funding’ at its disposal 
derived from services rendered to 'user ministries' or to other organisations (CNES 
'filiales' operate on a commercial footing).3
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Without delving unduly into explanations of the power of Military-industrial 
or Scientific-technical complexes and lobbies, nor examining contemporary society 
a s  a  'systeme technicien ' we can still consider the oft-repeated (and rarely 
challenged) opinion that CNES exercises an influence disproportionate even to its 
ambiguous institutional status. In this view CNES engineers and administrators 
represent a  'mafia' of contacts throughout the space and related scientific and 
industrial sectors. This organisational lobby of personnel is underpinned by the 
'favoured activity' aspect of the space programme, making the state doubtless 
more tolerant of the corporaiist tendencies of space em ployees. The corporatist 
tendencies of space-em ployed individuals express them selves in pressure groups 
within the space  centre and industry, for exam ple the list for the election of CNES 
em ployees to the Board of Administration Vourun nouvel essor spatial', or 
through the network of highly trained and highly placed space  engineers and 
administrators throughout the 'technostructure'. 4
Our ambition here is not to study in detail either foreign, industrial or 
economic policy a s  they impinge on the development of the space  sector; such 
more restricted studies could well follow this broader analysis of the fundamental 
structures of the making of space policy. Here, the broad trends of French 
foreign, defence and industry policy and of macroeconomic m anagem ent have to 
be taken a s  'given' and representing the background to the evolution of the space 
sector (science and technology, defence and industry).
We shall first address the relationship between the Industry portfolio and 
space, since the responsibility for space during the early 1980s rested principally 
with Industry ministries of varying form. We shall then analyse how Science and 
Technology ministries becam e increasingly involved in the space sector in the late 
1980s, before concluding the chapter with brief studies of the links between the 
Finance and Foreign Affairs Ministries and CNES. In Chapter 7 we shall go on to 
examine how the somewhat confused pattern of interaction between CNES and its 
‘m aster-partner-user’ ministries was changed in the late-1980s by the creation of a 
‘Space Ministry' which exercised tutelle jointly with the Ministry of Research and 
Technology.
6.2. CNES and the Industry and PTT Ministries
The Industry Ministry (often containing the PTT Ministry) has traditionally featured 
as  one of the regulating ministries for CNES activities, along with the Science and 
Research ministries (and the Economics, Finance and Budget Ministry). During
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som e periods, the Science and Industry Ministries have been merged and tutelle 
for these  two different elem ents of CNES activities has originated from a  single 
source. In the later 1980s, Industry Ministry intervention in CNES affairs was 
more limited, being essentially restricted to the exercise of a  monitoring role on the 
CNES Board of Administration effected by the representative of the Direction des 
industries electroniques etde I'informatique (DIELI), and by the encouragem ent of 
a small num ber of industrial activities undertaken by sp ace  sector firms by the 
Service des industries de commerce et de services (SERICS).5
6.2.1. The Industry Ministry
However, during the early and mid-1980s, responsibility for space rested with the 
Industry Ministry. The changes to CNES statutes brought in by the decree of 14 
June 1979 which dealt with the organisation and functioning of CNES (not 
addressing the question of space research a s  such), originated from the then 
Industry Ministry (under Andre Giraud, who later presided as Defence Minister 
over the relaunch of French military space in 1986/87). With the objective of 
preparing CNES for the applications era, the modifications defined the CNES 
Conseii d ’administration for the first time exclusively in term s of the 'corps 
d'origine'oi its members, thus emphasizing the variety of ministerial and other 
interests in space. In addition to five m em bers nominated by the Industry Ministry 
because of their expertise in various aspects of the C entre's activities 
(Meteorology etc), the Council w as to be com posed of the Director of the Budget 
(Budget Ministry), the Directeur des affaires industrieiies et internationales at the 
Secretariat d'Etat aux Postes et aux Telecommunications, the head of the 
Direction technique des Engins (Ministry of Defence), the Secretaire General de la 
Defense nationale, the Director General of Telediffusion de France (TDF), the 
Director General of Cultural, Scientific and Technical Relations at the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry, the Director of the DGRST, and the head  of the External Economic 
Relations at the Finance Ministry.6 This composition of the Council held more or 
less for the period of the 1980s, representing a s  it did the ministerial interests 
implicated in this particular stage of the space sector's evolution towards 
technological, organisational, industrial and financial ‘maturity'/’autonomy’.
The Ministry of Industry (and Research) w as again instrumental in 
changing CNES’s organisation when in 1984 the CNES statutes were 'brought up 
to date ' through decree no. 84-510 of June 28.7 In abrogating the decrees 76- 
104, 77-977 and 79-468, and by reference to the law 82-610 concerning the 
Recherche et developpement technologique de la France, this updating of the
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organisation of CNES translated the new Socialist administration's view on such 
large state technico-industrial institutions, namely that high technology should 
contribute positively to France’s continuing industrial and social modernisation.8
Under the Industry Ministry in the early and mid-1980s the brief of the Conseil 
d'administration remained largely unchanged from the 1970s, with the sam e 
freedom of action for the governing body of the space Centre relative to the 
approval or veto of the ministries entrusted with tutelle for CNES, or of the 
government Commissar. Thus in 1984, Conseil d'administration decisions 
concerning annual income (expenditure forecasts, balance sheets, borrowing, 
prefinancing of projects, financial participations in other businesses and 
recruitment) were all effective unless challenged by the Ministries of Industry and 
Research, or of the Economy, Finances and Budget.9 The government 
Commissar supervised the other activities and organisation of the Centre, 
including the production of the annual report, the negotiation of contracts, 
conventions and 'marches' and the international relations aspects  of CNES 
activities. Any opposition to these responsibilities and decisions of the CNES 
administration by the Commissar led to the notification of the government Ministry 
concerned.
The Commissaire du gouvernement was seconded in this supervisory role by 
the Controleur d'Etat, responsible also for the financial organisation of the Centre's 
activities and appointed by the Budget Ministry.10 This ‘political’ supervision was 
not noticeably modified in 1984 from the dispositions already adopted in the 
1970s. The 1984 update also included the reaffirmation of the advisory role of 
the Comite des programmes scientifiques, but, perhaps significantly, the 
opportunity w as not taken to reestablish the Conseil des applications spatiales in 
either its previous or a  modernised form.11
6.2.2. Ministries of Industrial redeployment, Industry and the PTT
After the three Mauroy governments between 1981 and 1984, the Fabius 
government appointed in July 1984 (and reshuffled in D ecem ber 1984 and May 
1985) bequeathed to the right-wing Chirac period a  situation in which responsibility 
for space had been split unequally between the R esearch and Technology Ministry 
under Hubert Curien, who exercised the main authority over CNES, and the 
Ministry of Industrial Redeployment and O verseas Trade (Edith Cresson), within 
which served Louis Mexandeau as  Delegate Minister in charge of PTT. Under 
cohabitation, main responsibility for space w as restored to the Industry Ministry.
168
The 1986 change of government and the following period of cohabitation 
brought about a  relatively minor transformation of the CNES statu tes but which is 
nevertheless of interest to our study in the way it revealed prevailing patterns in 
the state/space sector interface. Two decrees promulgated in April 1986 defined 
the attributions of the Industry, PTT and Tourism Ministry under Alain Madelin and 
those of the Ministere de I'Education Nationale headed by Rene Monory, again 
sharing responsibility for CNES between them .12 Jointly, these  two ministries also 
exercised the tutelie of other EPICs such as  the Agence nationaie pour ia 
valorisation de ia recherche (ANVAR), the Agence frangaise pour la maitrise de 
I'energie and the Cite des Sciences et de I'lndustrie (National Science Museum). 
Within the Ministry of National Education, only minor responsibility for space 
questions w as held by the Ministre delegue for Research and Higher education, 
Alain Devaquet, acting a s  he was in collaboration with a  'full' and powerful Ministry 
in the form of Madelin's Industry, PTT and Tourism which exercised the other, 
more major elem ents of CNES tutelie13 .
It might be suggested that placing CNES activities essentially under the 
aegis of the Industry Ministry reflected the supposedly 'liberal' industrial creed of 
the Chirac administration in that space activities were to be seen  a s  a  free-market, 
industrially and commercially orientated sector rather than a s  a  problem for debate 
in term s of massive state funding through government research and technology 
budgets. This w as definitely the general ‘ideological rationale' of the Industry 
Minister and doubtless he hoped that space might respond to this style of thinking 
in the sam e way that the ‘liberal’ ideology of the econom ics of scientific research 
maintained that research funded by industry (and not by the state) w as the most 
cost-effective.14 The subsequent perennity of more or less traditional attitudes 
towards the French space effort by the Chirac government would tend to imply that 
any intention to streamline the space effort along drastically liberal economic lines 
w as abandoned a s  the Chirac government becam e aw are of the power both of the 
CNES lobby within the Establishment and of the prestige value of a  strong, 
government-led space sector.15
This situation w as thus codified by the decrees 86-714 and 86-715 16. Article 
2.3 of 86-715, which stated that the Industry, PTT and Tourism Ministry gives 'les 
impulsions necessaires au developpement par les entreprises d ’une politique 
d‘innovation et damelioration de ieur com petitive  reveals the perspective taken 
towards science and technology by the Industry Ministry. Before the end of 
Cohabitation, the organisation of responsibility for sp ace  varied little, control of the 
PTT being hived off from Industry in late 1986 under Gerard Longuet, and
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Devaquet being replaced by Jacques Valade at Research and Higher Education in 
early 1987.17
During the 1980s, much of the interaction betw een the Industry Ministry in 
its differing forms and CNES was through the organisations attached to the 
Industry Ministry which were interested in fields of applications provided by CNES 
expertise. On a  relatively low level the Institut frangais du petrole (IFP), and the 
Bureau des recherches geologiques et minieres (BRGM) liaised with CNES for 
obvious reasons of satellite observation detection of mineral and fossile fuel 
resources. More importantly, on the level of satellite telecommunications 
applications, Telediffusion de France (TDF) and the Direction Generate des 
Telecommunications (DGT) cooperated closely with CNES in the definition of the 
specifications for telecom and broadcasting satellites. Ministerially, the Industry 
and Telecom s portfolios have often been grouped together, as  we have seen , for 
example during 1985,1986 and 1987, usually because of the industrial importance 
of large telecommunications programmes. Because of CNES's collaboration with 
TDF and the DGT on satellite broadcasting and telecommunications, the tutelie 
over CNES of the Industry Ministry (to which the PTTs were attached) w as often a 
logical s tep .18
The Industry Ministry saw  space as  a  diffuse but nevertheless priority area  
for high-tech development. The close and considerable links between the MRT 
and CNES and more recently between the MPTE/DGE and the space  agency 
mean that Industry Ministers are decreasingly involved in space policy and in the 
space effort, the industrial aspects  of the policy and its implementation being 
produced by the industhai fabric of the space sector, itself public or para-public for 
the most part and stimulated not by the Industry Ministry but by the 
MRT/MPTE/CNES conglomerate, a s  well, of course by the DGA.19
It is to a  consideration of the involvement of Science, Research and Technology 
Ministries in the development of overall space  policy that we now turn.
6.3. CNES and the Research and Technology Ministries
Although in April 1992 the tutelie of CNES becam e the sole responsibility of the 
Ministere de la Recherche et de I’Espace (MRE), as  we have seen  authority over 
the agency w as essentially shared during the 1980s betw een Industry and 
Research (som etim es combined in a  single ministry). In the period immediately 
preceeding the change of President and government in May 1981, CNES w as
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under the authority of the Industry Ministry, but the new Socialist administration’s 
desire to s tress  France’s scientific and technological development led to the 
agency first becoming part of the responsibility of Jean-Pierre C hevem enent’s 
‘super-Ministry’ of Research and Technology. In July 1983 the tutelie for CNES 
moved to the newly-created Ministry of Industry and R esearch, under Laurent 
Fabius, only to be moved again a  year later to another newly-formed Ministry of 
Research and Technology led by the former president of CNES, Hubert Curien.
Under Curien CNES consolidated its position from July 1984 - March 1986, 
naturally enjoying the favourable relationship that existed between the agency and 
its controlling minister. It is a  significant indication of the privileged rapport 
between government and the EPIC during this time that the period saw  the 
ratification of CNES's involvement in the major European Space Agency 
programmes such as  Ariane V, and Columbus which were decided at the ESA 
summit in Rome in 1985, and also, France’s strong interest in planning the 
Hermes space plane. Although Hermes w as actually accepted for 
‘Europeanisation’ by the ESA in June 1986 under the Chirac government, the 
major effort of finalising specifications and negotiations w as undertaken by CNES 
and Curien’s Research and Technology Ministry.
During cohabitation, CNES was supervised mainly by the Industry, PTT and 
Tourism Ministry assisted by Research and Higher Education, before returning to 
joint tutelie in 1988. Between May 1988 and May 1991 CNES w as overseen 
jointly by the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications and S pace (MPTE), and by 
the Ministry of Research and Technology (MRT) headed again by Hubert Curien.
1988 saw the first real attempt to rationalise tutelie for the space  sector with the 
creation of the MPTE and the MRT. In the following paragraphs we will examine 
the relationship between Research and Technology and CNES at the end of the 
1980s in the form of the MRT. (The MPTE is the subject of analysis in chapter 7)
6.3.1. The Ministry of Research and Technology (1988 - 91)
In 1989 the organisational chart of the MRT w as redrawn in accordance with the 
wish of Hubert Curien to streamline the activities of the Ministry. As expressed in 
the review La Recherche. Curien's objectives seem ed a  little contradictory, since 
he stated that the Ministry should be involved a s  little a s  possible in m anagem ent, 
develop technical expertise and ensure the efficient tutelie of research institutions 
(such as  CNES).20 The ambition to reduce the importance of the ’m anagem ent’ 
role of the Ministry seem s to cohabit with difficulty with the exercise of tutelie over
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the research institutions, and the need to p o ssess  technical expertise itself would 
seem  to go against the possibility of streamlining the Ministry.
However, the project to reform the Ministry w as part of the overall project to 
renovate the French public sector (Plan de renovation du secteur public) in accord 
with the aim of 'modernisation'. As set out in a  circular from the Prime Minister on 
23 January 1989 the renovation w as to be based  on four main them es: firstly, a  
more dynamic m anagem ent of public sector personnel; secondly, the 
encouragem ent of administrative and financial initiative; thirdly, improved service 
for public service 'usagers' and fourthly the assessm en t ( o r 1evaluation) of the 
efficacity of state intervention.21 In terms of the relationship between the MRT 
and the space  sector, this modernisation project resulted in the creation of a  
scientific and technical departm ent within the MRT responsible for Earth Sciences, 
Oceanography, Space and Environmental Science.22 Along with nine other 
specialised departm ents, Terre, Ocean, Espace, et Environnement (TOEE) under 
the authority of the Direction generate de la recherche et de la technologie 
exercised the full range of tuteilary duties for its sectors of responsibility and drew 
up budget proposals for research institutes.23 This action w as com plem ented by 
that of the parallel Direction de I'administration et du financement de la recherche 
which elaborated the Ministry's budgetary decisions and statute reforms.24
6.3.2. The special nature of space policy.
When considering the role of the MRT in relationship to specific sectors of science 
and technology, of which space and the TOEE is a  special example, it should be 
kept in mind that the research and technology brief is singular to the extent that the 
actions of the Ministry and the advice and decisions it forwards to the scientific and 
technological community are followed by relatively long-term and distant 
consequences. The reform of the MRT w as intended to increase its ability to 
follow (and a s se s s  and control) the actions of its sector. Comparing the MRT and 
the MPTE in 1989, the then Directeur General de la recherche et de la technologie 
Didier Lombard stated his belief that the essential difference between the two tutor 
ministries of CNES lay in the relative ‘immediacy’ with which the effects of MPTE 
policies were perceived, w hereas for the MRT and its dependent bodies such as  
CNES, effects were distant.25 Lombard recognised that the ministerial authorities 
are to greater or lesser extents incapable of exercising complete control over the 
activities of the organisations over which they are theoretically deem ed to 
implement tutelie and that there is consequently an ‘indicative’ quality to the tutelie.
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This ’flexibility' of the relationship between the MRT and institutions which like 
CNES may be 'agences d'objectifs’ (or mission-agencies) in their own right w as 
neatly expressed by M. Vidal-Madjar of the TOEE, who described the activities of 
his departm ent a s  being 'une courroie de transmission intelligente' between the 
different actors making up the space sector.26 This image of a  continuous drive 
belt to represent the interaction between the MRT and CNES is particularly 
appropriate because it translates the hierarchical ambiguity of the situation, 
namely that it is som etim es difficult to see  just who is at the controls of the power 
belt and which direction it is going in. To deepen the metaphor, the 'intelligence' 
of the transmission represents the "give" in the mechanism afforded by the 
complicated nature of the MRT as  theoretical tutelie and de facto partner. The 
ambiguity of the relationship is a  function of the incom pleteness of the chain of 
responsibility (in contrast with the MPTE, as  Lombard implies, where results and 
m istakes are rapidly apparent). Essentially, depending on where one is placed 
within the CNES-MRT system, the initiative for undertaking m easures and 
implementing decisions can vary between the two actors.27
This situation was reflected in the confusion about the precedence of either 
CNES or the MRT in negociations concerning state intervention in space activities. 
The popular opinion, fed by suspicion of the Scientific-military-industrial complex, 
w as that the technical expertise and influence of CNES allowed it to 'manipulate' 
the Research and Technology Ministry. In May 1989 the Directeur adjoint of 
Curien's personal cabinet, Daniel Sacotte, w as at pains to reject this view, 
affirming that the MRT w as ‘perfectly in charge’ '(parfaitement leader1) in budgetary 
discussions with CNES.28 The justification for this affirmation of the primacy of 
political control over the influence of the space  agency is based  on the fact that 
since the CNES budget goes through the Budget civil de recherche e tde  
developpement (BCRD) m anaged by the MRT, CNES is thus necessarily 
subordinate. This essentially theoretical argument is perhaps less than totally 
satisfactory, omitting a s  it does consideration of 'extra-budgetary' p ressures 
exerted by CNES throughout the space sector and governm ent outside the precise 
framework of MRT-CNES funding negociations. Moreover, Sacotte’s  view, 
representing the official position of the Ministry (and thus necessarily stressing the 
authority of the establishm ent over its 'tributary' institutions) does not seem  to be 
entirely shared by other officials, as interviews reveal.29
Indeed, both in CNES and within the Research and Technology Ministry itself, 
CNES's 'capacite de proposition1 (or role in suggesting itself projects and policy) is 
recognised a s  representing a considerable concession to CNES expertise and 
influence vis-a-vis its controlling authority. CNES's control of its scientific
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program m es is a  case  in p o in t: the funding from the MRT is used by CNES on the 
basis of its own evaluations of projects proposed by laboratories and research 
institutions and mediated by the MRT ('mise en forme de demandes' ) 30 The cost 
of putting the experiments into space is a sse sse d  by CNES and they are then 
ranked in order of scientific merit, the projects actually selected being determined 
by the budget level for scientific programmes decided by CNES for the year in 
question.
After the period of the early 1980s, when the tutelie for CNES w as variable and 
confused, complicated by the anticipated onset of the ‘applications era’ and by the 
new Socialist administration’s ideas on science and technology, the end of 
cohabitation in 1988 and the Rocard government’s ambitions to modernise and 
rationalise the state created the possibility for a  reappraisal of CNES's relationship 
with its tutelie. During 1988,1989 and 1990 and part of 1991, tutelie for the 
agency remained stable (between 1980 and 1986 tutelie changed five times) in the 
form of the MRT and the MPTE.
6.4. CNES and the Finance and Budget Ministry
The budget level decided by CNES for any specific programme in any given year 
is to a  certain extent a  function of the overall funding attributed to the agency by 
government for the year in question, flexibility being retained by calling on the 
agency’s "own funds".31 The channels through which this dotation budgetaire' is 
transmitted to CNES, namely the budget of the Ministere de la Recherche et de la 
Technologie for the operating costs of the agency, and the 'budget annexe' of the 
PTT (now PTE) Ministry for capital investment program m es have been discussed 
elsew here. The nature of the Budget Ministry is of course to cut costs and 
encourage efficiency in the spending ministries which benefit from the public 
funding of the state budget. The annual budget negociations between the Prime 
Minister's office at Matignon, the Budget Ministry and the spending ministries can 
take on the form of running battles between ministers anxious to maintain or 
increase levels of funding for their particular sectors (in 1990, Jean-Pierre 
Chevenem ent - then at Defence - was an especially vivid example of the lengths 
som e ministers will go to in resisting financial restrictions) and the political and 
technical constraints imposed by the Prime Minister in conjunction with the 
Direction du Budget at Bercy.
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6.4.1. Prioritised sectors.
In general, the Budgetary policy 'traduit les objectifs du Gouvernement en matiere 
de prelevements obligatoires d'Etat et d'affectation de ses ressources'.32 In 1990 
for example, French budgetary policy was influenced by three imperatives: the 
progressive reduction of the budget deficit; the lightening of the tax burden; and 
the control of public spending. Within these two general aspects of policy there 
can be priorities for spending; thus in 1990 Education, Employment, Research, 
Culture, Development aid and Housing were all 'favoured* activities.
The existence of prioritised sectors within the budget betrays the political 
latitude exploited by the government to favour certain measures, notwithstanding 
external pressures from the international economic system forcing France to toe 
the line in terms of budgetary, fiscal and public spending hygiene. In the process 
which determines the budget in France, such 'technical' economic factors are 
presented by the Direction du Budget in its recommendations for state spending 
and taxation. The political leeway enjoyed by ministries and by the government is 
illustrated by the possibility for ministers to contest the proposed spending levels, 
and by the fact that in the final analysis, disagreement between the Budget 
Ministry and a spending ministry (such as the MPTE for example) is always 
adjudicated by the Prime Minister with a political decision concerning the merits of 
the spending ministry's case. The diagram below illustrates the position of the 
Budget Ministry vis-a-vis spending on publicly funded research in general and 
CNES in particular:





Public spending / Research funding
Popular opinion in France, supported by the uninterrupted increases in CNES 
budgets over the lifetime of the space agency, (see graphs of state spending on 
CNES in Chapter 5), holds the view that Space has been a prioritised case within 
the favoured sector of Research and High Technology.33 The large proportion of 
the budget civil de recherche et de developpement (BCRD) that is devoted to the
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space agency and the way in which funding increases for space  have been 
accepted even in times when funding for research in general has under pressure 
do indeed reflect the ‘generosity’ of the state towards space. The notion that 
space has traditionally been a  favoured activity is not contradicted by CNES’s 
financial m asters, but it w as somewhat qualified in 1989 and 1990 by the growing 
attitude at the Budget Ministry that CNES w as ’financially irresponsible', a s  the 
following sections will make clear.34
The budgetary tutelie of the space sector is effected within the Direction du 
Budget by essentially two services, one of which, the Bureau Recherche, Espace 
et PTT  deals with the civil aspects  of CNES activities and the other, the Bureau 
Defense, oversees the funding of the Armed Forces, including the financing of the 
military space  programmes. These structures of budgetary control reflect as  
usual the links space entertains with Research, Defence and Telecommunications. 
The Direction du Budget is frustrated in its desire to increase what it s e e s  a s  the 
possible financial efficiency of the space sector in general and of CNES in 
particular by 'political' factors, as  well a s  by what it s e e s  a s  anom alies in the 
funding m echanism s inherited from previous structures and som e 'automatic' 
trends in funding which should be reevaluated.
The 'political' factors which inhibit the Budget Ministry's quest for technical 
budgetary efficiency in a  field even as  far divorced, (at least in the past), from 
conventional cost-benefit analysis a s  Space, stem  essentially from the special 
place occupied by the space  sector in the thinking of the French state. In the 
1980s this has been expressed in the view held at the Elysee that Space has a  
'message unificateur', a  view in turn expressed by Matignon in adjudication 
favourable to ministries involved in space activities during the annual process of 
'arbitrage budgetaire', or budgetary negociations. The anom alies and rigidities of 
the way in which funding for CNES and the space  sector is effected also make 
cost-cutting and revision of practices difficult. The 'ratchet effect'35 created by 
CNES perm anency com pared with changing ministries and governm ents has 
already been mentioned elsewhere, but within ministries them selves there are 
traditions of funding which automatically maintain CNES at 'traditional' levels of 
financial importance within overall state spending. For example, the successive 
Ministries of Research/Technology have a  habit of allocating a  more or less fixed 
25% of their budget and any budget increases to space, almost regardless of new 
factors which might cause  a  reevaluation of such a  proportion 36 CNES itself, in 
its transm ission of state funding to industry and research institutes has created a 
situation in which the space sector is accustom ed to 'support' from government, 
support described at the Direction du Budget a s  having becom e a  private income
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almost like 'a  Ricardian r e n tA b s t r a c t in g  from the imperatives of prestige, 
national independence and military security which inform the Presidential and 
Prime Ministerial support for CNES funding and the m aintenance of the space 
sector at traditional levels, the financial experts at Bercy see  the situation as  being 
one in which CNES is less and less in touch with macroeconomic realities.
6.4.2. Budgetary reality
Perhaps the most important of the structural factors having encouraged this 
divorce between CNES and budgetary reality is the mechanism of the 1budget 
annexe'. As explained before, the greater part of CNES funding is channelled 
through the 'budget annexe' formerly of the PTT Ministry and now of the MPTE. 
Along with the 'comptes speciaux du Tresor', the 'budgets annexes' represent an 
exception to the general budgetary rule of 'non-affectation des recettes aux 
depenses', an exception justified by any combination of three reasons : the 
activities of the organisations financed are commercial in nature; for political or 
administrative reasons government wishes to give an appearance of autonomy to 
a  public service; Parliament and the government feel that the ’useful' nature of the 
activities financed should be highlighted to increase taxpayers readiness to accept 
new taxes. The contents of the 'budgets annexes' are in effect 'debudgetised', 
being considered outside the overall budget of the state. Although these  budgets 
are supposed to be balanced, the simple fact that they escap e  to a  certain extent 
the normal constraints on overall-public spending represents, for the Budget 
Ministry, an influence increasing the ‘financial irresponsibility’ of the space sector. 
The fact that the MPTE budget annexe was by far the largest of the six budgets so 
organised37 m eant that the forthcoming reform of the Posts and of France 
Telecom w as seen  by the Budget Ministry a s  a  welcome rectification of a  
'detrimental' feature of CNES funding.
The Direction du Budget was at pains to point out that its cost-cutting fervour 
had a  double objective in that it not only aimed at stemming the overall inflation of 
public spending but also, by moderating unwarranted or wasteful spending in 
som e fields, at increasing the room for manoeuvre in funding other sectors.38 In 
this perspective the momentum (or inertia) of CNES spending is both resented and 
criticised by the Budget Ministry. A specific example of this attitude was the 
Direction du Budget’s disappointment at the ‘automatic’ increases in CNES funding 
for 1991, which they perceived a s  waste, given that no new funding needs were 
immediately apparent in CNES programmes. In term s of the tactics adopted by 
CNES, the Budget Ministry criticises the increases in funding which in its view will
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serve CNES ill in the long-run because they are perceived as  too large and 
insufficiently justified by the agency's long-term plan which actually projected an 
relative decrease  in funding in 1992-93 considered unlikely to occurr by the 
Direction du Budget.
The Direction du Budget works in concert with the Delegation generate pour 
I'espace (DGE) in assessing  the funding needs of the space  sector, collaborating 
essentially with the Service de rnise en oeuvre de la politique spatiale headed by 
Jacques Serris. While welcoming the creation of another body intended to survey 
the developm ent of the space  sector, the Budget Ministry rem ains som ew hat 
sceptical a s  to the real powers of the DGE given that its double role of supporting 
and inspecting space sector activities puts it in a  position where it can do relatively 
little to actually impose reductions in spending and program m es. Nevertheless, 
the 'rebudgetisation' of spending on space consequent on the reform of the Posts 
and Telecommunications elem ents of the MPTE is looked forward to a s  a  step  in 
the right direction, although it is feared that it may have repercussions both on the 
responsibilities of various ministries and also even on the concept of a  ‘global* 
approach to public sector civil research funding (the BCRD).
The overall attitude of the Budget Ministry is that the space sector seem s to be 
largely independent of conventional financial safeguards. The justification that 
space is a  politically favoured sector is accepted, although with the proviso that 
politically and financially prioritised sectors reduce the possibilities for action in 
other fields, at least in difficult economic conditions. The apparent relative 
autonomy of CNES in terms of funding and the anom alies of the financial 
mechanisms which finance the space sector are less acceptable to the experts of 
the Budget Ministry.
The frictions between CNES and the Finance and Budget Ministry exemplify 
the conflicts between agency autonomy and financial/political control of the Centre. 
The influence that CNES can bring to bear in resisting budgetary control and the 
pressures that it can exert in protecting its interests through the presidential and 
prime-ministerial support for space make the task  of the Direction du Budget 
particularly difficult. French public policy in econom ics and finance com es into 
conflict with other objectives of other fields of public policy, of which space, a  
particularly onerous special case , has pretensions to being outside conventional 
cost-benefit analyses through its claimed effects of industrial catalysis and 
international ‘grandeur1. Increasingly, however, in the late 1980s, it seem ed that 
the state w as attempting to graft new considerations of financial rigour into the 
space system  through increased Budget Ministry vigilance.
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To conclude this analysis of the relationships between CNES and various 
elem ents of government we shall now examine briefly the interaction between 
CNES and the Foreign Affairs Ministry.
6.5. CNES and the Foreign Affairs Ministry
Since the 1960s, the Ministere des Affaires etrangeres has in its various guises 
boasted a  departm ent specialised in the issues associated with space activities.
In the 1960s, the presence of such a  com petence within such a  ’traditional'
Ministry w as found by many to be somewhat surprising, but the existence of the 
Service des affaires spatiaies within the Ministry w as justifed by a  number of 
argum ents all essentially based  on the fundamentally ’international' nature of 
space activities. In a  short article on the Service des affaires spatiaies published 
in 196639 th ese  reasons were enum erated in term s of the international nature of 
'outer space ' and in term s of the international cooperation required to launch and 
monitor rockets and their associated satellites. The Service des affaires spatiaies 
was attached to the Service des pactes within the Direction politique of the Quai 
d'Orsay (the Foreign Ministry) and had two main tasks, firstly to liaise closely with 
CNES on m atters concerning possible or actual international cooperation, and 
secondly to give its opinion on the possible economic or cultural effects of 
telecommunications satellite programmes.
This secondary (although important) advisory role has continued into the 
present period. The almost axiomatically international nature of many aspects  of 
space activities has not changed drastically since the early years of the space 
effort, indeed, there are ever increasing trends towards cooperation because of the 
financial contraints of space programmes on national budgets (early cooperation 
was as  much a  result of technological necessity a s  of monetary problems). The 
rapid and m assive development of telecommunications and broadcasting satellites 
has also created  an increased need for Foreign Ministry expertise in m atters 
pertaining to Space, since whether these program m es are solely national or, a  
fortiori, cooperative in term s of their production, their operation tends to involve 
many different countries. During the 1980s the Foreign Affairs Ministry has 
followed the developm ent of space activities through its Economic and Political 
Affairs departm ents, what is now known as the Sous-direction des affaires 
spatiaies forming part of the Direction des affaires politiques. The scientific, 
technological and cultural aspects of space matters are followed by the Direction 
Generate des relations, scientifiques et techniques, which is particularly interested
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in and involved with the advanced communications technology satellite Olympus.40 
This particular ESA project seem s of special interest to the Foreign Ministry 
because its role is to encourage new applications in telecommunications, 
broadcasting and education, and the French are particularly anxious to encourage 
national exploitation of such facilities as  part of the 'rayonnement culture!’of 
French culture and science.41
The traditional role of the Foreign Ministry in representing France at 
international meetings dealing with space related issues which w as already under 
pressure from CNES itself has also since 1989 com e under increasing rivalry from 
the MPTE and especially the DGE, both of which claim to have authority to 
represent French interests in space in international discussions.
The Foreign Affairs Ministry is the one which is most closely involved with 
the most basic elem ents of Grandeur furnished by the space  effort to France, 
namely participation in international discussions and the m anagem ent of 
international cooperation in bodies such as  ESA. If French space  activities were 
to becom e actively involved in the orbital politics of space  station operation for 
instance, the Quai d'Orsay might begin to take on an expanded role in space 
affairs, but for the present at least, its activity is restricted to the international 
relations aspects  of space. The increasing belief that satellite broadcasting 
furnishes a  potent m eans of transmitting culture (for exam ple the TV5 francophone 
channel on Eutelsat from 1984, and the Olympus programme led by the Foreign 
Ministry from 1990) may give an expanded importance to this classical aspect of 
‘grandeur’ a s  well.
6.6. Conclusion
This chapter has shown the variety and complexity of ministerial links with CNES. 
Som e of the ministries which work with CNES are what might be called ‘user- 
partner’ ministries since they interact with the agency on the basis of an interest in 
the space-derived services CNES can provide. Examples of th ese  are the 
Industry (and PTT) and Research (and Technology) ministries. Other ministries 
work with CNES on the basis of an interest in monitoring the agency’s activities, 
either in term s of the diplomatic aspects of high technology in the case  of the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry, or, for the Budget Ministry, in term s of the conformity of 
CNES expenditure with the overall context of public finances. As has been 
described, the tutelie for the space agency has tended to move from Ministry to 
Ministry during the 1980s as a result of changing governm ents and ministerial
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structures, changing ideologies’ of industry, science and technology, ‘ad hominem’ 
attributions of ministerial portfolios and, most latterly, new ambitions to rationalise 
public policies and ‘reform the state’. The diagram below illustrates in isolation 
from one another the main sources of interaction (and tutelie) between CNES and 
government during the period 1979-1988 :
Prime Minister and President
Foreign
Affairs
Research Industry Finance and 
Budget
As has become apparent in this chapter however, tutelie has rarely been exercised 
by single ministries, and the overall pattern of control over the space agency and 
the space sector has been complicated and confused. What might be best 
termed ‘political tutelie’ has variously been provided by the Industry and Research 
Ministries in their various incarnations and in various combinations, culminating in 
1988 with the Ministry of Research and Technology, which nevertheless shared its 
responsibility for CNES with the innovatively constituted Ministry of Posts, 
Telecommunications and Space. Because of the varied scientific and 
developmental activities of CNES, the ‘political’ tutelie exercised by Research and 
Industry has also included some elements of technical expertise (although the 
space agency has always been the dominant partner). In the absence of a body 
equipped with a real base of scientific and industrial expertise responsible for the 
assessment of CNES activities on a properly technical level, a kind of ‘technical 
tutelie' was exercised indirectly during the 1980s by the Budget Ministry and by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in their attention to funding and CNES negotiations in 
collaborative space ventures. The Prime Minister and President have also 
interacted with the agency, but their role has been essentially one of arbitration, 
based on the Presidency’s interest in space’s contribution to France’s ‘image’ in 
the international system and to the credibility of the nuclear deterrent and on the 
Prime Minister’s responsibility as final pay master (or funding ‘principal’) of CNES.
In the following chapter we examine the MPTE and DGE, assessing what their 
creation implied about the state’s attitude towards the patterns of tutelie applying 
to CNES and considering how their functioning may reflect a desire on the part of 
government to assert greater control over the space sector.
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Defining the attributions respectively of the Ministries of National Education and Industry, PTT and 
Tourism. 86-715 of 17 April 1986 added to the decree of the Fabius government 86-129 which had 
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7. CNES, the MPTE, the DGE and the  MELTE 1988-92 : interaction redefined
The most obvious feature of the relationship between CNES and government 
during the greater part of the 1980s was the complexity of links between the 
agency and the many and varied ministries with whom it dealt. In 1988 however, 
reforms were implemented which initiated changes in the interface between the 
space sector and the state. As we have seen  in the previous chapter, the return 
of a  Socialist government in 1988 led to a restructuring of tutelie for CNES through 
initially the Ministry for Education nationale, Recherche et Sports (from 28 May 
1988) and then Hubert Curien’s Ministry of Research and Technology (MRT), from 
20 July 1988. Most significantly however, the new governm ent also created a  
’Space Minister' in the form of Paul Quiles, Minister of Posts, Telecommunications 
and S p ace .1 The primary task  of the new Ministere des Postes, des 
Telecommunications, et de I’Espace (MPTE) w as to 'assu re  the coherence of 
overall government space policy'.2. In order to help in this mission, the Ministry 
created a Delegation Generate a I ’Espace (DGE) and a  Comite de I’Espace.
Such a  redistribution of tutellary responsibility for CNES in 1988/89 by the 
Rocard government was perhaps the first example of a  will on the part of 
government to implement appropriate institutional changes to the structures of 
tutelie of CNEs and the space sector, rather than to simply ‘reshuffle’ tutellary 
authority from ministry to ministry on the basis of either convenience or vague 
‘ideological’ convictions about the^status of space a s  an ‘industrial’ or research 
issue. We have already looked at the contribution of the MRT created  by the 
Rocard government in the preceeding chapter, and will here concentrate on the 
MPTE and the DGE during the period May 1988 to May 1991, when the 
replacement of Rocard by Edith Cresson led to a  further restructuring of tutelie for 
CNES. We shall also consider what the structure of tutelie under the Cresson
government in 1991-92 implied about the experience of 1988 - 91. The plan of
the chapter is thus the following :
- 7.1. The MPTE and Comite de I’Espace : Rocardian rationality ?
- 7.2. The Delegation Generate a I’Espace
- 7.3. A ssessm ent of the MPTE and the DGE
- 7.4. The MELTE : Cressonian confusion ?
- 7.5. Conclusion
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This chapter will conclude our treatm ent of the civil inputs to policy making. The 
third section of the thesis which starts with Chapter 8 will look at military space.
7.1. The MPTE and the Comite de I ’Espace : Rocardian rationality ?
Until 1988, the ministerial responsibility for the space sector w as shared 
essentially by the ministries entrusted with the industry and research and 
technology briefs. The return to power of the Socialist government after the 
period of Cohabitation w as marked by a  double administrative novelty a s  far as 
space was concerned. This novelty was firstly that in a  reorganisation of 
ministerial responsibility the tutelie of space w as transferred from Industry, Posts, 
Telecommunications and Tourism to a  new ministry amalgamating the Posts, 
Telecommunications and Space, or the MPTE (thereby excluding industry), and 
secondly, that new bodies intended to help m anage the space effort were also 
created.3
In the first instance, the new Ministere des Postes, des Telecommunications 
etde  I’Espace headed by Paul Quiles exercised its authority over CNES jointly 
with Lionel Jospin 's Ministry of National Education, R esearch and Sports until 
these  latter briefs were separated into an Education Ministry under Jospin4 and the 
Ministere de la Recherche et de la Technologie headed by Hubert Curien. This 
w as the first time since the 1960s (when space and atomic affairs were 
represented by a  Secretariat d'Etat) that 'Space' w as explicitly present in the title of 
a  Ministry. The shift of authority for space away from the industry brief in 
government towards its own ministry (shared with the closely linked field of 
telecommunications) and Research was consecrated in the statu tes by the 
modification of decree 84-510 defining the organisation and functioning of CNES. 
Decree 89-77 of 6 February 1989 codified the reversal of roles, specifically stating 
that the representative of the PTT Ministry in the CNES Conseil d ’administration 
(no longer necessary  because of MPTE tutelie) w as to be replaced by a  
representative from the Industry Ministry.5
The 'rearrangem ent' of existing responsibilities into the MPTE in Sum m er 1988 
was com plem ented in Decem ber 1988 and during the course of 1989 by the 
second novelty of the new government's approach to the space  sector, namely the 
ex nihilo creation of two bodies within the Ministry which were intended to 
strengthen the new Minister's control over space affairs and to ensure efficient 
governmental control of the sector. These two bodies were the Delegation 
Generate a I'Espace (DGE), and the Comite de lEspace .6
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In terms of the general trend of space policy from the 1960s through the 
1970s and 1980s, the creation of two such institutions, a s  well a s  the presentation 
of Space a s  an explicit Ministerial responsibility were the expression of essentially 
two factors. These two factors were firstly the perm anence or continuity of 
political backing for space and, secondly, the desire for effective control of space 
m atters by the political authorities. Expressed in ministerial-administrative 
vocabulary th ese  two factors translate as  'coherence1 and 'tutelie'.
7.1.1. 'C oherence'and'tutelie '.
With state enthusiasm  for space activities taken a s  a  usually stable datum line for 
the making of all space policy, 'la coherence de I'ensemble de la politique spatiale' 
(as the concept is expressed), is of crucial importance for the efficient exercise of 
tutelie itself, even if the tutelie is split, essentially between the MPTE/DGE and the 
MRT but also with inputs from other ministries such a s  the Quai d 'O rsay.7 The 
wide variety of projects, program m es and activities coming under the global 
heading of space  creates a  perm anent need for interministerial coordination and 
also the need for the tutellary body to possess  sufficient technical expertise and 
hierarchical importance in the space sector itself to be able to give authoritative 
judgment on the strategy to be followed in space policy.
The administrative innovations of 1988 and 1989 represented both continuity 
and change when viewed within the context of space policy trends. They signified 
simultaneously the perm anence of political commitment, but also the new (at least 
in institutional terms) desire to ensure effective state control of what seem ed to be 
a  developing and burgeoning sector.8 In such a  perspective, the creation, 
organisation and missions of the MPTE and the DGE reveal the tensions inherent 
in the system of space affairs in the 1980s and the S tate 's  attempt to m anage 
these tensions to the best advantage. The justifications for the creation of the 
MPTE/DGE and the timing of the decision to innovate in the field of space tutelie 
go som e way to revealing the p ressures and motivations involved. The why's, 
when’s, wherefore's, who's and how's show the complexity of the influences 
involved in the overall determination of the making of space  policy.
The person and personality of Minister Paul Quiles are not for nothing in the 
creation of the new ministerial portfolio. There is a  strong presumption that a s  a 
senior m em ber of the Socialist Party and a s  a  former Defence Minister9 his 
appointment to the head of a  new large ministry may have been determined to a  
considerable extent by political motivations, namely the desire to give a  more than 
ordinarily important ministry to an influential party worthy. A less cynical and more
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prosaic explanation for the creation of the MPTE itself would be that there is a 
natural and com m on-sense link between telecommunications and authority for 
space to the extent that satellite telecommunications are perhaps the major 
operational commercial feature of space activities. In this view, combining the two 
portfolios within a  single ministry, (with that for space no longer hidden within 
broader considerations of overall industrial policy) must appear at first sight as  an 
exercise in the rationalisation of ministerial structures. A further contributing factor 
in the creation of the MPTE/DGE w as also quite simply the increasing budgetary 
importance of the civil space  programme with its rising commitment to European 
projects such a s  Ariane V, Hermes and Colombus, added to which w as the burden 
of a  renewed military space programme launched in 1986/87 and w hose 
coordination with the civil effort w as seen  to be increasingly crucial.
Although the Delegation Generate a I'Espace is an integral part of the PTE 
Ministry, a  large part of its work being to inform the decisions of the Minister on 
space policy, the logic of the creation of the Ministry itself and of the Delegation 
Generate respectively were not identical. In term s of the dual imperatives of 
government in the space sector, the MPTE mainly fulfilled the role of coherence 
while the DGE contributes to the control of space sector activities.10 Although, as 
implied above, these  two imperatives are closely if not inextricably linked, the 
difference in the founding logic of the DGE and the MPTE enables a  distinction 
between the importance of the institutional innovations to be drawn. This 
theoretical ('ideological') deduction is that given a  primary desire for coherence in 
government approaches to space, the setting up of the MPTE and its attribution to 
Quiles were essentially typical of the general trend in space  policy organisation, 
although discussion below of the reasons behind the twinning of Space, Posts and 
Telecom s will nuance this initial and generally valid hypothesis. The creation of 
the DGE and of the Comite de I'Espace would however seem  to reflect a  break in 
the traditional pattern of state control of space, in the sen se  that a  desire to 
increase the m eans of tutelie at the disposal of the governm ent implied either a  
change in attitude, or a  change in circum stances, or both. The MPTE w as an 
institutional response to the gradual evolution towards maturity of the space 
sector. The DGE is an institutional response to a  perceived new need on behalf 
of government for increased authority over certain developm ents in the general 
evolution of the sector.
We shall address in detail the nature, activities and  significance of the DGE 
in a  later sub-section of the chapter; here however we will exam ine the Comite de 
I ’Espace.
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7.1.2. The Comite de I ’Espace
Since July 1989, the influence of the CNES Board of Administration ('Conseil 
d'administration) in the definition of policy has been somewhat reduced by the 
existence of the Comite de I'Espace attached to the minister responsible for space 
matters.11 July 1989 saw the institution of the Comite de I'Espace in the MPTE.12 
A Comite des recherch.es spatiaies had existed between January 1959 and 
February 1962 before being transformed into the Conseil de I'Espace. The 
Comite de I'Espace of 1989 was created as an extremely high level 
pluridisciplinary body advising the Prime Minister. Working under the 
chairmanship of the minister responsible for space matters (at that time Quiles), 
the new Comite de I'Espace included extremely high-ranking officials from 
government, the Armed Forces and CNES covering all aspects of space sector 
activities, whether civil or military. Members currently include the Delegue 
General pour I'Armement, the Director Generals of Industry, Telecommunications 
and Research and Technology, the Chef d'Etat-major des Armees, the President 
and Director General of CNES and the Delegue General a I'Espace. The wide 
range of organisations and corps represented within the Comite was intended to 
enable its proceedings to enhance the coherence of overall space policy and thus 
facilitate the MPTE’s work in the space sector. Specifically, as  of July 1989, the 
Committee had four briefs : preparing the decisions taken by the government in 
the field of space policy; studying the industrial impact in France and in Europe of 
the space programmes; elaborating in conjunction with CNES French options in 
international collaboration in space matters; and finally, exercising an advisory role 
to the Prime Minister.13
ComitG de I’Espace interactions with CNES and government
Prime M inister
ESA CNES
. Comite de I'Espace . . . . M P T E  Minister
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Thirty years on, in comparison with the Comite des recherches spatiales, whose 
briefs were essentially to survey resources, anticipate problems of interministerial 
and international cooperation and to propose research projects to the Prime 
Minister, the Comite de I'Espace of 1989 has a more direct influence in space 
policy. The accent placed on space research in the 1960s has been replaced with 
concern about the industrial impact of space programmes on the French and 
European economies and the overseeing role of the previous institution has given 
way to a more active and prescriptive task of helping prepare government 
decisions in space policy and proposing to the Prime Minister any measures felt 
necessary for the overall coherence of the space effort.
The more direct influence of the 1989 Comite de I'Espace compared with 
the Comite des recherches spatiales may seem paradoxical in terms of the 
maturity of the sector, but the apparent paradox of a mature sector requiring more 
state guidance than an infant industry becomes clear when considered in the light 
of government-agency issues of coherence, power and control.
Meetings of the Comit£ de l'espace 1989-1992
3
! 10 December 
j 19893
I
\ Comite de l'espace presided by M. Paul Quiles 
| (MPTE) reviewing national military programmes, 
| civil telecommunications and observation 
! programmes, discussing future satellite 
| requirements for 2000-2010.
12 June 1990 1 Comiti de l'espace presided by M. Paul Quiles 
j (MPTE) discussing France’s European space 
programmes and a possible European 




j Comite de l'espace presided by M. Paul Quiles 
| (MPTE) discussing international space policy.
| 11 June 1991 | Comite de l'espace presided by M. Paul Quiles 
j (ministre de I'Equipement, du Logement, des 
| Transports et de I'Espace) discussing the use of 
\ space during the Gulf War, France's European 
I space programmes, and the French contributions 





| Comite de l'espace presided by M. Paul Quiles 
(ministre de I'Equipement, du Logement, des 
Transports et de I'Espace) discussing the Ariane V 
programme and mobile satellite 
telecommunications.
|
(Source : CNES Annual Reports and La Lettre du CNES1
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Below, we look at the Delegation Generate a I ’Espace.
7.2. The Delegation Generate a I ’Espace
The issues raised by the creation of the MPTE/DGE and the concomitant 
questions of timing and personality (Why 1988 ?, Why Quiles ?) can be explained 
by an examination of the stated missions of the DGE. In order to fulfil the 
missions assigned to it, the DGE is naturally endowed with independent structures 
and personnel whose task  is to interact with the other actors of the space  sector. 
The following analysis of the DGE presents the practical organisation and activities 
of the new institution, which reveal the real motivations of the innovations of 
1988/89. In arriving at an assessm ent of the motivations and su ccess  of the DGE 
a  practical difficulty intervenes, namely, that com pared with the long term span of 
of French sp ace  activities, the DGE is a  new phenom enon.
Following the placing of real, direct authority for space  m atters solely with the 
new MPTE structure, the final innovation of 1988 saw  the creation of the DGE 
within the central administration of the Ministry. In accordance with a  report 
submitted by the MPTE to the Prime Minister, the decree 88-1121 of 14 December 
modified the organisation of the 'P I T  Ministry to include the DGE am ongst the 
directorates and services directly attached to the ministerial cabinet, an indication 
of the hierarchical prestige of the subject matter it w as dealing with.14 An 
additional article w as appended to the modified Decree 86-129 of 28 January 1986 
to state the aim s and functions of-the DGE a s  being to facilitate the coherence of 
space policy through the preparation of studies, m eetings and negotiations, and 
through assisting the Minister in the exercise oftutelle for CNES.15
The hierarchical importance of the DGE (reporting immediately to the 
minister) w as thus a  direct reflection of the importance of its responsibilities. The 
post of Delegue General was filled in early January 1989 with the nomination of 
Ingenieur general des Telecommunications Michel Petit.16 With experience of the 
CNET and of the CNRS, as  well a s  having been the French Science and 
technology attache at France's Perm anent Representation to the European 
Community from 1985 to 1987, Petit left his function of Commissaire du 
Gouvernement at CNES,17 and that of Delegue aux affaires internationales at the 
MRT. Petit's considerable experience of things spatial and of the telecom s 
industry showed how the importance of the post was viewed to require som eone 
with experience and perhaps an international vision. In a  more critical light, it can 
be pointed out that his appointment represented very much the choice of som eone 
from within the space/MIC system itself.
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Concretely, the institutional definition of the DGE and of its missions found 
organisational expression in a team of some fifteen administrators housed within 
the MPTE whose daily activities revolved around two main themes. These 
themes of course reflect the sometimes ambiguous relationship between 
coherence and control. In DGE terminology they are 'concertation' (or the 
encouragement of liaison and collaboration), and the 'su iv i'(or overseeing) of short 
term implementation of space policy. The organisational chart of the DGE reveals 
this administrative and functional distinction between the twin branches of activity, 
but in practice of course the relationship is far from being one of hermetic 
separateness. The diagram below illustrates the structure of the DGE :















The Delegue General is assisted by three delegues adjoints and by an advisor for 
strategic (in other words - military) affairs. Two of these high level aides 
contribute towards the overall concertation between space users in the fields of 
civil space exploitation and space science/earth observation. The role of liaising 
with military space activities is of course inherently a concertative one, but it is 
given a relatively less important place in the DGE compared with the other 
concertative tasks in order to avoid duplicating existing consultative structures 
involving the Defence Ministry, the DGA and various space user ministries. 
Moreover, the 'part-time' nature of the strategic affairs advisor’s collaboration with 
the DGE (Mme Bonnevie's principal responsibilities are with the DEN/DGA) are 
characteristic of the relatively informal nature of the 'coherence' brief of the DGE, 
for example, MM. Michel Glass and Alain Giraud, the two vice general delegates 
work essentially alone or in collaboration with the Delegue General himself in 
establishing contacts, polling opinions in the scientific and industrial communities, 
questioning the viability and interest of projects and encouraging synergies. The
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relative informality of the DGE's methods of operation is not to be taken as an 
indication of lack of influence, and it must be rem em bered that the liaison between 
the MPTE and the Defence Ministry/DGA, although doubling existing, essentially 
military, coordinating structures was a  true innovation in the sen se  that it increased 
the potential for communication between the organisations charged with the 
control of the civil and military sectors.
7.2.1. 'Concertation '
The work of vice-DG Michel Glass, who is responsible for *Recherche, affaires 
scientifiques et observation'furnishes a  useful example of the m echanism s of 
DGE surveillance of the overall coherence of space policy.18 A scientist by 
training and professional experience, G lass's current brief is the administration of 
space research and of space-based  observation projects. The appointment of a 
technical expert to an essentially administrative post illustrates the important point 
that the DGE provides an alternative source of technical expertise for the 
government and administration of the space sector.19 Before the creation of the 
DGE, the Industry and Science Ministries of the classical model of tuteile were 
essentially reliant on technical appreciations originating from CNES itself. This 
previous monopoly enjoyed by CNES is reflected at present by frequent reference 
within the DGE to CNES 'hegemony' and to the existence of a  CNES ’mafia'. The 
role of the DGE through Glass is to tem per the ambitions of CNES expressed  in 
the projects it submits to the MPTE for inclusion in the annual budget allocation. 
This tempering is effected through what am ounts essentially to a  cost-benefit 
analysis informally conducted but resulting in an assessm en t of the quality, 
usefulness and national interest of the project under consideration. Evaluated in 
such a  way, a  CNES proposal for a  probe to explore the asteroid belt w as rejected 
by the DGE on the grounds that it was too ambitious and lacking in real 
advantages for France, w hereas the Franco-Soviet Antares w as encouraged as  
useful value-for-money international cooperation.20
The technical assessm ent made by Glass of proposals is then communicated 
to CNES which either modifies or withdraws the project. Projects gaining the 
immediate approval of the DGE are presented through the Delegue General and 
the MPTE Minister to the Government. If despite the DGE’s efforts to ensure the 
most harmonious level of projects proposed for budgetary support this level of 
hoped-for funding is still in excess of the limits desired by the Finance and Budget 
Ministry the evaluation which then intervenes becom es strictly political.21 This is 
to say that while DGE selection is based on technico-budgetary criteria, the
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ultimate decision on CNES funding for any given year is taken by the Prime 
Minister as  an arbitrage between the Budget Ministry and the MPTE.
It must be rem em bered that the Departement Terre, Ocean, Espace et 
Environnement (TOEE) of the MRT also exercises a  role in the administration of 
space science. The activities of the DGE and of the TOEE are complementary in 
the sen se  that the TOEE promotes initiatives w hereas the DGE encourages 
synergies and attem pts to deter ill-considered projects. According to G lass, 
(whose former colleague Vidal-Madjar in the CNRS now works in the TOEE), the 
fact that the DGE and MRT technical analysts com e from a  background of 
professional science rather than being career civil servants m eans that they enjoy 
an independence of judgement denied to other administrators.22
This pattern of relatively informal concertation and negociation is repeated in 
the final branch of the DGE's coherence brief, namely the follow up of civil space  
exploitation. DG-adjoint Alain Giraud has the responsibility 'de faire la synthese 
de tous les usages civils des possibilites ouvertes par I'exploration spatiale'23 
Interministerial collaboration is once again the watchword in this dimension of the 
work of the DGE, whether the programmes of civil sp ace  exploitation are 
commercially orientated or whether they answ er 'imperatifs strategiques 
d ’independance nationale'2A As well as  organizing cooperation between 
ministries and national industry, this task requires negotiation on the European 
level (with the ESA and with international high-tech consortia), and internationally, 
given France's collaboration with the USA and the USSR.
7.2.2. 'Miseen oeuvre25
The second brief of the DGE is, a s  noted above, that of overseeing the 
implementation of space policy in the short term. This represents the more 
structured and formal element of DGE activity, being undertaken by Delegue 
general adjoint Jacques Serris assisted  by three 'charges de mission'entrusted 
with responsibility for Budgetary and legal affairs, International affairs and 
Industrial affairs. These administrators thus interact with all the organisations and 
ministerial bodies concerned with the overall space program, ranging from the 
Direction du Budget through CNES and the ESA to the individual firms making up 
the space sector. For some, the ethos of the DGE is to be seen  a s  fulfilling the 
role of easing the path of space policy, of being the oil in the machine which 
ensures its smooth running. This role is exemplified by the activity of the DGE's 
task  of 'instructing' (or drawing up) the budget requests m ade by CNES and of 
preparing the legal packages necessary  for the execution of programmes. In
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term s of finance, this necessitates liaison with the Budget Ministry, and for the 
legal side of dossiers, with the MRT. Similarly, the DGE's role in facilitating 
international collaboration is restricted to working with CNES on proposals for 
international projects and negociations with the ESA.
The final elem ent of the ’mise en oeuvre de la politique spatiale’ is one which 
like the functions of the advisor for strategic affairs which previously existed a s  an 
independent feature, has increased its importance through being included in the 
brief of the DGE. The fact that this responsibility w as previously a  function of the 
Industry Ministry also leads us naturally to a  consideration of the usefulness of an 
independent tutellary body such as  the DGE as  opposed to dispersed functions of 
liaison and control characteristic of the period before 1988/89. It would in fact 
seem  that the centralised independent tutellary body offers advantages of 
efficiency and rapidity of reaction over the previous system . This final elem ent of 
short term policy is the promotion of industrial policy initiatives with the space 
sector, which is the responsibility of the charge de mission for Industrial affairs.
The task  of encouraging the space industry through what are described a s  
’actions ponctuelles de politique industrielle’ w as originally confined solely to the 
Industry Ministry's Service des Industries de communication et de services 
(SERICS) forming part of the Direction Generate de I’lndustrie (DGI), which 
devolved a  budget of som e 80 million Francs to the firms of the space  sector. The 
DGE now has a  similar budget (100 mF) intended to encourage the international 
competitivity of French space industry across the whole range of firms making up 
the sector from the big five26 to the ’equipementiers’ (or com ponents suppliers) 
working for the traditional ’maitres d ’oeuvre’ of the large program m es. Rather 
than giving grants or subsidies to the firms concerned, the DGE's principle for the 
m easures is that the ventures must be cofinanced by the individual firm with the 
DGE but with the firm supplying a  minimum of fifty percent of the costs, thus 
representing an attempt to move away from the French system  of a  Ricardian rent 
to high-tech industry.
This overview of the missions and organisation of the DGE has highlighted the 
principal points of interaction between the institution and the various actors of the 
space sector. Despite the relative informality in procedure of som e of the DGE's 
activities it can be seen  that certain tensions exist where the tutellary body 
interacts with the institutions it has to regulate. It is clear that the DGE itself was 
created out of similar tensions between CNES and the governm ent itself. The 
resolution of conflict between government and the national space  agency can be 
seen as  the implicit raison d ’etre of the DGE, but its su ccess  a s  an institution in
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its own right is dependent on its ability to maintain an efficient relationship with 
both government and CNES. In automotive terms, a  brake which overheats is 
essentially an inefficient and even potentially dangerous safety feature. In 
contrast to the DGE, which faces external tensions with internal cohesion, the 
MPTE would seem  to embody internal w eaknesses deriving from the variety of 
ministerial responsibilities it encom passes. T hese two features of inter- 
institutional tension and intra-ministerial instability are crucial in explaining the 
evolution of space  policy in 1988/89 and after.
7.3. Assessment of the MPTE and of the DGE
The assessm en t of the performance of the DGE during 1988-91 w as complicated 
by a  number of factors, amongst which the foremost w as the new ness of its role 
when viewed a s  part of the long-term history of the French space  effort. Another 
problem w as that of comparing DGE activities with past practices exercised by 
other bodies. Conversely, the question arose of how to evaluate the success of 
the new functions assum ed by the DGE. The nexus around which assessm en t 
must turn is com posed of the various interfaces (direct and indirect) between the 
DGE and CNES. As we have seen  above, the DGE interacted through informal 
structures with CNES and other bodies in attempting to ensure coherence, but in 
managing the implementation of short-term policy this interaction w as more direct. 
Discussion with the two branches of the DGE revealed a  difference in the 
perception of the nature and success of these  interactions.27 However, the 
characteristic feature of the DGE's existence and activity w as potential conflict with 
CNES, and it is obvious that the rationale of its creation w as to 'm anage' CNES in 
such fashion.
During 1988-91 the question of the life span  of the DGE and of the level 
reached by its activities was also open to different interpretations from different 
quarters. A view expressed at CNES in February 1990, after the DGE had been 
operational for little more than a  year was that the new body had already reached 
its 'vitesse de croisiere\ or cruising speed, and that it should expect to gain no 
greater control over matters in the future 28 This opinion w as not shared by 
Delegue General adjoint Michel G lass three months later, who saw  that an 
extension of DGE responsibilities w as likely. Indeed, on a  purely statutary level of 
analysis, the nature of the DGE as a  institution tended to support the view that it 
could look forward to a  long career a s  a  regulatory body and a  consequent gradual 
accretion of functions and tasks. In effect, the choice of setting up a  delegation
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generaie rather than a delegation interministerielle reflected a long-term 
commitment on behalf of the government in 1988. Within the MPTE the decision 
to create the DGE was part of a  long-term vision of increased control of the space  
sector by government. The unavoidable conflict betw een CNES and the DGE 
perhaps threatened the viability of the DGE, whose existence in its initial form w as 
also dependent to some extent on the perennity or otherwise of the MPTE itself.
As noted above, the reorganisation of space affairs into a  ministry combining the 
Posts, Telecommunications and Space was apparently a  com m on-sense grouping 
of portfolios which were complementary and best served by centralised treatm ent 
in a  single ministry. On closer inspection however, this operational administrative 
rationale appears a less than perfect guarantee of a  stable institutional 
background to DGE activities. The natural synergy between Posts, 
Telecommunications and S pace w as perhaps no more than a happy coincidence 
in the creation of the MPTE, since it can be argued that the conflation of the three 
briefs was undertaken more for reasons of budgetary harmony than because of a 
desire to create an integrated 'superministry1.29
7.3.1. The MPTE as a ‘tactical’ aspect of space sector management.
In this context, the on-going reforms of the Posts and Telecommunications 
aspects  of the MPTE during 1988-1991 seem ed to bear out the view that Space, 
Posts and Telecom s were grouped together in a reflection of past budgetary 
practices rather than as  part of an integral strategic vision. In fact, the creation of 
the MPTE is best understood a s  a  tactical (as opposed to strategic) feature of the 
French sta te 's  vision of the structure and uses of the space  sector. The root of 
the problem to be resolved by the MPTE reforms lay in the practices of the 1970s 
when the government decided on a  massive investment in the telephone and 
telecommunications infrastructures and in the channels through which funds for 
this programme were funnelled. In effect, the funding for the modernisation 
passed  through the PTT Ministries and the Direction Generaie des 
Telecommunications (DGT) as  pure investment and a s  such w as not considered 
a s  a  taxable resource. In the 1980s however, when the infrastructures created by 
the 1970s investment becam e commercially viable and began producing revenues 
they becam e the source of potential income for the state  a s  taxable revenue. 
Instead of taxing the revenues as  they accrued to the PTT however, the decision 
w as taken to tax the PTT budget directly, thereby avoiding a  fictional financial 
exchange between the Budget Ministry and the PTT. Since funding for CNES 
essentially transited through the PTT Ministry's 'budget annexe 'during 1985, 1986,
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1987 and 1988, this situation meant that CNES subsidies were being taxed for 
Telecom purposes.30 The first step  to rectifying this set of circum stances, a  so- 
called expedient m easure ( o r 'regime d'expedient’) w as the m erger of the 
interested parties in a  single ministry (the MPTE), which w as then called upon to 
separate them through the reform of the statutes of La Poste and of France 
Telecom, (formerly the DGT). Once these two state services were hived off from 
the central administration of the PTT in a form which would make them  largely 
private enterprises run on commercial lines, then the sta te  would be able to tax 
their profits in the normal fashion.
The reform of the statutes of La Poste and of France Telecom w as intricate 
and was only expected to becom e operational in 1994. This m eant that the DGE 
(as part of the MPTE) was thought to have at least a  period of four years of relative 
institutional stability before it. In the years to 1994 it therefore seem ed that the 
evolution of the DGE would be determined mainly by its relationship with CNES 
and with the ESA on the one hand, and with the MRT on the other hand. The 
feeling of those responsible for both facets of the DGE’s  activity coincided in 
suggesting a  constant and probably increasing role for the Delegation. The 
reasons adduced for these views differed however according to w hether they were 
based on the activities in favour of coherence in space policy or on the 
m anagem ent of short-term policy.
The self-assessm ent of those involved in increasing coherence of policy was 
positive, despite the unavoidable problems posed by CNES’s expertise and 
hegemonic tendencies; existing coherence between CNES and the CNRS for 
example was successfully emulated in other fields. The independence of the 
DGE’s sources of information was generally reliable, except in the field of earth 
observation where CNES w as in a  position of monopoly because  of its domination 
of the SPOT programmes. A point of friction between the DGE and CNES was 
however to be found in the position of CNES vis-a-vis the ESA, where the DGE 
also represented France, thus destroying the national sp ace  agency's monopoly of 
negotiations on the European level. In terms of budgetary or technical criteria this 
monopoly was less dangerous than at the national level because  in order to be 
accepted by the other ESA members, CNES projects have to be efficient and 
internally coherent. In terms of prestige and influence however, CNES felt that 
this situation represented a  retrograde step. Given that before the creation of the 
DGE 'le CNES faisait un peu ce qu'il voulait’,31 and that DGE surveillance of space 
activities was relatively successful during 1990 and 1991, the general view was 
that the 'vitesse de croisiere' had not yet been reached and that the role of the 
DGE would increase a s  CNES becam e more used to the existence of a  more
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technical tutelle. Indeed in the longer term it w as thought possible that the 
"double tutelle "(MPTE/MRT) of CNES might be abolished because  of the 
possibility it offered to clever dealings by CNES in playing off ministries against 
one another in order to create a  vacuum of authority. In the event of a  reform of 
the tutelle system it was naturally hoped in the MPTE that the DGE would 
undertake the responsibility thus created.
7.3.2. The future of the DGE
For Jacques Serris, responsible for directing the implementation of short-term 
policy, any assessm en t of the performance of the DGE had to be coloured by the 
thanklessnesss of the task  of tutelle, tutelle being a  'tache ingrate\  or thankless 
task.32 The tension created by the thanklessness of the task  reflected a  more 
conflictuai understanding of the relationship of between CNES and the DGE than 
is evident in the more informal functions of the DGE's coherence brief. Serris's 
view was that the DGE w as not really a  force in the system  of space policy, but 
was more accurately the oil in the machine which allowed its sm oother functioning. 
The DGE w as thus aiming at increasing the 'intelligence' of the overall space  
programme without reducing its efficacity. The tension betw een CNES and the 
DGE was expressed in the form of criticisms that the staff of the DGE are 'des 
empecheurs de tourner en rond' (troublemakers) and the assertion, oft-repeated, 
that the DGE 'ne sert a rien' (had no useful purpose). This reluctance to accept 
the intervention of the tutellary body was proof a  contrario of the need for 
increased control and a  reflection of the fact that the DGE w as in fact serving 
some purpose, however much one could criticise its marginal impact in certain 
quarters.
In term s of the perm anence of the DGE, this view implied that the need for it 
would continue, and that its role and influence were likely to increase a s  CNES 
resistance weakened. This resistance was expected to w eaken because  the DGE 
did in som e ways actually serve the interests of CNES, for example in acting a s  a  
buffer between the agency and the Budget Ministry's cost-cutting m easures. The 
'symbiosis' of DGE with CNES also benefited the latter in situations where a  
neutral chairman was required in negociations and where in the past the choice of 
CNES as the 'natural' expert arbiter had aroused resentm ent. Similarly, the 
restraining influence of the DGE profited CNES where the Delegation weighed 
against excessive enthusiasm  for what turned out to som e extent to be technical 
'fads' such as  hypersonic flight and microgravity.33
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In term s of its own structures and of its relationship with the MRT, the DGE was 
also likely to expand, according to Jacques Serris. Seen from the standpoint of a 
delegation generaie attached to a  ministry dealing with stable long-term needs 
such a s  Posts and Telecoms (although a s  we have remarked their institutional 
stability is less certain), the MRT w as perceived a s  being too much at the service 
of successive ministers with changing priorities, and thus unsuited to the strategic 
task  of managing CNES and the space  sector, On the other hand, the sm allness 
of the DGE itself and its specialised field of responsibilty when com pared with the 
Industry Ministry and the Direction Generaie de /'Industrie som etim es handicapped 
it in negotiations with the giants of the space, defence, aeronautics, and 
electronics industries. For example, if the DGE w as negotiating modification of a 
project proposed by CNES with Thomson, there w as relatively little scope for 
making com promises on other dossiers pending with Thomson in exchange for 
concessions on the case  in point because  it would be unlikely that there would be 
many other projects with Thomson under consideration. In order to increase its 
weight in such affairs, and to give the Delegue General a I'Espace a s  much 
influence a s  the Directeur General de I'Industrie, it w as thought that the DGE might 
well find itself pushed towards expanding its field of com petence in directions more 
in accord with its long-term future, namely industrial affairs.
The stability of the DGE was not m ade any easier by the reorganisation of tutelle 
for sp ace  which occurred in 1991, when Prime Minister Rocard w as replaced by 
Edith C resson and ministerial responsibilities were rearranged.
7.4. The MELTE : Cressonian confusion ?
The early 1990s have been a particularly troubled time for CNES, and these 
troubles have been reflected in the various modifications to the tutelle of the space 
agency which have occurred over the period. The organisational aspects  of 
tutelle tend to change most readily at moments when governm ents are changing 
or being reshuffled, and the misfortunes of the Socialists during the run-up to the 
second cohabitation between President Mitterrand and a  right-wing Prime Minister 
gave ample political opportunity for the redrawing of ministerial responsibilities for 
space. Combined with these political uncertainties of ministerial continuity and 
change have been the technocratic pressures for the rationalisation of tutelle and 
control in the space sector, and for the simplification of relationships between 
semi-public entities such as  La Poste and France Telecom.
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The period between 1988 and 1993 can in fact be seen  to be com posed of 
two phases. The first phase is represented by the relative continuity of the three- 
year Rocard government, which lasted (with som e intervening changes) from May- 
June 1988 to May 1991, and whose action in the field of space w as to introduce 
the initial reforms of the MPTE, the Comite de I'Espace and the DGE detailed 
above. The second phase is made up by the governm ents of Edith Cresson, 
Pierre Beregovoy and Edouard Balladur, whose modifications to the ministerial 
organisation of authority for space have not had the advantage of relative longevity 
enjoyed by Rocard.
The continuity and coherence of government action established in 1988 
after the first cohabitation w as disturbed in May 1991 by the replacem ent of Michel 
Rocard by Edith Cresson and the consequent redistribution of ministerial portfolios 
in June 1991. Under the short Cresson administration, tutelle for CNES was 
placed with the Ministere de I'Equipement, du Logement, des Transports et de 
I'Espace, (MELTE), with assistance from the Ministere de la Recherche etde la 
Technologie. The action of the Rocard administration betw een 1988 and 1991 
has been studied above. Here, we propose to d iscuss the changes brought about 
in the ministerial governing of the space agency on the dem ise of the MPTE, in 
order to se e  what lessons can be drawn from this reorganisation of tutelle about 
the innovations of the Rocard government. As always, the different formats of 
tutelle for CNES during this period represent differing perspectives on the 
'interministeriaP nature of the space effort.
7.4.1. The MELTE : the ‘diversification’ of tutelle for space 1991-92
The MELTE is an example of government confusion rather than vision in the 
attribution of tutelle for space. The Rocard administration had recognised the 
need for effective and innovative ministerial m anagem ent of both CNES and the 
space sector and of the Posts and Telecommunications sectors to which space 
had becom e tied. The Cresson interim period betw een Rocard and Beregovoy 
was one in which government, (beset by economic and other problems), failed to 
capitalise on the completed transformation of La Poste and France Telecom into 
public sector entities by continuing its modernisation of the tutelle of space.
Edith C resson was particularly concerned during her period in office by the 
problems of French high-technology industries in competition with Jap an ese  and 
American dominance. The Cresson government launched two plans to help 
French industry becom e more competitive : the first of th ese  plans concerned 
small and medium-sised firms (les PME/PMI); the second  concerned the
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stimulation of high-tech industry in general and the electronics industry in particular 
by the creation of a giant French public sector consortium similar to Toshiba 
through the merger of the civil electronics division of Thom son Consum er 
Electronics SA and an industrial subsidiary of the Commissariat a I'energie 
atomique (CEA).34 The creation of what w as to be known a s  Thomson-CEA- 
Industrie w as problematical, to a  large extent because the m erger reflected the 
political desire of the Prime Minister's office to subsidise the volatile, struggling and 
potentially profitable electronics industry with funds from the more stable but 
somewhat un-enterprising nuclear sector.35 Such a  political desire for 
interventionism in industry, albeit what w as presented a s  nothing more than 
normal free-market (if state-inspired) rapprochement betw een (admittedly public) 
com panies w as an example of a  much discussed trend in French government 
back towards som e kind of industrial policy in reaction against the liberal and neo­
liberal tendencies of the 1980s 36 The notions of industrial policy that were 
originated by the Cresson government concentrated essentially on the more 
efficient running of 'capitalisme d 'E t a t in other words the m anagem ent of public 
sector com panies along private sector lines. As the problems of organising the 
merger between parts of Thomson and the CEA continued during 1991 and 1992, 
the government began to consider other ways of managing the sclerosis of the 
CEA, one of which was its transformation into an etablissement public a  caractere 
industriel et commercialalong the lines of the example offered by CNES.37 This 
plan, although reaching the stage of a  projet de decret w as nevertheless 
eventually shelved in favour of a  modified merger betw een parts of the CEA and 
Thomson.38
Within such a  context of concern for high-tech industry and government 
policy to encourage France's competitive position, the attribution of responsibility 
for CNES to the MELTE might appear somewhat inconsistent. It is significant to 
note however, that the one element of continuity existing betw een the MPTE and 
the MELTE w as in fact the space portfolio (accompanied by the DGE), and the 
Minister (Paul Quiles) himself. Such a  concern on the part of government to 
protect the ministerial follow-up of the space sector reflected the importance of 
space a s  a  contributing sector to 'equipement' (or infrastructures) in the widest 
sense. Quiles was himself anxious to stress the 'coherence' of his ministry and 
also the m anner in which the various portfolios over which he had overall authority 
were all important in the everyday lives of French people.39
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7.5. Conclusion
As we have seen , the MPTE was replaced in May 1991 by the Ministere de 
I’Equipement, du Logement, des Transports e tde I’Espace (MELTE) during new 
Prime Minister Edith C resson’s reshuffle of ministerial responsibilities. The new 
ministry (and the DGE) with Paul Quiles retained a s  Minister continued to exercise 
tutelle for CNES with assistance from the Ministere de la Recherche et de la 
Technologie. The disappearance of the MPTE, and the end of the Rocard 
government provides a  convenient point for reconsidering the implications of the 
MPTE/DGE for the making of space policy.
The history and workings of the MPTE and the DGE are more complicated 
than the institutional innovations of 1988 and 1989 would give to believe on first 
examination. The motives and manner of their creation a s  well a s  their stated 
missions and organisation reveal various features of French space  policy in the 
short- and longer terms. The shift of ministerial responsibility for space from the 
Industry and Research Ministries to a  Ministry of Research and Technology and 
the MPTE aided by the DGE reflected the continuity of the French state 's  
traditional interest in Space. Moreover, the addition of the DGE (and the Comite 
de I’Espace) to the panoply of institutions exercising som e degree of control over 
CNES marked a  new desire on behalf of the state, namely that of checking more 
closely on CNES activities. The Comite de lEspace represented a  move away 
from the monopoly of expertise on space matters held by CNES during the long 
period in which CNES was simultaneously the proposer of policy to government 
and the only body sufficiently well informed about space  to give an assessm en t of 
the worth of such policy. Along with the Delegation generaie a l’espace, the 
Comite de lEspace showed how government was concerned in the late-1980s to 
strengthen its control over the definition and execution of policy by by-passing the 
stranglehold on policy proposals and programme evaluation held by the national 
space agency.
The sta te 's  desire for the continuity of the space effort and for increased 
control of the then rapidly developing space sector w as mirrored in the missions of 
the DGE, organizing inteministerial cooperation on the one hand and overseeing 
the application of short-term policy on the other. The MPTE and the DGE were 
set up in order to m anage the tensions inherent in the space sector between a  
powerful space agency, industry and government. Given the nature of the 
situation, defined by the evolution of the general economic climate and by the 
development of the space sector itself, the partnership betw een the MPTE and the 
DGE can be viewed as  an intelligent tactic for controlling th ese  tensions. It has
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been mentioned above that there are two apparent explanations for the merger of 
the Posts/Telecommunications and Space portfolios: firstly that these  
complementary services and applications were brought together in the interests of 
administrative synergy, or secondly, that the merger w as a  happy coincidence 
determined by the desire to rectify past budgetary practices, (the 'de-budgetisation' 
of the funding for CNES), rather than by a  real strategic vision. On closer 
inspection, the merger of responsibilities in the MPTE appears a s  the first step in a 
longer-term strategic process of separation aiming at freeing all the component 
elem ents of the Ministry (not just reforming the statu tes of La Poste and of France 
Telecom, but in so doing also freeing the DGE and tutelle for space in general 
from other government responsibilities).
In this interpretation of the situation, the MPTE w as created a s  a  temporary 
tactical feature of the long-term m anagem ent of the space  sector. Against the 
background of the evolving structures of the MPTE the separate  structure of the 
DGE represented a  certain perm anence. In addition, the perm anence of the 
institution a s  a  delegation generaie w as complemented by the flexibility of its 
operational ethos which theoretically allowed it to m anage conflict without 
provoking rejection. With the expected eventual d isappearance of the MPTE in its 
original form, the DGE was to be in a  position to maintain its role and influence and 
to continue applying the French state 's  long-term strategic vision for the space 
sector.
Most importantly, the long-term trend of governm ent direction of the affairs 
of CNES has becom e increasingly one of regulation or control, and decreasingly 
one of confidence in the automatic conjunction of the best interests of the state 
and those of a  loosely supervised scientific-technical agency. The experience of 
modifications in CNES statutes reveals how intervention has aimed at directing 
activities and also at limiting them in order to curb the influence of the space 
agency over its political authorities. In the face of changing policies on science 
and technology, whether ‘liberal-free market oriented’ or ‘dirigiste-interventionist’ in 
inspiration, the perm anency of CNES as  an institution has enabled the ratchet 
effect to work. The importance of 'coherence' exemplified by the creation of the 
MPTE (and of the Comite de I’Espace) and of 'contrdle' manifested in the setting 
up of the DGE show how the pro-active role of governm ent is perceived to be 
increasingly necessary in the state m anagem ent of sp ace  agency activities.
The final chapter of evaluation which concludes this thesis will examine the 
patterns of tutelle for CNES which em erged during 1992 and 1993, representing 
the ‘final version’ of the Socialist governm ents’ m anagem ent of the space sector 
and the first attempt at dealing with CNES and space policy m ade by the new
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centre-right majority. Briefly, these changes were a s  follows. Upon the departure 
of Edith Cresson after only a  year a s  Prime Minister, and the arrival of Pierre 
Beregovoy at Matignon, the ministerial authority for the space sector regained a  
m easure of apparent coherence with the creation of the Ministere de la Recheche 
etde I'Espace (MRE) which alone exercised responsibility for CNES between April 
1992 and March 1993, when the tutelle of the agency w as importantly extended to 
include the Ministry of Defence. The second period of cohabitation between 
Mitterrand and the neo-liberally inspired Balladur governm ent (1993 onwards) 
produced the innovation of a  three-way split in the tutelle for CNES by retaining the 
Ministry of Defence, reintroducing industry in the form of the Ministere de 
I'lndustrie, des Postes et telecommunications et du Commerce exterieur and also 
reinstating research in the guise of the Ministere de I'Enseignement superieur et 
de la Recherche.
In the next major section of the thesis however, we look at the military inputs to the 
making of French space policy, specifically the contributions to the elaboration of 
the overall space  effort which derive from defence policy and deterrent strategy, 
from the military establishm ent’s space bodies, and from the industrial 
development of military space system s.
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Section III THE MILITARY SPACE SECTOR : STRATEGY, ORGANISATION
AND PROGRAMME DEVELOPMENT
The third major section of the thesis looks at the military space sector, analysing 
the interaction between strategy and the technological requirements of the armed 
forces, describing the functioning of the military space ‘system ’ in the defence 
establishm ent and investigating the industrial development of the satellite and 
missile programmes.
The military establishment, nuclear strategy, defence policy in general and 
the space industry are inextricably linked by the simple fact that nuclear w arheads 
rely on ballistic missile vectors to deliver them to their targets. Targeting is indeed 
more and more reliant on space based navigation and position information, and 
SDI opened the perspective of truly militarised space, thus adding a  properly 
spatial dimension to strategy.1 On a  com m on-sense level, it can be asserted  that 
defence policy in the nuclear state has considerable implications for the rate and 
direction of development of the space industry through the stimuli to industry given 
by military requirements and research.
Various studies have dealt with the 'A' and 'H' bomb w arhead development 
program m es and with their subsequent production and miniaturisation. Similar 
analyses of their delivery system s are sadly lacking, with the early exception of 
Judith H. Young's 1967 Adelphi paper on The French Strategic missile 
program m e, which is nevertheless technical and descriptive in approach.2 Our 
analysis p laces military space system  technology procurem ent within the triple 
context of strategy, of the administrative organisation of the space  structures, and 
the industrial production of satellites and missiles.
In this first chapter of the third section of the thesis, we will examine the 
input of nuclear strategy in particular (and to a  lesser extent of general security 
policy) to the formulation of military space policy, in order to se e  the functioning of 
this element of the overall French space effort.
Chaper 9 will then look at the organisation of French military space in order 
to arrive at an understanding of how the structures of the defence establishm ent’s 
military space bodies influence the making of policy and its implementation.
Finally, Chapter 10 exam ines the the implementation of military space 
policy through an analysis of the theory and practice of military space 
procurement.
Overleaf, Chapter 8 d iscusses the gradual move of French defence towards a  
deterrent posture based on nuclear w eapons and space systems.
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8. Strategy 1981 -1992  : Tow ards 'une dissuasion nuciearo-spatiaie' ?
The 1980s produced a  new strategic environment for the French Force de 
Dissuasion which placed strategists and technologists in the difficult position of 
adapting rapidly to the new and future param eters of national military security.
The cause of this new techno-strategic environment w as of course the Strategic 
Defense Initiative proposed by President Reagan in March 1983. It would be 
misleading to believe that French interest in military space  dates only from 1983; 
a s  a  later section on current military space program m es will show, there w as a  
certain amount of interest in concepts and studies in the early 1980s and before. 
However, it is true to say that SDI caused  a  crystallisation of ideas in the minds of 
military planners and technologists and a  focussing of the realisation that French 
military space activities had perhaps been neglected in the past, and more 
worryingly, that a  new context w as already developing.
By 1985, two years of action later, French attitudes towards SDI itself and 
towards the m easures needed to protect French defence interests had settled 
somewhat. The still considerable debate about space  and its military, industrial 
and commercial consequences for France w as reflected by the ENA Conference 
on VEspace, un Defi pour la France\ held in November 1985.3 The many expert 
contributions to the procedings provide a  valuable cross-section of attitudes, both 
official and personal, but the official line towards military space activities had 
already found its essential form, expressed after the conference by Ingenieuren 
chefde I'armement Jean-Y ves Leloup, who declared that French military space  
options were militarily and strategically determined by France’s  primary military 
objectives, namely the continuation of French deterrence and the ability to m anage 
crises.4 Thus stated by the director of the high-level Defence ministry Groupe de 
Planification et d'Etudes strategiques (GROUPES), the c loseness of the links 
between the development of military space technology and the growth of the 
space industry w as plainly evident.
The structure of the Chapter will be as  follows:
8.1.1981-1992 - a  brief chronology : the New strategic environment
8.2. Militarisation of space, disarm am ent and French nuclear strategy
8.3. Military space : problems and benefits for French defence ?
8.4. The lessons of the Gulf War
8.5. Conclusion
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Before looking in som e detail at the strategic challenges concerning space 
confronting France in the 1980s, it is useful to consider a  brief overview of events 
relating to space  activities in the Mitterrand years.
8.1. 1981 -1992 - a brief chronology : the New strategic environment
The period can be divided into three or four key moments. 1981 -83 appears as a  
time of relatively little positive action towards the use  of space  for military 
purposes, partly a  continuation of the lack of enthusiasm  of the previous 
administration and partly a  consequence of the 'settling-in' period required by the 
Socialist government. In contrast to this apparent lack of interest in military 
space, civil science and high technology were given considerable attention, 
reflected by the creation of the 'super-Ministry' of Science and Technology under 
Ministre d'Etat Jean-Pierre Chevenem ent, and by increasing state funding for 
CNES.
March 1983 saw the shock to European science, technology and defence of 
SDI. President Reagan's proposals caused mitigated consternation in Europe on 
the political and industrial levels a s  well as  in term s of defence strategy. Fear that 
anti-missile defences would alter the deterrent balance w as accom panied by 
concern that the stimulus given to American science and industry by SDI contracts 
would lead to an increasing technology 'gap' between the US and Europe. Both 
these concerns were felt to give rise to the risk of a  vassalisation of Europe to the 
United s ta tes  either through 'simple' military-technical-industrial isolation or 
through an inferior partnership with American efforts. This period saw  a  dual 
immediate response to the shock of SDI from the French. Firstly, they proposed 
French and European committment to the militarisation of space if necessary, and 
secondly, they suggested  that Europe should launch a  (theoretically) civil industrial 
research and technology programme to reduce the feared SDI technology gap.
1984-85 thus saw the setting up of relevant institutions in France and 
Europe. In February 1984 at the Hague, President Mitterrand aired the proposal 
that Europe should cooperate on a  manned space station, on observation and 
communications satellites and computing.5 In May 1984, the Plan Pluriannuel 
Spatial Militaire was approved by the Ministry of Defence, catering in the short- 
and medium-term for the development of space telecom m unications and 
observation system s. Within the Ministry of Defence a  num ber of new structures 
dealing with space  were set up, including a  so -called 'Etat-major de l 'e s p a c e On 
the civil level, the European Space Agency confirmed the objectives of the long-
210
term European space plan. These ESA programmes, in conjunction with the 
initiatives taken under the EUREKA project proposed by President Mitterrand in 
1985 can be seen  as  the techno-industrial European answ er to SDI.
1986 and 1987 w itnessed the launching of military space programmes, and 
the provision of substantial increases in funding over the preceding period. From 
1981 to 1986, finance for military space had fallen by 50%. The fruits of the 1983- 
84 'prise de conscience first cam e in 1987, with an increase of 145% in the 
autorisations de programme for space projects in the military space budget. This 
positive financial trend w as confirmed in the 1987-1991 Loi de programmaiion 
militaire (voted in Spring 1987) which set out spending on military space  hardware 
of 9.1 billion francs for the five year period. It w as predicted that France would 
spend more on military space than on contributions to the ESA.6 The past 
commitment to military space was then seen  to have been deficient to the extent 
that it had almost ignored the development of the fourth (spatial) com ponent of the 
nuclear force. It was originally intended that the strategic Mirage bom bers, land- 
and subm arine-based missiles should eventually be com plem ented by satellite 
system s. In the late 1960s General Ailleret had already reflected on the eventual 
'extrapolation spatiale' of the Force de Frappe.7 In the 1980s, it w as the role and 
usefulness of satellites in times of peace and war that w as one of the major 
preoccupations of military space planners. In 1989, concern grew in som e 
quarters that the strategic triad would eventually be reduced to a  single arm 
(submarine) by the year 2000 because of the obsolescence of the airborne force 
and the delays in replacing the S-3 Plateau d'Albion m issiles.8
In spring 1989 the Rocard government undertook a  mid-point review of the 
Loi de programmation 1987-91, allowing the Finance ministry to dem and 
considerable cut backs of the order of 70 bn francs in the planned major 
procurement projects, the necessity of all of which w as being increasingly 
questioned.9 The ‘cut backs’ were implemented through the procedure of 
‘rescheduling’ the development of som e of the projects, and so no major 
programme w as cancelled, thereby postponing the making of real choices until the 
next Loi de programmation.
The concern over the confidence to be placed in the deterrent force which 
the review of the 1987 - 91 program law avoided addressing is not solely a  
consequence of the inadequacies of past commitment to military space, (a failing 
that appears all the more striking since, as  ICA Leloup repeatedly stated in his 
contribution to the ENA debates, French space options derive directly from 
defence policy).10 The new strategic situation th reatened  French independence 
of action on a  number of levels, the most important of which were the military-
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strategic, the industrial-technological and the political-diplomatic, (on the linguistic- 
cultural level, the French felt threatened by DBS television saturating Europe with 
American culture).11 The dem ands made on the French space  and associated 
high technology industries to produce hardware capable of allowing France to 
maintain her strategic position in the new post-SDI context posed with particular 
acuity the problem o f 'cooperation franco-frangaise (joint work between civil and 
military sectors), European collaboration, or partnership with the SDIO industrial 
complex.
In 1990 and 1991 the Gulf War and the problems of France’s minor-partner 
participation in Desert Shield and Desert Storm reactualised debate in French 
strategic and political circles over France’s ability to cope in modern warfare 
conditions dominated by satellite telecommunications and observation satellite 
intelligence gathering. The ways in which these  questions were answ ered reveal 
the complicated mix of factors at work in the relationship between the sta te  and 
space in France.
As a  first s tage  in examining the military aspects of the making of space  policy, we 
will now examine the strategic and technological challenges concerning space  
facing the French armed forces and industry in the 1980s.
8.2. Militarisation of space, disarmament and French nuclear strategy.
SDI was after all an Allied project, and as such did not pose a  direct military threat 
to France (unless one retains a  rigourous 'tous azimuts'conception of the location 
of 7a menace), although it did destabilise the logic of deterrence. Thus on the 
military level, French reactions were a  function of the strategic and technological 
changes that SDI provoked in potential agressors, to be clear, the USSR. On the 
civil level however, technological, industrial and commercial concern focussed on 
developm ents in the USA. Thus SDI combined both civii-economic-technological 
a s  well as military-nuclear-strategic features. Essentially, in the military field, the 
question hanging over French strategy was whether the potential development of a 
Soviet ABM capability would seriously affect the efficacity of the deterrent force. 
W hatever the extent of Soviet departure from the Moscow ABM Treaty of March 
1972, there w as a  general consensus in France about the greater military 
importance of space, and general official confidence in the continued deterrent role 
of the FNS. Already at the ENA Conference, A m bassador Claude Arnaud, 
(advisor to the Minister of External Relations) expressed  the conviction that space
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would be extraordinarily important in strategic and military term s.12 This 
statem ent of faith echoed the view expressed  by the Head of State himself at the 
nuclear submarine base  at He Longue in Brittany in May 1985 that 7a strategie 
sera necessairement spatiale dans le courant du XXIieme s/ec/e'.13
Despite som e doubts voiced by Arnaud and others a s  to the long-term viability 
of SDI projects given the hugeness of the operation and the vagaries of funding 
under the American democratic system, the ‘worst c a s e ’ scenario of w eapons 
development m eant that the French must act on the assum ption that the US and 
the USSR would develop space-based  defensive system s threatening the current 
technology and formulation of French nuclear strategy. The threats thus posed, 
which through the 'effet miroir' determine changes in French technology and 
strategy concerned firstly 'la penetration de nos forces’ and secondly the whole 
relationship between SDI, European security and the independence of the FNS.
As Michel Duclos, (CAP-Ministere d es  Relations Exterieures) remarked in 1985 : 
'Ce n'est pas la fin de la dissuasion nucleaire, mais en meme temps des defis 
nouveaux se presentent'.14
We will first consider the credibility of the FNS in the face of potential Soviet 
technical developm ents and secondly the political viability of the FNS in the 
context of disarm am ent and moves towards common European security.
8.2.1. Credibility of the FNS.
Given the assumption that a  Soviet anti-missile defence would be created, even 
an imperfect system  would protect the superpower's second strike capability. 
French targeting policy w as not directed at targets in the Soviet Union ensuring a  
second strike anyway, being based  on the enlarged !anti-cites' principle.15 There 
seem ed thus to be relatively little call for France to attempt to emulate an SDI ABM 
system, partly because of the scale and cost of such a  project, (beyond the reach 
of France), and partly because of the principle that French deterrence rested 
essentially on the capacity of its missiles to penetrate enem y defences and impose 
unacceptable losses, whatever the state  of France's own defences. There w as 
much lobbying for improving w arheads and vectors to increase their chances of 
reaching their targets, a s  well a s  for finding ways of bypassing a  Soviet ABM 
system, and Pierre Lellouche for exam ple suggested  that a  considerable effort 
would be necessary  in order to create new ballistic and non-ballistic w eapons.n6 
New non-ballistic system s would include cruise missiles or a  new generation of 
strategic bombers, but whilst there w as consensus and support for modernizing
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missiles (the M-4 particularly), there seem ed to be little overall agreem ent in this 
area.
Apart from missile modernisation, the principal concern of the French military 
was becoming the development of satellite system s and the ways in which these  
system s could improve France's deterrent stance. The details of the French 
attitude towards satellite system s exemplifies to som e extent the double logic of a  
medium sised power attempting to m anage a  new techno-strategic context to 
maximise its own interests. The 'discours strategique’emanating from the 
military-diplomatic establishment stressed  two them es : the reluctance of France to 
engage in the militarisation of space  and her desire for a  peaceful use of space; 
and secondly, France’s capacity to defend her strategic interests if forced to do so 
by the regrettable actions of the superpowers. Charles Hernu, (Defence Minister 
May 1981- Septem ber 1985) dem onstrated this complex attitude by declaring that 
France did not wish an ABM arm s race but was perfectly ready to engage in o ne .17
The development of satellite system s w as presented a s  a  m eans to two 
ends in official discourse. Firstly, they were to complete and reinforce deterrence 
through allowing France to communicate via, observe, and take early warning from 
space. Secondly, they were to help to maintain peace through the dissemination 
of information about superpower arm s activities to other nations. In either 
scenario, whether it were of France developing space  system s capable of 
safeguarding her military interests against American SDI and Soviet ABM, or of the 
peaceful exploitation of space for disarmament, France w as presented a s  being 
technologically or diplomatically capable of leading the developm ents. To a  
certain extent this was of course bluff and propaganda. We have already 
mentioned that few in France advocated a  full-blown French SDI/ABM project or 
anything approaching it. Likewise, past French initiatives on the peaceful u ses  of 
space and restrictions on militarisation met with little encouragem ent from the 
superpowers. We will return to a  discussion of French positions on 'l'espace 
pacifique' after a  brief presentation of the ways in which President Gorbatchev's 
own arm s reduction onslaught on European defence affected the viability of the 
French strategic position.
8.2.2. Political viability of the FNS.
Technologically, the Soviet reactions to SDI jeopardised the operational credibility 
of the FNS. Diplomatically, as  well as  strategically, Soviet arm s reduction 
negotiations in Europe created a  context in which the backing for the FNS w as 
conceivably weakening, or at least changing in content.
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It would be easy  to establish a  substantial list of calls for European cooperation 
in conventional defence, in military high-tech, in military space  activities and even 
in strategic defence, reflecting new doubt over France’s  capacity to ‘stand alone’. 
Similarly, the dem ands of the disarmament process led in som e quarters to the 
argument that modernisation of the French nuclear forces should actually be 
frozen.18 The propaganda effect of Soviet disarm am ent initiatives w as to create a 
climate of doubt in European society, particularly in W est Germany, but also to a  
certain extent in France (a new development). In tim es of perceived (if not actual) 
arm s reduction, social dem and moves away from strong defence towards other 
desiderata, and som e expert commentators believed that the twenty-year social 
consensus in France on foreign policy and defence might be coming to an end .19 
A survey of public opinion conducted by Le Monde with CSA-FR3 in May 1989 
indicated a  certain amount of confusion of ideas on defence : the Soviet threat was 
receding in the popular imagination at the sam e time a s  popularity of the FNS was 
increasing com pared with 1977 and 1980.20 Typically of popular imagination, a 
majority w as in favour of the integration of the deterrent force into European 
defence as well as preferring the money spent on it to be invested in health and 
education. This confusion is perhaps inherent to opinion polls a s  a  genre, but as  
Jacques Isnard I Le Monde's defence expert), remarked, even among French 
political parties 7a dissuasion n'estplus forcement la Bible' 21 Already in 1986, 
Jolyon Howorth concluded an analysis of the resources and strategic choices open 
to French defence policy in the following term s : ’A combination of forces is urging 
France to accept that in the age of "Star Wars", national defence is increasingly 
illusory, if not actually meaningless. France's fate cannot be divorced from that of 
its European neighbours, but the obstacles to defence cooperation are 
formidable...'22. Furthermore, this study anticipated the break-up of the cosy 
political consensus of the illusion on 'defence on the cheap ' a s  France moved into 
the 'post-deterrent' world.
Thus the implications of SDI and the new strategic environment it created 
addressed  two major questions to France's position in the  international system  as  
guaranteed by the independent nuclear force. Firstly, there w as a  question mark 
hanging over the technical credibility of the FNS in the face of anti-missile system s 
and the potential deployment of counter force w eapons. Secondly, the Soviet 
arm s reduction offensive in Europe was creating the conditions for a  reassessm ent 
of the role of an independent nuclear force in European security, which along with 
financial scrutiny of the Defence Budget in France itself contributed to undermining 
French efforts to maintain their rank in the world 23
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The responses that France produced to m eet these  twin threats both included a  
spatial element. The technical credibility of the deterrent force w as seen  to lie 
essentially in the spatial modernisation of the French nuclear forces, and by the 
integration of new spatial considerations into French strategy. On the diplomatic 
and political levels of response to SDI, the militarisation of space  and the arm s 
reduction process, the French developed their lobbying for peaceful u ses  of space, 
a  rhetoric designed to defuse criticism of France's own ('reluctant') moves towards 
military space  activities, and to reinforce the image of France as  an enlightened 
nuclear power. In this way a  virtue w as m ade of the necessity of developing 
military u ses  of space through declarations that such a  project w as easily enabled 
by the high level of French technology and industry, and that moreover, such 
modernisation would complete and complement the traditional deterrent strategy. 
Equally, a  manifest virtue in term s of world opinion w as m ade of the necessity to 
restrain superpow er military ambitions in space  by France's declarations in favour 
of peaceful exploitation of satellites. This rhetoric in support of ABM system s and 
against the developm ent of ASAT technology w as an important if secondary 
feature of overall space policy, illustrating French willingness to extract as  much 
mileage a s  possible from all aspects  of space  technology and diplomacy.
Before looking at the spatial modernisation of strategy we will next exam ine how 
military space  is alternately thought to provide problems and advantages for 
French defence.
8.3. Military space : problems and benefits for French defence ?
We will firstly examine initiatives in favour of non-military, peaceful u ses  of space  
coming from France, by which the French have attem pted to influence the 
development of the militarisation of space. Secondly we will consider the more 
commonly held idea that space is a  complement to the deterrent force.
8.3.1. * L'espace pacifique '24
France had been militating in favour of solely peaceful u ses  of space  since 1978, 
when President Giscard d'Estaing presented the concept of an international 
observation satellite agency to the General Assembly of the United Nations.25 
This project for a  'Blue satellite', a s  it becam e known, provided for the extension to 
other countries of the space observation facilities at that time limited only to the 
superpowers. The French were particularly sensitive in the late 1970s about their
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own dependence on American satellite information, (when such information was 
forthcoming), and about their inability to check or refute the data  should it conflict 
with French interests. Since the SPOT programme w as launched in 1978 it was 
presented in this light as  a  development breaking the superpower monopoly of 
space reconnaissance and thus contributing to the m aintenance of world peace.
(In fact, the project has also been presented a s  a  m eans of predicting natural 
disasters, so it combines all possible virtues).26
Given the fact that the realisation of the importance of military space  only really 
started crystalizing in 1983-84, the enthusiasm  for these  'passive', 'para-military' 
uses of space  observation, telecommunications and early warning for the 
international control of destabilizing situations may represent a  genuine initial 
belief in such initiatives. The French proposals had been repeated at UNSSOD II 
by Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson (11 June 1982), who expressed France's 
willingness to join a  general treaty prohibiting BMD.27 At the June 1984 UN 
disarm am ent conference held in Geneva, A m bassador Frangois de la Gorce 
presented a  French proposition that antisatellite system s should be strictly limited, 
that ABM or ASAT lasers and studies should be banned for a  five year renewable 
period, and that the superpowers should extend their private accord guaranteeing 
the immunity of certain satellites to the satellite system s of other nations.28 These 
propositions avowedly had the dual ambition firstly of preserving the stability of the 
strategic balance, and secondly of safeguarding the civil-commercial opportunities 
of space exploitation.
The ambiguity of the French position (a consequence of trying to back too 
many horses at one time) transpired in a  January 1984 Defense Nationale article 
by the senior Delegation generate pour I’Armement (DGA) officer ICA Pichoud in 
which he declared that military uses of space were minor in comparison with civil 
exploitations, but that to maintain credibility and to perfect techniques, the French 
space effort would have to engage in military applications 29 Coming from the 
director of the Groupe Espace-Satellites of the DGA’s  ballistic missile directorate 
(DEN-STEN)30, this apparent em phasis on the civil and political aspects  of space 
technology w as som ewhat surprising, evidence of France searching for an 
effective argum ent on which to base her attitudes towards the moral and practical 
dimensions of the militarisation of space.
In May-June 1988, ten years after the initial proposal, France reiterated her 
support for the creation of an international satellite agency for arm s control 
monitoring, an initiative paralleling the W estern European Union (WEU) project for 
a  similar European system for verification of arm s control agreem ents.31 The 
WEU considered the plan of using SPOT satellites (Alain SIMON of CNES
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suggested a  possible option of using SPOT 2/3 immediately, with relatively low 
definition data  available to all countries, followed by SPO T 4 to be offered by 
France to the UN in 1992).32
At the sam e time a s  backing moratoria on ABM system s and ASAT m easures 
in order to slow the militarisation of space, the French were busy integrating the 
spatial dimension into their nuclear strategy. As has already been mentioned, the 
official discourse on this process presents space  a s  complementing and 
completing the FNS. Assuming the right hand of the French state knows what the 
left hand is doing, these  attitudes might appear som ew hat Machiavellian. Having 
looked at the diplomatic-military aspects of post SDI space  policy, we will now 
examine the them e of space a s  a  complement to the deterrent force - towards a 
'dissuasion nuclearo-spatiale'- the second of France's responses to the new post- 
SDI diplomatic-strategic environment.
8.3.2. Space as a complement to the deterrent force.
The complexity of the French reaction to the militarisation of space  w as 
representatively illustrated in ICA Jean-Y ves Leloup's contribution to the ENA 
conference in November 1985. Entitled 'Les options spatiales frangaises', this 
speech reached a  much wider audience in the February 1986 issue of Defense 
Nationale 33 Leloup defined the principal objectives of French defence policy as  
being the m aintenance of the Force de dissuasion and of France's ability to 
m anage crises, and stated that French space options m ust be consonant with the 
guaranteeing of these objectives. For Leloup this necessitated  satellites and 
ground stations for observation, listening and communications from space, and 
secondly, m easures to protect the FNS from militarised space. T hese applications 
were described a s  the 'utilisation militaire pacifique de i'espace', and were 
contrasted with t h e 'ambitions beaucoup plus demesurees’ of the superpowers, 
whose ABM research w as presented as  potentially destabilizing. Leloup's rhetoric 
is such that a s  well a s  stressing the 'peaceful'34 nature of French military space, he 
also maintains that the French reply to SDI is not to be found in space  : 'Quelle est 
pour nous la reponse a ces menaces? Elle ne se situe pas dans I'espace: il ne 
s'agirait pas pour la France de se lancer dans une operation du type IDS a 
I'americaine'.35 To complete the full range of official positions, Leloup also evoked 
the G eneva proposals made by France in 1984, before going on to state that 
France would also improve the penetration of her missile system s through 
hardening, multiple w arheads and stealth techniques. His conclusion w as that as  
far ahead a s  forecasts could be m ade, space would not undermine France’s
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nuclear deterrence.36 These protestations of France's b lam elessness and 
capacity to react reluctantly to the new dem ands are to be contrasted with the 
admission that space might indeed be a  potential complement to deterrence.37 
Which gives a  scenario something like 'We are against it. We can do it if we have 
to. It will be to our advantage to do it'... The situation was, however, more 
complicated than this view would suggest, even though strategically space has an 
undeniable complementary role to play.
For example, speaking at the Cours superieur interarmees on 'Les perspectives 
d'utilisation militaire de 1'espace' in 1988, the senior DGA officer IGA Bousquet, 
Directeurdes Engins, expressed his personal opinion that space w as having som e 
problems in being accepted into French military thinking (Tespace a un peu de mal 
a s'integrer dans la pensee militaire)'.38 Bousquet advanced operational factors 
(space system s would never replace the need for conventional forces), strategic 
considerations (in so far a s  space  system s would always be vulnerable to the 
superpowers), and practical and financial constraints of what he considered to be 
the necessary  separation of civil and military space a s  reasons for the problems of 
sp ace  strategy in military thinking.
Given that France considered SDI to be destabilizing, her political and 
diplomatic efforts attempted to limit this process and to dissociate France from its 
effects. Strategically, a s  Rear Admiral Alain C oatanea, President of the Groupe 
d ’etudes spatiales (GES - the highest level military sp ace  body), stated at the 
Activites soatiales militaires conference in October 1988, the military attitude 
towards space followed the traditional pattern for technological innovations : firstly 
the new technology is integrated with existing general strategic notions, and, 
secondly the arm ed forces attempt to use existing facilities, even if civil, attempting 
to adapt them to their own requirements 39 (Operationally and industrially, the 
military space  programmes treated in the chapter of the thesis devoted to the 
practical aspects of military space programmes show how far military space has 
profited from existing civil projects). Strategically (our concern here), despite the 
claim that SDI and the militarisation of space were destabilizing, the French also 
maintained that the situation nevertheless exhibited som e stabilizing features 
exploitable in their own interests. Amongst these  features C oatanea listed early 
warning satellites providing improved chances of effective reprisals, greater 
reconnaissance information guaranteeing Tautonomie de la decision', the 
prevention of circumvention of deterrence through triggering of local conflicts, and 
finally, 'le contrdle des crises' (political-military com m and communications).
These features illustrate the central notion integrating space  with French 
nuclear strategy, namely that of space system s a s  a  'multiplicateur de forces'.40
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Considered in this way, military space applications stabilise the strategic 
environment through freedom of reconnaissance, and guarantee a  near equality of 
chances (credibility) in the event of deterrence becoming war. C oatanea’s 
formulation of the importance of space to French defence policy prefigured the 
debate over military space stimulated by the Gulf War and many of the 
conclusions drawn in 1991 over the need to expand military space  programmes. 
We will consider the effects of the Gulf War on French defence presently, but must 
here address a  feature of the militarisation of space  which w as of concern to the 
French military during the 1980s. The element in the new strategic environment 
which integrated least easily into French military planning w as antisatellite 
m easures. ASAT appeared indeed as  the joker in the pack, the only aspect of 
military space  activities which threatened the continuation of the deterrent principle 
and France's claims to independence of action.
8.3.3. Anti satellite technologies (Asat.)
Between 1985 and 1987 a  new concern arose in French military circles over the 
vulnerability of the deterrent force to anti-satellite m easures, the principal fear from 
1983 onwards having essentially concerned the ABM asp ec ts  of the space 
defensive shield proposed by President Reagan. (And anyway, before 1985 and 
the launch of the Telecom 1 satellite with its military equipm ent piggy-backing on 
the civilian payload, France had no military satellites to worry about). Indeed, 
given the advanced state of American and especially Soviet Asat studies this 
potential threat to French independence of reconnaissance and communication 
w as more direct than the eventual development of a  more or less impermeable 
ABM defence. Analyses of the problem were forwarded at the ENA conference 
by Frangois Heisbourg and by Jacques Battistella. For Heisbourg, the absence of 
a  legal framework constraining Asat projects represented an open door to threats 
to the relatively few French satellites that would be operational at any time of 
crisis.41 The development of Asat w eapons targeting French satellites would 
imply great costs for the French space  industry and  French defence in hardening 
satellites against agression. Generalised research into Asat technologies might 
also, Heisbourg suggested, lead to a  bypassing of restrictions on specifically ABM 
technologies. Furthermore, horizontal proliferation of the techniques of satellite 
destruction might lead to an undermining of the strategic balance.
Battistella's understanding of the implications of Asat technologies can be 
opposed to that of Heisbourg to the extent that, interestingly, he saw  them as  a  
possible ‘lever’ enabling France to maintain her strategic position in the
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international system: 'pour une puissance moyenne comme la France ou I'Europe, 
les Asat pourraient remplir un role de dissuasion du faible au fort, comme 
I'atome'.42 Since the superpow ers rely heavily on highly expensive satellites to 
maintain their military security, Battistella's notion w as that the potential 
destruction of these satellites by a  third power would exert a  dissuasive influence. 
This use of space as  an active elem ent of France's deterrent w as conceptualised 
in terms which evoke the development of the Force de Frappe, and which suggest 
that space is a  technology whose military applications can  work in France’s  favour 
in the sam e way as  the possession nuclear w eapons allowed France to dialogue 
with the superpow ers in the 1970s.43
The suggestion that Asat w eapons could provide a  way for France to shift her 
deterrence into space  through a  displacement of the concepts of 7a dissuasion du 
faible au fort' and of 'I'ultime avertissement' into Clarke's and other orbits, 
revolutionary and appealing a s  it might initially appear, w as not accepted by other 
French defence analysts. For instance, Marisol Touraine, writing in early 1987 
arrived at very different conclusions concerning advisable French attitudes towards 
Asat.44 Touraine's analysis w as based  on the identification of Asat w eapons as  a 
strategic and not merely technological challenge and yet concluded that the course 
of action most appropriate for France was to consider the use  of A sats in a  battle 
rather than a  deterrent context. Because of the great disproportion between the 
numbers of French and Soviet satellites, the principle of deterrence 'du faible au 
fort' although quantitatively present would be inoperable in space  since France 
would never have enough satellites or Asat system s to hinder enem y actions, and 
the converse a  fortiori. (The fact that the Soviets could replace satellites in matters 
of only a  few hours would also seem ed to invalidate this concept).
The transfer of the 'final warning’ into space w as likewise rejected by 
Touraine, since she argued that the explosion of a  nuclear satellite in a  French 
Asat action would not only probably dam age friendly satellites, but that such an act 
through its nuclear nature would confuse the credibility of the distinction between 
battle tactical/pre-strategic and space-strategic engagem ent. B ecause of these 
problems, Touraine's recommendation (not shared by som e of her colleagues at 
the SGDN)45 w as that France should integrate her military response to an eventual 
attack on her satellites with her 'strategie d'emploi aeroterrestre', thus maintaining 
the coherence of the deterrent system. Once French satellites are understood by 
the Soviets a s  merely one element of the French C3I system , attack on them can 
be answ ered by a  conventional strike against Soviet satellite ground stations. The 
implications of Touraine's analysis for the French sp ace  industry w as that Asat 
w eapons developm ent should not be proceded with immediately, but that 'veille
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technologique, diplomatie active et preparation de represailles eventuelles*6 
would enable France to adapt to a  variety of situations, and to rapidly develop Asat 
capabilities should the need arise.
In conclusion to this analysis of France’s attitude towards the militarisation 
of space in the 1980s and the effects of these strategic considerations on the 
militarisation of French space activities, we can state that the new situation of the 
1980s created an arena in which France could attempt to exploit developments to 
her own best advantage. The spur to military space  given by SDI created a  
relative consensus behind the idea that the arm ed forces required spatial 
modernisation in order to maintain their technical credibility. In parallel, on the 
diplomatic level, the French were careful to maintain a  'double discourse* on the 
militarisation of space, simultaneously decrying the move towards any kind of 'Star 
Wars' and stressing France's strategic and industrial capability to answ er any 
threat this might pose to the 'independence' of France within the international 
system. Both these features of the spatial modernisation of the arm ed forces 
combined to allow the space lobbies within the arm ed forces to expand and 
strengthen their organisation and influence and also to launch procurement 
programmes such as  Syracuse and Helios which exemplify the c loseness of the 
links and 'imbrication' between the military and civil space  sectors. These 
programmes and links will be discussed in Chapter Ten, but here we shall 
conclude this appraisal of the links between defence strategy and space with a  
discussion of the implications of the Gulf W ar for the French arm ed forces. In 
1990-91 and afterwards the development of strategic thinking on French military 
space w as further stimulated by the Gulf War and by the lessons leamt from the 
conflict both in general concerning the nature of such operations, and in specific 
term s concerning the experience of the French forces involved, and of France as  a  
minor partner in the Desert Shield / Desert Storm alliance.
8.4. The lessons of the Gulf War
The Gulf W ar caused  the French military-political establishm ent to reflect upon 
France's traditional security stance and the strategic, technical and industrial 
principles which underlie French geo-political action. The Gulf W ar added to calls 
for a  rethinking of defence which had already arisen after the changes in Eastern 
Europe and the perceived possibility of a 'peace dividend'. In the term s of 
Frangois Heisbourg, director of the IISS, the strategic changes consequent on the 
end of the Cold war and the implications of the Gulf W ar m ade an ‘aggiornamento’ 
indispensable for France if she were to avoid the unusual danger of being 'en
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retard d'une paix’ (end of cold war) and 'en retard d'une guerre' (unprepared for 
subsequent conflicts).47
The simplest lesson that France drew from her experience of the Gulf War 
and which w as perhaps the fundamental stimulus for the reassessm en ts  of policy 
and structures which ensued w as that she had been shown to be a  very minor 
partner in the US-dominated Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, because 
of deficiencies of equipment on the ground and because of problems of 
communication and intelligence. Given France's traditional aspirations to 
autonomous and wholly credible military capabilities, one might expect that the 
normal reaction to such a  position of inferiority within an alliance would be calls for 
improvements in materiel and support, and this w as indeed the case. However, 
the Gulf War also dem onstrated the immense cost of playing an autonom ous and 
credible military role in the contemporary world. If the cost of the operations can 
be taken as  the second lesson of the war, then the two lessons combined led 
France to the realisation that a  reassessm ent of her traditional security stance w as 
necessary, and that it should be defined in term s of credibility and cost rather than 
in terms of pure ‘autonomy’.
8.4.1. Military space and the new debate on Defence
The end of the war provided an opportunity for the President of the Republic to call 
for a  debate on the definition of a  new 1politique militaire' (3 March 1991) in 
addition to the examination by Parliament of the projet de loi sur la programmation 
militaire for 1992-96. Mitterrand's initial suggestion, m ade during a  televised 
address to the Nation, w as that France's defence system  {‘appareil de defense) 
should be modernised without any modification to strategy. Alongside the 
modernisation, (or perhaps as  an unavoidable elem ent of such modernisation), 
Mitterrand called for changes in the nature, composition and balance of the French 
armed forces overall48
Amongst many distinguished participants in the debate  on France's security 
policy during 1991 w as Henri Martre, the managing director of Aerospatiale, who 
contributed an article to Le Monde entitled 'Les samourafs et les marchands49 
Such a  title w as chosen to reflect the twin tem ptations of French thinking on 
military matters, namely that France can be a  kind of ‘sam urai nation’ in the world 
community by virtue of her nuclear deterrent, and a  major merchant of arms, but 
Martre's conclusion w as that given France's size and resources, she  can play 
neither role completely and should capitalise on her strengths, such a s  high 
technology, in order to play an influential part in world politics.50 Also addressed
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by Martre in his analysis of the issues of the security debate was the question 
(central for many commentators) of the future of the French nuclear deterrent. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, as  managing director of the main producer of the deterrent 
force vectors, Martre was in favour of maintaining the role of the FNS a s  the 
ultimate guarantee of France's 'vital interests' against attack from any quarter and 
in any form, nuclear itself or not. Such support for the FNS (and for any - spatial - 
modernisation necessary to protect it) is justified for Martre by the logic of France's 
nuclear capability and by the favourable cost-efficiency ratio of nuclear arm s in 
ensuring security.51 In the recessionary context of the Gulf War period, marked in 
France by the Rocard governm ent's increasing difficulties to m anage the conflict 
between falling revenues and rising expenditures, the cost of security w as the 
basic key to the debate that arose on French defence.
Since the Gulf War stimulated re-opening of debate on France's security 
options, the loi de programmation militaire has been the object of considerable 
conflict and confusion, resulting in the abandonm ent of a  traditional five year plan 
and the consequent definition of spending ambitions for the arm ed forces on an 
annual or two- to three-year basis. Even before the impact of the Gulf War, the 
French arm ed forces had been moving towards an updating of som e of their 
structures within the framework of Defence minister Chevenem ent's loi de 
programmation 1990-93 and the Armees 2000 plan, whose rationale had been the 
slimming down of the armed forces and the search for greater efficiency. Som e of 
the decisions taken during the 1991 debate over the rationalisation and 
modification of the defence system  were thus inherited from Chevenem ent, such 
a s  the abandonm ent of the S 45 ballistic missile, the planned reduction of the 
professional army from 280,000 to 230,000 over a  six year period, the planned 
reduction of military service to ten months and the creation of a  joint Franco- 
German unit.52 In addition to this rationalisation, which had been stimulated 
essentially by the developments in Eastern Europe, the Gulf W ar provided a  
realisation that the armed forces required modernisation and reorganisation just as 
much as  rationalisation.
8.4.2. Loi de programmation 1992-94 : economies and diversified priorities
The loi de programmation as it finally em erged from governm ent in July 1992 after 
a  long period of gestation dem onstrated the desire to limit increases in spending.
At the sam e time as  a  slowing in the increase of funds, the programme law aimed 
at a  'rebalancing' of the allocation of funds within the defence system , doubtless in 
answ er to President Mitterrand's call for a  debate on the 'internal equilibrium' of the
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armed forces. This rebalancing of priorities concerned most importantly the place 
of the nuclear forces within the defence system. For the first time, the loi de 
programmation for 1992-94 and 1995-97 provided for an actual decrease  in the 
funding allocated to the nuclear forces, and significantly, substantially rising 
investment in the spatial com ponents of France's defence.53
These decisions to give extra funding to space gave effect to opinions 
voiced in May 1991 by Defence Minister Pierre Joxe, who described the 'extreme 
dependency' and the 'feebleness' of French intelligence during the Gulf conflict, 
inadequacies which, in the view of the Defence ministry, would have left the 
French forces 'almost blind' had they not been aided by other Alliance partners.54 
This problem w as to be addressed  by Joxe through the planned transformation of 
French military intelligence into a  full 'arme' (or corps) of the arm ed forces, in order 
to reflect its new dimension s tra te g iq u e Such a  reorganisation of the structures 
of intelligence gathering, and the increased prestige of the activity within the armed 
forces w as intended to improve the efficiency of information gathering and 
communication, along with an effort to improve the technical endowment with 
which the intelligence personnel gather and diffuse information.
Although Joxe stressed  t h a t 'fascination technologique' w as not the only 
answ er to the inadequacies of the system , it becam e obvious that space 
observation and communications capabilities such a s  those that had enabled the 
Americans to see  and talk during Desert Shield and Desert Storm were considered 
to be essential to proper French independence of action in conventional 
operations. As Joxe was reported as  stating in his speech  to the Institutdes 
Hautes etudes de defense nationale (IHEDN), a  situation in which France 
depended on the good will of the US for information w as unacceptable : 'Ce sont 
les Etats-Unis qui nous ont fourni, comme et quand ils I’ont voulu, I’essentiel des 
informations necessaires a la conduite du conflit'.55 The conclusion that the 
Defence minister drew from this unhappy situation w as that for the sam e reasons 
that had led France to develop an autonom ous nuclear deterrent in the 1960s and 
1970s, an independent space surveillance capability should now be acquired.56 
The importance of these m easures is underlined by the fact that they were the first 
to be proposed by Joxe after his arrival at the Defence ministry in January 1991 to 
replace Jean-Pierre Chevenement, and the term s in which they were expressed 
suggested that space was indeed likely increasingly to becom e of extreme 
importance to the French armed forces.
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8.5. Conclusion
French strategic thinking has been forced by the Gulf War into recognising the 
fundamental importance of space-based  system s in the conduct of modern 
warfare and the necessity for France to develop such system s. The importance 
of the system s is not a  new idea, since even in the 1960s, strategists in France 
and elsew here speculated on the eventual need for satellites a s  complementary 
elem ents in nuclear deterrence, but dependence on the US in Desert Storm and 
the new strategic context of the post-Cold war period has forced France into 
realising that the time has come to develop such capabilities fully.57 Given 
France's traditional military-diplomatic stance, the developm ent by allies of a  
spatial elem ent to conventional warfare and nuclear strategy is doubly galling, 
especially if (as has been reported) President Mitterrand's request to retain US 
satellite photographs of the Gulf conflict w as refused by the American officer who 
had brought them to the Elysee.58 The feeling that military space technology is 
crucial if France is to maintain her rank in the international concert of nations was 
expressed neatly by a  contributor to the review Defense Nationale in February 
1992, who stated that in an ever more dangerous international system  French 
defence could only deteriorate without investment in space, leaving France’s 
national deterrent force grounded and dependent on the ‘systeme nord-americain 
de guerre assistee par ordinateur. ’ Moreover, and  more immediately to the point 
for the making of military space policy, ‘Un plan de rattrappage est imperatif, 
comme le fut en son temps le plan atomique, ne serait-ce que pour le ren forcer1.59 
The final comparison between the atomic w eapons developm ent programme of 
the 1950s and 1960s and a  plan for France to ‘catch up' in military space 
capabilities is an illuminating insight into the importance military space  is 
assum ing for the French armed forces.
The changing strategic environment of the mid- and late 1980s and the 
difficulty of forseeing strategy in the 1990s have combined to force modernisation 
and rationalisation on the French armed forces. Most recently, Defence minister 
Joxe 's principal strategy in 1991 and 1992 w as to develop the panoply of space- 
based  technology at France's disposal as a complement to the FNS  and also a s  a  
m eans of improving France's independence of decision and action. In term s of 
programs, this has translated itself in the continuation of the Syracuse program, 
the extension of the Helios series of satellites, the initiation of two new satellite 
programs nam ed Osiris (radar) and Zenon (electronic listening), and the planning 
of a  second generation optical observation satellite nam ed Songe . These 
programmes combined national self-reliance and increasing openness to
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European partnership. Pierre Joxe's enthusiasm  for the spatial modernisation of 
the arm ed forces thus echoed som e opinions voiced in the 1980s, when 
European collaboration w as seen a s  a  possible future for French industry and 
military influence (once the possibilities of national civil-military cooperation were 
exhausted), but when hopes for joint space programs were tem pered by the 
failure for political reasons of past collaborations.
Strategic thinking and defence policy in general have thus provided a  strong 
source of discussion of military space, and especially in the later 1980s and the 
early 1990s, a  strong impetus to the expansion of military involvement in the 
industrial development of applications programmes such as  communications and 
observation satellites. As French deterrent strategy has moved towards a  kind of 
‘dissuasion nuclearo-spatiale’ and a s  conventional conflicts such a s  Chad and the 
Gulf War have em phasised the need for French forces to ‘voir, ecouter et 
communiquer\ military space structures have evolved within the defence 
establishm ent to initiate policy and protect the interests of military space.
It is to the consideration of the organisation of French military space  
activities that we now turn in order to show how the military space sector tries to 
resolve its internal tensions between technicians and strategists and the external 
tensions existing between military space and civil industry and government.
Issues of power and control are to be found on two levels, namely that of the Etat 
Major des Armees (EMA) and that of the S taterspace sector interface.
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9. O rganisation, Planning and Funding of military sp ace  activities
French military space institutions and structures as  they stand today date 
essentially only from 1985. Before the major effort m ade by the Ministry of 
Defence under Charles Hernu at that time to update existing structures and to 
create new institutions and thinking, neither the Etat Major des Armees (EMA)nor 
the Ministry of Defence itself had any specific bodies dealing solely with space. 
This is not to say of course that the possibilities of military use of space  were not 
considered before 1985, or that French military planners were caught totally by 
surprise by President Reagan's 1983 launch of the SDI and its attendant 
structures. Prior to 1985 in effect, space-related m atters within the Ministry of 
Defence were dealt with by the authorities responsible for the Force de 
Dissuasion. The quickening of interest in military space  in the 1980s, both before 
and after SDI, culminated initially in Hernu's reform of structures. Thus one of the 
major instruments of French military space policy, the Plan Pluriannuel Spatial 
Militaire (PPSM) predates the creation of the organisms we shall analyse below.1
In term s of the sociology and politics of the arm ed forces, the current 
context of French military space activities can perhaps be simply described in two 
opposing ways. Firstly there is the official explanation of the m echanism s of 
strategic need, research, development and production put forward by the Ministry 
of Defence/EMA/DGA; and secondly, in opposition to this, the ‘suspecting glance' 
typified by the independently minded and highly respected critic of military 
extravagance Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, who asserts  that no-one is at all 
concerned with the real defence of France and that the whole procurement system 
is motivated by 'fric et fantasmes'.2 In looking at the defence establishm ent 
planning and decision-making processes in missile and satellite developm ent we 
take them to be similar to those obtaining in the atomic programmes, an 
assum ption supported by Mendl's assertion that 'The pattern of civil-military 
collaboration which dominated the military programme of the CEA in its period of 
clandestinity w as repeated in the more open missile and space  research 
program m es'.3 The analyses of Mendl and of Kohl underlined the complex 
causation of high-tech w eapons procurement. Their contributions concern what 
might be term ed the 'sociology' of decision making in military space technology 
acquisition: Kohl remarks that the military nuclear programme w as not led from 
the highest authorities (the Prime minister and his cabinet), but by 'second-rank 
officials' (technocrats and military officers in the CEA).4 Similarly, Mendl s ta tes  
that in the early years at least, discussion of the choice of delivery system s, limited
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at that time to long-range bombers and unperfected ground to ground missiles w as 
restricted to a small group of technical officials and a few politicians.5
Such considerations on the status of decision-makers in the choice of w eapons 
and delivery system s reflect another distinction drawn by Sapolsky, namely that 
between possible 'macro-sociological' and 'micro-bureaucratic' approaches to 
w eapons acquisition studies. Taking the case  of the Force de Frappe, a  potential 
macro-sociological’ explanation would invoke the fact that its development 
simultaneously provided the French army and France herself with an expensive 
and prestigious 'toy' as  compensation for declining professional and national self­
esteem  caused  by the reductions in personnel of the Army after the Algerian War 
and the social malaise engendered by the instability of the Fourth Republic. A 
micro-bureaucratic approach would highlight the roles of individual actors in the 
decision making processes, typically, for Sapolsky, 'bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs...from the ranks of w eapons designers or the officer corps'.6 A 
micro-bureaucratic’ style of enquiry is best applied to our investigation of the 
relationships between the Etat Major des Armees and the Delegation Generate 
pour I'armement, and between these military structures and political authority.
Before looking at the structures them selves however, it is necessary  to p resent the 
institutional context within which they operate. The main institutional context is of 
course the Ministry of Defence. This background is characterised by a  division of 
responsibilities and influence between the bodies charged with the purely military 
aspects of space and those dealing with the technical and industrial questions 
which arise in the process of satisfying the dem ands of space  applications.
The plan of the chapter is thus a s  follows :
- 9.1. Etat-Major des Armees and Delegation Generate pour i ’Armement
- 9.2. New interest in military space in the mid-1980s - new space bodies
within the Defence ministry
- 9.3. Post-Gulf War innovations in the organisation of military space
- 9.4. Organisational efficiency and internal synergy
- 9.5. Funding for military space - past, present and future
- 9.6. Conclusion
In order to give a  consideration of the Defence Ministry and space  we turn now to 
a discussion of the main organisational structures of the Defence Ministry and  their 
relations to space activities.
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9.1. The Etat Major des Armees and Delegation Generate pour I'armement.
These two sectors of activity within the Ministry of Defence are represented by the 
Etat Major des Armees (EMA) and the etat-majors of the three armed services for 
the strictly military aspects, and by the Delegation Generate pour I'Armementtor 
the technical and industrial aspects. The Etat Major des Armees consists of six 
separate divisions staffed by career military personnel.7 The six divisions cover 
the totality of the operational requirements of the armed forces, ranging from 
Organisation and logistics, Communication-electronics-computing through External 
relations and Employment to Nuclear forces and Plans-Programmes-Espace 
which alone now has responsibility for the operational aspects of space systems.
The Plans-Programmes-Espace Division and the EMA
Organisation 
et logistique







Each division is headed by an officier general of the EMA who has the task of 
assisting the C hefdE ta t Major des Armees (CEMA). Since the CEMA is second 
in rank only to the Defence Minister, (and the President of the Republic), whom he 
advises on the use and organisation of the armed forces at the same time as 
supervising the management of defence-related research and information 
gathering, the work of the specialised divisions has an almost exceptionally close 
direct link with the final centres of decision making.
The Delegation Generate pour I'Armement (DGA) is the technical and industrial 
counterpart of the EMA.8 It is headed by the Delegue general pour I'armement, 
during January 1989 - May 1993 M. Yves Sillard, (formerly of CNES and, 
immediately prior to his replacement of Jacques Chevallier at the DGA, General 
secretary of the French EUREKA secretariat).9 Created in 1977 in a renaming of 
the Delegation Ministerielle pour I'Armement (DMA), instituted in 1961 at the same 
time as CNES, the DGA brings together all the producers of arms used by the 
French armed forces as well as those sold as arms exports. Backed by a  number 
of departments dealing with administrative and financial issues and by six 
technical directorates, the Delegue General manages the running of arms study,
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research and production programmes. The following diagram gives a simplified 
representation of the organisational structure of the DGA :
T he D£16gation generale pour I’Armement
Direction des armements 
terrestre
Direction des personnels
Direction des constructions 
navales__________________
Service central des 
Affaires industrielles
Direction de 1'electronique • • • 
ei del nriforinatigiie . ! ! ! ! ! .
_  Delegue aux programmes 
d'armement
Direction des recherches 
etudes et techniques









(Shading represents involvement in military space)
Of the directions techniques, during the 1980s the Direction des Engins (DEN - 
responsible for ballistic missiles) and the Direction de I'Electronique e tde  
I'lnformatique (DEI) were the most heavily involved in space programmes along 
with to a lesser extent the Direction des Recherches, Etudes et Techniques 
(DRET).10 In 1991, however, under the catalysing effect of the lessons drawn 
from the Gulf War, the DEN was reorganised into a Direction des Missiles et de 
lEspace  (DME), both as a modernisation and clarification of terminology and as a 
structural measure intended to simplify interaction between the DGA and the 
space industry.11
The theoretical relationship between the EMA and the DGA is that of equal 
client and supplier. EMA officers identify a "besoin militaire", or military
234
requirement, and ask the military engineers of the DGA's relevant services to 
study, research and propose technical solutions fulfilling the operational 
requirements se t out by the EMA. When a  satisfactory solution is proposed, the 
EMA m akes an appeal for tenders from industry through the DGA. If a  tender is 
accepted, the DGA m anages the running of the programme in its technical and 
industrial aspects, with the EMA checking the ongoing work to ensure that there is 
no divergence from the operational characteristics requested. The different 
natures of the officer corps of the EMA and the DGA leads to a  potential conflict of 
ambitions between these two wings of the Defence Ministry In effect, there is a  
tendency within the DGA to carry out work independently of any request 
formulated by the EMA, a  recent example of this being research on Extra High 
Frequency radio communications.12 Moreover, since it is the DGA which has final 
control over the funding of Defence Ministry work with industry, it is som etim es 
inclined to 'anticipate' operational requirements in its research into potential arm s 
system s. Indeed, one of the modifications brought in 1985 to the m echanism s 
dealing with space  in the Defence Ministry w as a  m easure specifically designed to 
reduce the possibility of friction between the two institutions. Unfortunately 
however, at the sam e time, a  transfer of responsibility for space  from one division 
to another within the EMA created internal tensions to replace those previously 
experienced by the EMA vis-a-vis the DGA.
Within this organisational context, we now turn to a  consideration of the bodies 
that deal with the space sector and how these  bodies influence space  policy.
9.2. Mid-1980s interest in military space- new space-related bodies
The institutional changes and innovations of 1985 appeared  a s  the practical, 
organisational effects of a  period of increasing aw areness of, and interest in the 
military applications of space for France. The advent of the Socialist 
administration had brought a  President who had a  strong personal interest in the 
symbol of the FNS and in space, the SAMRO project (SAtellite Militaire de 
Reconnaissance Optique) had passed  through a  period of intense debate in 1982- 
83 before finally passing away, and 1983 itself had seen  President R eagan 's 'Star 
W ars' proposal.13 In 1984 at The Hague, President Mitterrand suggested  that 
Europe should cooperate on a  manned space station and observation and 
communication satellites.14 Furthermore, the failure of bilateral discussions 
between the French and West German Defence Ministries over Helios (the
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successor to the SAMRO project) underlined simultaneously aw areness of the 
importance of military space, the difficulties of collaboration and the seem ing 
necessity for France to lead from the front in this field a s  well a s  in the civilian 
sector.
According to General Bertrand de la Presle, former head of the division Plans- 
Programmes-Espace at the EMA, prior to 1985" I'espace militaire etait traite par 
les etats-majors d'armee dans le cadre de leurs responabilites de 
programmation.1,15. This is a  somewhat opaque way of saying that space was 
essentially dependent on the bodies responsible for the Force de Dissuasion. 
Immediately prior to the creation of the Groupe d'Etudes Spatiales (GES) in March 
1985, military space m atters were dealt with by the Groupe nucleaire militaire de 
I'espace. In the late 1970s, responsibility for space  had lain with the Groupe des 
Forces nucleates, who proposed studies on the SAMRO project in 1977. This 
link between the nuclear force and space is of course both natural and historical: 
in the early years of the Fifth Republic ministerial authority for the two was 
conflated in the Secretariat dEtat aux questions atomiques et spatiales under 
Pierre Guillaumat16 The closeness and inevitability of the link between the 
nuclear force and space does not however mean that relations are always 
harmonious between the two; the proceedings of the Groupe nucleaire militaire de 
I'espace were hindered by tensions between the EMA and the DGA. These 
tensions were caused  principally by the fact that the Group w as chaired jointly by 
the Sous-Chef Plan for the EMA and by the Delegue General for the DGA. The 
superior rank of the Delegue General put the EMA in a  subordinate role in 
discussions, in contradiction with the theoretical client-supplier relationship existing 
between the EMA and the DGA. This tension, and the desire to have structures 
having clear responsibility solely for space was a  contributory factor leading to the 
creation of the GES, (the so-called "Etat Major de l'Espace') in March 1985.17 
The separation of authority over space from that over nuclear issues caused  some 
resentm ent in the nuclear corps, but the innovation of making a  high-ranking EMA 
officer chairman of the new group, assisted by a  DGA engineer gave a  sm oother 
hierarchy of influence more in conformity with the 'precedence ' of the EMA.18
The diagram overleaf gives a  simplified schem atic representation of the 
organisation of French military space as it was structured in 1985.
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9.2.1. The Groupe d'Etudes Spatiales (G E S ): high-level authority  for sp ace
The original 'tandem' of officers in charge of the GES was composed of the 
General de division aerienne Guy Fleury, Sous-Chef of the EMA’s Organisation 
and logistics division, and by Ingenieurde I'armement (IGA) Jean Sandeau, 
Directeur des Engins at the DGA/DEN. At the end of August however, Fleury was 
replaced as President of the GES by Vice-amiral d'Escadre Bernard Louzeau, 
previously commander of the Force Oceanique strategique (FOST). Again 
assisted by Sandeau of the DEN, Louzeau was simultaneously Major-General of 
the EMA, reporting directly to the similarly newly-appointed Chef d'Etat Major des 
Armees (CEMA), General Jean Saulnier, previously (1981-85) President 
Mitterrand's chef d'etat major particuiier or personal chief of staff - a position of 
significant influence over policy formulation. With this appointment the rank
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accompanying the Presidency of the GES illustrated vividly the importance 
accorded to space issues within the Ministry of Defence. In effect, the GES is 
only at one remove (the CEMA) from the Minister himself.19 In 1986 Louzeau was 
succeeded by Admiral Alain C oatanea, working with IGA Daniel Pichoud of the 
DEN. The to-ing and fro-ing of th ese  officers between the GES and the Elysee, 
indicative of Mitterrand's attention to space m atters, w as continued in 1989 with 
C oatanea's departure to advise the President.
9.2,2. The GCSM, the division PPE and PPSM.
The Groupe d'Etudes Spatiales w as not the only organism created in the 1985 
reorganisations. An attempt to secure the harmonious cooperation of EMA 
officers and technical experts from the DGA w as represented by the inauguration 
of the Groupe de Coordination Spatiale Militaire (GCSM), chaired jointly by 
representatives of the EMAI  Division Plans-Programmes-Espace and of the DGA. 
The division Plans-Programmes-Espace (PPE) functions to a  certain extent a s  the 
secretariat of the GES, although the PPE is itself headed by a  high-level officer 
(General de la Presle, succeeded by General Christian Fontaine). The GCSM is 
in charge of seven groupes technico-operationnels responsible for technical and 
practical aspects  of various military technologies.20 The studies and propositions 
of these  working groups, coordinated by the GCSM, inform the reflections and 
decisions of the GES. The Plan Pluriannuel Spatial Militaire (PPSM) is thus in 
part dependent on the activities of these  organisms.
The PPSM is drawn up under the chairmanship of the Directeurdes Engins (or 
Directeur des Missiles et de lEspace post-1991) in the GES, and is signed jointly 
by the Delegue General pour I'Armement and the Chef d'Etat Major des Armees 
before being presented to the Minister for final approval. Before its presentation 
for integration in the Defence budget the PPSM has already the support of the 
highest echelons of the military establishm ent below the Minister himself, a s  well 
a s  potential input directly from the presidency via Saulnier a s  CEMA. Despite its 
considerable importance, the PPSM is not the only fruit of the G ES's activities: the 
Minister also receives an annual report on the military space  sector in France and 
a  presentation of GES projects and the state of developm ent of its programmes. 
Although it w as initially devised in 1983, the PPSM in its current form is a  product 
of Hernu's new structures, it represents the final synthesis of the functions of the 
GES, the PPE, the GCSM and the technico-operational working groups. Before 
considering in more detail the functioning of these  structures we will now present 
in outline the aims of the PPSM, its exact content of course being 'top secret’.21
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The PPSM has a  fifteen- to twenty-year rolling horizon and is brought up to date 
('actualise) every two or three years. The 1983 - 1988 PPSM w as reviewed in 
1985, the updated PPSM 1987 - 2002 was modified in 1989, and the third Plan for 
1992 - 2002 w as redefined in 1991 -92. The present PPSM contains scenarios for 
the developm ent of the French military space sector over the period 1992-2002.22 
These "grandes orientations”aim to define the space requirements of French 
defence policy, to a sse ss  the threats posed to France by potential enem y use of 
space, and to propose the m eans and resources that France should devote to 
military space  activities. In this way the PPSM represents the technical and 
industrial solutions proposed by the DGA to the military requirem ents expressed 
by the EMA.
These space-related bodies in the military establishm ent essentially originated 
during the mid-1980s, under the stimulus of French reactions to the perceived 
threats of SDI. In 1990-91, the Gulf War provided another impetus for French 
action in military space.
9.3. Post-Gulf War innovations in the organisation of military space
After the Gulf War, military interest in space hardware was considerably intensified 
by the strategic lessons drawn from ‘the first space  w ar’, a s  we have seen  in the 
preceding chapter on the evolution of strategy and military space  requirements. 
This renewed enthusiasm  also led to even closer scrutiny of the organisational 
m echanism s of the definition of military space policy and the m anagem ent of 
military space  programmes. Innovations were instituted in the organisation of 
military space  structures which were intended to ensure greater efficiency and 
effectiveness in military space policy making. The major changes concerned a  
new space body within the EMA, a  new space post within the EMA, a  redefinition 
of the nature and importance of intelligence gathering and a  new organisational 
bridge between military and civil space.
9.3.1. The Section des Affaires spatiales (EMA )and ‘le general Espace'
The Section des affaires spatiales is a  departm ent of the Etat-Major des Armees 
created to reflect organisationally the increased importance of military space. The 
diagram overleaf represents the relationship between the EMA and the Defence 
ministry:
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The composition of the Section des affaires spatiales reflects the various aspects 
of military space activities, from officers responsible for following research projects, 
funding developments and possible cooperative ventures, through the ‘officier 
programme’ in charge of Helios and colleagues leading other current projects, to 
the vice-president of the GCSM.
In addition to the section des affaires spatiales, the EMA also plays host to 
the so-called ‘general Espace’, who undertakes to liaise with those generals in the 
Army, Navy and Air Force who have responsibility for military space in the context 
of their particular service. The creation of such a post within the EMA is indicative 
of the Defence Ministry’s desire to increase the coordination of military space 
thinking and policy making, in order to protect military space from attack by 
‘regulatory’ government bodies keen to cut costs and programmes.
9.3.2. The Direction du Renseignement militaire (DRM)
The intention to rationalise the organisation of France’s intelligence gathering 
services was announced by Defence Minister Pierre Joxe in May 1991. The need 
for such rationalisation had been demonstrated by French difficulties during the 
Gulf War, which were deemed to be caused by both deficiencies in technical 
capabilities (observation, communications) and by organisational inefficiencies. 
Joxe especially stressed the fact that the French intelligence service of the future
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would have to combine ‘equipements adaptes - satellites d ’observation - et 
personnels reconn us’.23
In July 1992 the Direction du Renseignement militaire w as se t up with a  
personnel of some 450 in order to provide a  m easure of centralisation for the 
previously disparate intelligence bodies. The DRM brought together a  variety of 
existing structures, in particular the principal command centre for the Helios 
military observation satellite (CPHF), the Combined Forces Image interpretation 
Centre (CF3I), and the Centre d ’exploitation du renseignement militaire (CERM).
In the early stages of thinking about the composition of the DRM, the question of 
the appropriate home for the reception and treatment of d a ta  from Helios did not 
find a  definite answer, but in July 1992 the decision to place the CPHF at the 
centre of the DRM reflected a  realisation of the major importance of the specifically 
spatial elem ents of intelligence gathering.24
The diagram overleaf illustrates the general organisation of French military 
intelligence subsequent to Joxe’s modifications, and show s the central importance 
of space-derived contributions to the DRM in particular and to the political 
authorities in general. The DRM reports directly to the Chef d ’Etat-major des 
Armees (CEMA - Chief of staff), who in turn is directly responsible to the Defence 
minister and to the Prime minister. The diagram also reveals the number of, (and 
complex interactions between), the different intelligence structures. Although the 
DRM was clearly set up a s  a  clarification of theorganisation of intelligence 
gathering, apart from the streamlining of spatial intelligence gathering, doubts 
remained over the relationships evolving between the other bodies such a s  the 
DGSE, the SGDN and the DAS 25
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One further improvement to the organisation of military (and ultimately civil) space 
activities was what is known as the Comite Delta.
9.3.3. The Comite Delta - military-civil coordination
The Comite Delta was set up by ONES and the Delegation generate pour 
I ’armement at the suggestion of Defence Minister Pierre Joxe in August 1991. It 
is a high-level consultative body which brings together representatives of the DGA, 
the EMA and ONES to discuss the harmonisation of civil and military projects.
The Committee represents a further attempt to coordinate and streamline both the 
making and implementation of policy in all the fields where civil and military 
interests can coincide. Thus during 1991 -92 the Committee negotiated 
collaboration between CNES and the DGA on applications programmes to
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continue the Spot and Helios observation satellite projects and also considered 
ways of better coordinating research and development activities.
The motivations behind the creation of the Comite Delta were two-fold. 
Firstly, the Gulf War had focussed attention on the need for the military-industrial 
complex to provide France with the technical m eans to redress the manifest 
deficiencies of her military telecommunications and surveillance facilities, and thus 
more even than before, the DGA and EMA were concerned to guarantee the 
efficiency of procurement. This w as doubtless the major motivation for Pierre 
Joxe as  Defence Minister, convinced of France’s  obligation to modernise her 
arm ed forces through space Secondly, the prevailing context of economic 
recession and budgetary rigour m eant that, in the field of science and technology, 
the government was increasingly emphasizing the need for military and civil 
research and development to attain a  high level of coordination.26 In the field of 
space technology, where military activities accounted for spending of over 3 billion 
francs per annum in 1991 and 1992, the necessity of coordination and the 
opportunities for it were ev iden t27
The creation of the Delta Committee represented an addition to the panoply 
of bodies already set up to ensure the efficient running of the military space 
programmes. Although it did not represent a  change of direction for CNES-DGA 
relations, the Committee’s particular nature as  a  body attempting to establish new 
and overt institutional bridges between civil and military space  w as perhaps 
indicative of a  growing desire on the part of government to simplify the patterns of 
interaction within the overall space sector. Patterns of interaction between bodies 
within the military space system itself tend to reflect a  tendency towards the search 
for efficiency and synergy.
9.4. Organisational efficiency and internal synergy in military space
The functioning of the space-related structures analysed above exemplifies ways 
in which the military space sector attem pts to protect itself against outside 
pressures.
The DGA is periodically the object of American admiration for its successes  in 
arm s production and sales, and for the efficiency with which it coordinates state, 
military and industrial efforts in favour of French influence in the world. According 
to Lieutenant-Colonel Bouchard of the PPE, the organisation of French military 
space has similarly been the cause  of envy in the United S ta tes because of its 
relatively simple, streamlined nature.28 Indeed, perhaps the major problem
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encountered by the US space industry is the confusion created by its size and 
complexity: firms wishing to collaborate with the armed forces on space  system s 
may have difficulty in identifying the appropriate correspondent within the Defence 
D epartm ent29 In contrast, the relatively small scale of the French space  sector, 
both military and civilian, gives the Americans the impression of efficiency and 
organisation. Mere size is not however the only explanation for this efficiency.
US enthusiasm  is justified to the extent that the whole organic structure of the 
space related institutions of the French Defence Ministry is designed to foster easy 
cooperation between the many different partners involved in the space  sector and 
thus to create the conditions for efficiency. It would appear that US authorities are 
trying to integrate some features of the French organigramme into their own 
system s. The effect of efficiency is not restricted to the internal workings of the 
space instances; it also helps to promote the image of space  within the Defence 
Ministry. Som e of the characteristics of military space  m atters which favour their 
importance within the Defence Establishment have already been mentioned, such 
as  the high level at which space projects are discussed and finalised, and the 
privileged access  to the Defence Minister enjoyed by the GES. We shall now 
consider in more detail the other attributes of French military space  institutions 
which contribute to the success  of their activities.
9.4.1. Reconciling technical and strategic ambitions
The most visible proof of the will to create synergy within the structures 
them selves is the Groupe de Coordination Spatiale Militaire (GCSM), w hose joint 
composition (co-presidence EMA-PPE/DGA) and the role of managing the equally 
hybrid technico-operational working groups exemplify the need to harm onise the 
relationships between the two poles of authority within the military space 
establishment. In more detail, the role of the GCSM is to receive the reports on 
the activities of the sub-groups which meet at least twice every twelve months to 
consider the development of existing technologies in their specialised domains, or 
to envisage advance studies of emerging technologies, {'etudes amont1). As well 
a s  acting a s  clearing house for these  contributions to the initial elaboration of the 
PPSM, the GCSM also interacts with the work of the sub-groups, rejecting som e 
suggestions on the grounds of expense and requiring less costly solutions to the 
operational needs expressed to be found, or laying down new operational criteria 
for the technical solutions. In this way, the GCSM translates the p resence and 
views of the Direction des services financiers (the finance and accounts division of 
the Defence Ministry) in the GES committee.30
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Synergy is also assured by the 'interarmees'composition of the PPE which 
assis ts  the GES. This joint composition reflects a s  faithfully a s  possible the 
nature of operational responsibilities for space system s in all branches of the 
arm ed forces. The frequency of the work of the PPE is such that the secretariat 
reports twice weekly to the head of the division PPE. This contact between the 
work of the officers supporting the GES through their immediate superior to the 
CEMA and the Minister typifies at the highest level how the space  organigramme 
has been designed to facilitate information gathering and communication within the 
structures. This rapidity of communication is one of the features most coveted by 
the US counterparts of French military space officials; it is estim ated that the 
EMA/PPE is informed of any contact or proposition m ade to any part of the DGA or 
any firm involved in military space production within six w eeks of the initial event. 
Rapidity of information transfer enables the decision-making instances to react 
immediately in the best interests of the French military space  effort, and also in the 
best interests of the MIC.
9.4.2. Military space as a 'purposive' system
The military space  plan itself is a  good example of this tendency towards what 
might be term ed institutional "self-defensiveness" or "homeostasis". As outlined 
above, the PPSM is relatively long-term (longer at least than the Military 
Programmme Laws), and is brought up to date every three years except when 
major uncertainty over the Defence budget prolongs discussion of the Programme 
Law, a s  was the case  in 1989 and 1991. B ecause of the need to plan long-term 
in the space sector in term s of lags and time spans of developm ent program m es 
and because of the dangers of financial restrictions upsetting the required stability 
of the programmes, the PPSM is presented separately to the Defence Minister for 
his preliminary approval before being included in the Defence Budget. In this 
way, the PPSM receives the backing of the Defence Minister before the overall 
budget is subjected to financial wrangling over budget cuts for the arm ed forces.
This innovation meant that although the 1989 military budget 31and the Loi de 
programmation militaire 1990-93 were much discussed in the Autumn of 1988 and 
the Spring of 1989, leading to the eventual modification of a  num ber of 
program m es,32 the Minister of Defence Jean-Pierre Chevenem ent had already 
given his approval of the PPSM, a s  he stated at the Military S pace Activities 
conference held in Paris in October 1989. In his closing speech  at this 
conference, Chevenem ent concluded on the role of the s ta te  in coordinating the 
military and civil space sectors in the following terms: 77 faudra a la fois une
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grande souplesse et un veritable pragmatisme mais, dans le meme temps une 
totale fermete sur les objectifs et les orientations. Car rien d'important, aucun 
projet de longue haleine, ne se construisent dans le flou et rimprovisation. 33
The function of the PPSM is to provide this flexibility and structure. The long­
term projects of the space plan current when Chevenem ent m ade this declaration 
(in addition to what the Minister described as  the 'renouvellement du systeme en 
cours', referring to Syracuse and Helios) tentatively included the developm ent of 
tactical listening system s in order to monitor enem y m anoeuvres, the development 
of a  radar satellite, and the creation of a  space surveillance radar. The ’long-term’ 
a s  a  prerequisite of managing the military space sector a s  a  system  is not the only 
reason for the existence of the PPSM. Psychologically, there w as a  need to 
mobilise the defence establishm ent and the totality of the arm ed forces behind the 
concept of military space. At the sam e time there was a  desire on the part of the 
military to have a  military counterpart to the successes  of the civilian space  effort, 
especially since civilian research and development had always been more or less 
linked technically and financially to military R & D, essentially in the early years of 
the space  industry, but su ccesses  had always been perceived by the public a s  
civil. This is not to say of course that there was no reticence in certain spheres 
about the expansion of military space activities. The position of the Groupe des 
Forces nucleaires vis-a-vis the transfer of authority for space  from the nuclear 
structures to the GES is a  case  in point. The attitude of the conventional forces 
w as similarly ambivalent: whilst desiring a  French military presence in sp ace  for 
reasons of prestige, they were initially ill at ea se  over the prospect of potential cuts 
in the conventional forces budget to finance the extension of sp ace  programmes. 
The operational a s  well a s  prestige value of space w as however recognised by the 
conventional forces, and their uncertainty over the funding of space  w as finally 
overcome after the Epervier operation conducted in Chad in February 1986. In 
contrast to the logistic failure of the earlier Manta action in the Chad conflict, 
Epervier w as a  success, largely due to the efficient communications offered by the 
Syracuse I satellite system .34
Overall, the institutional structures and procedures of the military space  sector, 
and the complementarity existing between the roles of the EMA and the DGA 
show neatly how ’sp ace’ is both a  strategic and technological challenge to the 
French defence system. The conflict that is apparent between the EMA and the 
DGA, its notional executant, illustrates how the technological and industrial 
aspects  of military space policy tend sometimes to exert influence ’upstream ’ on 
strategic and political choices.
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The creation of new structures in the mid-1980s such as  the GES and the 
PPE reflected a  number of concerns: firstly the desire to provide the institutional 
tools necessary  for France to answ er the SDI space  challenge, and secondly, the 
concerns of the EMA and DGA to protect their own separate  and combined 
interests. The composition of the organisms is such that the EMA hopes to 
maintain control over the technical/industrial hegem ony of the DGA, at the sam e 
time as  ensuring sufficient organisational efficiency and synergy within the military 
space  sector a s  a  whole to protect its interests against external political control by 
government. Within the S pace Military Industrial Complex the military strategists 
are attempting to retain leadership in the determination of policy, and the complex 
itself is evolving towards a  homeostatic existence justified by strategic/technical 
synergy, high-level political support outside the normal channels of cost benefit 
politics (the links with the Elysee and 'domaine reserved politics), and by closer 
cooperation with civil industry.
9.5. Funding for military space: past, present and future
Having presented the ways in which the organisation and principal characteristics 
of the space structures inside the Ministry of Defence tend to preserve the 
interests of all factions involved, and having alluded to the problems of finance 
caused  by inter-service/inter-specialisation rivalry, we shall now briefly examine 
the funding of French military space activities in the 1980s. Such an analysis is 
hindered by the secrecy surrounding present levels of funding and by uncertainty 
about size of budget allocations in the past, when the percentage of the Defence 
Budget going to space w as not calculated separately.
In order to situate the funding for military space  in the context of the overall 
Defence budget a  preliminary remark is useful: General de la Presle has stated 
that “the space budget should be calculated finely to correspond to the minimum 
of real requirements, since new money can only com e from that devoted to 
existing projects".35
This affirmation takes on something of the status of an article of faith to the 
extent that both national politics in the form of the national budget negotiations and 
intra-armed forces inter-service politics are inflexible in their views on, 
respectively, increased military spending and redistribution of the "noble" elem ents 
of military activity such a s  space. The first part of General de la Presle 's 
statem ent should be taken with something of a pinch of salt and the second a s  a  
more faithful reflection of EMA (if not DGA) thinking on funding.
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The Defence Ministry budget in France is a  subject of im passioned debate 
between those elements of government such as the Finance and Budget Ministries 
who give total priority to spending restrictions and those, in the arm ed forces and 
elsew here, who claim that France must maintain her military capabilities in order to 
safeguard her rank in the world. Since the late-1980s, attem pts by governm ent to 
restrict military spending have becom e ever more pressing as  a  consequence of 
France’s economic difficulties and of perceived lessening of tensions in the 
international system (peace dividends etc). Military spending a s  a  percentage of 
GDP declined from 3.87 in 1981 to 3.8 in 1987 and before dropping to 3.37 in 
1991 and 3.2 in 1992. This decline in funding for the arm ed forces formed the 
financial background to the discussions during 1991-92 over France’s  strategic, 
technical and funding choices which were induced by the Gulf W ar and by the 
need to review and renew the Loi de programmation militaire.
As well a s  providing the political will to support the arm ed forces’ requests 
for greater access  to space technology, the Gulf W ar-induced Joxe reforms also 
included organisational modifications, as  we have seen , and one such reform of 
structures affects the funding of military space. This reform is the conflation of the 
EMA Space, Communications and Intelligence responsibilities under a  single 
budgetary heading, a  modification which is deem ed to be both technically 
indispensable, so close are the linkages between th ese  three fields, and  the 
reflection of the political support for space .36 Indeed, the strategic, technical and 
funding decisions for space in 1991 ,1992 ,1993  and beyond which em erged from 
this informal national debate confirmed its importance a s  a  crucial elem ent of 
French arm ed forces capabilities. We have already d iscussed  the strategic and 
technical innovations brought about by Defence Minister Joxe’s  redefinition of the 
role of space in French military thinking, so we will here present briefly the 
evolution of funding for military space before and then after the Gulf War.
As the graph below shows, funding for military sp ace  went through two 
major phases in the 1980s. From 1981 to 1986 finance w as actually reduced until 
the realisation of the importance of military space for the continued credibility of 
the FNS and the concomittant need to make up lost ground led to release of funds 
in the Military Law Programme for 1987-1991. During this second phase  the trend 
of investment is such that estim ates place funding for military space  in 1995 in 
excess of French contributions to European Space Agency program m es. The 
year 1987 is taken by many as  the date of launch of a  significant military space 
policy with funding beginning to rise from the level of approximately 740 million 
francs.37 In 1989 1.8 billion Francs were allotted to space.
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The graph also illustrates how in 1991 the military space budget reached 3.1 billion 
Francs, with a 17.5% increase in funding intended for 1992. Some longer term 
predictions place French spending on military space at 11 bn francs during 1992- 
1994 and 5 bn F per annum by the late 1990s, rising to 8 bn F post-2000. 
According to Jacques Isnard, the privileged defence commentator of Le Monde, 
classified funding studies in the Defence Ministry suggest that the quinquennium  
1992-95 will see an annual 3% increase in funding for military space, amounting to 
a cumulative total of 85.2 bn francs.38
Figures for projected military spending tend to vary from source to source 
and, in the context of the debate over the Loi de programmation, with some 
rapidity, but it is nevetheless possible to distinguish some significant trends which 
imply that space will remain of growing importance to the French armed forces.
The first of these trends was the short-term considerable increase in space funding 
from 1989/90 which gave the 17.5% rise in credits d ’equipem entior 1992 and a 
13% increase in 1993. Given the prevailing context of budgetary restrictions, 
such short-term increases were particularly noticeable because they took place 
against a background of a stable overall level of funding for the armed forces 
equipment budget. (The monetary ‘stability’ of funding levels is only relative, 
since in real terms, spending on defence is starting to decrease).39 The total 
funding for equipment for 1992-94 was set at 308 bn francs, spread evenly over 
the three years at approx 100 bn per annum, and continuing the level of 103 bn 
francs set in 1991. As suggested by the earlier quote from General de la Presle,
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increased spending on space, (even from a low level) thus competes with other 
spending needs, and one of the sources for space expenditures has been the 
nuclear branch of the Armed Forces’ equipment budget. In effect, since 1990, 
spending on nuclear forces has declined from 30% of the equipment budget to 
‘only’ 25%, whilst space and research spending has grown.40 A large number of 
nuclear and conventional arms programmes have suffered in the 1992-97 program 
law in order to provide continued funding for space and research and other 
favoured fields, including the S4 MSBS ICBM (cancelled), the ‘pre-strategic’ Hades 
missile (cancelled), the hunter-killer nuclear submarine (rescheduled) and the 
Mirage 2000 (rescheduled).41 If the figures for equipment spending 1992-97 
revealed by Isnard are worthy of trust, the 3% annual increase in space spending 
and 85 bn franc total stands in interesting contrast to the 6.6% annual decrease in 
funding for nuclear forces and the five-year total of 135 bn francs.42
Loi de programme 1992-94 : ‘credits d ’Gquipement’
Equipment category % change 1993/92








Conventional forces + 4.6
(adapted from Le Monde. 25 November 1992)
Joxe's principal innovation was to develop the panoply of space based technology 
at France's disposal. In terms of programs and costs, this has translated itself in 
the continuation of the Syracuse program, the extension of the Helios series of 
satellites, the initiation of two new satellite programs named Osiris (radar) and 
Zenon (electronic listening), and the planning of a second generation optical 
observation satellite named Songe These programmes will be assessed  in the 
following chapter.
9.6. C onclusion
This investigation of the organisation of French military space activities in the 
1980s has revealed how the strategic and technical branches of the armed forces 
coincide in their enthusiasm for the ‘spatialisation’ of the French deterrent force,
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and how both the EMA and the DGA are attempting to maximise their respective 
influence over the development of the spatial modernisation of the arm ed forces. 
Combined, the military space lobbies are thus overtly becoming an increasingly 
important force in the determination of overall space  policy within France.
However, given ever increasing costs for programs and despite the apparently 
privileged position of space within the defence budget, the stricture of financial 
restraint em anating from the Finance Ministry has increasingly relevant 
implications for the organisation of French military space  activities : can 
program m es be undertaken nationally or does som e kind of international 
cooperation seem  unavoidable ?
The organisation of French military space  is structured in a  way that reflects 
the importance of space in new thinking on deterrent strategy and intelligence 
gathering. The space-related bodies in the Etat Major des Armees have 
privileged access  to the highest echelons of military decision making and within 
the Delegation generate pour I’Armement the technical directorates concerned with 
space  and the nuclear deterrent are the most prestigious and undertake the most 
‘noble’ tasks. The presence of a  tightly organised and efficiently running ‘military 
space system ’ within the overall French space effort naturally creates the 
possibility of military and civil space coming into conflict. In general military and 
civil space  ‘coexist’ satisfactorily, but the creation of the Comite Delta in 1991, 
which instituted a  new link between the DGA and CNES suggested  that the 
relationship between military and civil might be in need of som e overhaul.
In the following chapter, we shall examine the closeness of the links between 
military and civil space in the military space technology procurem ent programmes, 
investigating the notions of civil-military 'synergy' and 'imbrication'
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10. Theory and practice of military sp ace  procurem ent
This chapter looks at the reality of military space  in term s of the planning and 
development of military space programmes. It d iscusses the principles of military 
procurement and how these are applied in the practice of missile and satellite 
production. In so doing it examines the links between military and civil in the 
‘military’ programmes. The analysis shows how military and civil strands in the 
making of policy coincide to som e extent in the military space programmes.
In considering the procurement of military space  technology, attention must 
be paid to the way in which military technology becom es necessary. Is strategy 
technologically led, or do military technologists provide only the equipment 
required by the strategists to guarantee the most cost-effective defence of the 
nation? This is the question of the 'sociology' of decision making addressed  a s  
part of the analysis of the previous chapter. In term s of theory, positions on this 
question range from the 'technological determinists' evoked by Sapolsky1, who 
believe that everything that is feasible in w eapons technology will be produced, to 
the assertion that 'new w eap o n s .. .  are less the product of technological forces 
than they are of institutional and socio-political factors'.2 Analysis of program m es 
tends to lead to the conclusion that the development of arm s technology is most 
likely to be a  result of interaction between available and required techniques and 
various non-scientific constraints.3 This 'interactive' understanding of the 
relationship between technologists in industry and the military administration 
appears valid for the French case, a s  De Rose, former m em ber of the CEA board 
of directors, representative to CERN and head of the Service des Affaires 
atomiques et spatiales in the Defence Ministry has implied, speaking of the 
'interaction permanente entre revolution technologique et les concepts de 
defense4. In this chapter we examine the ways in which the satellite and missile 
programmes are actually undertaken in reality.
The structure of the chapter is a s  follows :
-10 .1 . The theory of military space procurement 
-1 0 .2 . The practice of military space p rocu rem en t: Syracuse 
-10 .3 . The practice of military space p rocu rem en t: Helios 
-10 .4 . The practice of military space p rocu rem en t: IRBM programmes 
-1 0 .5 . Theory and practice in perspective 
-10 .6 . Conclusion
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10.1. The theory of military sp ace  procurem ent
Procurement for space-linked military system s in France follows essentially the 
'normal' patterns of procurement for conventional material. There are however 
certain differences in the exact organisation and m anagem ent of the procurement 
programmes which result from the nature of the system s them selves and from the 
structure of the space industry. As we shall see , the structure of the space  
industry has particularly interesting consequences on the m echanism s of 
procurement. The usual procedure for procurem ent5 upon which space 
programme development is based  is as follows.
For a  programme d'armement majeur w hose final product is intended to 
answ er the besoin militaire identified as  a  potential w eakness in France's 
defensive posture, the procurement process consists of three main stages. In the 
stade de definition, (or definition phase) a  groupe technico-operationnel 
undertakes studies of potential military system s which would answ er the 
w eakness. This initial step  is classed as a  demarche prospective (or planning 
initiative) As its name implies, the groupe technico-operationnel is com posed 
jointly of officers drawn from the Etat Major des armees (EMA) and military 
engineers from the Delegation Generate pour I'Armement (DGA), being presided 
by an EMA officer and a  DGA engineer. The dual nature of the group's 
composition enab les its analysis and evaluation of the w eapons system s to cover 
four major them es. Firstly, a  precise definition of the military u ses  envisaged for 
the system s is drawn up. Secondly, the various technical propositions for the 
system s up to the stage of project are evaluated. Thirdly, the possibilities of 
international cooperation are considered, and finally, industrial partners com petent 
to produce the system s are identified.
The actual decision to proceed with any given proposed major arm am ents 
program is m ade by the Defence Minister or by the Delegue General pour 
I'armement on the basis of a  dossier de lancement prepared by the division of the 
DGA entrusted with the technical aspects of the military need in collaboration with 
the EMA, author of the initial expression of the need. O nce accepted, the dossier 
leads to the second stage of procurement; the stade de realisation (or production 
phase). This stade de realisation itself com prises two phases, the first of 
development, and the second of manufacturing. These two phases in fact overlap 
in time since the materiel, soft-ware and back-up are conceived in their final form, 
tested  and eventually manufactured by the industrial partners designated over a 
som etim es quite significant time period. In order to make this process a s  efficient 
a s  possible, the development and production of the system  are coordinated by a
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directeur de programme who ensures the smooth running of the programme and 
effective liaison between the DGA division directly involved (la direction m enante), 
the EMA and industry.6 The third and final phase  of the procurement process is 
the integration of the system into the defence of the nation, thus leading to the 
stade d'utilisation.
In this way the conduct of an arm am ents programme necessitates a  bipartite 
system  of concertation between staff officers from the EMA and technical experts 
of the various divisions of the DGA. These partners determ ine the nature of the 
relationship between the military and industrial enterprises which are called upon 
to realise the w eapons system s. Major arm am ents program m es are so defined 
on the basis of their military importance, their innovatory technical content, their 
cost, their industrial consequences and their international ramifications.
The two current military space programmes (Syracuse and Helios), are both 
classed  as  major programmes. We deal with the military importance of these  
space based  system s elsewhere; similarly, their cost is analysed in our treatment 
of spending on military space projects. In this section, our principal concern is to 
examine the nature and workings of the relationship between the military space  
establishm ent and civilian industry.
The consequences of the two major space arm am ents programmes on industry 
are considerable both in term s of the contracts passed  with the space divisions of 
the principal firms of the space industry, and in term s of the organisation of the 
collaboration between the EMA, the DGA and CNES. As major programmes, 
Syracuse and Helios have the sam e general organisational structure a s  outlined 
above. However, since there exists a  'rival' source of technical expertise to that of 
the DGA in the form of CNES and France Telecom in the fields of earth 
observation and space telecommunications, th ese  institutions are involved in the 
organisation and execution of the programmes. The bipartite concertation thus 
becom es tripartite under the form EMA-DGA-CNES (Helios), and EMA-DGA- 
France Telecom (Syracuse).7
10.2. The practice of procurement: the Syracuse programmes
'Syracuse' is the near-acronym standing for SYsteme de RAdioCommunication 
Utilisant un SatellitE. The term covers two generations of system s: Syracuse I 
and Syracuse II. Syracuse II is not yet in service, being planned to replace the 
earlier system  in 1992, when the original satellites reach the end of their seven- 
year operational life. Syracuse first cam e into practical use  in August 1984, and
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the planned ten year life span of the Syracuse II satellites should ensure the 
reliability of the system until 2002. Choices m ade now and even further back in 
the late 1970s thus have considerable importance when one considers the time 
span over which errors in specification or of technology may arise. The precise 
function of satellite radiocommunication is to allow the transmission of telegraphic, 
telephone or data  communication from one point of the globe to another via a  
transmitter, a  satellite relay and a  receiving ground station. In addition to these 
basic facilities of obvious military usefulness, the Syracuse II system  will enable 
liaison with the RITA battleground communications network8 and with the fourth 
generation army radio. The creation of the whole system  thus implies the 
production of control centres, transmitters, satellites and ground stations. The 
ground stations are either fixed or mobile, the latter type including naval or 
airborne receivers a s  well as  lorry-transported stations. The exact nature of the 
satellites and of their corresponding ground stations and control centres differs 
between the Syracuse I and Syracuse II networks a s  a  consequence of their 
origins and development, which we shall now examine. Mention will also be 
m ade of the industrial organisation of the program m es, a  subject which will be 
treated in more detail after the presentation of the genesis  and characteristics of 
the system s them selves.
10.2.1. Syracuse I
Syracuse I show s how the procurement process worked in the space industry, 
combining military and civil expertise.
The initial impulsion for the acceptance of Syracuse I a s  a  major arm am ents 
programme cam e in 1979 from a  group of officers in the various Etats-Majors, the 
foremost am ongst whom was Admiral Bovis. The program m e w as given official 
approval by the Ministry of Defence on 17 January 1980. Feasibility studies for 
radiotelecommunications had been going on for som e years prior to this however; 
the final form of the system w as derived technically from a  series of experiments 
baptised SEXTIUS carried out over the period 1975-79.9 T hese studies, effected 
by the Centre d'Electronique de I'Armement (CELAR) and by the Service 
technique des Constructions etArmes navaies (STCAN) using the Franco-German 
telecommunications satellite Symphonie proved the usefulness and possibility of 
producing such a  system. Although considered potentially useful, the production 
of a  solely military satellite w as not deem ed w arranted b ecause  of the restricted 
volume of purely military communications at the time of the Sextius operation. It 
w as not until the announcem ent of the PTT telecom m unications satellite Telecom
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1 in 1978, and the consequent opportunity of sharing the satellite payload between 
civil and military uses that the project of developing a  military telecommunications 
facility, albeit in a  shared form, was reconsidered. The principal stumbling block 
to a  military system  distinct from civilian cooperation w as cost. The Telecom 1 
programme was launched officially in February 1979, with the military participation 
in the programme being consecrated in a  PTT-Defence Ministry Protocol. This 
would seem  to imply that there is no technical hegemony of military space over 
civil, but rather a  military exploitation of synergies with the civil sector.
The Telecom 1 / Syracuse I programme consists of three DGA commissioned 
Matra satellites carrying military cartridges integrated with the civilian payload. 
Telecom 1A w as launched on August 4 1984 by the first Ariane 3 rocket; Telecom 
1B w as launched on May 7 1985 and Telecom 1C on 11 March 1988.10
The Syracuse I programme shows how even in the earliest initial s tages of the 
programme the 'besoin militaire' identified by the EMA quickly becam e a  DGA 
project (CELAR/STCAN), and how it also implied synergy with the civil sector in its 
use  of the Symphonie Telecom project. It also shows how the civil 
telecommunications budget can be seen  as a  m eans for the military sector of 
bypassing the financial constraints alluded to by General de la Presle
10.2.2. Syracuse II.
Preparatory studies for the Syracuse II programme were initiated by the DGA in 
1983 in anticipation of the seven year life span of the Telecom 1 satellites and the 
consequent replacem ent date of 1991 -92 for the m aintenance of the military 
communications system. The preparatory studies arrived at a  number of technical 
options for the future system. The projet de definition that w as eventually retained 
by the Defence Minister on 20 January 1987 took cost considerations into account 
in the form of an agreem ent between the Ministry of Defence and the civilian 
Direction Generate des Telecommunications (DGT), part of the P.T.T. Ministry, for 
the joint production of the spatial element of the Telecom 2  programme.
Preparatory studies 1983
Programme launched 1987
Satellite launches December 1991 
Anril 1992
Planned end of operational life 2001 -
(Sources : various)
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Prior to the final acceptance of the project by the Defence Minister, the protocol of 
agreem ent between the DGA and the DGT provided for the joint research, 
developm ent and production of three joint DGA-DGT satellites sharing military and 
civil payloads, the launch of two of these  satellites and the design and installation 
of a  satellite ground control centre for these  Telecom 2  satellites.
With Ariane launches in Decem ber 1991 (Telecom 2A) and April 1992 
(Telecom 2B), the Telecom 2  satellites will fulfil essentially the sam e operational 
requirements as  their p redecessors in the Syracuse I system  except that Syracuse 
II will have greater flexibility of use than the earlier system  because of the greater 
power and complexity of the Telecom 2  satellite platform and its military payload. 
The new satellites will exceed two tonnes in weight and will have an operational 
life of ten years. The increased weight and complexity of the second generation 
satellites is a  consequence of two factors: firstly the increased volume of military 
communications expected to pass  through the satellite has given a  doubling of the 
number of relays (from 2 to 5); and secondly, the satellite has to be 'hardened' 
against potential anti-satellite action (including remote control independent of PTT 
control system s in case  of failure or attack). The increased importance of military 
space over the period of the Syracuse I system is vividly illustrated by the 
threefold increase in the m ass of the military com ponents of the joint satellite from 
one sixth to one half of the payload. Overall, the number of ground stations will 
be greatly expanded, increasing from twenty-six to approximately 100 coming into 
service over the period 1991-95.1-1
These are thus the principal operational and technical features of the Syracuse 
program m es showing the military use of the satellites and how their genesis and 
development, even in the earliest s tages have involved cooperation with civil 
activities, in particular with the telecommunications branches of the P.T.T. Ministry.
It remains for us to discuss the organisation of the program m es in term s of the 
partners with whom the Ministry of Defence works to define and produce the 
satellites and their accompanying system s, in other words practical programme 
synergy. A brief analysis of military procurement procedures a s  they relate to the 
space sector has been given above, a s  Syracuse is a  major arm am ents 
programme its industrial and institutional organisation reflects som e of the 
innovations of these  procedures.
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10.2.3. Mistrust and c lose  cooperation
On the institutional level, Syracuse II is led by the DGA and by its Direction de 
I'electronique et de I'informatique (DEI). Throughout the organisational chart of 
the programme, representatives of the Etats Majors and of the Etat Major des 
Armees participate in the development of the system  in order to ensure the 
smallest possible divergence of its final characteristics from the military 
requirements originally expressed by the EMA.12 The smooth running overall of 
the programme is ensured by the Comite directeur presided by the head of the DEI 
and com posed of EMA representatives and engineers from the DGA divisions 
involved. Reporting to the Comite directeur are the groupe operationnel and the 
groupe technique. The former of these represents the Etat Major in the 
developm ent of the programme, being presided by the head of the EMA's 
Telecommunications, Electronics and Computing division. Its m em bers are drawn 
from the staff headquarters of the three armed forces. The second group, the 
groupe technique, headed by the Directeur de programme, also participates in the 
proceedings of the Operations group, being itself responsible for the day-to-day 
running of the programme, coordinating the production of the different com ponents 
of the system  and checking that cost, quality and deadlines are respected. The 
programme director is assisted  by the responsable de la composante spatiale, 
(who is simultaneously directeur de projet adjoint of the Telecom 2  programme), 
and by the responsable de la composante sol (the ground segm ent). The 
installation of mobile groundstations on ships, lorries and aeroplanes leads the 
technical group to liaise with the directions cooperantes of the DGA (the divisions 
responsible for naval construction, ground vehicle production and planes : DCN, 
DAT, DCAe) and with CELAR, the Defence Ministry electronics centre. The 
membership of the group is made up of representatives of the staff headquarters 
and of the DGA and the off icier de programme. The programme officer is an EMA 
officer in charge of the equipe de marque Syracuse II which provides a  forum for 
the EMA to m eet with representatives from the different arm s.
Syracuse II is of course inseparable from the civilian programme Telecom 2 :  
a s  we have seen, the officer responsible for the spatial com ponent of Syracuse II 
is at the sam e time the vice-director of Telecom 2 ‘s direction de projet, or project 
m anagem ent team . The term s of the agreem ent betw een the DGA and the DGT 
provided for Telecom 2  to be undertaken by a  project leadership under the 
direction of a  Comite de programme. The programme committee is presided by 
an official of France Telecom, and is com posed of twelve m embers, four drawn 
from CNES, four from France Telecom and four from the Ministry of Defence.
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The direction du projet is assisted in the management of the programme by an 
equipe de projet made up of engineers from France Telecom, CNES and the 
DGA-DEI/CELAR.
Far from being mere detail, these features of the organisation and management 
of the programmes show how far the military and civil space sectors work together 
in 'imbrication '. 'Imbrication' implies the close intertwining of 'separate' entities; 
the 'separateness' of civil and military activites is in fact revealed by the relative 
mutual distrust which necessitates the complicated joint leadership of projects and 
checks and controls by EMA, DGA and CNES. We shall return to this notion in 
the evaluation of the military space procurement procedures as a whole.
Syracuse I /  Telecom 1
Program
Leaders
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Two further examples of the close links between the military and civil space 
programmes are the Samro and Helios satellites.
10.3. The practice of p ro c u re m e n t: the Sam ro and Helios program m es
Helios is the French armed forces’ current observation satellite programme, the 
launch of the first satellite of a series of three or four being planned for 1994. The
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su ccess  of the Helios programme in the later 1980s and 1990s contrasts with the 
difficulties of the SAMRO programme in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
10.3.1. Samro : a failed military observation satellite
SAMRO was the French military's first attempt to create a  space  surveillance 
system , unfortunately doomed to fail despite the agreem ent on the usefulness of 
the system  proposed and on the capacity of French and European industry to 
produce the technology required. The current grand programme d'armement 
Helios is however derived from the studies m ade for SAMRO and perhaps also 
from the lessons learned from the eventual failure of the project.
The acronym SAMRO stands for SAtellite Militaire de Reconnaissance 
Optique. The need for such a  facility first becam e felt in French military circles in 
1977, and interest focussed on a  proposal m ade by the Groupe des Forces 
nucleaires in the EMA, the body responsible at that time for reflection on the 
military aspects of space. Between 1977 and the end of 1985, the DGA devoted 
considerable funding to studies on satellite reconnaissance techniques in addition 
to contributing 30% of the total funding for CNES's civilian observation satellite, 
SPOT. It would seem  however that DGA interest in cooperation with CNES 
began seriously only in 1981, a  year before the burgeoning costs of the solely 
military satellite SAMRO led Defence Minister Charles Hernu to cancel the 
preliminary studies into the project in mid-1982.13 It is important to realise that 
SAMRO w as never actually launched as  a  programme, the project remaining at a 
preliminary level of studies, however successful. Officials are anxious to point out 
that SAMRO never existed as  an individualised item in the Defence Budget.14 
The studies were so advanced indeed that 1982 could have seen  the launch of 
SAMRO as  a  major development programme. Hernu's decision on the contrary to 
shelve the initiative because of financial imperatives led to considerable doubt in 
military and political circles a s  to the precise commitment of France to military 
space. The fact that continued studies into two crucial techniques for military 
reconnaissance by satellite were authorised as  a  kind of veille technologique did 
little, in the absence of any engagem ent to transform the project into Helios, to 
allay public debate over the uncertainty of France's position vis-a-vis military 
space. In the face of opinion such a s  that of S enate  Defence Commission 
Rapporteur Jacques Genton that SAMRO w as of 'capital importance' for the Force 
oceanique strategique (FOST), or nuclear submarine fleet,15 the decision to shelve 
its development almost indefinitely led com m entators such a s  Patricia Chilton to 
remark that the satellite programme w as the subject of one of the most asked and
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least answ ered questions of the 1983 Defence law d eb a tes .16 In industry a s  well, 
concern arose over the lack of government interest in military space: in June 1983 
Pierre Usunier of Aerospatiale and Jean-Luc Lagardere of Matra, two of the 
biggest actors in the French MIC, expressed their disappointment at the small 
scale of military program m es.17
10.3.2. Helios:'cooperation franco-frangaise' and ‘synergie Internationale’
The SAMRO studies were in fact transformed into the Helios programme 16 The 
studies that Hernu authorised were into the specifically military elem ents of an 
eventual armed-forces-civilian satellite, namely the optical viewfinder and a  
magnetic recorder.19 Helios was included in the Defence Ministry budget for the 
first time in late 1985, and its development in cooperation with the CNES 
programme SPOT was approved by the Ministry of Defence in February 1986, 
only to be the subject of a  cost reappraisal by the new Chirac government in 1987, 
leading to its final inclusion in the Loi de programmation 1987-1991. The first 
satellite w as expected to become operational in 1993.
The Helios programme as  it currently stands is an example of 'cooperation 
franco-francaise' (a kind of military-civil industrial synergy) between the Ministry of 
Defence/DGA and the SPOT programmes conceived and developed by CNES and 
m anaged by the CNES subsidiary SPOT Image. Helios also represents the 
innovation of small scale international cooperation in military space  system s since 
Italy and Spain contribute 14% and 7% respectively of the developm ent costs in 
exchange for proportional access to the operational facilities of the satellite.
During 1984-85 however, discussions also took place between the French and 
W est German Defence Ministries concerning W est Germ an participation in Helios, 
but agreem ent w as never reached, avowedly because of problems in financing 
such cooperation in Bonn.20 The German refusal to cooperate, after the setting 
up of a  joint working party on the issue, and despite W est Germ an agreem ent over 
the political value of the initiative caused  disappointment and even rancour in 
France. After a  speech by Hernu in May 1985 at the Institut des Hautes Etudes 
de Defense nationale (IHEDN), France's most prestigious forum for debate on 
defence policy, in which he stressed  the need to organise space activities in the 
interests of Europe21, and within the context of new French commitment to 
modernizing the organisation of military space structures, W est German 
withdrawal caused  incomprehension in Paris. Whilst still holding out hope for 
future cooperation in a  second generation satellite system , the French tried to 
understand the reasons for their partner's reluctance. The lack of money for such
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a  project w as an obvious motive, but there were technical and political reasons as 
well. Technically, there was support in the Federal Republic for a  radar satellite 
rather than an optical system such a s  SAMRO-SPOT-Helios (discussions over the 
proposed European fighter aircraft had seen the FRG demanding a  configuration 
answering German needs) and with G erm an/East European territory often 
obscured by cloud cover, existing German expertise in radar seem ed a  convenient 
justification for a  radar satellite. This explanation has however been rejected by 
representatives of the French Ministry of External Relations, who saw  the German 
position a s  being more one of differing time scales for the need for satellite 
observation, rather than fundamental disagreem ent over specifications.22 The 
French military accepted both these factors a s  potential explanations for German 
refusal, and also, considering the strategic-diplomatic level, suggested that the 
G erm ans were hesitant to develop an independent satellite reconnaissance 
capability for fear of implying reduced confidence in American information sharing, 
or even a  move away from cooperation with the US. This view (expressed by 
General Fricaud-Chagnaud of the SGDN), implied that one of the reasons for 
French interest in an independent satellite w as to check information given by 
Allies. Indeed, part of the G eneral's formulation of the problem seem ed to 
contradict to an extent the view that Helios is absolutely indispensible for the FNS, 
by saying that it was not necessary or imperative that the French be able to 
observe everything all the time, because they had agreem ents with allies to give 
them  satellite intelligence. ‘
However, he went on to add that if France were herself to p o ssess  
independent satellite facilities, this would oblige allies to help her with accurate 
information.23 The tone of the second part of the statem ent revealed a  persistent 
suspicion of their American allies typical of the post-Gaullist French military 
establishm ent, a  mistrust motivated by the desire to remain independent in ail 
w ays and at all times, from friend and foe alike. It is the persistence or dem ise of 
this kind of attitude in the longer term which will eventually condition the su ccess  of 
French integration into European defence policy, and which in the medium term 
term will determ ine the nature of French industrial participation in joint military 
procurem ent program m es.24
The Helios programme seem s to have thus already tested  the limits of som e 
kind of 'synergie internationale' in the European space arm am ents sector. The 
institutional and industrial organisation of the Helios programme represents the 
latest version of cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the civil space  
sector. In effect there are of course three major actors in any collaboration in this 
field: firstly the DGA and its specialised 'directions’; secondly CNES, and thirdly the
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high-technology companies involved. The public aim of cooperation between 
military and civil space instances is that of 'synergy', and the reductions in cost and 
increased efficiency in terms of research and developm ent that this implies. The 
synergy that the Helios programme creates is not so much that of a  meeting of 
opposites (civil and military space efforts) as  of a  coming together of already 
am biguous activities. For example, CNES is a  strictly civil body, whose statutes 
preclude it from working on military projects, it Is however a  state organisation thus 
entertaining a  privileged relationship with the Ministry of Defence. In a  similar 
fashion, the industrial com panies them selves are not purely private enterprises, 
many are nationalised or state owned such a s  Aerospatiale and Thomson. The 
synergy is therefore to a  certain extent already existing in a  latent form a s  a  
consequence of the historical development of the space  sector in France.
The counterpart to the search for 'synergie' is, a s  always, the need to safeguard 
the eventual fulfilment of the operational requirements stated by the Etat Major. 
This necessity is institutionalised in the organigramme of responsibilities for Helios. 
The innovation of Helios is that CNES expertise is called upon in the running of the 
programme. Under the term s of a convention between CNES and the Ministry of 
Defence signed in early 1987, the overall m anagem ent of the programme is 
entrusted to the DGA.25 This 1direction du programme’ (or comite directeur) 
within the DGA delegates authority for the overall design coherence of the system 
to CNES. Ultimately the programme com es under the authority of the Delegue 
General pour I'armement who appoints the directeur de programme from within 
the DEN, who then presides the comite directeur assisting the directeur de 
programme in the realisation of the project. Whilst the overall homogeneity of the 
system  between civil and military requirements is guaranteed by CNES, who are 
also responsible for the development of the space-borne elem ents of the system , 
the DGA/DEN retains influence over the purely military ground station equipment 
for processing the satellite data. Under the 'maitrise d ’ouvrage' or prime 
contractorship of the DGA/DEN, Aerospatiale, Matra and SEP are entrusted with 
the overall production of this material. The corresponding maitrise d’ouvrage for 
the spatial system  is held by CNES, with Matra exercising the maitrise d'oeuvre 
industrielle for the satellite platform itself. The choice of Matra w as more or less 
unavoidable since SPOT 1, 2 and 3, the previous generations of the civilian 
satellite upon which Helios draws were produced by Matra in association with 
Aerospatiale, Alcatel Espace and SEP. Helios will share  characteristics and 
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Helios is an interesting programme because the eventual decision to undertake it 
after a  considerable period of a  mainly financially inspired hesitation coincided with 
the mid-1980s awakening of interest in military space and the realisation that 
France must not be left behind. The programme is equally interesting in the way 
that it presents the latest version of cooperation franco-frangaise, whilst at the 
sam e time demonstrating the persisting political and strategic obstacles to the 
evolution of synergy from an essentially national solution to military challenges and 
financial constraints to an international security feature (in other words a  European 
defence satellite) based on international scientific and industrial cooperation.27
10.4. The practice of procurement: IRBM programmes
According to the Larousse Dictionnaire de la Defense et des Forces Armees. the 
definition of a  missile is as  follows: Worn militaire de la fusee. Comme elle, le 
missile est un corps projete dans I'espace qui comporte les elements necessaires 
a sa propulsion, mais sa tete (ou ogive) porte une charge destructive, alors que la 
fusee porte une charge ,,civiien telle qu'un satellite.28 Despite the clarity of this 
definition, and especially the link that it establishes between the civil and the 
military aspects  of space ballistic technology, there seem s to exist within the 
French defence establishm ent an almost "doctrinal" refusal to consider the 
strategic ballistic missile a s  a  spatial element of France's defence.29 It is perhaps 
true that this refusal can be justified under the largely administrative grounds that 
since the missile is a  nuclear vector it is best classified under that heading.
Against this taxonomic justification, however, we would oppose the common sense  
notion (supported by historical, industrial and operational argum ents) that strategic 
ballistic missiles are so closely linked with space  technology that their 
developm ent and production must be examined in a  study of military space  policy.
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So, despite official reticence, we shall consider the strategic missile programmes 
a s  a  more or less integral part of the military space  effort.
The ambiguity of missile technology between civil and military u ses  is of course 
typical of technology in general, a s  Jacques Ellul has s tressed .30 A recent 
example of this definitional problem is afforded by the controversy between the US 
State Department and Arianespace, accused of intending to sell Brazil the 
technology of the Ariane Viking motor.31 If the Viking motor is considered 
susceptible of being transformed into a  military propulsion unit, this sale would be 
in contravention of the 1987 international agreem ent on missile technology 
transfers. In support of their action, Arianespace advanced the argum ent that the 
liquid fuelled Viking motor is ill-suited to military purposes, military rockets usually 
relying on solid fuels. Unfortunately, however, this nice distinction is belied by the 
claims of the DEN's Service technique des Poudres et Explosifs (STPE), which 
boasts that 'la propulsion par moteur fusee a ergols liquides...presente egalement 
un interet pour les programmes militaires...c'est un mode de propulsion 
particulierement adapte pour les parties superieures de missiles strategiques a 
tetes multiples.32 The DEN's statem ent that studies on basic technology and 
applications are in hand supports the case  that civil and military rocket 
programmes are closely linked, and w eakens Arianespace\s defence of their 
technology transfer.
These IRBM missile programmes are m anaged by the Service technique des 
Engins (STEN) of the DEN/DGA, with the STPE contributing expertise on 
propulsion. The missiles are of two main kinds: the sea-to-ground Mer-So! 
balistique strategique, (MSBS), and the ground-to ground Sol-Sol balistique 
strategique, (SSBS). The former are naturally launched from the nuclear powered 
subm arines of the FNS, the Sous Marins nucleaires lanceurs d'engins, (SNLE), 
and the latter from silos in the Plateau d'Albion in Provence. A third kind of 
missile has been very much in discussion at various tim es during the 1980s, 
namely a  mobile strategic system capable of supplementing the land- and sea- 
based deterrent forces.33 These discussions have been partly a  consequence of 
developm ents in the strategic environment caused  by the USSR's new stance on 
disarmament, and remain relatively unresolved. The disagreem ent between 
factions in the military and political establishm ents over the necessity of a  mobile 
arms system  illustrates how som e changes in strategy may instigate changes in 
technology as well. After looking at the major missiles program m es (whose basic 
features are presented in tabular form below) and the way in which they have 
been affected by the major changes in the strategic environment of the 1980s,
267



















SNLE / Plateau 
d’Albion
10.4.1. The Mer-sol balistique strategique (MSBS) program m es
Two missiles are currently in service. The M-20, a 3,000 km range single 
thermonuclear headed missile became operational in 1977 and is carried by the 
majority of the submarine force. The M-4 (the current generation of multiple 
thermonuclear headed missiles) equips the Inflexible, the most recent of the FOST 
submarines, which entered service in 1985. M-4 missile improvements constitute 
the major ongoing missile programme, along with preparatory studies for an M-5 
system and the intermediate technology M-45 initially destined to equip the first of 
the new generation submarines (SNLE-NG), the Triomphant, in 1994, but 
postponed since the 1989 defence budget problems until 1996. The table below 
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|  Weight 20 t 20 t 2 0 1 | 35 t 35 t ! Classified
i Submarine SNLE (1st generation)
SNLE 
(New generation)
(Modified from Air et Cosmos, no.1360, 6-12 January 1992)
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Improvements to the M-4 were decided in 1984, a  year before their formal entry 
into service, by the then Defence Minister Charles Hernu.34 The 1985 budget 
allowed 116 million francs in credits de paiement and 550 million francs in 
autorisations de programme for this development work. The willingness to 
maintain a  kind o f "veilie technologique" (and strategique) over the development 
of improved missiles was illustrated by Hernu's Senate declaration in D ecem ber 
1984 when he stressed  the readiness of the technologies required: 'La decision 
de developpement sera prise en fonction de devolution de la situation. Ueffort de 
recherche et d'etudes se situe a un niveau tres important qui nous permettra, le 
moment venu, de faire les meilleurs choix technologiques.'35 The studies being 
carried out on the M-4 and M-5 arms system s cover two main areas: system s 
work on new missiles, com ponents and the militarisation of space, and the 
improvement of existing system s through work on fuels, motors, w arheads and 
electronics.36 The TN-71 w arheads are multiple, miniaturised and hardened 
against defensive m easures.
In the face of criticism from the Opposition that Defence w as being 
neglected under the Socialists, Hernu was at pains to point out that the m easures 
he w as proposing represented increased funding in the budget category ’etudes 
amont FN S/A N T  since 1980.37 The responsibility of the government to the 
defence of the nation through the FNS w as proved by his figures that the general 
missile studies acounted for 1.2-1.3% of the Titre V equipment budget over the 
period 1981-85, a s  opposed to less than 1% during the final years of the Giscard 
d'Estaing presidency.
The example of the M-4 missile modernisation programme dem onstrates not 
only how technology of existing system s can be called upon to change in response 
to changes in the strategic environment (in this case  the fears that Soviet ABM 
m easures mirroring SDI might weaken the credibility of the deterrent force), but 
also the long period of research and development required for such programmes. 
In an analysis of France's position vis-a-vis the new strategic environment, 
Frangois Heisbourg, the former Deputy Managing Director of Thomson 
International, former Conseiller technique in the Defence Minister's cabinet (1981- 
84), and the then director of the Institute for International Strategic Studies in 
London, pointed out that under present circum stances 7a sagesse militaire et 
financiere pourrait consister a ne pas aller trop vite dans le gel des specifications 
du systeme choisi',38 given that a  period of twelve years research and 
development intervened between Pompidou's decision to go ahead  with the initial 
M-4 system  and its entry into service. There is a  consequent need either for 
visionary planning or for a  flexible definition of priorities to include all potential
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future requirements. Four years after its entry into service, the continued 
modernisation of the M-4 was complicated by arms reduction negotiations 
concerning intermediate range weapons in Europe, notably a Soviet proposition to 
link SS20 withdrawal to a freeze on French and British missile modernisation. 
Despite the need to take decisions early for the defence of France in the next 
century, the fluidity of the strategic environment engendered a stricture of less 
haste and more speed.
Below, we examine the ground-launched missile programmes.
10.4.2. The Sol-sol balistique strategique (SSBS) program m es
SSBS Missiles
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j Commission 1971/72 1980-82
1
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j Range 3,000 km + 3,500 km +3,000 km 10,000 km?













Hardened N 1 N Y Y
j Stages 2 2
Height ? j ? 13.7 m 10 m





25.7 t. 9 t.
L <------------------------ "j
(Sources: various)
As the table indicates, ground-based ballistic missiles are only at their second 
generation, compared with the four generations of their submarine-borne 
equivalents, (M-1, M-2, M-20, and M-4). The S-2 missile which entered service in 
1971 was replaced in 1980 by the S-3 system which is still in operation. A 
development programmme for an S-4 missile due to come into service in 1996 
was frozen by Defence Minister Chevenement in the 1989 Defence budget Bill.39 
Taken initially in September 1988, this decision was confirmed in spring 1989 
during the revision of funding for the 1987-1991 loi de programmation. 
Chevenement chose the term "etalement" (or deferment) to describe the future of 
the programme, stating that the realisation of the missile system no longer 
apppeared as necessary to the French defence effort. In addition, the financial
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considerations imposed by the cost overruns of the Triomphant (probably the real 
reason behind the change of policy) made the S-4 programme less attractive.
The future of the S-4 programme had been the subject of much discussion 
during the 1980s. The major issue of disagreem ent over the replacem ent for the 
S-3 system  w as whether it should be fixed in silos or mobile. During 1987, debate 
about the suitability of a  mobile ground-to-ground missile, the SX (nicknamed the 
"missile a roulettes") led to a  divergence of views between the Elysee on the one 
hand (the President's office) and Matignon (the Prime minister’s  office) and the 
Defence Ministry on the other. President Mitterrand preferred the option of 
replacing the S-3 missiles with S-4s in renovated silos, w hereas MM. Chirac and 
Andre Giraud favoured both fixed and mobile missiles with a  degree of technical 
compatibility between the new strategic system and the Hades tactical missiles 
then under developm ent.40 Apart from political manoeuvering under the 
Cohabitation or power-sharing period between 1986-88, this dispute represented 
the two imperatives acting on the defence establishm ent at the time, namely the 
necessity of restricting costs and the need to respond to the new strategic 
environment.41 Moreover, as  the respected defence com m entator Jacques Isnard 
suggested  in Le Monde, the search for a  degree of technical compatibility 
between Hades and the S-3 replacement risked triggering debate about the 
evolution of French nuclear doctrine in the face of new European security 
requirem ents 42 The notion of replacing the Plateau d'Albion and its symbolic 
and strategic characteristics (an attack on the Plateau is a  "declaratory" strike) with 
mobile quasi-tactical missiles caused  a  certain disturbance within the military 
establishm ent.43 The main conclusion that can be drawn from the debate is that 
the Presidential understanding of the mechanics of deterrence remains firmly 
strategic and spatial, a  viewpoint reinforced by the judgem ent of the Commission 
surles Armes spatiales that the modernisation in hand of French missiles 
guarantees the credibility of the FNS until 2010.44 Mitterrand has of course 
further declared in another context his belief that 7a strategie sera necessairement 
spatiale dans le courant du XXlierne siecle'.45
In the following section of the chapter we shall exam ine the industrial aspects of 
these  military applications programmes.
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10.5. Theory and practice in perspective
Under the overall authority of the DEN, the study and industrial production of 
missiles are conducted by a  small number of firms in the space sector, be they 
nationalised, para-public or private. The exception to this general rule is of course 
the w arheads, which are designed and produced by the Commissariat a I'Energie 
atomique (CEA).46 At this particular juncture we will restrict our analysis to the 
patterns of interaction between the STEN-DEN-DGA and their industrial partners, 
leaving consideration of the commercial importance of the transactions to the 
Section on the relationships between the State and the civil space sector.
Missile production involves a  number of specialised technologies of which 
nuclear w arhead development is the most striking and the least representative. 
Unlike the production of nuclear w arheads by the CEA, the other techniques 
required in ballistic missile production, although similarly specialised, have 
immediate applications in other, civil fields of industrial activity. If we consider the 
ballistic missile in terms of its components, it becom es evident that there is a  
degree of (involuntary or accidental) "commonality” between this materiel and that 
required for civil applications. Thus if the w arheads must be considered as  
specifically military in nature and application (despite the spin-off in term s of 
industrial techniques originated during their development), the re-entry body for 
example, (developed by Aerospatiale) integrates technology (such a s  heat 
shielding) of general applicability throughout the aerospace sector. Similarly, we 
have already discussed the relative interoperability of civil and military rocket 
propulsion system s, but another interesting example of this phenomenon is 
afforded by the inertial guidance system of the M-4 missile, which is not dissimilar 
to that of the Airbus.
In term s of industrial organisation, taking the M-4 missile programme as  a  ca se  
study, the industrial prime contractorship for missile production along with the 
control and launch system s is delegated by the DEN to the Division Systemes 
strategiques et spatiaux of Aerospatiale 47 The propulsion system  is produced by 
the Societe europeenne de Propulsion (SEP), and the Societe nationale des 
Poudres et Explosifs (SNPE) who are associates in the G2P Groupement d'lnteret 
Economique (GIE). As prime-contractor, Aerospatiale subcontracts certain 
com ponents to smaller companies, either private (such a s  MATRA) or DGA- 
dependent facilities such as  those of the DCAN/DCN at Toulon. For the S-3 
SSBS system  the pattern of interaction is even more streamlined with the entirety 
of the programme, the motors (SEP/SNPE) and the electronics excepted 
(principally Thomson CSF  and C IT Alcatel), being m anaged by Aerospatiale.
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This analysis of the ballistic missiles projects has aimed to illustrate a  number of 
features of French military space policy. Firstly, it has attem pted to illustrate the 
Hpara-nuclear" dimensions of new space activities in the military sector, 
dimensions which for all their historical, present and future importance are 
seemingly too often obscured by problems of definition or classification.
Secondly, the content and extent of the ballistic missile program m es have been 
considered, along with an indication of their importance in the military and political 
imagination. Thirdly, the industrial ramifications of th ese  program m es in term s of 
space sector organisation and technical cross-fertilisation between military 
applications and civil projects has been presented. All these  features of the 
MSBS and SSBS programmes illustrate the especially direct link existing between 
the maintained credibility of the French deterrent through spatial modernisation 
and the military, technological and economic rank of France in the world.
10.5.1. 'Im brication"
The links between military and civil space activities have been described as  
'imbrication' or an interlocking of similar but not identical concerns and projects. 
The term of imbrication is in a  sense  the static equivalent of the dynamic synergy 
that linked military and civil activies are hoped to engender.
The extent of the synergy which is attained in joint civil-military programmes 
such a s  Syracuse and Helios depends ultimately on the degree of 'commonality' 
between the two projects. In general, differences between civilian and military 
uses are a  m atter of degree rather than of nature. For Helios/SPOT, the 
differences concern the quality of resolution of the optical equipment and the 
rapidity of access  to the data  gathered by the satellite. The problem of 
commonality is reduced by the fact that much of the difference betw een civil and 
military requirem ents lies in the treatment of the data, a  distinction which allows 
separate  processing techniques in the respective ground centres. As CNES 
officials have pointed out, the only strictly military space-related technique is 
probably the encoding of data  transm issions to and from satellites in the interests 
of secrecy.48 However, even this is not without applications in the civil domain in 
sensitive commercial operations, so the distinction between military and civil space 
is a s  difficult to draw on technical grounds a s  ever. Conversely, the c loseness of 
the techniques required in the two sectors promises a  good future for such 
cooperation. If asked to say whether SPOT and the Telecom satellites are 
military or civilian, the military authorities have a  variety of answ ers available. The 
usual view expressed  is that such programmes are purely civilian, with the military
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elem ents merely riding piggy-back on civilian technology 49. A more satisfactory 
explanation is that these programmes are the result of cooperation between 
civilian and military interests with the civil side preponderant in the payload of the 
satellites. The most honest, although still unsatisfactory explanation is that given 
the c loseness of the links between civil and military technology and between the 
institutions and industrial entities which collaborate on the programmes, a  
distinction between the civil or military nature of the satellites is almost impossible 
to draw.
To take the example of SPOT/HeliGS, military funding of the whole 
programme is estim ated at some 30% of the total costs, with 50% of the costs of 
development of the joint platform coming from the Ministry of Defence.50 At first 
sight this would seem  to be a  relatively equitable distribution of the financial 
burden. However, it should be pointed out that Helios, due for operational use in 
1993, represents a  common technology and platform with the SPOT 4 generation 
of satellites. In this way, military participation in the early stages of the 
programme appears as  an investment in the real sen se  of the term, except that 
once having funded the development of the first generation of SPOT, the advent of 
respecification for the satellite of real interest to the Ministry of Defence called for 
more funding yet. A number of different criteria can be invoked to determ ine the 
military or civil nature of a  satellite programme, given the fact that the essential 
vocation, or actual application of the satellites is double. Technically, the payload 
weight of the civil and military com ponents could be com pared. Financially, the 
sources of funding and their volume could be confronted. Industrially, the 
research and development and production could be classified a s  military or civil 
based. Operationally, an index of 'weighted use ' translating the exploitation of 
civil and military functions of the satellite could give a  useful indication of the total 
exploitation m ade of the system and of the indispensability of its functions to 
defence, industry and society.
10.6. Conclusion
In conclusion to this chapter on the procurement of military space technology, it 
can be suggested  that the fundamental feature of the practice of procurement is 
cooperation between the civil and military sectors. Indeed, the complexity of the 
synergy and imbrication of the industrial aspects  of the program m es is such that it 
is notoriously difficult to draw the dividing line between 'military' and 'civil' space. 
The symbiotic relationship thus established between the two elem ents of the
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sector is advantageous to the short-term interests of all, but the perm anence of the 
solution of cooperation franco-frangaise is not without problems. During the late 
1980s the military space programmes underdevelopm ent represented an 
intermediate stage of the evolution of French strategic thinking on space and 
industrial practices in the procurement of space system s.
Since the Gulf War, and France's realisation that the forces making up the 
Desert Storm coalition were almost totally dependent on American intelligence, 
especially satellite reconnaissance information, s teps have been taken within the 
French defence community to redress this dependency and to thus restore 
France's autonomy of interpretation and action during such crises. Space does 
seem  to hold a  protected place within the defence budget a s  we have illustrated in 
our consideration of the lessons drawn by France from the Gulf war. Despite the 
problems of the civil space sector, confronted with sceptical oversight reports, the 
French military space programmes Syracuse (telecommunications) and Helios 
(observation) are continuing, with the addition of extra satellites and the initiation 
of new program m es for the expansion of the spatial elem ent of France's defence 
system. Post-Gulf war the program has been extended to cover two operational 
Helios -1 satellites, to be put into orbit in 1994 and 1996, and two Helios-2 
satellites for 2002. The third generation observation satellite Songe is planned 
for 2008-10 . Osiris (radar) and Zenon (listening) have also been included in the 
PPSM and in the military program law. The Osiris program is budgeted at 10 bn 
F and depends on Italian and Spanish collaboration, a s  well a s  on the potential 
participation of the Germ ans who have consistently stated  an interest in a  radar 
satellite. Zenon is a  national program, whose preliminary s tages are costed  at 3 
bn F, but whose development will be assured by the sam e industrial partners of 
the DGA and CNES.
Developments since the Gulf war have been such that optimism 
concerning European military space collaboration seem s better founded: the 
continued Spanish and Italian participation in Helios, taken a s  a  sign of new 
dynamism and enthusiasm  has given confidence to supporters of Euro- 
collaboration, although the previous 'inevitability' of Germ an involvement in 
anything major has been eroded by the financial burdens of unification. There is 
even hope that the UK might find common ground with continental rather than 
Atlantic partners for the development of future generations of military 
telecommunications satellites.51 In another forum, the French-backed WEU 
initiatives in favour of a  European arms-reduction verification satellite based 
potentially on the French Spot or Helios system s has also concentrated thinking 
on the practicalities of military cooperation in space matters.
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The creation of the Eurodynamics company by Thomson-CSF and British Aerospace in February 
1990 to merge their expertise in the field of tactical missile technology has showed that this kind of 
collaboration is effectively possible.
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11. Evaluation
In this concluding evaluatory chapter we will bring together the various strands of 
our analysis of the different actors in the French space  effort and of their different 
inputs to the making of policy. The analysis thus far has been restricted 
essentially to the period 1979-1992, but here, in order to place the developm ents 
of the 1980s in the context of the present and the near future, we shall include 
som e consideration of the way in which French sp ace  is evolving now, and where 
it may go in the course of the 1990s.
Bearing in mind the multi-disciplinary framework for our analysis that w as 
established in the Introduction, the present ‘evaluation’ of the making of French 
space policy exam ines the ways in which developm ents in civil space  during the 
1980s and early 1990s icontribute to an understanding of French state-agency 
relations in a  high-technology sector and considers the extent to which the 
evolution of military space activities has shown the making of space policy 
generally to reflect traditional French concerns of ‘independence’ and ‘prestige’. 
The evaluation also considers the ways in which the most recent developm ents in 
the organisation of French civil and military space activities are tending towards 
the making of ‘integrated’ space policy on the national level.
The discussion of the analysis here will follow the structure of the thesis 
thus far, in that it will firstly address the civil inputs to the making of policy 
(represented by CNES’s activities and its relationship with government), and then 
will secondly examine the implications of the expanding military interest in space. 
In the third and final part of the chapter we will combine our conclusions on civil 
and military policy making in order to discuss how the French space  effort overall 
is developing, to consider what lessons can be drawn from the experiences of the 
space sector in the 1980s and early 1990s, and to se e  what questions might be 
addressed by further research.
The chapter will thus have the following structure :
-11 .1 . Civil space policy : a troubled age of majority ?
-11 .2 . Military space in a changing environment
-11 .3 . Whither French space policy ?
-11.4 . Concluding remarks
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11.1. Civil sp ace  : a troubled age of majority ?
In evaluating developments in the civil sector of French space  activities during the 
1980s and early 1990s we must consider again a  num ber of features of the civil 
space agency’s  interaction with government which have been presented in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven. Essentially, th ese  features concern the role and 
activities of CNES, and the nature of the tutelle exercised by government over the 
agency.
Concerning the role and activities of CNES, it has  been seen  that CNES is 
theoretically a  mission-agency set up by the state in order to stimulate and 
m anage the development of the space  sector, and  that in fulfilling these  objectives, 
CNES has becom e involved in a  considerable variety of responsibilities. T hese 
responsibilities range from encouraging the developm ent of space  science 
research in French laboratories, through managing the production in industry of 
applications programmes, to the creation of subsidiary com panies and economic 
groupings intended to catalyse the French space-related economy (and provide 
income for the agency).
In order to undertake the range of activities through which CNES fulfills its 
mission, it requested and obtained constantly hsing funding throughout the period 
of the 1980s and early 1990s. It is the financial ‘burden’ of CNES on the 
government funding budget for science and technology that increasingly drew the 
need for reform of the agency’s tutelle to the attention of government.
Conversely, the increasing volume of the agency’s  ‘own resources’ deriving from 
its industrial and commercial activities underlined for the s ta te  the fact that CNES 
was also in a  position to exercise a  m easure of autonomy, both financial and 
political, and thus to manipulate the exercise of tutelle.
Concerning the nature of the tutelle exercised by governm ent over the 
space agency, we have seen  how the relationships betw een ministries and CNES 
were multiple and  confused during most of the 1980s, until attem pts to simplify the 
interface betw een the state and the EPIC were initiated in 1988/89 under the 
Rocard government. Until 1988 and the creation of a  ‘S pace Ministry’ in the form 
of the MPTE which began (with the Ministry of R esearch and Technology) to 
concentrate tutelle, responsibility for CNES w as usually split between a  num ber of 
ministries, none of which would have the explicit primary responsibility for the 
agency, thus creating a  situation in which CNES a s  the leader of its sector, and 
unquestioned expert on space policy could exploit the divided and ‘generalist’ 
ministries who were theoretically its masters. Examples of CNES’s ability to lead 
its tutellary authorities have included its use of the European dimension of its
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activities as  a  lever on the state for continued high levels of funding in general 
(over-commitment of France to European program m es in the mid 1980s such as  
the Ariane V, Columbus and Hermes package), a  casual approach to the 
transparency and accountability of decision-making (typified by the absence of any 
official note of France’s decision to engage upon the developm ent of Hermes) and 
by the irregular implementation of proper financial accounting procedures.
11.1.1 State-agency relations : CNES and government 1979-1992
The decisions taken by the 1979 Conseii restreintXo create  Arianespace and to 
engage in the the ‘commercialisation’ of space products and services marked the 
entry of the space  sector into the first mature phase of its development, after the 
hesitant beginnings of the 1940s and 1950s, the rapid progress of structures and 
industry in the 1960s and the consolidation of the 1970s.
The idea propagated by the space lobby that the space  industry would 
expand to becom e a  substantial source of wealth and an indispensable catalyst of 
France’s scientific, technological and economic developm ent has not been 
confirmed by the evolution of the sector during the 1980s, although space  a s  part 
of the aerospace and defence industries is a  not insignificant contributor to 
turnover, employment and profits. The space sector d o es  however represent a  
quite sizeable part of the s ta te ’s funding for science and  technology
The 1980s and early 1990s have indeed been the mature period of the 
space sector, but not in the ‘commerciar dimension that w as hoped for. It has 
been in the 1980s and early 1990s that CNES has evolved towards its finished 
form as  a  contemporary semi-autonomous mission agency maintaining links with 
government appropriate to the current ideologies of science, public policy and the 
‘modern’ state. This evolution towards maturity for CNES has been the result of 
both the intrinsic nature of the space sector in its m ature phase  (for example the 
greater importance of industrial development activities rather than research) and 
the problems encountered by CNES and government during the 1980s (such as  
rising costs) which led them to reassess  their relationship. In effect, the maturity 
of CNES’s statu tes in the early- and mid-1980s and subsequen t reforms of the 
agency’s relationship with government in the late 1980s and  early 1990s have 
been complicated by changes occurring during the period in the fields of politics, 
strategy and diplomacy, economics, and the modernisation of the state.
In French politics, changes such a s  the transition from 23 years of right- 
wing rule to the Socialist administration of Frangois Mitterrand in 1981, followed by 
the uncertainties of the two periods of political cohabitation between left and right
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in 1986-88 and from 1993 created a  context in which thinking on science and 
industry policies has fluctuated. These two periods o f 'Changement' and 
'Cohabitation' were perhaps somewhat unsettling in term s of the relationship 
between the political authorities and the scientific-technological community. In 
term s of party political ideology on science and technology for example, the two 
periods were placed under opposite signs as  far a s  research  policy w as 
concerned: the Socialist ambition in 1981 was to renovate the whole edifice of 
French science and technology from the regions to the  highest national level, and 
w as inspired by an interventionist belief in the power of governm ent to direct 
science and technology in favour of national objectives, w hereas the period of 
cohabitation in contrast w as characterised by the 'liberal' trends of the RPR/UDF 
in term s of industry, science, technology and the economy, which resulted in a  less 
direct interaction between government and the developm ent of science and 
technology policy and proclaimed reliance on market forces and deregulation.1 It 
can be suggested that periods of relative political instability or transition such as  
those of the installation of the first Mitterrand administration and Cohabitation 
benefit organisations like CNES because their own continuity and maintained 
expertise contrast with the flux and uncertainty of their political m asters. This 
'ratchet effect' working in favour of CNES ambitions applied in 1981 and in 1986, 
emphasising to government the fact that CNES was increasingly in need of new 
structures of tutelle.2
Strategically and diplomatically, developments such a s  SDI, the dem ise of 
Communism and the Gulf War have created a  troubled backdrop against which 
‘commercialisation’ has struggled to succeed. Economically, the period h as  been 
marked by reversals of macroeconomic policy such a s  that effected by the 
Socialists in 1983-84, by changes of em phasis on the importance of the role of the 
state such a s  that made by the Chirac government of 1986-88, and by recession.
In term s of public administration, the development of the sp ace  sector in and 
towards its maturity has also been affected by the desire to m odernise the state 
which found expression under the Rocard governm ents of 1988-91.
In the model provided by Dyson’s ideas on the nature of the French state, 
the French space sector in the 1980s can be considered to have reached a  stage 
in its development where the state, no longer concerned with nurturing the infant 
activities in ‘heroic’ mode, is concerned to apply ‘statecraft’ and ‘brokerage’ to 
reform its relationship with the space agency. As an EPIC, CNES was initially 
created a s  an elite, corporatist, semi-autonomous body entrusted by the s ta te  with 
the ‘indirect provision’ of space-related technologies and  services to France 
through its leadership of a  grand programme. As w as mentioned in the Literature
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review, Dyson warned in 1980 and 1986 that doubts were arising about the 
capacity of European sta tes  (and their semi-autonom ous agencies) to cope with 
the complexities and competition characteristic of contem porary high-tech 
industries. The idea of ‘commercialisation’ arguably represented governm ent’s 
and CNES’s solution to the difficulties of managing a  technologically and 
industrially mature space sector through a hoped-for transition to market-driven 
industrial activities and a  space agency less reliant on public funds because of 
increasing ‘own resources’ from the commercialisation of its expertise.
The agency and government were however caught in the 1980s and early 
1990s in the cleft stick of insufficient commercialisation and continued high levels 
of sta te  funding for CNES/ESA programmes such a s  Ariane V, Columbus and 
Hermes. Concern over the trends of funding and over the accountability of CNES 
led to a  progressive questioning of the activities of CNES and the space  sector, as 
evidenced by the Academie des Sciences Rapport sur la recherche et la politique 
spatiale dans les prochaines decennies. (March 1988) and the Rapport annuel 
1991 du Conseil suoerieur de la recherche et de la technoloaie (CSRT1. which 
expressed the wish that French space policy be exam ined in order to a s se s s  its 
objectives.
Most importantly, the Office pariementaire devaluation des choix 
scientifiques et technoiogiques (OPECST) or parliamentary technology 
assessm en t office produced a  relatively critical Rapport sur les Orientations de la 
politique spatiale frangaise et eurooeenne in D ecem ber 1991 which w as followed 
by another critical study by a  recently created science and  technology scrutiny 
body, the Comite national devaluation de la recherche (C N ER ): Rapport sur le 
Programme spatial franqais. (10 Septem ber 1992). As Hogwood and Peters have 
suggested in their study of the ‘pathology’ of public policy, the intervention of such 
oversight organisations is a  sign that ‘something is am iss’, and the sudden flurry of 
interest in reassessing  French space policy in the late 1980s w as clear evidence of 
perceived ‘illness’ in the relationship between the agency and governm ent and of 
the need for the application of som e form of ‘statecraft’.3
In the light of this understanding of the problems of CNES and government 
during the 1980s, the Rocardian reforms of the tutelle of the agency from 1988 to 
1991 and the various ‘oversight reports’ which reached worrying conclusions about 
the m anagem ent of civil space can be seen to represent the s ta te ’s  Dysonian 
‘brokerage’ activities in the sector. Apart from the multiplication of oversight 
reports, a  concrete example of the s ta te’s desire to reassert its exercise of tutelle 
and controle over CNES w as the ‘cancellation’ (or postponem ent, since som e 
studies are still continuing) of the Hermes programme, the first high-profile calls for
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which were voiced in the OPECST Rapport Loridant of D ecem ber 1991, and 
eventual lack of political support for which led to its dem ise a  year later. CNES 
and French industry lobbied intensively for Hermes in the early- and mid-1980s, 
considering the development of a  ‘space shuttle’ capability to be the next step  in 
technology (and ‘independence’) for French and European space, and also a  
m eans of maintaining activity in the space sector during the 1990s.
However, in addition to general recommendations that the space  effort 
needed to be rationalised organisationally and financially, the Loridant report 
raised specific doubts over the justification for the m anned Hermes space 
shuttle/plane. By stressing that the motivations for m anned European space flight 
were exclusively political and prestige-based, the report contributed to the 
consolidation of cost-based criticisms of Hermes culminating in its (indefinite) 
postponem ent in November 1992. The criticisms of Hermes were arguably the 
most important part of the Report's conclusions, since by attacking the Hermes 
programme, upon w hose continuation and success the future of the French space 
agency and French space sector a s  it had evolved in the 1980s w as predicated, 
the OPECST effectively called for a  re-assessm ent of the entire direction of the 
space programme.
Although the criticisms contained within the Loridant report were m ade 
public in Decem ber 1991, the influence of the space ‘lobby’ within France was, 
interestingly, sufficient for CNES and the MRE to be ab le to persuade the Office 
parlementaire to postpone its completion from June 1991 to December, thus 
delaying its publication until afterxhe crucial November 1991 European Space 
Agency meeting of space  ministers in Munich, which notably reviewed the 
progress of Hermes, thus gaining a  year of grace for the  programme. Initially 
considered a s  part of the ESA’s long-term European sp ace  plan at the Rome ESA 
meeting of January 1985 and confirmed at the Hague ESA summit in November 
1987 a s  part of the Ariane V / Columbus / Hermes package, the chequered career 
of the (Franco-) European space  plane is arguably symbolic of the evolution of the 
French civil space sector during the 1980s from ‘youthful optimism’ to ‘mature 
restraint’.
11.1.2. CNES and government since 1992
As we have seen , under the government of Edith C resson in 1991 and 1992 the 
issue of the most appropriate tutelle for the space agency seem ed to lose priority, 
as  responsibility for space was lost within a  ministry covering Equipement, 
Transports, Logement and Espace, and as  government attention to high-
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technology was rather focussed on attem pts at the redemption of the French 
nuclear industry. Since 1992 however, the pattern of tutelle for CNES has 
evolved in ways which suggest that government is still prepared to to modify the 
interface between the space  agency and the state in an attempt to improve the 
accountability of CNES, but that contradicting influences on the structure of tutelle 
are also still present, which may prevent the definition of the simplest and most 
efficient state-agency interface. The table below lists the changes of 
responsibility for CNES that occurred in 1992 and during 1993, both immediately 
before and after the change in government from the Socialists under Pierre 
Beregovoy to the centre-right RPR/UDF coalition led by Prime Minister Edouard 
Balladur.
CNES Tutelle 19
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 T u te lle  ____ _____
! Ministere de la Recherche e t de TEspace 
\ (MRE)
| Ministere de la. Recherche e t de l ’Espace 
\ (MRE) and Ministere de la Defense
\ Ministere de lTndustrie, des Postes et 
j Telecommunications, and Ministere de la 
i Defense, and Ministere de VEnseignement 
j superieur et de la Recherche.____________
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In more detail, these changes had the following content and motivations.
The Ministere de la Recherche et de i'Espace (April 1992 - M arch 1993)
Under the new government of Pierre Beregovoy, who replaced Edith Cresson in 
spring 1992, control over the space sector w as once again centralised in a  single 
ministry, this time combining the portfolios of Research and S pace and inheriting 
the Delegation generate a l'espace in its organisational chart. The MRE under 
Hubert Curien a s  Minister thus continued the logic of the Rocardian MPTE 
(directed by Paul Quiles) in the sen se  that it merged what were seen  a s  the 
naturally complementary briefs of space  and research, but without the 
complications of the P.T.T., which had by then been resolved by the new statutes 
of La Poste and France Telecom. According to Curien, one of the major tasks of 
the new tutellary authority w as to work on the creation of ‘structures nationales 
fortes et transparentes’ in the field of space policy.4 Such a  desire to clarify 
further the relationship between the Comite de I'Espace, CNES and the DGE
2 8 5
reflected the enduring need for accountability and efficiency in the administration 
of the space sector.5
It is possible to see the MRE as the culmination of the Socialist ministerial 
management of the space sector, or if not as the ‘culmination’ of this strategy, at 
least as the finai version of tutelle defined by the Socialists before their defeat in 
the Legislative elections of 1993. As an intermediate stage at least in the 
evolution of tutelle the MRE was undoubtedly an advance on the purely control- 
inspired reforms of the eariy Rocard penod and the rationalisation-driven 
modifications of 1990 and 1991 (separation of space, posts and telecoms). In 
terms of personalities as well, Curien’s eventual mastery of the research and 
space portfolios represented a logical responsibility for som eone with his 
experience of science and technology in general, combined with his particular 
knowledge of space gained as President of CNES in the early 1980s.
Beregovoy’s period in office was troubled by various political-financial 
scanaals and complicated by the iong run-up to the Legislative elections of Marcn 
1993, when the Socialists were (eventually) ousted from government. One of the 
last decisions taken by the Beregovoy government was to recreate a  system of 
‘dual tutelle’ for the space agency through the explicit involvement of Defence.
CNES dual tutelle
Centre National dEtudes Spadcdes
Ministere de la Defense Ministere de la Recherche 
et de I'Espace
This late decision to extend the tutelle of CNES to include the Defence Ministry as 
well as the MRE was the effect of another influence on the organisation of 
ministerial authority for space, namely the increasing need for synergy and cost- 
efficiency in the space sector overall created by the rising military interest in space 
applications post-Gulf War. Dual tutelle was an important step towards what the 
new President of CNES, Rene Pellat (appointed in November 1992) has termed 
‘une politique spatiale integree '.6
Balladurian cohabitation : triple tutelle
Another modification in the pattern of tutelle was effected by Edouard Balladur's 
redistribution of ministerial portfolios in April 1993. In addition to the double tutelle
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recently instituted by Beregovoy through the Defence Ministry, the new hght-wing 
government reintroduced the Industry Ministry into the management of CNES, in 
echo of CNES’s tutelle in the earlier penod of cohabitation led by Chirac (and of 
earlier Socialist ambitions of conflating responsibility for space, research and 
industry in 'super-ministries' of Industry and Research). With the Industry portfolio 
were attached the responsibilities for Posts and Telecommunications and External 
trade, authority over this range of briefs being exercised by Gerard Longuet, 
whose ministerial expenence of the 1986-88 cohabitation had begun with a gentle 




Ministire de iIndustrie, des 




et de la Recherche
i  S
Centre National dEtudes Spatiales
The creation of a system of tripie tutelle has its logic, although in a sense it goes 
against the earlier Socialist attempts to simplify the structures of responsibility and 
accountability through the use of single tutellary ministries (soon complicated by 
Beregovoy’s dual tutelle). The logic reflected in Balladuris version of of the 
CNES-government interface is that space activities are essentially of industrial and 
commercial importance and are thus the responsibility of the Industry Ministry. 
Defence and research are also interested in space activities and are thus included 
in government’s relationship with the space agency.8 In terms of the 
administrative simplicity and efficiency of the pattern of tutelle however, the 
presence of three ministries as CNES’s interlocutors in government may prove 
ultimately to favour the agency’s exploitation of its expertise in negotiations with 
‘fragmented’ political authority.
11.2. Military sp ace  in a changing environm ent
We must consider the development of military space activities during the 1980s 
and early 1990s in a number of aspects, specifically that of strategy and its 
implications for policy, technology and industry, that of the organisation of military 
space bodies in the military establishment and that of the industrial features of the 
production of space systems. Chapters Eight, Nine and Ten have examined
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these  aspects and have revealed how the making of French military space policy 
has been stimulated to develop intelligent strategic responses, well organised 
structures, carefully planned projects and efficiently produced system s.
In term s of strategy and strategic planning, SDI and the Gulf War provided 
considerable catalysts to French thinking on the military u ses  of space, leading to 
a  situation in which, a s  we have seen , space surveillance and communications 
system s appear to be almost the new technological ‘fetish’ of the arm ed forces. 
France has attem pted to m anage strategic uncertainty over the need for spatial 
elem ents in her defence and to use new developm ents in strategy and technology 
in her favour by such m eans as  suggesting that ASAT m easures might provide a  
m eans of shifting deterrence into space  or the notion of profiting from 
'discontinuities' in strategy and technology as  was done in the 1960s with the 
nuclear deterrent.
Jn term s of the organisation of military space, the French defence 
community based  around the Defence Ministry, Etat-Major des armees and the 
Delegation Generate pour I’armement has evolved a  network of planning and 
decision-making bodies whose position in the military-political hierarchies ensure 
that military space  policy is supported by the highest levels of military and political 
influence. Not only does the organisational chain of responsibility tend to protect 
military space, the actual functioning of military space planning is intended to 
insulate programmes from re-appraisal, for example through the mechanism of the 
pluri-annual Plan de programmation spatial militaire (PPSM). The organisation of 
military space bodies also involves cooperation with civilians involved in civil 
aspects  of France’s  overall space effort from which military sp ace  can profit, and 
this cooperation has been structured in such a  way a s  to guarantee that military 
specifications and requirements are met, for example through the ‘officiers de 
programme’ and various coordinating bodies.
In term s of the industrial production of space system s, there has been 
developed what has been called ‘cooperation franco-frangaise’, o r ‘imbrication 
under which dual-use technologies such a s  satellite observation and satellite 
communications have given rise to collaborative military-civil program m es such a s  
Syracuse and Helios, and there have been moves to obtain European 
collaboration on projects which are essentially of interest to the French but where 
the high costs to be borne indicate the need for contributions from partners who 
will also derive som e benefit from the programme.
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11.2.1. Strategic uncertainties and national sym biosis 1979-1992 ?
The making of military space policy has traditionally derived most crucially from 
France’s need to guarantee the credibility of her nuclear deterrent. As we have 
seen , the French military establishm ent has evolved sophisticated structures for 
defining policy and for implementing programme development. As the 
technological complexity of deterrence has increased, and  a s  new requirements in 
space  technologies have ahsen (Chad, the Gulf War), a  military space  capability 
has becom e more and more an unavoidable necessity for France both in term s of 
security policy credibility and in term s of prestige, or (‘grandeur1), but increasingly, 
doubts have arisen over the best way for France to achieve such a  capability.
Admiral Pierre Lacoste remarked in 1989 that from the point of view of the 
superpowers, the French distinction between civil and military space  must appear 
something of a  paradox, given the degree of integration of their civil and military 
efforts in the quest for prestige.9 The present symbiotic relationship between the 
two sectors in France seem s to be relatively successful, to the extent that military 
program m es are being efficiently conducted in tandem  with civil industry and 
exchanges of expertise and facilities occur without excessive hindrance. Official 
views on collaboration remain resolutely positive in term s of its results, stressing 
the (perhaps debatable) claim that DGA industrial activities in sp ace  programmes 
and in general stimulate the turnover and competitiveness of French industry: 'Les 
retombees de technologies militaires sur les programmes spatiaux civils, ainsi que 
sur de nombreux secteurs de la vie courante... sont autant de temoignages de 
I'impact des programmes spatiaux militaires sur I'activite et la competitivitd de 
rindustrie nationale'.10
S ynergy  a s  an  im perfect and  tem porary  solu tion
However, one must not lose sight of the fact that the search  for national synergy 
and ‘imbrication’ is the solution, necessarily imperfect becau se  of the eventual 
costs of military space system s, to the problem of realising the successful long­
term spatial modernisation of the arm ed forces. This challenge has coincided with 
other difficulties, one specific to the space industry and the other concerning 
French industry and society as  a  whole. As predicted by Hubert Curien in 1980, 
the space industry in the decade of its ‘maturity’ has been  forced to evolve an 
adequate ’dialectic’ between the promoters of new technologies and potential 
users, am ongst these the military.11 The difficulty facing industry and society is 
that of maintaining France's technological and industrial rank in the post-SDI, post-
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Gulf War, post-Maastricht world In effect, France is faceo with the conundrum of 
maintaining an industrial potential based on the development of the nuclear 
deterrent and on i:s arms sales, in an economic context where purely national 
solutions to the production of defence systems are no longer financially feasible.
The system is still imperfect, relying (despite the reforms of 1985 and of 
1991-93) on the evolution cf an understanding of state-military-industral relations 
inherited from the creation of the DGA and CNES in the early 1960s. Given the 
pace of technological and strategic change, cooperation franco-frangase is merely 
a  transitory phase between the national self-reliance of the 1960s and future 
collaboration on a  European scale. Calls for European collaboration in mifitary 
space have been numerous, and former Delegue General pourl'armemeni 
Jacques Chevallier has expressec his faith in the absence of autarky and 
'autosuff/sance'characterising military space.12 The frequency of references to 
European military space cooperation in the face of previous failures in joint 
projects perhaps tetrays the real fear that France may now indeed be 'too small a 
country’.13
Cooperation francc-frangaise or Euro-collaboration ?
The medium- and long-term future of French military space programmes, as 
opposed to the present situation represented by Syracuse and Helios described 
above, involves a choice between autonomy and European collaboration. The 
present autonomy of French military space activities is diluted essentially only by 
the minor Italian and Spanish participation in Helios, although it can be suggested 
that this form of burden sharing is a model for future more extensive partnerships. 
In fact, the second half of the PPSM for 1986-2002 reportedly relied already on 
collaboration within Europe.14 In 1936, ICA Pichoud stated unambiguously that 
military space was ultimately a European affair, even if France were to play a  
catalysing role : 'L'enjeu que represente les activates spatialespour la securite est, 
a terme, plus a lechelle de 'Europe que de la France seule, meme si ceile-ci peut 
jouerun role moteur pour les engager. Les specificites de tespace, en termes de 
missions et de capadtes industnelies, vont dans ce sens.'.15 This is a  revealing 
expression of the cominant view in French military circles that European 
cooperation (if French-led) is unavoicable. As well as Pichoud, commentators 
such as Admiral Jean Ghabaud of :he SGDN, General Guy Fleury of the GES and 
Isabelle Renouard of the Direction des Affaires pohtiquesoiXhe Ministry of 
Defence also expressed in the late-198Ds the hope or belief that the spatial 
defence of France and Europe might eventually be arrived at through European
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cooperation in military space, in the sam e way that the ESA has succeeded  in 
leading civil space  collaboration since 1975.16 The European solution is 
supported for two (complementary) reasons : cooperation is both necessary  
b ecause of the costs involved, (Fleury quoted 8 billion francs a s  the average cost 
of a  military space programme, which with a  slight increase seem s to be borne out 
by current estim ates), and desirable because of the stimulus that such cooperation 
could give to European integration.
Europe as catalyst or constraint ?
Indeed, for Chabaud, who poses the question of w hether SDI will be seen  to have 
been a  death blow or stimulus ('un coup de grace ou un coup de fouef) for 
European security, cooperation in military space is perhaps the last chance for 
Europe to overcome national differences and build a  coherent defence system . 
Chabaud even draws a  direct parallel between the strategic objective of the 
nuclear strike force in the late 1940s (and the decision to proceed with its 
development despite the imprecision of its definition) and the strategic objective of 
a  European spatial defence.17 From a  more strictly European perspective, an 
anonym ous group of senior civil servants in the Ministry of Defence, (writing under 
the pseudonym of CRITIAS) has s tressed  the common position occupied by all 
European countries, regardless of their possession of nuclear w eapons, vis-a-vis 
threats to their security from superpow er space  militarisation.18 On the technical 
level, there is a  general air of bullishness concerning French and European 
capabilities of producing even the most sophisticated space  hardware for military 
purposes, despite occasional partial dissenters such a s  Battisteila, who has voiced 
the view that in the field of orbital photographic surveillance, France is at least 
thirty years behind the United S ta te s .19
For non-technical reasons however, other analysts have taken a  more sanguine 
view of the possibility of European cooperation in military space, doubtless basing 
their scepticism on the failure of past attem pts at common w eapons developm ent 
such a s  fighter planes and main battle tanks. A recent conclusion to this debate  is 
Jerom e Paolini's conclusion that European military cooperation is dependent on, 
rather than a  stimulus to, wider European integration :'De parson manque 
d'autonomie par rapport au continuum des operation aeroterrestres, I'espace 
militaire en Europe apparait comme une resultante plutot qu'une veritable 
dynamique de flntegration'.20 This contradiction of the hopes of many of the 
partisans of European integration is derived from the observation of the disparity 
of strategic positions assum ed by different major European nations, particularly
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Germany, who would be France's main partner in any common space defence 
programme, (we have already mentioned the apparent divergence of French and 
Germ an technical specifications for a joint observation satellite).21 Paolini's 
analysis rejects the argument proposed by CRITIAS, and recom m ends that 
France's role should be limited to the maintaining her position a s  prime-mover of 
European civil space as  a  m eans of preserving a  capability of developing military 
applications in the future. In the medium term, such a role would imply the French 
national military space effort being limited by the normal constraints determining 
her defence policy at between 3.5 and 4.0% of the defence budget equipment 
heading ('Titre V').
The pace of developm ents in this field is such that, since Paolini's study in 1987, 
optimism concerning European military space collaboration has becom e more 
robust in the late 1980s and early 1990s: the Italian participation in Helios, taken 
a s  a  sign of new dynamism and enthusiasm , and the 'inevitability1 of German 
involvement in anything major give confidence to supporters of Euro- 
collaboration.22 There is even hope that the UK might find common ground with 
Continental rather than Atlantic partners for the development of future generations 
of military telecommunications satellites.23 Concretely, the idea mooted in 
Septem ber 1987 at the conference ‘ 'Defense nationale et cooperation 
internationale' of the creation of a  military EUREKA program m e24 resulted in a 
proposal m ade in June 1989 by the French Defence Minister Jean-Pierre 
Chevenem ent for increased cooperation in military research within the framework 
of the Groupement europeen independant de programme (GEIP).25 This renewal 
of interest in cooperation in military research coincided with the appointment a s  
Delegue General pour I'armement of Yves Sillard, a  military engineer having 
served with CNES and a s  the General secretary of the French EUREKA 
secretariat. In another forum, the W estern European Union (WEU) initiatives in 
favour of a  European arm s reduction verification satellite based  potentially on the 
French SPOT or Helios system s also concentrated thinking on the practicalities of 
military cooperation in space matters. In the 1990s the costs of reunification for 
Germany have undermined her readiness to fund both civil and military space, 
however, so cooperation is still less than an evident solution.
Despite these  uncertainties about the long term viability of the current 
approach of the French state towards the military space  industry, the fact cannot 
be avoided that underlying the whole edifice of military space  planning a s  well a s  
the civilian space industry is the feeling that space remains an essential sector of 
activity for France if she is to retain her place in the international system. A final 
quotation from the former President of the Fondation des etudes pour la Defense
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nationale (FEDN), General Fricaud-Chagnaud, speaking in 1985, illustrates this 
point a s  well a s  evoking the notion of prestige or ‘grandeur1 that still colours all 
French space  activities. In this perspective, French military presence in space is 
essential to her remaining a  major power, just a s  in de  Gaulle's time the 
developm ent of nuclear capabilities fulfilled the sam e role : 'sif d'ici douze ou 
quinze ans nous ne sommes plus dans I'espace, et dans I'espace militaire, nous 
aurons signe notre decheance, et nous aurons abandonee notre rang. II faudra 
done etre dans I'espace, comme le General de Gaulle a voulu que nous soyons 
nucleaires pour etre une grande puissance. Le reste ne fait aue suivre,'26
Such an ‘un-reconstructed’ Gaullist approach, while underlining the 
significance of military space for France, perhaps also reflects an  overly national 
understanding of its importance for properly harmonious European cooperation. 
The extension to the European level of French military space  activities is likely to 
be the acid test for motivations within government and military establishm ents in 
support of space  programmes since the 'Europeanisation' of French strategic 
defence and of sensitive defence-related high technologies may run counter to the 
previous trends of military attitudes towards European cooperation.27 Put simply, 
can French security policy in general, and military space  policy a s  part of overall 
French defence, become truly European ?
11.2.2. Military space since 1992
As we have seen , in 1991 and 1992, following calls for modernisation of the armed 
forces in general from past Defence Ministers such a s  Jean-P ierre Chevenem ent 
and Charles Hernu, the then Defence Minister Pierre Joxe w as at pains to se t out 
France's renewed committment to military space, in particular in a  series of 
declarations which appeared to wish to draw the lessons of what has been 
described a s  'the first space war1.28 In February 1992 he stressed  that space 
would be a  prioritised item both in the 1992 budget and in the military program law 
for 1993-97, which was eventually approved in July 1992 by the Council of 
Ministers and contained new satellite equipment program s, in addition to the the 
existing Syracuse and Helios telecommunications and observation satellites 
programs decided and initiated during the 1980s.
In November 1992 a  classified internal Defence ministry report on the costs 
of the various equipment program m es was leaked to the press, revealing that over 
the period of application of the programme law spending on the nuclear forces was 
planned to fall by an average of 6.6% per year, w hereas space  funding w as se t to 
rise by an average 3% per annum. Although the conventional forces still
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represent the great bulk of spending on equipment program m es, it w as 
nevertheless patent through 1993 that the space  communication and observation 
program m es were favoured in this funding plan to the detriment of conventional 
and especially nuclear projects. In contrast to the traditional funding preem inence 
of the nuclear aspects of French defence, these  unambiguous reductions in 
investment in the FNS revealed the strength of the s ta te ’s  manifest desire to 
modernise the deterrent and conventional forces through the acquisition of a  
substantial spatial component to the defence system . This shift in funding 
priorities reflects one of the major conclusions drawn by the defence establishm ent 
from the Gulf war, namely that France needed desperately to enhance not her 
‘absolute autonomy’ of the nuclear deterrent, but the more relative independence 
of intelligence gathering, communication and control in times of conventional 
conflict.
As we have seen, in February 1993, Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy 
announced that CNES would in future be in charge of military space  program m es 
and would itself consequently be under the joint ministerial authority of the 
Defence ministry, a s  well as  the Ministere de la Recherche et de I'Espace.29 This 
decision reflected both a  desire on the part of the state to recognise existing 
patterns of interaction within the overall space sector (namely the cooperation 
franco-frangaise of Syracuse and Helios), and the ambitions of CNES to profit 
from the financial favours bestowed by government on the military space  sector.
In effect, the relative vitality of the military sector, (whose transfer to CNES is 
likely to represent an annual additional income of between 3.5 and 6 billion Francs 
by the end of the decade) has created tensions between the civil agency stricken 
by national economic rigour and by the cancellation or ESA m anagem ent of major 
program m es and the Delegation Generate a I'Armement, the traditional guardian 
of the military space effort.
Developments during 1992 and 1993 were complicated by the impending 
Parliamentary elections of March 1993 which threatened to create disturbances 
for the military space sector, even if the presum ed effect of the likely Right-wing 
majority and consequent political ‘cohabitation’ between Socialist President and 
right-wing Prime minister was likely to be increased governm ent interest in French 
arm ed forces, a s  was the case  in the 1986-88 cohabitation which precipitated 
France's military space modernisation. In fact, since 1993, military space  has 
continued as  a  priority element of the reform of the arm ed forces intended to 
equip French defence for the years 2000 - 2010 which w as developed in the 1994 
‘White paper* on defence.
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In the following concluding section of this chapter we examine the features of 
French politics and of the French space effort itself which imply that the making of 
space  policy will still be required to evolve before it finds a  fully satisfactory form.
11.3. Whither French space policy ?
The context of French civil and military space activities is stiii far from stable, 
notwithstanding the efforts made to reform the tutelle of CNES and the apparent 
success of the current military space programmes. In addition to ongoing 
developm ents in the structures and pattern of tutelle, the instability of the context 
derives in the civil sector from a developing debate on science policy, and in the 
military sector from continuing uncertainty over France’s  defence choices and the 
availability of funds to finance them. As a  further complicating factor, the 
difficulties of cohabitation since March 1993 are likely to end in spring 1995 with 
changes of government and President, which, whatever the political colour of the 
respective incumbents of Matignon and the Elysee, are likely to disrupt any 
decisions m ade in the interim period of Mitterrand’s fin de regne. The two major 
general dom estic factors which will influence the future of French space  policy are 
the debate  over research and the debate over defence.
11.3.1. The continuing debate over Research
Under Frangois Fillon a s  Minister for Higher education and R esearch the place of 
science in French society has once again becom e an issue of som e importance, 
and implicitly therefore, France’s commitment to sp ace  is also being 
reappraised.30 The arrival of the centre-right governm ent in power has effectively 
given rise to an operation of appraisal for the science and research policies 
conducted by the Socialists.31 Such an ‘evaluation’ aim s a s  much at criticising 
past practices a s  at establishing new b ases for the developm ent of French science 
and technology, and much of the debate has concentrated on the claimed 
‘irregularities’ of funding for research during the period 1981-1993, when Tenfant 
cheri de la Republique’ (as science has been called by Mitterrand), although 
apparently favoured with increasing long-term funding w as actually squeezed  by 
increasingly restrictive annual grants from government.32
Although Fillon has launched a  ‘national consultation’ on the objectives and 
organisation of French research, the debate on science is thus still centred 
essentially on the costs of the government funding for research a s  they are
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perceived by a  Finance and Budget Ministry and government concerned a s  ever to 
limit spending.33 Within such a  context of financial rigour and uncertainty over the 
future direction of science and technology, CNES seem s to be maintaining its 
priority position34, but is nevertheless becoming increasingly exposed a s  one of 
the largest beneficiaries (nearing 20%) of the Budget civil de recherche e td e  
developpement.
11.3.2. the continuing debate over Defence
In defence policy, controversies are still current concerning the strategic choices 
open to France and the requirements in materiel and funding necessary  to fulfill 
France’s  military responsibilities. The run-up to the Presidential elections of April- 
May 1995 has already been marked by fevered discussions of the Livre blanc sur 
la defense and  of the Loi de programmation militaire 1995-2000, which puts the 
principles of the Livre blanc into financial term s.35 The Livre blanc sur la defense 
(or Defence White Paper) is only the second such docum ent to have been 
produced in France. Following the model of the first White Paper prepared by 
Michel Debre a s  Defence Minister of Jacques Chaban-Delm as and President 
Pompidou, which w as published in 1972, this second Livre blanc w as m ade public 
in February 1994 by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, who had requested its 
preparation in May 1993. Produced by a  Commission of 25 m em bers and written 
by a  senior civil servant and an army general, the Livre blanc received no input 
from the Presidency, except in the last stages of its finalisation, but w as submitted 
to the Defence Ministry for correction, in order to officialise its sta tus a s  a  
governmental document of reference.36 As the Livre blanc de la defense 1994 
m akes clear in an introductory statem ent by Edouard Balladur, in setting out 
Gaullist French defence policy, the original White paper of 1972 marked the 
transition from France’s traditional role of ‘colonial defence’ to the m odem  era , and 
by implication, the present restatem ent of defence choices marks an equally 
m om entous turning point in French security policy, namely the move from 
dissuasion in the stable context of the Cold War to a  defence stance appropriate to 
the modern international system and new technologies. Another implication may 
be drawn from this, namely that the turning point of F rance’s  move to ‘une 
dissuasion nuclearo-spatiale’ might ultimately establish military space  system s a s  
the armed forces technology ‘fetish’ of the 2000s, just a s  nuclear w eapons were 
the obsessional play-thing of French defence in the 1960s.
One of the major points put forward by Balladur and Defence Minister 
Leotard in their introductory statem ents, and reiterated at various junctures in the
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Livre blanc is the necessity for French security policy to evolve towards integration 
in som e form of European defence, but only in the longer-term. Moreover, in 
term s of the industrial production of w eapons system s, the White paper 
distinguishes between defence technologies in which France must retain 
independent expertise (nuclear and nuclear-related, including ballistic missiles, 
launch and communications system s) which must be produced nationally, and 
other less strategically sensitive technologies in which national expertise m ust be 
maintained but where cooperation is permissible (surveillance, communications, 
data processing).37 In the words of the Livre blanc, Europe is lun imperatif et une 
chance'for defence policy and for the French defence industry, but, reading 
between the lines, only as  long a s  France remains leader in the noblest 
technological fields.38
11.4. Concluding remarks
Above these  issues of science funding and defence spending, which are in 
e ssen ce  questions of finance, and therefore to a  certain extent contingent on the 
vagaries of macroeconomic performance and budgetary ideology, and beyond the 
political issues of changes in the executive, the future making of French space  
policy and the content of that policy will be conditioned by the ‘paradoxes’ which 
characterise the French space  effort as  it currently stands. The paradoxes are 
that the traditionally successful civil side of space policy is increasingly in 
difficulties, on the domestic and European levels, whilst the hitherto low profile 
national military space  sector is more and more tending to move towards 
successful high-profile international cooperation.
In civil space  the national space  agency CNES is in a  state of turmoil 
because of governm ent’s moves to reform its relationship with its chosen m anager 
of the space sector, these attem pts at reform having been precipitated essentially 
by CNES’s over-ambitious involvement in costly French-led European 
program m es such a s  Hermes and Ariane V. Thus the m anagem ent of the 
domestic civil space  sector is in crisis because of the French s ta te ’s  concern to (in 
Dyson’s  terminology) ‘re-establish a  governing com petence and to maintain 
governmental and ideological credibility’, the perceived loss of authority over 
CNES having been caused  by the agency’s  skilful but ultimately over-committed 
use of international collaboration.
In military space, the answ ers to France’s  defence needs are increasingly 
seen  to lie in European collaborative projects, both industrially and strategically, 
and thus F rance’s traditionally independent security stance is to be transformed
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into a  kind of collaborative defence involving the joint development of defence 
system s and increasing integration of strategy. On the dom estic level, 
responsibility for French military space  has been moved to lie with the civil agency 
CNES, which will conduct program m es in liaison with the DGA, which itself is 
under increasing criticism for its inefficient cost m anagem ent of military equipment 
program m es in general.
The solutions to the problems caused  by th ese  paradoxes reside essentially 
in the degree to which the reforms of the CNES-state interface will eventually 
succeed, and in the practical su ccess  of collaborative industrial production of 
‘European’ military space system s. Equally, in term s of national space  activities, 
the success  or failure of recent modifications to interaction between CNES and the 
DGA implemented by the Beregovoy and Balladur governm ents’ reform of CNES 
tutelle will be important in determining how the making of policy will evolve. On 
another level however, the future health of the French civil space sector also 
depends on the redefinition of cooperative European sp ace  activities, since it is the 
European dimension of CNES’s activities which is likely to remain most difficult for 
French governm ents to revise satisfactorily. Similarly, the ultimate su ccess  of a  
‘Europeanised’ French military space  effort will be conditioned by the extent to 
which long- and deep-rooted traditions of national independence in the Armed 
Forces can be replaced with truly European sentiment.
Future research on French civil space activities will be able to address the 
issues of the resolution of CNES’s crisis of identity, the continuing financial 
problems of the funding of the civil sp ace  effort in tim es of economic rigour, the 
future of the EPICs and grands programmes in an increasingly internationalised 
context of science and technology, and the su ccess  of the recent attem pts by the 
European Commission to work with the ESA in a  reform of European space  
policy.39 In the field of defence, further research will continue the analysis of the 
links between developing strategy and the need for military space  system s, 
appraise the evolution of the DGA and France’s  expensive arm s industry, and 
a s se s s  how far France is really prepared to go down the road towards European 
security.
Sometimes described in the past by sceptics a s  'une solution sans probleme’, it 
remains to be seen  in the mid-1990s and beyond, w hether the French space  effort 
and the making of policy will avoid becoming ‘un probleme sans solution’.
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Notes to Chapter 11.
1 Although party rivalry over 'who is best for French science’ is at times intense, the attitudes of left 
and right to research do share some common features (such as a belief in its importance). The 
difference in approach over space was however re-iterated in April 1993 with the system of triple 
tutelle under which CNES became dependent essentially on the Industry Ministry again.
2 This was the candid opinion of Jean Gruau, Inspecteur General au CNES. Interview, 22 November 
1989.
3 Hogwood, Brian W„ and Peters, B. Guy, The Pathology of Public Policy Clarendon, Oxford, 1985,
p.6.
4 See Augereau, Jean-Frangois, L’espace frangais change de main., Le Monde. 15 April 1992, p. 19.
5 One of the consequences of the change of tutelle to the MRE was in effect the sidelining of the 
DGE,whose Delegue General left to take up other responsibilities, and whose activities were run 
down.
6 See Langereux, Pierre, Le CNES sera au coeur du programme spatial militaire frangais, Air et 
Cosmos. 23-29 November 1992, p.52.
7 The Socialists had moved away from the link between CNES and Industry, since practice had 
arguably shown them that this was not the best home for the tutelle of space; the right however, as the 
recent opposition, wer still driven a more 'ideological’ approach to high-technology, which saw space 
as an industrial issue.
8 The return to what has been described as ‘la logique industrielle et commerciale represents a reversal 
of Socialist thinking on space, which tended to consider it to be most closely related to 'research’.
For a brief discussion of the change to triple tutelle, see Augereau, Jean-Frangois, Le CNES sera place 
sous la triple tutelle de MM. Longuet, Lyotard et Fillon, Le Monde. 15 April 1993, p.8.
9 Lacoste, Admiral P., Que peut apporter I'espace militaire k lEurope?, L'Agronautiaue et 
l'Astronautiaue (1989-3-4, Nos 136-137), pp.48-51.
10 La DGA Technospace. DGA Information brochure for the Bordeaux Technospace Trade Fair, 6-9 
December 1988. It is worth noting that this commercial propaganda runs counter to the more usual 
official claim that the military sector is an adjunct of civil activities.
11 Curien, Hubert, La France dans lEspace, Defense Nationale fMav 1981), p.26.
17 Chevallier, Jacques, Discours d'ouverture, Activity spatiales militaires conference, Paris, October 
1988, reproduced in L’A6ronautiaue et rAstronauriaue (1989-3-4, Nos. 136-137), pp.43-44.
13 See IGA Jean Sandeau's contribution to the ENA Space conference; L*Espace: un D6fi p o u t la France. 
p. 151.
14 Interview, Lieutenant-Colonel Bouchard, PPE/EMA, 19 April 1989.
15 Pichoud, Daniel, L'espace pour voir, communiquer, 6couter, Defense Nationale (July 1986), pp. 141 - 
152.
16 See their various contributions to the debate at the ENA conference reproduced in L*EsDace. un D6fi 
pour la France (Association des anciens eifcves de 1ENA, 1986).
17 Chabaud, J., in LEspace. un D6fi nour la France , pp.103-104.
1 ® CRITIAS, Pour une capacity spatiale militaire de lEurope', Le Monde 16 March 1985.
19 Battistella, J., in LEspace. un Defi p o u t la France, pp. 104-106.
20 Paolini, J., Politique spatiale militaire frangaise et cooperation europdenne, Politique Etrangfere (2/87), 
p.450.
21 Although France and Germany have collaborated on DBS satellite launching.
22 Interview, Lieutenant-Colonel Bouchard, PPE/EMA, April 1989.
23 7he creation of the Eurodynamics company by Thomson-CSF and British Aerospace in February 
1990 to merge their expertise in the field of tactical missile technology has showed that this kind of 
collaboration is effectively possible.
24 See Liberation 23 June 1989, La France veut lancer un /eureka en kaki', p. 13.
25 Independent European programme group.
26 General Fricaud-Chagnaud, LEspace. un Defi pour la France Association des anciens eifcves de 
1ENA, 1986, pp. 134-136. (emphasis addedV This quote encapsulates all elements of an almost 















France in the World as a 'great power'. The final implication that 'le reste ne fait que suivre' implies 
that economics and finances are of little importance in such a situation, echoing de Gaulle's famous 
statement that Tintendance suivra'...
Also, if one accepts the 'suspecting glance' approach of Admiral Sanguinetti, the 'Europeanisation' of 
the French space system may be the last chance for the cleaning up of the corporatist and anti­
democratic features in the space MIC.
Thus during April and May 1991 he suggested that Europe as a whole should develop together a 
military space capability in order better to manage peace and to foresee the development of conflicts 
and that France would give military intelligence gathering the full status of a military arm within the 
organization of the armed forces, thus increasing its prestige in accord with its new space-derived 
importance. For a treatment of the Gulf War as the first ‘space war’, see Anson, Sir Peter and 
Cummings, Denis, The First Space War: the Contribution of satellites to the Gulf war, RUSI Journal, 
winter 1991, pp.45-53.
Tutelle', or ministerial authority for CNES has followed a somewhat tortuous path over the lifetime of 
the national space agency. The supposedly civil brief of the agency did not prevent it from 
contributing to the development of the nuclear deterrent, coming initially under the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Scientific Research and Atomic and Space questions, which exercised authority for 
space matters until 1965. During the greater part of thel970s and 1980s authority for CNES was 
exercised in the various, Research, Technology and Industry ministries, making B&6govoy's 1993 
innovation all the more interesting.
Interestingly, and perhaps an indication of the importance of space, Fillon’s chef de cabinet at Higher 
education and Research is Jdrome Paolini, specialist on space and author of the study on European 
military space integration referred to earlier.
See, for a brief overview of the research debate, Buchan, David, Strategic vision needs to be restored, 
Financial Times. 12 July 1994, p. VI., (special supplement on France)
The particular mechanism of this squeeze involved the distinction drawn between ‘autorisadons de 
programme’ and 'credits de paiement’. See for example Budget de pdnurie pour la recherche, Le 
Monde. 13 October 1993, p.14., and Fillon, Francis, Preparer l’aveni’, Le Monde. 17 November
1993, p. 17.
7 billion francs of government spending overall were frozen in May 1994; see Vemholes, Alain, Des 
retombees parfois douloureuses, Le Monde. 9 June 1994, p. 12.
See Hughes, Stella, French research’s top ten, Times Higher. 1 July 1994, p.l 1.: space is designated 
as one of ten research areas deemed to be of 'national importance’.
For this reason we shall here concentrate on contents of the Livre blanc.
The 25 member commission of expats presided by Marceau Long was served by Jean-Claude Mallet 
(Maitre des requites au Conseil dEtat) and General Eric Pougin de La Maisonneuve, (Secritaire du 
Conseil de defense and Directeur de la Fondation d  etudes de defense). See Le Monde. 25 February
1994, Le Livre blanc sur la defense, p.7.
Livre blanc. pp.117-118.
Livre blanc. p.120.
The European Commission has interested itself in space policy on the European level since at least 
1988, and during the early 1990s has been increasingly active in calling for a new organisation of this 
relatively successful form of ‘functional integration’. See for example Commission of the European 
Communities, The European Community and Space: A Coherent Approach. COM(88)417 final, July 
1988, and Commission of the European Communities, The European Community and Space: 
Challenges. Opportunities and New Actions. COM(92)360 final, September 1992.
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G lo ssa ry
ABM Anti Ballistic Missile.
ANVAR Agence Nationale pour la Valorisation de la Recherche.
ASAT Anti Satellite.
ASE Agence Spatiale Europeenne.
BCRD Budget Civil de Recherche et de Deveioppement.
BMD Ballistic Missile Defence.
BRGM Bureau des R echerches Geologiques et Minieres.
C3I Command and Intelligence.
CAP Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision.
CASD Comite d'Actions Scientifiques de D efense.
CASDN Comite d'Actions Scientifiques de D efense Nationale.
CCRST Comite Consultatif de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique.
CEA~ Commissariat a  I'Energie Atomique.
CELAR Centre d'Electronique de I'Armement.
CEMA Chef d'Etat-Major des Armees.
CERES Centre d 'Enseignem ent et de R echerches Socialistes.
CERIS Centre europeen de relations internationales et de strategie.
CERN Centre Europeen de Recherches Nucleaires.
CIMRST Commission Interministerielle de  la Recherche Scientifique et
Technique.
CNER Comite National devaluation  de la Recherche
CN ES Centre National d 'E tudes Spatiales
CNRS Centre National de Recherche Scientifique.
CST Centre Spatial de Toulouse.
DAM Direction des Applications Militaires.
DAT Direction de I'Armement Terrestre,
DBS Direct Broadcasting by Satellite.
DCN Direction des Constructions Navales.
DCAe Direction des Constructions A eronautiques.
DEFA Direction des Etudes et Fabrication d'Armement.
DEI Direction de I'Electronique et de I’lnformatique.
DEN Direction des Engins.
DGA Delegation G enerale pour I'Armement.
DGE Delegation G enerale a  I'Espace.
DGI Direction Generale de I'lndustrie
DGRST Delegation generale a  la recherche scientifique et technique.
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DGT Direction G enerale des Telecommunications.
DIELI Direction des Industries Electroniques et d'lnformatique.
DMA Delegation Ministerielle a  I'Armement.
DOM-TOM Departements et Territoires d'Outre-Mer.
DOPR Direction de I’Organisation et de la Promotion de  la 
Recherche.
DRET Direction des Recherches, Etudes et Techniques,
DRME Direction des Recherches et Moyens d 'Essai.
EBRD Effort Budgetaire de Recherche et de Deveioppement.
ELDO European Launcher Development Organization.
EMA Etat-Major des Armees.
ENA Ecole Nationale d'Administration
EPIC Etabiissement Public a  caractere Industriel et Commercial.
ESA European Space Agency.
ESRO European Space Research Organization.
FEDN Fondation pour les Etudes de D efense Nationale.
FNS Force Nucleaire Strategique.
FOST Force O ceanique Strategique.
GCSM Groupe de Coordination Spatiale Militaire
GEIP Groupement Europeen Independant de  Programme
GES Groupe d 'E tudes Spatiales.
GIE Groupement d'lnteret Economique
GROUPES Groupe de Planification et d 'E tudes S trategiques.
ICA Ingenieur en Chef de I'Armement
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.
IFA Institut Franco-Allemand de Saint Louis.
IFP Institut Frangais du Petrole
IGA Ingenieur General de I'Armement.
MSS International Institute of Strategic Studies.
LOP Loi d'Orientation et de Prog ram mation.
LRBA Laboratoire de Recherches Balistiques et Aerodynamiques.
MATRA Societe Mecanique-Aviation-Traction.
MDIS Ministere du Deveioppement Industriel et Scientifique.
MIC Military Industrial Complex.
MPTE Ministere des Postes, Telecommunications et de I'Espace.
MRT Ministere de la Recherche et de la Technologie.
MSBS Mer-Sol Balistique Strategique.
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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ONERA Office National d'Etudes et R echerches Aeronautiques.
O PECST Office Parlementaire d’Evaluation d e s  Choix Scientifiques et 
Technologiques.
PDG President Directeur GeneraL
PDT Programme de Developperrnent Technologique.
PPE Division Plans-Program m es-Espace.
PPSM Plan Pluriannuel Spatial Miliitaire.
Ps Parti Sociaiiste.
PTT Postes, Telephones et Telecommunications.
RITA Reseau Integra de Transm issions autom atisees.
RPR Rassem biem ent Pour la Republique
SAMRO Satellite Militaire de R econnaissance Optique.
SDI Strategic Defence Initiative.
SDIO _ Strategic Defence Initiative Organization.
SE P Societe Europeenne de Propulsion
SEREB Societe d 'E tudes et de Realisation d'Engins Balistiques
SERICS Service des industries de Com m erce et de Service.
SGDN Secretariat General de ia D efense Nationale
SIRPA Service d'lnformation et de Relations Publiques des Armees.
SNECMA Societe Nationale d'Etudes e t  de Construction de Moteurs 
d'Aviation.
SNIAS Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale.
SNLE Sous Marin Nucieaire Lance ur d'Engins.
SNLE-NG Sous Mann Nucieaire Lanceiur d 'Engins Nouvelle Generation
SPO T Satellite Probatoire d'Observation Optique.
S S B S Sol-Sol Balistique Strategique.
STCAN Service Technique des Constructions et Armes Navales.
STEN Service Technique d es  Engins.
STPE Service Technique d es  Poudires et Explosifs.
SYRACUSE System e de Radiocommunication Utilisant un Satellite.
TDF Telediffusion de France.
TDF1 Telediffusion de France 1 (Satellite).
TOEE Departement Terre, Ocean, Environnem ent et Espace au 
MRT.
UDF Union pour la Democratie Frangaise.
UEO Union de I'Europe O ccidentals (=WEU).
WEU W estern European Union.
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A ppendix I
CNES s ta tu te  d o c u m e n ts
Presidence du Conseil,
Decret du 7 janvier 1959 relatif a la creation d'un Comite de recherches 
spatiales.
Ministre delegue aupres du Premier ministre,
Decret No. 61-703 du 3 juillet 1961 modifiant le decret du 7 janvier 1959 relatif a 
la creation d'un Comite des recherches spatiales.
Loi No. 61-1382 Instituant un centre national d'etudes spatiales.
Ministres delegues aupres du Premier ministre,
Decret No. 62-153 du 10 fevrier 1962 pris pour I'application de la loi No. 61- 
1382 du 19 decembre 1961 et relatif au fonctionnement administratif et financier 
du centre national d'etudes spatiales.
Ministre d'Etat charge de la recherche scientifique et des questions atomiques et 
spatiales,
Modalites de fonctionnement financier du centre national d'etudes spatiales, 14 
septembre 1963.
Ministere de I'industrie et de la recherche,
Decret No. 76-104 du 27  janvier 1976 relatif au centre national d'etudes 
spatiales et a I'organisation de la recherche spatiale.
Decret No. 79-977 du 22 aout 1977 modifiant le decret No. 76-104 du 2 7  janvier 
1976 relatif au centre national d'etudes spatiales et a I'organisation de la 
recherche spatiale.
Ministere de I'industrie,
Decret No. 79-468 du 13 juin 1979 modifiant le decret No. 76-104 du 2 7  janvier 
1976 relatif au centre national d'etudes spatiales.
Modalites de fonctionnement financier du Centre national d'etudes spatiales, 24 
fevrier 1984.
304
Ministerede I'industrie et de la recherche,
Decret No. 84-510 du 28 juin 1984 relatif au Centre national d'etudes spatiales. 
Ministere des P. T. T.,
Decret No. 86-129 du 28 janvier 1986 portant organisation de I'administration 
centrale du ministere des P. T. T.
Ministere de i'industrie, des P. et T. et du tourisme,
Decret No. 86-715 du 17 avril 1986 relatif aux attributions du ministre de 
I'industrie, des P. et T. et du tourisme.
Recherche et enseignement superieur,
Decret No. 86-721 du 24 avril 1986 relatif aux attributions du ministre delegue 
aupres du ministre de I'education nationale, charge de la recherche et de 
I'enseignement superieur.
Ministere de I'education nationale, de la recherche et des sports,
Decret No. 88-726 du 28 mai 1988 relatif aux attributions du ministre d'Etat, 
ministre de I'education nationale, de la recherche et des sports.
Ministere des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace,
Decret No. 88-741 du 3 juin 1988 relatif aux attributions du ministre des postes et 
telecommunications et de I'espace.
Ministere des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace,
Decret No. 88-837 du 20 juillet 1988 relatif aux attributions du ministre des 
postes, des telecommunications et de I'espace.
Ministere de la recherche et dela technologie,
Decret No. 88-838 du 20 juillet 1988 relatif aux attributions du ministre de la 
recherche et de la technologie.
Ministere des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace,
Decret No. 88-1121 du 14 decembre 1988 modifiant le decret No. 86-129 du 28  
janvier modifie portant organisation de I'administration centrales du ministere
desP.T.T..
Ministere des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace,
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Decret du 6 janvier 1989 portant nomination d'un delegue general a 
I'administration cent rale.
Ministere des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace,
Decret No. 89-77 du 6 fevrier 1989 modifiant le decret No. 84-510 du 28 juin 
1984 relatif au Centre national d'etudes spatiales.
Ministere des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace,
Decret No. 89-508 du 19 juillet portant creation du comite de I'espace.
Ministere des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace,
Arrete du 20 juillet 1990 relatif aux modalites de fonctionnement du Centre 
national d ’etudes spatiales.
Ministere des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace,
Arrete du 20 juillet 1990 fixant la composition et les regies de fonctionnement de 
la commission des marches du Centre national d ’etudes spatiales.
Ministere des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace,
Decret No.90-1121 du 18 decembre 1990 portant organisation de 
I'administration centrale du ministere des postes, des telecommunications et de 
i'espace.
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1 1 6 6 8  JOTRNAL OFFinihT. DE LA IIKI'I BI.IOL'E F lfA N i;A ISt 20 l)«Vem|>re 1981
LOI n* 61-1382 d u  19 d tc e m b r*  1961 
ir ls t itu a n t un  c e n tre  n a tio n a l d 'e tu d e s  s p a tia le s  (1).
L’Assemblce nationale et le Senat ont adopte.
Le President de la Republique promulgi/fe la loi dont la te.neur
suit .
Art 1" - II est institue sous le nom de Centre national
d'etudes spatiales un etablissement public scientifique et tech­
nique, de caractere industriel et commercftl. dote de i autonornie 
finadciere et place sous l’autorite du Premier ministre.
Art 2 — I.e centre national d'etudes spatiales a pour mission 
de de\elopper et d 'orienter les recherches scientifiques et tech­
niques poursuivies dans le domaine des recherches spatiales.
II est notamment charge :
1* De r e c u e ill ir  to u te s  in fo rm a tio n s  s u r  les a c tiv i te s  R a tio n a le s  
et In te rn a tio n a le s  concernant les p ro b le m es  d e  I’espace. son  
e x p lo ra tio n  e t son utilisation ;
2 De preparer et de proposer a l'approbation du comite inter- 
ministeriel dc la recherche scientifique et technique les pro­
grammes de recherche d ’interet national dans ce domaine ;
3* D assurer 1 execution desdits programmes, soit dans les labo- 
ratoires et etablissements techniques crees par lui. soit par le 
moyen de conventions de recherche passees avec d autres orga- 
nismes publics ou prices. soit par des participations financieres ;
4" De suivre. en liaison avec le m in is te re  des affaires etran- 
geres. les problemes de cooperation In te r n a t io n a le  dans le 
domaine de I'espace et de veiller a l'execution de la part des 
programmes m temationaux confice a la France ;
5“ D assurer soit directement. soit par des souscriptions ou 
1 octroi de subventions, la publication de trasaux scientifiques 
concernant les problemes de I’espace
Art 3 Le centre national d etudes spatiales assure sa 
gestion fmaneiere et prcsente sa comptabilite suivant les usages 
du commerce
Art. 4 — Pour le financement des diverses missions prevues 
a Particle 2. le centre national d'etudes spatiales dispose notam­
ment des credits budsetaires ouverts pour les recherches spatiales 
dans chacun des budgets annuels en execution de la loi de 
programme d ’actions complementatres coordonnees de recherche 
scientifique et technique n* 61 530 en date du 31 mat 1961.
Le centre sera, des la promulgation de la presente loi. 
substituc a 1’Etat dans les conventions de recherche spatiale 
passees sur le chapitre (5600) du budget du Premier m inistre 
intitule * Funds de deveioppement de la recherche scientifique 
et technique »•
Art. S. —  Un ddcret en Conseil d’E tat fixers les conditions 
d ’applkatioo  de U presente loi et d^term inera^aoU m m ent. les 
regies de fonctionnement adn^frmtratif et finmncier de 1’etablisse- 
menL la composition du consort d’administration, les attributions 
respective* du conseil d'administration, dc son president e t du 
d irecteur gdndral du centre.
Art. 6. — Le centre national d’etudes spatiales deposera chaque 
annde, devant le Parlement. avant le vote du budget, un rapport 
sur son activite et les rcsultats obtenus pendant l’annce dcoulee.
La prdsente loi sera executce comme loi de 1’EtaL
Fait & Paris, le 19 ddcembre 1961.
C .  D E  G A U L L E .
Par le President de la Republique:
Le Premier ministre.
M I C H E L  D E B R E .  -
Le ministre delegue aupres du Prem ier m inistre.
P I E R R E  G L’I L L A U M A T .
Lc ministre des affaires < granger ex.
M A U R I C E  C O U V E  D E  M U R V I L L E .
Le ministre des finances et des affaires economiques.
W I L F R I D  B A U M G A R T N E R .
Le ministre de I'education nattonale,
LUCIEN PAYE.
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M I N I S T R E  DELEGUE AUPRES DU PREMIER MINISTRE
Die ret n‘ 61-703 du 3 J u ille t  1961 modifiant I* d6cr*t du 
7 1959 relatif 6 la creation d'un comiti da* r*ch*reh*s
spatial**.
Le Prem ier ministre,
Sur le rapport, du m inistre d£l£gue aupres du Prem ier minis­
tre,. du m inistre des affaires 6trang£res et du m inistre de Indu­
es ti on nationale,
Vu le  d6cret n ' 58-1144 du 28 novembre 1958 concernant la 
recherche scientifique et technique, modifig par le decret
_ n* 6L-362^1u^a avrilr 1961f __________ n____.J ..    _
_. Vn Tcrifaret du.7 fanvler 1959 relatif  li TaqrealiQn'd’-Uii comil6_
• des rechercheTTPatiales:   ._
Vu le d fc re t du 18 nqvembre 1959 portant nomination ati
Vu le -d fe re t  n*~ SQ-242 du ia  m arl 1560 relatif aux attribu- , 
t io n sd u  m inistre d21?gu6 aupres du Prem ier ministre,
D fc rf te : \
Art. I**: — Le_d6cret ausvis6 du 7 janvier 1959 relatif 4 la 
creation d ’un comitAdes reeherebes-spatiales eat abrog6 et rem- 
placf par les dispositions su ivan tes:
1” . — 11 est ciM  a jp r^s du Premier ministre (d616- 
gation gdnfrale i  la recherche scientifique et technique) un 
comit6 de*- reeherebes-spatiales:-----
« Art. Z- — Le com iti des recherches spatiales comprend :
«• M. P ierre Auger, professeur 4 la Sorbonne.
< Le haut-commissaire k l’6nergie atomique.
< Le directeur .general des '  affaires cuiturelles et techniques 
au m inistire  des affaires 6trang£res. *
« Le chef dq service des affaire) spatialesV au miniature des 
affaires etrangeres.
^Le directeur des recherches et moyens d’essais air m inistire
< De coordonner l’action des different* dfpaxtements minis­
terial* in ter esses au deveioppement des recherches spatiales.
r  A rt -5. Le-president du comitf des recherches spatiales
a pour mission: ~  — — ____       „___
« De d ir ig e r~ I i~ m lse  en- application du programme de 
recherches spatiales arrft& par ie G ouvernem ent;
- * D e -suiVr»^-ep liaison arec les services du~ mtflTStere des 
lTlaIres'~etrad?fercs-et--4«-diJi£iuiLJg^n6ral 6 la recherche scien­
tifique et technique, les probl6meide~codp»i ation intern at ion al*—  
dans le domaine de i'espace. _r . . - *.
<11 tie n tle  com iti inform6 des rfsultats de sa mission.
- c Art. 8. — Pour l ’accomplissement de sa mission, le president 
'dispose du personnel, des locaux et des moyens m atfriels mis 
k sa disposition par la d&fgation gfn6rsle 4 la recherche 
sCieartUiqbe et tedngiqne~:>! — — ■ - r  ■ -•
A r t  7  __ l > - i r n n k t r « .  S t 'P r f f  d u  R P M liW  .m ln ia t r a , -
le ministre des affaires ftrang ires, Ie~mlnlxtre  'dee -f inanceg-
. sont charges, chacun eh ce qui U  coocerne, de l’execution 
du prdsent decre t
Fait 4P *ris , le 3 juillet-196Lr
utrww. SESXi.
Par 1« Premier m inistre:
Le ministre d iU q u i aupris du Prem ier ministre,
> P I X B K K  C U I L L A U M A T .
_L  Le ministre des- affaires EtranaAres.
MAUK1CX COUTX Dl MURVILLX.
Le ministre des fm m c e s  et des afffcres Economiques,
WTimm BAUMCARTNXX.
Le Ministre de VEducation nationale, 
LUCIXW rAYB.
des armees.
« Lc directeur du d6partement Engins 4 la delegation ministe- 
rielle pour l’armement
< Le chef d’6tat-major interarm£es.
recberches-a^roaautiques.—  ---------------
< Un repr^sentant du chef d’etat-major general de ja  defense 
nationale.
« Un repr6sentant du ministre des finances ct des affaires 
feonomiquesc-- - ~r~ :
« Le directeur g£n£ral de l’enseignement superieur.
« Le directeur du centre national de la recherche scientifique.
« Le directeur de l’Observatoire de Paris.
« Le president du Bureau des longitudes.
« Le president de la section IV (astronomie, astrophysique. 
physique du globe) du comit6 national de la recherche scienti-
« Le president de ' la  section DC (physique nucl6alre et physi­
que corpusculaire) du comitf national de la recherche scienti­
fique.
« Le president de ia section X (electronique, 41ectricite, magne-
La directeur de la mftforologJe-nattonale.-
.« Le directeur de l’institut gcographique national.
« Le directeur de l’institut national d ’hygifne.
< Le directeur du centre national d ’6tudes des telecommuni­
cations.
« Le directeur des services techniques de la radiodiffusion- 
teievision frangaise.
< Le president du comite peut appeler 4 y si6ger toute pcrson- 
nalite susceptible de participer utilement aux travaux en cours 
ainsi que les representants des minist6rcs ou services interesses.
« Art. 3. — Lc president du comite jest nomrne par arrete 
U u  ministre delegue aupres du Premier)ministre.
cA rt. 4. — Le comite a pour m ission:
< De recenser les moyens dont la France dispose dans lc 
domaine des recherches spatiales ;
« De presenter  des propositions au Premier ministre pour 
l ’ttabliasement d’un programme de recherches spatiales ;
« De donner avis au Premier ministre sur toutes questions 
concernant les problemes de I’espace, notamment en maticre 
da coan^ration Internationale;
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C H A R G E  DE t A  R E C H E R C H E ~ S C I E N T I F I Q U E " t — 
E T U D E S  ^ Q U E S T I O N S  " A T O M I Q U E S  If SPATI ALES
-^M od*iR **-^-#o»»ctlD m »e«Tienf financier 
du cen tra  national d 'e tu d es  spatiales.
 icsaffalres fconomlgues et le ministre ~
d’Btat charg* de-1* recherche •cfeatlflque- e t des quesliohJ-itomlques 
et spatia le* \
V d’ la -lo t n* 6F1382 $o-19 decembre 1961 lnstltuant an centre 
 ii*ttofiU^<tode*-»patIales v  ■ « j ■ *
V tt-le.d6cret n* .62-153 du 10 fevrier L962 pris pour l’appllcation 
de la^ioi’'n*-;61-1382_dul9-.d*c«mbrel961 et relatif au fonctlonne- 
ment adm inistratif e t  financier du centre national d’etudes spatiales. 
notamment son article 16 ;
 -V n  la  dArret n« 62-1587 dir M d ie tm h ri 1962 portant r*glement
'p u b l lque,— »------- ._______ _____
-Arrftenf :
A rt: !•»; — Le^fbncllonnement financier e t  comptable du centre^ 
' national d'etudes'spatlales- est assur* d a n s le s  conditions fix?es par 
le d e c re t sqsvlse du 29 decembre 1962 pbrtant reglement general 
— »nwvpf*SilltA puhUtp ia , seiorr lea gtadali&fal tj^flnKf /‘t-apr*« 
-ArLii'IL .W’ TTn*~' t^at de provision de recettes ^ t  de d6penses
—r es t ttab li-pour-jchaque excrcicn-annuel commengani en pnnclpe 
; le I "  janv ier; cette date peut *tre-m odlfjee par le president du 
conseil d'administration avec 1’accord du contrfileur dTtat. 
^ il/e ta^ tfa ltj* n n ara itm . aoua^ieiix.ancilnna, dlatinctea .lea. ooeratinna 
-TelitH er^liU '.'ionctlonnttnentret-lea operations en capltatr lf est
* divise en  chap itres-q u isle  doivent comprendre que des depenses 
’ .ou .des recettes do m tm e nature et est conform s a La nomenclature
comptable via** 4 I 'a r t td e r t ia  dtxjji*cret-susvisA du 29 decembre
*____1962. Lca.T'<mfrallnni eiy  capital peuvent donner lieu k des pr*vi-
~«lons d.‘«X*cutlOn .Arh alortneon  suviptasleua^aimoea^-Eo* _pr*vlsibn* - 
 tnscntes ;S\rr: ehapltres'dont 1'inum^ration ts t  flx*e par arre te  du
 ministry d u  fliu iifw  nnt nn > . ^ r .
A rt;.:S^T". L es provisions en matiere Jrinvestlssements doivent 
 L-iuAsfaltarny V ofttllotal ‘des- operations i"  en r a r e r ' et I’e^hflbnne-
* ment dvehtuoPear^plnslcurs inn*ea-de*rpalem ent*. correspondents.
A r i /4 .— L’eiat de. prevision est p r ip a r i  par le directeur "general 
«t d6UMr< p a r le conseil d'administration de fafcon a etre soutnis 
e-rapp toba tfdn 'du  ministre' d 'E tat charge de la recherche scienti- 
'  n q u e 'e trd e a  bnestlons atomlciu**-ef spatiales et du ministre des 
finances .ctljdea_afffires *conomlquee, dans les conditions. prevues
 jfcl'artlcla 8 d adA cret surrlsA n* .62-153 du 10 fArrier' m Z u le u x
m ol*,** plus tard jivan t la date du debut de 1’ex e rd ce ...
—ht--l'djM->A‘est  ■ par  encore - approuv* -  a  Pou vcrture de l’ex trdce, 
I ’ofdOnnatenr. peUtrh^anmoins, dans la llmite des fonds dlsponibfes 
et..ave«-. i'agrement du contrAIeur d T ta t, engager les depenses 
anteneurem ent spj^rjs^ea ntYatdptanec les palements correspondanta.
II p e u t^ tn  outreU'dans la double llmite des previsions adoptees 
. p a r  14 conseil..d’administration et des credits approuvfa au tltre 
da l'ahnAn nrAcAdantn. engager, ianf opposition du contrfileur d ’Etat. 
le ^ d ig e n s e s  .indlspensabJes A .la contlnulta de la gestion.
‘ 7 modifications reconnuea necessalre* en cours d’exerdce sont72*^1 e t ' approuvOes dans lea mAmes formes que retat annuel
contrOIeur 
transfert
  — — ------------------------- -------------------- —  deux sec­
tions n ’orft pas a #tre soumlses k 1'approbatlon des mlnlstres.
— ArL: 6 ._ —  Le president du conseil d ’administration a qualite 
d’ordonnateur 'principal. II peut. sous sa responsabllite, deieguer 
rme parties de sea pouvolra au directeu r general, ou, apres avis 
da'^SeiuFcii'tlii inn1, ou piusieurs des ehefa. de service places sous 
ra u to rtte : da-, directeur f*nAraL;
Toutefois, pour “t'appllcatlon des articles 219 et 220 du decret 
' susvisd du 29 decembre 1962, ■ le ’ directeur general a qualite
r f * n r r f t U » i f ’ f» * '  h . ,  ^  . . _______ , ___
,^ A i i , 'i '~ 'I ? e s .a v in c e s  peuvent^6tre consentles dans les condl- 
nons-flx6es par 1’ordpnjpteur, avec 1’accord du contrOieur d’Etat, 
aux.persoames chargeer de^noission pour le compte du centre alnsi
—: pocteges o ^ o n ran lsmea mandates par le centre
 .pourtl open*: POU/ribn ^ ( ^ p te r ^ t s - in o d e  - de Jus tinea tld ff^ d r  cei“
svancea est determine par I’agfent compUbie. *
Art. 7.. — Lei fonds deposes k la Banque de France et, avec 
l’autorisatlon du ministre des- finances, en -^banque n i .  peuvent 
•xcOderj un ■ raont 
contrOieur- (FEtaU
   .
ment et de contrOle des marches sont-* fixeea par le conseU
de m a t .
 0—eat—InstUue^au-
La composition e t les ir*glea- da> fonctionnement de cette commis- 
~ iI<5h TefOfirrocee's p s r  Trjr^arretr tfu^m lnm rtf des fln an cer et du 
ministre charge de la recherche scientifique et des questions 
atomlques et spatiales.
A rt 9. — De* regies d’avances e t dei~r6gles de recettes peuvent 
etre lnstituees par arret* du ministre des finances et des affaires 
Iconomlques et du m inistre d’Etat charge de la recherche scienti­
fique- el-des-questions atom iquea-et spatlalea^-Les-regisseurs-sonL 
design** par le president do .conseil d'administration avec l'accord 
de l’agent r^Tnptahje, iis^jveuyent, * t r e ^dispenses de constltuer 
cautionnement-r-dans-ce caa, ia responsabHIU-pecunlaire de-J'agent 
comptable couvre i’ensemble d e - leurs operations.- ■
En accord avec L'aaent rompiahie, d»« aoua-regle* . peuvent ~ *tre- 
^ n a titu e es- par decision • du -presiden t d u -conse if-dTdmiiilstr atlon.— 
selon des modalites flx6es par le conseil d'administration.
A rt 10. — Dads les trJls mols qul suivent la transmission de 
1'avls de la ‘ commission de veilflcatlon_des—comptes, un arre te  
du ministre d 'E tat charg* de la recherche scientifique et des 
questions atom lques-et spatiales et du ministre des finances et des 
s/fstres econornlques sts iue  sur rapptobstlon  des-comptes et fbte 
deflnltivement^ie - bllan^— . —
de la Republique francaise.
Fait k Paris, le  29 aoOt 1963.
'  Le m inistre d’Etat eharai de la recherche scientifique  
j et des questions atomiques et spatiales,
GASTON rALXWSU. •*
Le ministre des finances et des affaires iconomiques.
Pour le m inistre et par d*l*gaQon:
- * Le directeur du-hudffct,-------------------- — -----------_  .
• ^  axYMonn KAsnxrr. . w.
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MI N I S T R E S DELEGUES 
A U P RE S  DU PREMIER M I N I S T R E
D 6cr* t  n" 62-153  d u  10. f i v r i e r  1962 pr i*  p o u r  I ' a p p l i c a t i o n  
d e  la lo i  n “ 61-1382 d u  19 d e c e m b r e  1961 e t  r e l a t i f  a u  f o n c t i o n ­
n e m e n t  a d m i n i s t r a t i f  e t  f i n a n c i e r  d u  c e n t r e  n a t i o n a l  d ' e t u d e s  
s p a t i a l e s .
Le President  de la Republique.
S u r^ lc  rappor t  du Premier ministre. du ministre delegue 
aupres-du Prem ier  ministre et du nunistre des finances et lies 
affaires economiques.
Vu la loi n* 61 1382 du 19 decembre 1961 insti tuant un 
centre national  d ctudes spatiales. et notamment son article 5 ;
Vu le decret du 7 janvier 1959 relatif a la creation d'un 
comite des recherches spatiales. modifie par le decret  n" 61-703 
du 3 ju ille t  1961 ;
Vu le d ecre t  n* 55-733 du 20 mai 1955 relatif l u  controle
6conomique et financier  de :__________
Le Conseil d 'E tat  (section de l'intcricur) entendu,
Decrete :
Art. 1". — Le conseil d'administration du centre national 
d ctudes spatia les est compose comme suit :
Le d irecteur general du centre national de la recherche scienti 
fique.
Le d irec teur  de l'Observatoire de Paris.
Le d irec teur  "des recherches et moyens d'essais au ministere 
des armees.
Quatre personnali tes qualifiees en raison de leur competence 
dans le domaine scientifique ou industriel.
Trois hauts  fonctionnaires relevant du Prem ier  ministre ou 
des departemcnts  mimstcriels undresses.
Les mem bres autres que les membres de droit  sont desigrres 
pour une durce de cinq ans par arrete  du ministre delegue 
aupres du Premier ministre.
Le mandat des membres sonan ts  peut et re renouvele.
Les membres du conseil d’administration decedes ou demi^ 
sionnaires et eeux qui, en cours de mandat, cessent d ’exercer 
les fonctions cn raison desquelles ils ont etc ddsignes doivent 
et re remplaces. Dans ce cas. le mandat aes nouveaux membros 
expire a la date a laquelle aurait normalement pris fin celui 
de leurs prcdecesseurs.
Art. 2. — Le president du conseil d’administration. choisj. 
parmt les administrateurs.  est nomme pour une durce de cinq 
ans par decret en conseil des ministres pris sur  le rapport du 
Premier ministre et du ministre delegue aupres  du Premier 
ministre.
Le conseil d 'administration designe dans son sein. des sa nomi­
nation et apres chaquc renouvcllcmenl, un vice president charge, 
en cas d absence ou d 'empechement du president, de remplir  
les fonqtions de ce dernier au cours des seances
Art. 3. — Le conseil d'administration sc rcunit sur la convo­
cation de son president au moins huit fois par  an et plus 
souvent si les besoins l’exigent. Le president reunit immedia- 
tement le conseil s’il y est invite soit par le ministre delegue 
aupres du Premier ministre. soit par la majorite des membres.
Le conseil ne peut valablement deliberer que si la majorite 
des membres en exarcice assistent a la seance. Les deliberations 
sont prises a la majorite absolue des votants.
En cas de partage, la voix du president est preponderante.  
Les proces-verbaux sont signcs du president et notifies au 
ministre delegue aupres du Premier ministre
Le delegue general a la recherche scientifique et technique 
et le controleur d'Etat  assistent aux reunions du conseiLd’admi- 
nistration.
Art. 4. — Sur  proposition du president, lc conseil d’administra- 
lion delibere sur les objets suivanls :
P rogramme des activitcs et des investissements du centre, 
conformement a la mission qui lui est confide par l'artiele 2 de 
la loi susvisee du 19 decembre 1961 
Plan d ’organisation et de fonctionnement des services du 
centre.
Etat annuel des previsions de recettes et de depenses e ^ s ’il 
y a lieu, etats rectificatifs en cours d’annde. w
Approbation du rapport annuel d ’activitc, du bilan et des 
comptes annuels.
Proposition relative a la fixation et a l 'affcctation des bene­
fices et a la constitution des reserves.
Approbation des cmprunts  A court terme et A long terme, 
mcme s’ils ne comportent pas nantissement ou hypotheques, 
ainsi que toutes les emissions d’obligatioos.
Approbation des projets de conventions de recherche.
Approbation des projets dc marches, d'achats et de ventes 
d ’immeubles, constitution de nantissements et d'hypotheques, 
projets de baux et locations d ’immeubles.
Prises, -extensions ou cessions de participations financier^*.
Octroi d'avances.
Acceptation ou refus des dons et legs.
Regime de recrutement. d’emploi et de remunera tion du 
personnel.
Le conseil d'administration# peut cgalcment. dans les limites 
qu'il determine, autoriser le president a passer sans son appro­
bation prealable les conventions de recherche et les marches.
Art. 5. — Les deliberations relatives aux objets sur lesquels 
le conseil peut decider sans approbation ministericlle sont 
executoires si. dans les huit jours qui suivcnt la notification du 
proces-verbal. d ies  ne sont pas frappdes d ’opposition par le 
ministre delegue aupres du Premier ministre. En cas d'oppo 
sition, le ministre doit sla tuer  dans un delai d’un mois a parttr
de l'opposition ; pass# ce -delai. la deliberation devient exe-
^uToIre.
Le ministre ne peut annulcr  une deliberation que par decision 
motivee.
Art. 6 — Xe sont executoires qu'apres avoir etc approuvees 
par le ministre delegue aupres du Premier ministre et le ministre 
des finances et des affaires economiques les deliberations pot; 
tant sur  les objets ci-apres :
Etabjissement et modification des etats de previsions de 
recettetfVl de’ depenses.
Compte de pertes et profits, bilan. fixation des amortisse- 
ments, previsions, reserve et affectation des benefices.
Emprunts.
Prises, extensions ou cessions de participations financieres.
Regime de recrutement. d'emploi et de remuneration du per­
sonnel.
Art. 7 — Le comite de recherches spatiales. cree par le 
decret du 7 janvier 1959, modifie par  le decret du 3 juillet 1961, 
prend le nom de Conseil de I'espace. II est complete par l'adjonc- 
tion des personnalites suivantes :
Le eommissaire general du plan.
Le delegue general a la recherche scientifique et technique.
Le president du comitc consultatif de la recherche scientifique 
et technique.
Le president du comite d’action scientifique de la defense.
Le doyen de la faculte des sciences de Paris.
Le president  de la section XVI (Biologie cellulaire) du conseil 
national de la recherche scientifimie. *
Le Conseil de I'espace est preside parsje president du centre 
national d ’etudes spatiales ; il se reunit  k diligence dc celui-ci.
II examine 1’ensemble deS projets de recherche relevant de la 
competence du cen t re ;  il donne son avis sur leur contenu et 
leur mode d execution par les differents organismes interesses 
avant que lc conseil d'administrat ion n'arrete ses programmes. 
11 peut etre consulte par  son president sur toute question concer 
nant I'espace. et notamment sur le fonctionnement du centre.
Le conseil,.sur proposition de son president, peut constituer des 
commissions d'etudes.
Art. 8. — Le president du conseil d'administration represente 
le centre dans les negociations internationales et dans tous les 
actes de la vie civile. II assure l’exccution des deliberations du 
conseil d'administration ; il a qualite notamment pour :
1* Passer au nom du centre tous actes. contrats. traites ou 
marches ; cmettre, endosser ou avaliser tous efTets dc commerce, 
etablir tous ordres de vente. ordonnancer et liquider toutes 
depenses, recevoir Vmtes sommcs dues au centre et en donner 
quittance ou decharge ;
2° Proccder a toutes acquisitions, depots ou cessions de brevets 
ou de licences, autoriser tous compromis, acquiescemcnts, desis- 
tements ou toutes mainlevees d'inscription, de saisie et d'oppo- 
sition, avant ou apres paiement, reprcsenter  lc centre en justice, 
determiner l'emploi des fonds disponibles et le placement des 
reserves, proccder a toutes acquisitions, alienations et transferts 
de valeurs ;
3* Proccder. sous reserve des approbations prevues a Par­
ticle 4 ci-dessus. a tous achats, ventes ou locations d'immeubles. 
contracter tous emprunts,  constituer  nantissement ou hypo 
th e q u e s ;
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4* Conclure les contrats individuels de travail ; nommer, 
l icencier  les inembres du personnel de toutes categories. Toute- 
fois, les nominations aux emplois de chefs de service ne peuvent 
in te rv cn i r ,q u  apres avis du conseil d'administration ;
5° P re pare r  le rapport  annuel d activite en vue de son examen 
par le conseil d'administration.
Le president est assiste d ’un directeur  general auquel il peut 
deleguer une partic des pouvoirs qu il tient en vertu des alineas 
qui precedent.  11 peut egalement deleguer certaines att ributions 
aux chefs de service sous l autoritc  du directeur  general.
Art. 9. — Le directeur general  du centre national d 'e tudes 
spatia les est nomme par decret sur proposition du ministre 
delegue aupres du Premier ministre. 11 assiste aux seances du 
conseil d administrat ion avec voix consultative.
Le d irecteur general est charge, selon les directives du presi­
dent. de la mise en ceuvre des decisions du conseil d 'adminis­
tration concernant I'organisation et le fonctionnement des ser 
vices du centre ; il a autoritc sur l'ensemble du personnel ; il 
est responsable de la preparation des etats annuels de prevision 
de recettes et de dispenses, des comptes et du bilan annuel du 
centre.
Art.  10. — Les emoluments et indemnites du president et du 
d irecteur general,  ainsi que les je tons de presence qui peuvent 
etre alloues aux membres du conseil d’administration. sont fixes 
par le ministre delegue aupres du Premier  ministre et le ministre 
des finances et des affaires economiques.
Art. 11. — Le president du centre  adresse au ministre delegue 
aupres du Premier mintstre et au ministre des finances le 
rapport annuel sur 1'activite du centre prealablement examine 
par ic conseil d administration. Ce rapport est transmis par 
le ministre delegue au Par lement. conformcment a Particle 6 
de la loi jiu 19 decembre 1961.
Art. 12. — Le controle de la gdstion financiere du centre 
est exerce. sous l'autorite du ministre des finances et des 
affaires economiques, par un controleur d'Etat. Dans le cadre 
des lois et reglements en vigueur. un arre te  precisera en tant  
que de besoin les modalites d'application du present article.
Les rapports du controleur d 'E ta t  au ministre des finances 
sont adresses a u  ministre delegue aupres du Premier ministre. 
Le rapport  annuel est egalement communique au conseil d 'admi­
nistration.
Art. 13 — Les operations du centre sont soumises au controle 
de la commission de verification des .comptes des entreprises 
publiques inst i tu te  par Particle 56 de la loi du 6 janvier 1948.
Art. 14 — Les articles 3 a 6 du decret  susvise du 7 jarucj/r 
1959 portant  creation du comite de recherches spatiales. modifie 
par le decret du 3 juillet 1961. sont abrogcs. ^
Art. 15. — Un arrete  conjoint du ministre’ delegue aupres du 
Premier ministre et dn ministre des finances et .des affaires 
economiques precise les modalites ,-du fonctionnement financier 
du centre  et determine notammerr\de role de Pagent comptable 
nomme par arre te  d i/  ministre des-t inances et des affaires cco- 
nonuques. apres avis du conseil d'administratioa.
Art. 16. — Le Premier ministre. le ministre delegue aupres 
du Premier ministre et le ministre des finances et des affaires 
economiques sont charges, chacun en ce qui le concerne. de 
l'execution du present decret, qui sera public au Journal o fficiel 
de la Republique framjaise.
Fait a Paris, le 10 fevrier 1962. c DE i;AVLLE
Par le President de la Republique:
Le Prem ier m inistre,
MIC1IEL DEBRE.
Le m inistre delegue aupres du Premier m inistre,
% ’ PIERRE CUILLAL’MAT.
Le m inistre des affaires etrangeres. ^
m MAURICE COLVE DE MURVILLE. ~
** Le m inistre des finances et des affaires economiques,
VALERY GISCARD 1EESTAINC,
Le m inistre  de I'education nationale,
LL'CIEN PAYE.
^  Arrete :
Article unique. — Sont nommes membres du conseil d’admini> 
tration du centre national d’etudes spatiales
En tanf que membres de droit :
M. Jean Coulomb, directeur general du centre national de la 
recherche scientifique.
M. Andre Danjon, directeur de l’Observatoire de Paris.
M. Lucien Maiavard, directeur des recherches et moyens d’essaLs 
a I'administration centrale du ministere des armees. ,
En tant que personnalites qualifiees en raison de leur compe­
tence dans le domaine scientifique ou industriel :
M. Pierre Auger, professeur A la faculte des sciences de l'universitd 
de Paris.
M.- Pierre Grivet, professeur a la faculte des sciences de l’universit6
de Paris.
M. Maurice Pascal, ingenieur en chef du genie maritime.
M. Jean Voge, ingenieur en chef des telecommunications.
En tant que hauts fonctionnaires relevant du Premier ministre 
et de£ departements ministeriels interesses:
M. Jean Donrtedieu de Vabres, maitre des requetes au ConseU * 
d'Etat. ■*"
M. Jean de La Chevardiere de La Grandville, chef du service des 
affaires spatiales au ministere des affaires etrangeres.
M. Pierre Magniez, sous-directeur au ministere des finances.
Les membres autres que les membres de droit sont nommes pour 
une duree de cinq ans.
Fait k Paris, le 10 fevrier 1962.
P I E R R E  G l ' I L L A U M ^ T .  ~
  /
D e c r e t  p o r t a n t  n o m i n a t i o n  d v  p r e s i d e n t
Le President de la Republique,
Sur le rapport du Premier ministre et du ministre delegue aupr£* 
du Premier ministre,
Vu la loi ti" 61-1382 du 19  decembre 1961 instituant un centre natio­
nal d etudes spatiales ; r
Vu le decret n" 62-153 du 10 fevrier 1962 pris pour I’application 
de la loi n* 61-1382 du 19 decembre 1961 relatif au fonctionnement 
administratif et financier du centre national d'etudes spatiales, et 
notamment son article 2 ;
Vu l’arrete du 10 fevrier 1962 nommant les membres du conseil 
d'administration du centre national d’etudes spatiales ;
Le conseil des ministres entendu,
Decrete :
Art. 1". — M. Pierre Auger, professeur k la faculte des s o e n w »  
de I'university de Paris, est nomme president du conseU d'admi­
nistration du centre national d ’etudes spatiales.
Art. 2 — Le Premier ministre et le ministre delegu£ aupres du 
Premier ministre sont charges '  chacun en ce qui le concerne, de 
['execution du present decret. qui sera pubtie au Journal officiel de
la Republique franpaise.
Fait k Paris, le 10 fevrier 1962.
C . P S  G A U L L E .
Par le President de la Republique :
Le Premier ministre,
MICHEL DEBRE.
I.e ministre rielegut aupris du Premier ministre,
P I E R R E  C U I L L A U M A T .
Conseil  d ' a d m in is t r a t io n  
d u  c e n t r e  na t ional  d ' e tu d e s  spatiales.
A r r e t e  p o r t a n t  n o m i n a t i o n  d e s  m e m b r e s
„ Lc minfstre delegue aupres du Premier ministre,
Vu la loi n" 61 1332 du 19 decembre 1961 instituant un centre I 
national d’etudes spatiales :
Vu le decret n" 62 133 du 10 fevrier 1962 pris pour ^application j 
de la loi n" 61-1382 du 19 decembre 1961 et relatif au fem^ionnement 
administratif et financier du centre national d'etudes spatiales.
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!>* I ^ ^ e c T d f e  u < kEpublique, .
P rem ier m inistre, da ministre, d« 1’Economie 
et de* finance* e t da m inistre de I’industrie e t de la recherche, 
Vtf Ja .loTa** 6KL382 da l9  dEcembre 1901 instituant an  centre 
^nt1ioh»l..d*4fadei *p*Uale*..et, notsm m ent son artic le  5 ;
V a  ra rtid e-S O v d e  la to t n* 48-24 da 3 janv ier isHS relative 
A d l r e r m  dl^poeiUans d’ordre b udgeta ire ;
VU M b ttfcre i ST «&70^<dM'.a aodt 1903 modiflE relatif an 
con trd ie  fie  i’E ta t .s u r  . lea -en trep riies  publlqoes natlonalea et 
certa in s organism ** ajrant un objet d’o idre Econutnique oa 
social r ^ * -- y ; T X ' . / '  «
V a le  decre t a* 50-733 d a  28 mai 1955 modiflE relatif an 
contrAle Ecoaomique et financier de i'E tat';
V a leddcre t-n*  03-1587 da 29 decem bre 1962 portent rEgleraent 
gEnEral max la comptabilitE pub lique ;
Vu le  dEcret n* 66-819 du 10 aotit 1968 relatif aux fraia de 
d ip lacem en t dea fonctlonnalrea de I’E ta t e t  dee Etabiissements
publics de I’E ta t;*  /  - -
V a le  dEcret n* 68-827 du 20 septem bre 1968 relatif k la Coor
dee com ptes; j ,
Vu le dEcret n* 75-1002 da 29 octobre 1975 relatif k  la coordi­
nation  de la politique de recherche scientifique e t techn ique; 
Le ConseU. d’E ta t (section des travaax publics) entendu, 
DEcrEte:
Trrnx I "*r-
Orvanisation et fonctionnement du centre notional 
”  d’itudes tpat iales.
A r t  1” . — Le conseil d’adm inistration da centre national 
d’Etudes spatiales com prend treize membres :
L e .d ire c te u r  du budget au  ministEre de l’Economie et des 
finances ou son reprEsentant tfOmmEment dEsign*;
“ Douse personnaliUa qualifiEes en raison de leur competence 
dans les domaines d ’activitE du centre.
Les membres du conseil d 'adm inistration sont nommes pour ^  
tro ts ans par dEcret pris sur le rapport du m inistre de I'industrie 
et ds la recherche ; leur m andat est renouvelahle. Lea membres- 
dEcEdEs ou dEmlssionnalres doivent Etre remplacEa. Dans ce 
cas, Je m andat des nouveaux membres expire k la date k laqoelle 
su r  ait norm alem ent pris fin celui de leu ri prEdEcesaeur*.
Les m em bres du conseil d’administration pEbvent recevoir ‘ 
dea jetons de presence, dont le m on tant est fixA conjointem eat 
par le m inistre de 1’Economie et des finances e t  le m inistre 
de I’industrie  e t de la recherche.
Ces membres bEnEfldent du remboureement des fraia de 
dip lacem ent ou de  sEjour effectivement supportEs par eux k 
1’occasion des reunions du conseU, sur la base des taux ap p tt 
cables aux fonctionnaires appartenant au groupe I. dans les 
conditions prevues au dEcreLsusvisE da 10 aodt 1966.
A r t  2. — Le president d a  conseil d’adm inistration est choisi. 
parm i les doqze personnalites dEsign Ee* en application de I’ar- 
t id e  1”  ci-dessus. D est nommE par decret pris en conseil des 
m inistres, s u r , proposition du m inistre de I’industrie et de la 
recherche.
Les Emoluments et IndemnitEs du president sont fixEs par 
decision conjointe du m inb tre  de i ’industrie et de la recherche 
et du m inistre de l’Economie et des finances
A rt. 3. — Le conseil d 'adm inistration se rEunit su r la convex 
caUon du president, aussi sou vent, qu ’il est nEcessaire et au 
moins six fois par an. Le prEsident rEunit immEdiatement le 
conseil s ’ll y est invitE soit par le ministre de I’industrie et de 
la recherche, soit par la majoritE des m em bres
Le conseU ne peut valablement dEllbErer que si la majoritE 
des membres en exercice assistent k la sEance. Les dEcisions 
sont prises k Ia majoritE absolue des votants En cas de partage 
la voix du prEsident est prEpondErante.
Le lieu, la date e t rh e u re  ainsLque Fordr* da iira r sqpt portE* 
au moins hu it Jours k l’arance k  la connaistance dee m em bree 
dd conaeU d’adm inistration ainsi q u e  d a  contrdhsur d’E ta t et 
du eommiasaire da Gouvernement. qui a s s is te n ts a x  sEafice* d u  i 
conseU avec voix consultative:
Le censeU d'adm inistration peut. entendre,, en tan t que de 
beaoia, le* reprEsentant* des m inistres e t secretaires d ’E ta t 
visEs 4 I’a r t id e  16 du.prEsent dEcreL -* ’
A r t  4  —  Le conseU d’adm inistration dEilbEre su r le* objets ^  
suhranta: *
1* Programme des *ctivltE*~et dea Invest! sac  men ts du c e n tre ;
2* Plan d’orginisaUon e t de fonctionnem ent da c e n tre ; __
3* E ta t' annuel des provisions de recettea et dEpenses, e t s’U 
7  a lien, Etats rectifies lif t  en cours d’annEe *
4* Approbation du rapport annuel d’sc tir i tE ; *
.. 3* Approbation du, compte da perte* e t. profits e t du bilan
annnela, de l’affectation des-rEsuitat* a in tt que 'd e  Ia  fixation 
d e i Uax.dtamprtisseiDenLndu. rig im e e t de lsvdElwnninatio»,de«-  
provisions e t rEserves; ;  -
8* Approbation des em prunU  k court etiA long term e, mEme 
s’ils ne comporient pas nantissem ent oa hjrpotbEque;
T* Approbation des p ro je u 'd e  conventioeu de recherche^
8* Approbation de* projets de marchEa, (fachats e t-d #  -ventes 
d’immeubles et des constitutions de nantissement* on d ’hypo- 
tbEques, des projets de baux et de location d ’im m eubles;
9* Prise, extension ou cession de participations UnandEres, 
octroi d 'avances;
10* Acceptation ou refus des dons et le g s ;
11* REgime de recrutem ent, d’emploi et de rEmunEration du 
personnel: <
12*" Autorisation d’entreprendre, poor Is  anise- en oeuvre du 
programme de relations Internationale* de 1’Etablissement. des 
□Egociationi pouvant conduire k la conclusion d’arrangem ents 
adm inistratifs internatlonaux.
Le conseU d’adm inistration peut, dans les limites qu’il dEter- . 
mine, autoriser le prEsident i  passer sans son approbation prEa- 
lable des conventions de recherche ou ‘des marchEa 
Le conseil peut en outre Etre consult* sur touts question de 
la eompEtence du centre.
Art. 5. — Les dElibErations du conseU d’administration portant 
su r lea objets visEs aux 3*. 5*. 6*. 9* e t 11* de l’article prEcE- 
dent ne sont exEcutoires qu’aprEs avoir EtE approuvEes par Je'* 
m inistre de I'industrie et de la recherche et le m inistre de 
1’Economie et des finances.
Les dElibErations autres que celles ci-dessus visEes sont de 
plein droit executoires si le com missal re du Gouvernement 
prEvu k 1’article 9 du prEsent dEcret n’y a pas fait opposition 
ri»Ti« les dix jours qui suivent soit la rEunion du conseil s'il y  a 
asxistE, so it'la  rEception du procEs-verbai de la sEance. ^
Dans le cas oh il forme opposition, le commissaire du Gouver­
nem ent en rEfEre ImmEdiatement au m inistre de I’industrie et 
de la recherche qui doit se prononcer dans le dElai d’un mois.
A  dEfaut de dEcision expresse dans ce dElai la dElibEration du 
conseil d’administration est exEcutoire.
ArL 6  — Par application de l’article 2 (4*) de la loi susvisEe • 
du 19 decembre 1961, le m inistre des affaires etrangEres esl 
xxsociE k l'engagement, au dEroulement e t k la conclusion des 
nEgociations visEes au 12* de Particle 4 ci-dessus.
A r t  7. — Le prEsident du conseil d 'adm inistration reprEsente 
le centre dans tous les actes de la vie civile, dans ses rapport* 
avec les tiers et dans les relations Internationales, tl assure 
1’exEcution des dElibErations* du conseil d’administration.
Sous rEserve des approbations nEcessaires, il a. notamment 
qualitE. pour :
Passer au nom du centre tous actes. contrats ou marchEs ; 
ProcEder k toutes acquisitions, tout dEpbt ou cession de brevet 
ou de licence ;
ReprEsenter le centre en justice ;
DEtermlner l’emploi des fonds disponibles et le placement 
des rEserves, procEder k toutes acquisitions, aliEnations et trans- 
ferts de valeura;
ProcEder k tous achats, ventes ou locations d’immeubles, 
contracter tous em prunts, constituer nantissem ent ou hypothEque.
Art. 8. — Le prEsident du conseil d 'adm inistration est assistE 
d'un directeur gEnEral nommE par dEcret sur proposition du 
m inistre de I'industrie et de la recherche, le prEsident du 
conseil d'adm inistration ayant EtE prEalablement consultE.
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L* tdirecteur general ast chargE, salon les directives dd prExi 
deal. de ie su m  en oeuvre des programmes e t dea opera Horn
c o a lite s  au centre, de le preparation et de i’exEcutinn des
dEcisions concernant I’orfaniaation et le fonctionnement dea 
service*.
n  a autoriU  aur Tensemble du personnel ; il conctat les
contrata de traVail, recrute et licencie les agents de toutes
categories.
R s a t  charge de La prepar ation  des elata annuela de provision 
de rec-ettes et de dEpenses, dea comptes et du bilan annuel du 
centre- "v
B assiste aur stances du conseil <fadministration avec voir 
consul tative.
Le president du coneeii d 'adm inistration peut deleguer au 
d irec teu r general, pour i'rxEcutino de aa mission, une partis 
des pouvoirs qu’il tien t de 1‘article 7 ci-dessus.
Lea Emoluments et indemaitEs du d irecteur gEnEral sont fixes 
par dEciaion conjointe du m inistre de I’industrie et de la 
recherche et du m inistre de (’Economic et dea finances.
Art. 9. »— Un commiasaire du GouVernement, dEsignE par 
arrEtE du m inistre de I’industrie et de la recherche, est placE 
~auprEn du centre national d’Etudes spatiales. 11 peut k tout 
m om ent ae faire communiquer toutes piEces. documents ou 
erchiv es et procEder ou fair* procEder k toute vEriflcation. En 
cas <f em pEctwment, il peut se faire re presenter aux seances 
du cooseil d'adnvinixtratioo par un fonctionnaire place sous son 
an ton  tE et n o o in e n a n t dEsigne.
U Lai arm* les mimstEres lntEresses des questions figurant k 
l ’ordre  du jour du conseil d'administration et des dElibErations 
adoptees.
A r t  10. — Le conseil d'administration du centre national 
d ’Etudes spatiales est assistE d'un comitE des programmes scien 
tifiques, qui a pour mission :
a) D* faire rapport sur 1'intErEt scientifique des programmes 
de recherche souims au centre national d ctudes rpatiales et sur 
la cap>acite scientifique et technique des laboratoires qui propo- 
sent ces programmes :
b) I /Em ettre  de* avis et des propositions sur les programmes 
de rcc-herche propres au centre national d'Etudes spatiales :
c) De formuier, corapte tenu de* moyens disponibles, toutes 
propositions utiles concernant ie deveioppement de la recherche 
spatia le en France, e t  conjointement, des autres diaciplines iiEes 
1 cette  recherche.
Les membres de ce comitE. au nombre maximum de douze. sont 
nommes par le ministre de I’industrie et de La recherche apres 
avu du secretaire d'Etat aux universite*
Le prEsident du comitE est nommE par le ministre de I’indus- 
trie e t  de la recherche sur proposition du prEsident du centre 
national d'Etudes spatiales
Art- 11. — Le centre national d eludes spatiales dispose des 
reasotjrees suivante* :
CrEdils budgetaires ouvert* notamment au budget du mirus- 
tere de I'industrie el de la recherche, qui lui sont affectEs ;
Fond* des contests sur programme conclus avec des dEparte 
ment* ministEriels ou avec la delEgation genErale A la recherche 
scientifique et technique .
Produits des emprunU ;
Remunerations de services rendus ,
Dons et legs ;
Subventions publiques ou pnvees .
Produits financiers et divers.
Art 12 — Le rapport annuel sur I'activitE du centre est
adresse par le president du conseil ci administration au ministre 
de I Industrie et de la recherche qui le transmet au Premier 
ministre et a tous les ministres interesses
Ce rapport est egalement transmis. par le ministre de i'indus- 
tn e  et de la recherche, au Parlement. conformement a 1’article 6 
de la loi du 19 decembre 1981 susvisce
Art 13. -  l.'n arrete conjoint du ministre de I'industrie el
de la recherche et du ministre de I'economie et des finances 
precise les modalites de fonctionnement financier du centre et 
determine notamment le role de l'agent comptable, nomme par 
arre te  du ministre de I'economie et des finances
Art 14 - l.e controle de la gesiion financiere du centre
est exercc. sous I autorite du ministre de I'economie et des
finances par un controleur d'Klat l 'n  arrete precisera. en tant 
que de besoin. Ie> modalites d application du present article 
Les rapports du controleur d ’Etat an ministre de I'economie 
et de* finances sont a dresses an ministre de I'industrie et de 
la recherche Le rapport annuel est eualement communique au 
conseil d'admmiitration
Art. 15. — Les operations du centre v n l  soumiscs au controle 
de la t o u r  de.- c o m p t e s
Tttrx H
Le conseU des appiicahons rpat tales.
A rt 16. — D est crEE, auprEs du m inistre de I’industrie et 
de La recherche, un conseil des applications spatiales. ,
Ce conseil, k cvractErs consuitatif. com prend :
a) A titre de membres de d r o i t : le dElEguE gEnErai I la 
recherche scientifique et technique, qui assure La vice-prEsidence, 
le prEsident du conseil d 'adm inistration do centre national 
d'etudes spatiales, .et ie commiasaire du G ouvernem ent aupres 
de cat Stadlissement ;
b) Huit membres quaiifiEs en matiEre d’applicstions spatiales, 
reprEsentant respective m ent Ie* m inistres des affaires EtrangEres, 
de l’Economie at des finances, de la dEfense. de I’industrie et 
de la recherche, et les secretaires d’E ta t aux transports, aux 
univeraitEs et aux dEpartessents et te rrito ires  d 'outre-m er et aux 
postes el tElEcommunicstions ; .
c) Six k huit personasiitEs scientifiques ou techniques choixies 
par le m inistre de I’industrie et de Ia recherche.
Les membres du conseil autres que les membres de droit 
sont nomme* par arrEtE du m inistre de l’tsdustrie  et de la 
recherche pour one durEe de qUatre ans. Le conseil est renou- 
veiable par moitiE tous les deux ans. Lor* des premiEres desi­
gnations, La moitie des membres seront nommes pour deux ans.
Le president du conseil des applications spatiales est choisi 
par le m inistre de I’industrie e t de ia recherche parmi les 
membres du conseil.
Le conseil se rEunit sur convocation de son prEsident au moins 
deux fois par an. D pourra, en tant que de besoin, consul ter 
des personnalitEs ou des experts, crEer des comitEs ou des 
groupes de travail consultatifs.
Les membres benEfVdent du rem bourse m ent des frais de 
Jepi ace m ent cm de sEjour effect! vement supportEs par eux a 
I I occasion des reunions du conseil. sur La base des taux appli­
cable* aux fonctionnaires appartenant au groupe L dans les 
conditions prEvues par le dEcret susvisE du 10 aodt 1966.
Art. 17. — Le conseil des applications spatiales est charge :
D em ettre des avis et des propositions sur ia politique de 
developpernam des applications spatiales e t ses rEpercussions ;
De proposer les Etudes et dEveloppemeats adEquats ;
De form uier des recom m endations su r Is mise en place des 
moyens necesaaires a I'exptoilalion de ces applications, et sur 
l'harmonisation des dEpenses de recherche en tre  les diffErents 
secteurs concerne* par les applications spatiales.
La preparation des travanx du conseil des applications spatiales 
est assurEe par le centre national d’Etudes spatiales.
Tmax III
„  Dispositions finales.
A rt 18. — Le dEcret n* 62-153 du 10 fEvrier 1962, pris pour 
l'application de La loi n* 61-1382 du 19 dEcembre 1961, relatif 
au fonctionnement adm inistratif et financier du centre national 
d'Etudes spatiales, modiflE par ie dEcret du 14 fEvrier 1968 et 
par ia dEcret n* 68-853 du 25 septem bre 1968, ainsi que le dEcret 
, du 7 Janvier 19Q9, relatif I  la crEation d’un comitE dea recherches 
spatiales, modiflE par le dEcret n* 61 700 du 3 ju illet 1961. sont 
abrogEs
Art. 19. — Le P rem ier m inistre, le m inistre des affaires 
etrangEres, le m inistre de I'Economie et des finances, le m inistre 
de la dEfense, le m inistre de I’industrie et de la recherche et 
le secretaire d’Etat aux postes et tElEcommunications sont char­
ges. chacun en ce qui le concerne, de 1’exEcution du prEsent 
decret. qui sera publiE au Journal officiel de la REpublique 
francaise.
Fait k Pans, le 27 janvier 1976.
* v a l E r y  c i s c a r o  d ' e s t a i n g .
Par  le President de la Republique : 
l.e Premier ministre.
J A C Q U E S  C H I R A C
Le ministre de I'industrie et de la recherche,
M I C H E L  O ’O R N A N O
l.e mirm-fre des affaires etrangeres.
J E A N  S A l ' V A G N A K U t l E S
Le mmisfre de I'economie et des finances,
J E A N  P I E R R E  E O U R C A D E
! Le ministre Ae la defense.
W o n  not Hi.ES Le secretaire d'Etat
aux pastes et telecommunications,
N O R B E R T  S E G A R O
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M c r t t ' n '  77-971 du  22 aoOt 1977 m o d i f ia n t  I* d * c r « t  n* 76-105 
d u  27 j a n v i a r  1976 re l a t i f  au  c e n t r e  n a t io n a l  p o o r  1‘a x p l o i t a t i o n  
d r a  o c t a n t  a t  k I 'o r f lan isa t lon  da  la r a c h a r c h a  cxiarvolo^iqA/e.
lAt President de la Republique.
Sur le rapport du Premier ministre et du ministre de 
I'industrie, du commerce et de 1'artisanat.
Vu le decret n* 76-105 du 27 Janvier 1976 relatif au centre 
national pour l'exploitation des oceans et 4 I'orgamsation de 
la rect^ccL^^^oeeanologique ;
Vu le decret n‘ 77 431 du 25 avnl 1977 relatif aux attributions 
du Premier ministre en matidre -de recherche ;
Vu 1c decret n‘ 77 445 du 29 avril 1977 relatif aux attributions 
du secretaire d'Etat auprfes du' Premier ministre (Recherche);
Vu le decret n* 77-474 du 6 mai 1977 relatif aux attributions 
du ministre de I'industrie. du commerce et de 1'artisanat ;
I*e Conseil d'Etat (section des travaux publics) entendu, '
Decrete
Art 1 . Les qualre premiers % alineas de lar t ic le  17 du 
,d£crct susvise du 27 janvier 1976 sont abrogcs et remplaces 
par les dispositions suivantes :
« II est *cree aupr&s du ministre charge de la recherche et 
du ministre de I'industrie, du commerce et de 1'artisanat un 
eonseil de fa recherche octanologique
« Ucjx ropresentants du personnel du bureau designes au scin 
de cclui-ci sur des lisle* de presentation £tablies par les organ! 
sations .syndicates ou professionnelles les plus representatives, 
t un parmi les im.cmeurs ou cadres assinulcs, 1‘aulre parmi les 
agents d'cxecution ou de maitrlse .
-* Quatre personrubles choisics en raison de feur competence. •
A rt . 2 — la? troisidmc alinea de Particle 6 du decrel du 
23 octobrc 1950 est remplace par les dispositions suivantes :
«■ 1/e conscil d'administration designe en son sein, des sa nomi­
nation et apros chaque—r«Mx>uvelleti»eiil. un president sup  plea nt - 
chafge, en cas d absence ou d'empechemenl du president du 
eonseil d'administration. dc rcmplir les functions de cc dernier.
« I.e corvseil d'administration designc, en outre, on secretaire 
qui peut etrc |>ris hors flc son scin. II peut cgalcment conslituer 
dans son sein un- coinite de direction dont il fixe la composi­
tion >
ATt. "T~ Le p rcm ien r tm ra  de t  Jrtichr 7~dg decret du 23 octo1 ~ 
bre I939 est remplace par les dispositions suivantes :
» l ^ s  membres du conscil d'administration sont riommcs par 
d6cret pris sur le rapport du ministre charge des mines La durce 
' du mandat des admimstratefirs est de trois arvs .
Art. 4 — Larticle 10 du decrel du 23 octobrc 1959 est rem 
plape^par les dispositions suivantes
« Dans Je  cadre des programmes generaux definis par le 
codicil d'administration, les programmes d'opcration affcrents 
suit a une zone gdographiquement'delerminee, aoit a un secteur 
d ’acLvile technique, pesivetit etre  suivis par des com lies consli- 
tues par le eonseil d'administration selon ddb moJaliles approu- 
vees par Ic mihistre charge des mines. »
— ■—Art 5. — Le premier alinea de I'article 16 du-decret  du
23 octobrc 1959 est remplace par le^ dispositions suivantes :
« Le dlreeteui^general du Bureau de recherches gcologiques cl 
mimeres est nomme sur proposition du eonseil (^administration 
par ddcret pris sur le rapport du ministre charge des mines. »
Art 6 — l-e minLstre del£gue a l'6conomie et aux finances et 
le ministre de l 'industne, du commerce et de 1'artisanat sont 
charges, chacun en ce qui le conceme. de l’applieation du present 
decret, qui sera publie au Journal offtciel de la Republique
francaise
Fait A Paris. Je 22 aoirt 1977 fc ^
RA Y MO N D RAKRE
P a r  le P r e m ie r  m in is t re
Le m inistre de I'industrie. 
v du commerce et de 1'ar.Usanal.
R E N K  M O N O R Y
Le m m istre delegut a I'economie et a tu  finances.
R O B E R T  W W L I N
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77-977 du  22 aou» 1977 m o d i f ia o t  U  d4 c r» f  n ’ 76-1&4
du  27 j a n v i e r  1976 r e l a t i f  eu  c e n t r e  n a t i o n a l  d '6 tu d e «  s p a t i a l e s
at k • I ' o r y e n i s a t i o n  d« la  r e c h e r c h e  ip a t ia la .
Le President de la Republique,
Sur le rapport du Premier ministre et du ministre de I’indus 
trie, du commerce et de 1’artisanat.
-Vu le decrel n* 76-104 du ’27 janvier 1976 relatif au centre 
national d'dtudes" spatiales et a I’orgamsation de la recherche 
spatiale .
Vu lc decret n" 77-431 du 25 avnl 1977 relatif aux attributions
du Premier ministre en inaticre de recherche ;
Vu le decret n ‘ 77-445 du 29 avril 1977 relatif aux attributions
du secretaire d'Etat  aupres du Premier ministre (Recherche) :
Vu le decret n" 77 474 du 6 mai 1977 relatif aux attributions 
du ministre de I’industrie, du commerce et de 1’artisanat ;
Le Conseil d'Etat (section des fravaux publics) ehlendu.
^ D e c re te
Art 1 l-c* deux dermers alineas de Particle 10 du decret
susvise du 27 janvier 1976 sont abroges et rerapiaces par les dis
positions suivantes :
< Les membres de ce comite. au nombre maximum de douze. 
sont nommes par arrc te  conjoint du ministre charge de la 
recherche et du ministre de I'industrie. du commerce cl de 1’ar­
tisanat apres av.s du secretaire d ’Etar aux universites
* Le president du comity est nommi par conjoint du  
* ministre charge de la recherche et du ministre dc 1’industi/e.  du
commerce cl dc I’artisanal sur proposition du president du centre 
national d eludes spatialcs. * ^
r
Art 2 - I.cs quatrc premiers alineas de l article 16 sont abro­
gcs cl remplaccs par les dispositions suivantes :
« n est cre^. auprds du ministre chaTge da la recherche et du 
ministre de I'industrie, du commerce et de 1'artisanat. un conseil 
des applioetmns spatiales.
i Ce conscil, a caracterc consullatif, comprend .
* ,o) A litre de membres de droit : le deiegue general i  la 
recherche scienlifique et technique, qui assure la vice-pr£si- 
dcnce, le president du conseil d'administration du centre national 
d etude's spatiales et le commissaire du Gouvememeat aupres 
de cct etahlissement :
« h) Muit membres qualifies en mali&re d 'applications spa- 
riaTcs7' represipnranr respectivemenl les ministres des affa ires 
6trangdres. de l economie et des finances, de la defense, de l'in- 
dustrie, du commerce et de 1'artisanat et les secretaires d ’E tat 
aux transports, aux universites, aux departements et te rrito ires  
d outre mer et aux postcs et telecommunications ;
* c) Six a huit personnalit6s scientifiques ou techniques cboi- 
sies conjointement par le ntinistre charge de la recherche et par 
le ministre de Pindustne. du commerce et de 1'artisanat.
« I-es membres du conseil autres que les membres de droit 
sont nommes par arrdte conjoint du ministre charge de la 
recherche et du ministre de I'industrie, du commerce et de l'ar- 
tisanat pour une duree de quatre ans. Le conseil est renouve- 
labte par moitie tons les deux ans Lors des premieres designa­
tions. la moitie des membres seront n o m m h  poor deux ans.
« Le president du conseil des applications spatiales est choisi 
conjointement par le ministre charge de la recherche et par 
le ministre de I’industrie, du commerce et de 1’artisanat parmi 
les membres du conseil. ►
Art. 3. — Le Premier ministre et le ministre de I’industrie. du 
commerce et de 1’artisanat sont charges, chacun en ce qui le 
conceme. de l'ex£cution du present d6cret, qui sera public au
Journal officiel de la Republique fran^aise
Fait k Paris, le 22 aout 1977
V A L K R Y  C I S C A H O  O'CSTAINC.
Par le P res iden t  de la Republique 
Le Premier ministre.
R A Y M O N D  B A R R S
Le ministre de I'industrie. 
du commerce et de 1'artisanat,
R K N t  M O N O R Y -
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M I N I S T E R E  DE L ' I N D U S T R I E
D ecret n 79-468 du 13 ju in  1979 m o d ifia n t le d ec re t n" 76-104 
du 27 ja n v io r  1976 re la t if  au  c e n tra  national  d 'c tu d c s  spa­
tia les.
Lc P r e s i d e n t  d e  la R epub lique ,
S u r  !e r a p p o r t  du  P re m ie r  m in is t re .
Vu la ,oi n" 61-1382 du  19 de c e m b re  1961 ins t i tuan t  un  ce n t re  
nat ional  d ’c tu d e s  sp a t ia le s  ;
Vu lc d e c r e t  n" 76-104 du  27 j a n v ie r  1976 relat if  au  ce n t re  
nat ional  d ’c tu d e s  sp a t ia le s  et  a l’o rgan isa t ion  de la r e ch e rch e  
spa tta le .  m odifie  p a r  le d e c r e t  n" 77-977 du 22 aout 1977;
Le C on sc i l  d ’E ta t  (section des t r av au x  publics) cn tendu ,
D e e r c t e  :
Art.  l ' r. —  Les deux  p r e m ie r s  a l in eas  de Par t ic le  I "  du 
d e c re t  d u  27 j a n v i e r  1976 susvise  son t  r em places  p a r  les d ispo­
si t ions  s u iv a n te s  :
i  Le c o n s e i l  d ’a d m in is t r a t io n  du  c e n t r e  national  d ’e tu d cs  
spa t ia le s  c o m p re n d .  o u t r e  le p re s id en t ,  trc izc  m em bres  :
« Le d i r c c t c u r  d u  b u d g e t  au  m in is te re  du budget  ou son repre -  
s e n ta n t  n o m m e m e n t  d e s i g n e ;
< Le d i r e c t e u r  des affa ires  indu s t r ie l le s  et in te m a l io n a lc s  au 
s e c re ta r i a t  d ’E ta t  aux  posies  e t  t e l e co m m u n ica t io n s ;
« Le d i r e c t e u r  te c h n iq u e  des eng ins  au  m in is te re  de la defense  : 
« Le s e c r e t a i r e  g e n e ra l  de la de fense  na t iona lc  ou son repre -  
s e n ta n t  n o m m e m e n t  d es igne  ;
c Lc d i r e c t e u r  g e n e ra l  dc  T61ediffusion de F ra n c e ;
« Le d i r e c t e u r  g e n e ra l  des  re la t ions  cu ltu re l les ,  scientifiqties  et  
t e c h n iq u e s  a u  m in i s te r e  des affa ires e t r a n g c rc s  ou son rcpre -  
se n tan t  n o m m e m e n t  d es igne  :
« Le d i r e c t e u r  d e  la de lega t ion  g e n e ra te  h la r e c h e rch e  scicn- 
tifiquc e t  t e c h n iq u e  ;
« Le d i r e c t e u r  des  r e la t ions  I co n o m iq u cs  ex tc r ieu res  ;
« Cinq p e r s o n n a l i t e s  qualif iees en ra ison  dc leurs com petences  
dan s  lc d o m a in e  d ’ac t iv i te  du  centre .
« Le p r e s id e n t  du  conseil  d ’a d m in is t r a t io n  est n om m c p o u r  
t ro is  ans, p a r  d e c r e t  pris  en  consci l  d es  m in is t rcs  s u r  p ro p o ­
si t ion  du m in i s t r e  de  I’industr ie .  Son m a n d a t  est  renouve lab le .
* Les m e m b r e s  du  conseil  qui  ne son t  pas m em bres  dc d ro i t
son t  n o m m e s  p o u r  t ro is  ans  p a r  d e c re t  p r is  su r  le r a p p o r t  du
m in is t r e  de I’in d u s t r ie .  L e u r  m an d a t  es t  renouvelable .  Les 
m e m b re s  d eco d es  ou dem iss io n n a i re s  doiven t  e t re  rem places.  
D ans  ce cas,  le m a n d a t  des nouveaux  m em bres  exp ire  a la 
d a te  a l a q u e l le  a u ra i t  n o rm a le m e n t  p r is  fin celui de leu rs  p rede-  
cesseurs .  »
Art.  2. — Le p r e m i e r  al in6a de I’a r t ic le  2 du d e c re t  du
27 j a n v ie r  1976 susv ise  es t  abroge.
Art.  3. — Le d e r n i e r  a l inea  dc l’a r t ic le  3 du d e c re t  du
27 j a n v ie r  1976 susv ise  es t  abroge.
Art.  4. —  L’a r t i c le  4 du  dec re t  du  27 j a n v ie r  1976 susvise  
es t  itiodifie d e  la fagou su iva n te  :
Les V  e t  8" du  p r e m ie r  al inea  sont  r em places  p a r  :
« 7“ A p p ro b a t io n  des p ro je ts  de m a rc h e s  e t  conventions ;
« 8“ A p p ro b a t io n  des  p ro je ts  d ’ach a ts  et dc v\ i tes d ’im- 
mcublcs ,  des  c o n s t i tu t io n s  dc n a n t i s s em cn ts  et d ’hypotheques ,  
des p ro je t s  d c  b a u x  e t  de  location d ’i inm eubles ; >
Les deux  d e m i e r s  a l ineas  sont  r em p laces  p a r  :
« Le conseil  d ’adm in is t r a t io n  e s t  con su l t^  p a r  le m in is t r  
de I’industr ie  su r  les p ro je ts  d ’o r ien ta t io n  d c  la p o l i t ique  spr. 
t iale frangaisc. II peu t  en  ou tre  e t r e  c o n s u l t s  s u r  to u te  queslio i
de la com petence  du  centre .
« Le consei l  peut, d an s  les l im itcs  q u ’il d 6 te rm in e ,  a u t o r i s e  
le p res iden t  6 passe r  sans  son a p p ro b a t io n  p r e a ia b le  les m a r  
chcs e t  conventions . *
Art. 5. —  Le t i t re  II du de c re t  du  25 j a n v i e r  1976 susvis 
est  abroge.
Art.  6. — Lc P re m ie r  ministre ,  le m in is t r e  d es  affa ires  e t r a n  
gcrcs. le m in is t re  de la defense, le m in i s t r e  du  budge t .  1 
m in is tre  de I’industr ie ,  le m in is t re  des  t r a n s p o r t s ,  le secre ta ire  
d ’E ta t  aux postes e t  te lecom m unicat ions  e t  le s e c re ta i re  d ’E ta  
au p res  du  P re m ie r  m in is t re  (Recherche)  son t  charges ,  chacur 
en ce qui  le conccrne ,  de l’exccu t ion  d u  p r e s e n t  d e c re t ,  qu 
se ra  public  au  Jo u rn a l o ffic ie l dc  la R e p u b l iq u e  fran<,-aise.
F a i t  i  Paris ,  le 13 ju in  1979.
VALERY CISCARD D’ESTAI.NG.
Par  le President de la Republique:
Le P rem ier m in istre ,
RAYMOND BAR RE. Le m in is tr e  >le I’in d u s tr ie
ANDRE GIRAUD.
Le m in istre  d es a ffa ire s  e trangcres.
JEAN FRANgoiS-PONCET.
Le m in is tr e  d e  la defense,
YVUN BOURGES.
Le m in istre  d u  bud g e t,
MAURICE PAPON. L e m in is tr e  d es  transports, 
JO EL LE TIIEl'I.E .
Le secre ta ire  d 'E ta t a u x  p o ste s  e t te le c o m m u n ic a tio n s ,
NORBERT SEGARD.
Le secre ta ire  d 'E ta t a u p re s  du  P re m ie r  ministre 
(R ec h e rc h e ),
PIERRE AI GRAIN.
D e c r e t  p o r t a n t  n o m i n a t i o n  d c  m e m b r e s  d u  c o n s e i l  d ' a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
d u  c e n t r e  n a t i o n a l  d ' e i u d e s  s p a t i a l e s .
Par  decret en  dale  du 13 juin 1979, sont nommes m embres du 
conseil d ’administration du centre national d ’cturies spatia les er. 
tant que personnalites qualifiees en raison dc leurs  competences 
dans le domaine d ’activitc du centre :
M. Mittner (Roger), directeur de la meteorologie  nationale.
M. Esper (Philippe), dclcgue a faction extcr icure .
M. Laurenl (Pierre), conseiller d’Etat.
M. Le Bars (Yvont, president d irec teur  genera l  de la Socicte 
Transpac.
Les personnalites qualifiees ci-dessus designees sont nominees 
pour une duree do trois ans a compter de la date  de publication 
•du prccent decret.
317
1 9 2 2  N. C. JO U RN A L O FFIC IEL DE LA REPU BLIQ U E FRANQAISE 24 F 6vrier  1984
M o d a l i l e s  d e  f o n c t i o n n e m e n t  f i n a n c i e r  
d u  C e n t r e  n a t i o n a l  d ' e t u d e s  s p a t i a l e s .
I.e mini.itre de iYconornie. des finance* el du budget et le
ministre de I'industrie el de la recherche,
Vu la loi n 61-1.532 du 19 dec cm I) re 1961 imlituant  un Centre
national d'etudes spatiales .
Vu le decret n 76-104 du 27 janvier I97ii relatif au Centre 
national d ’etudes spat...les et a I'organisalion de la recherche 
spatiale, modifie par les decrets n 77-977 du 22 aout 1977 et n" 79-468 
du 13 juin 1979 ;
Vu le decrel n" 92 1537 du 29 decembre 1932 portant reglement 
general sur la coiuptabilite publique :
Vu le decret n 64-48l> du 23 mai 1904, modifie par le decret
n ” 71-153 du 22 fevrier 1971, relatif aux regies de recettes et aux
regies d'avances des organisrnes publics ;
Vu I'arrete du 3 decembre 1969 relatif a la commission des marches 
institute  aupres du Centre national d ’etudes spatiales, modifie par 
les arre tes des 12 mars 1971, 9 aout 1973. 7 mars 1975 et
15 juillet 1S76,
Arretent .
Art. 1". — Le fonctionnement financier et comptable du Centre 
national d’etudes spatiales est assure dans ies conditions fixees par 
lc decret du 29 decembre 1962 susvise portant reglement general 
sur la complabiliu publique, selon les modaliles definies ci-apres.
A:' 2. — L'n etat de prevision de recettes et de depenses est 
etabli pour chaque cxercice annuel comme'neant le l ' r janvier.
L’cta, des previsions fait apparai tre sous deux sections distinctes 
les operations relatives au fonctionnement et les operations en 
capital.
II est prcsentc selon la nomenclature budgetaire de Fct.ibli.s- 
scment e' la nomenclature comptable visee a l article 216 du decret 
du 29 decemore 1962 .susvise.
I>a presentation de l’etat  de previsions des recettes et des depenses 
doit permettre  un rapprochement avec les credits inscrits a la loi 
de finances.
Art. 3. — Les operations en capital s'exccutant sur  plusieurs 
annees font l’objet d une presentation previsionnellc du coiit total 
el de I'cchelonnement annee par annce des engagements et des 
paicments.
Art. 4. — L’etat de prevision est prepare par directeur general 
et delibere par le conseil d’administration de fa?on k e tre soumia 
a l’approbation du ministre charge de la recherche et du ministre 
charge du budget, dans les conditions fixees par le decret du 27 jan­
vier 1976 susvise. au plus tard dans les quinze jours qui suivent 
la derniere seance du conseil d'administration precedant la date 
du debut de 1’exercice et, si possible, deux mois avant cette date.
Art. 5. — Si 1’etat n ’est pas approuve a l’ouverture de l’exercice, 
les operations de recettes et de depenses sont faites sur la base 
des previsions de 1'exercice precedent. Toutefois, s’il est necessaire 
et apres accord du contrdleur d’Etat, ces operations peuvent etre 
faites dans la limite des previsions figurant a l’etat non encore 
approuve.
Art. 6. — Les decisions modificatives reconnues necessaires sont 
deliberees et approuvees dans les memes formes que l’etat  annuel 
des previsions.
Art. 7. — Le president du conseil d'administration a quality 
d 'o rdonnateur principal. II peut, sous sa responsabilite, deleguer 
une partie de ses pouvoirs au directeur general ou, apres avis de 
celui-ci. a un ou plusieurs chefs de service places sous l’autorite 
du dk'c.’teur  general. Le president du conseil d’administration 
designe les ordonnateurs secondaires.
Art. 8. — Des avances peuvent etre consenties dans les con iitions 
fixees par l ordonnateur, avec i’accord du controleur d ’El it, aux 
personnes chargees de missions pour le compte du centre ainsi 
qu’aux personnes, societes ou organisrnes mandates par le centre 
pour operer  pour son compte.
Art. 9. — Les conditions generates de passation. de financement 
et de contrble des marches sont fixees par le conseil d'administra­
tion. Elies s inspirent de la reglementation des marches de l'Etat.
La composition et les regies de fonctionnement de la commission 
des marches instituee aupres du C. S. E. S. sont fixees par arrete  
du ministre charge du budge* et du ministre charge de la recherche.
Art. 10 — Des agents complables secondaires pouiront etre  desi- 
gnes par lc directeur general sur proposition de I’agent comptable 
principal, confor/nement aux dispositions dc l'article 195 du decret 
du 29 decembre 1962 susvise.
Art. 11 — De> regies d’avances et des regies de recettes peuvent 
et re instituecs scion ies dispositions du decret n" 64-486 susvise.
Art. 12. I. 'arrete du 29 aout 1963 relatif aux modaliles de fonc­
tionnement ini.uicior du Centre national d'etudes spatiales est 
abroge.
\r t .  13 — l.e present arre te  sera public au J o u r n a l  officiel de
la Kcpubliquc Irancai.xe.
Fait a Faris, lc 7 fevrier 1981.
1 r m ■ h:\tre tie I 'ndust rie el tie la recherche,
Four le ministre el par delegation : 
l.c f: ■ reef cur r I- hi im 'itique generate de la recherche, 
J.-F. TIIKRV.
I e iinnisire tic I'cconuniic. ties imam ex et du budget.
Four le ministre et par delegation :
Far empcrhemcnt du directeur du budget : C
l.e sous directeur,
K ROnoCANACIII.
JO U R N A L O FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRA N CA ISE
M I N I S T E R E  DE L ' I N D U S T R I E  ET DE LA R E C H E R C H E
D e c r e t  n"  84-510  d u  2 8  j u i n  1984 
r e l a t i f  a u  C e n t r e  n a t i o n a l  d ' e t u d e s  s p a t i a l e s .
Ix? P rem ie r  ministre ,
S u r  le rapport <lu m in is t re  de I’industr ie  et de la recherche,
Vu la loi n'1 61-1382 du 19 decem bre  1961 inst i tuant  un
Centre  national d ’e tudes  spatia les,  e t  notam m ent son ar ticle 5 ;
Vu la loi n" 75-596 du 19 ju i l lc t  1975 por tant  diverses
dispositions relat ives a la r e fo rm e  de la p rocedure  civile, et  
no tam m en t  son ar t ic le  7 :
Vu la loi n" 82610  du 15 ju i l lc t  1982 d ’or ienta t ion  et de
program m ation  pour  la recherche  et lc developpem cnt techno- 
logique de  la F r a n c e : , . ,
Vu la loi n" 83-675 du 26 ju i l le t  1983 modifiee relat ive a
la dem ocratisa t ion  du s e c te u r  public, ensem ble  le dec re t  
n" 83-1160 du 26 decem b re  1983 portant  application dc cette  
*oi: .
Vu le decret n 53-707 du 9 aout 1953 modifie re lat if  au
con tro le  de I’Etat su r  les e n t rc p r is e s  publiques nationales et
ce r ta ins  organisrnes ayant un ob je t  d ’ordrc  economique ou
s o c i a l :
Vu It* decret n" 55-733 du  26 mai 1955 modifie re lat if  au 
contro le  economique et f inanc ie r  de l’Etat ;
Vu le decret n “ 59 587 du 29 avril  1959 relat if  aux nomi­
nations aux emplois de d irec t ion  de certains c tab lissem cnts  
publics, en trcprises  publiques et societes nationales , modif.e 
par  le decret n" 67-152 du 22 fevrie r  1967 ;
Vu le decret n 62-1587 du 29 decem bre  1962 portant  regle- 
mcnt general  s u r  la com ptab i l i te  publique ;
Le Conseil d 'E ta t  (section des t ravaux publics) en tendu,  
Decrcte :
TIT RE I r
O r g a n i s a t io n  e t  f o n c t i o n n e m e n t  
d u  C e n t r e  n a t io n a i . d ’e t u d e s  s p a t i a i .e s
i r.   Le conseil d ’adm in is t ra t ion  du C entre  national
d 'e tu d e s  spatia les com prend  dix-huit  m e m b r e s :
1" Sept rep re scn tan ts  de  I’E ta t .  nommes par  decret .  d o n t :
U n rep rescn tan t  du P re m ie r  m inistre  ;
U n represcn tan t  du m in is t re  charge  de Leconomic ;
Un rep rescn tan t  du m in is t re  charge  du budget ;
Un rep rescn tan t  du m in is t re  charge  de la defense ;
Un rep rescn tan t  du m in is t r e  charge  des re la t ions cxte- 
r icurcs  ;
Un rep rescn tan t  du m in is t r e  charge  dc la recherche  ;
Un represcn tan t  du m in is t re  charge  des I’. T. T. ;
2 ” Cinq m em bres  choisis en raison de leu r  competence dans  
le dom aine  d ’activite  du c e n t re  don t  l’un dans lc dom aine  de 
la te lcdiffusion. nom m es p a r  d e c re t  su r  proposi tion des n nn is t re s  
ch a rg es  dc I’industr ie  et  dc la recherche  ;
3 • s ix  m em bres  clus par  les sa laries  du cen tre  dans les 
condi t ions  prevucs  par  le c h ap i t r c  II du l i t re  II dc la loi du 
26 ju i l lc t  1983 susvisee.
Le president  du conseil d ’adm in is t ra t ion  es t nomme parm i 
ccs m em bres  p a r  dccrc t  pr is en conscil des m in is t res  su r  p ropo­
si t ion  du conseil d 'a d m in is t r a t io n  e t  su r  lc rapport  des m in is t res  
charges  dc I’industr ie  et dc la recherche .
I>a duree des functions des  m em bres  du conscil d 'adm in is ­
t ra t ion  est dc cinq ans c t  ne peut  e t re  rcnouvclec  plus de 
deux  fois consecutivcs.
Lc m andat  des m em b res  du conseil est  cxercc  a t i t re  gratu it .
A rt .  2.   Les em o lu m en ts  et indcm nites  du p res iden t  sont
f ixes pa7 decision con jo in tc  des m in is t res  charges de I’industr ie ,  
dc la recherche c t  du budget.
A r t  3.   Le conscil d 'a dm in is tra t ion  sc r cun i t  au moins
q u a t r c  fois par  an  su r  convocation de son president  et examine 
to u tc  question insc ri tc  a l ’o rd re  du jo u r  par  le p res iden t  ou 
p a r  le  conseil s ta tu a n t  a lo i ia jo r i te  simple.
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En outre .  !o p res iden t  reunit  le conseil su r  la deniande des 
m inistres  charges de  I’industr ie  ou de la recherche.  Le tiers 
de? m em bres  du conseil  peut convoquer le eonseil dans les 
conditions p ivvues au second alinea de l’article 8 de la loi du
26 .1.: i! let 1983 susvisee.
I.c c<>ns,*i! no de l ibere  \ .dahieir .ent que <i la moitie  au moins 
de fcs m em bres  e.?t prc?en!e Si ce quorum n'est pas atte int .
•. ion>eil c?t a nouveau  eonvoque avec le meme o rd re  du jou r  
dans u:i de'.ui m axim um  de \ in u t  j o u r s :  il de l ibere  alors sans 
i 'ndi;i>*M de q uorum
I.e< delibera tion*  du conseil  sont prises a la m ajor ite  des 
:ne:;-l>:e» e?ent< ou rep re sen t  es : en  cas de part  age des vnix, 
*.e!!o du p re -u len t  est p reponderan te .
Le I.i date et i 'heu re  ainsi  que 1’o rd re  du jo u r  sont
...i m-.ins huit  jo u rs  a I’avance a la eonnaissance <les 
momlvv? do conseil d ’adm in is t ra t ion  ainsi que  du conird leur  
d ’Et.t: e* d i commis*aire  du gouvernem ent qui part ic ipent  aux 
se:mee» du conseil ?a:is p re n d re  part aux votes.
Le president  peut  a p p e le r  a par t ie ipcr  aux seances avec voix 
consulta tive un i te  p e r so n n e  dont il juge  la presence  utile.
En apt*’.u a f .o n  de Lavant-dcrnier  a linea de l’ar t ic le  26 de la 
lot du 26 jiii!lot 1983 susvisee. les rep rescn tan ts  des sa laries 
dts'posont i h .u u n  d ’un  creilit de dix-huit heurcs par  mois pour
! exerc.ce ie leur  mandat.
Art 4 — I.c conseil d ’adm .lus t ra t ion  delibere  su r  les obiels
s u i v a n t s .
1 P rog ram m e des aet iv i tes  et des investissements du centre  :
2 Plan d organ isa tion  ct de fonctionnement du cen tre  :
3 Etui annuel  des previsions de rece ttes  et d e fe n se s  et. s ’il
j  a lieu, e ta ts  rec t i f ica t i fs  en  cours d ’a n n e c ;
4 Approbation du r ap p o r t  annuel  d ’activite :
5 Approbation  du com pte  f inancier  et dc 1’affectation des 
result  at? de l’exerc ice  :
6 Approbation des em p ru n ts  a court,  a moyen et 5 long 
term e :
7 Les condit ions gen e ra le s  de passation ties contrats. conven­
tions ct m arches  ainsi que  le seuil a u d e s su s  duquel ces mar-
. lies doivenl loi e t r e  soumis :
8 Les condit ions d a n s  lesquelles les depenses peuvent e tre  
p re fm anc ees  avant la s igna tu re  ou I’execution d ’un contrat ;
9 Approbation  des p ro je ts  d ’achats  et de ventes d ’immeubles. 
des cons t itu t ions dc nan t i ssem en ts  et d ’h y p o lh c q u c s :
10 Prise,  ex tension  ou cession de partic ipations f inanciercs .
11 Accepta tion ou re fu s  des dons et legs :
12 Regime tie r e c ru le m e n t .  d ’emploi et de rem u n era t io n  du 
personnel .
13 A utor isa t ion  d ’e n t re p re n d re .  pour la mise en oeuvre du 
p rog ram m e de re!at»ons in tc rna t iona les  de le tab l isscm en t .  des 
n egooa t ions  pouvant co ndu ire  a la conclusion d ’a r rangem cn ts  
adm in is t ra t i fs  in te rna t ionaux .
Le conseil  d ’adm in is t ra t io n  est consulte  par  les ministres  char ­
ges de I’indus tr ie  ou de la recherche  sur  les p ro je ts  d ’orientat ion 
de la politique sp a t ia le  f rancaise. 11 peut en ou tre  e t re  consulte  
s u r  toutc  question  de  la com petence  du centre.
En ce qui concerne  lc point 9. le conseil d ’adm inistra t ion  pent 
de leguer  une  par t ie  de ses pouvoirs a son president. C’elui-ci lui 
rend com pte  lors de sa plus p ro c ln in c  seance des decisions q u ’il 
a prises cn vertu de c e t te  delegat ion.
Art. 5. — Les d e l ibera t ions  du conseil d ’administrat ion  portant 
sur  les objots vises aux 3 ’. 5 . 6 . 8 . 10" ct 12" de Larticle prece­
dent sont execu to ires  sa u f  opposition des ministres charges dc 
I’industr ie  ou de la r ech e rch e  ou dc l’economic,  des f inances et  
du budget dans  lc mois suivant  la reception du proces-verbal .
Les delibera t ions  a u t r e s  que  celles ci-dcssus visees sont dc plcin 
droit  execu to ires  si le com m issa irc  du g o jv e rn em en t  prcvu a 
Larticle 10 du p re se n t  d cc rc t  n ’y a pas fait opposition dans les 
dix jo u rs  qui su iven t  soit  la reunion du conscil s ’il y a assiste, 
soil la reception  du proces-verbal dc la seance
Dans le cas ou ii fo rm e  opposi tion, lc commissairc  du Gouver- 
nem cnt  en  re fc re  i inm ed ia tcm en t  aux ministres conccrnes qui 
doivent sc p rononce r  d a n s  lc delai  d ’un mois. A dcfaut  dc deci­
sion expresse  dans  ce de la i ,  la de libera t ion  du conscil  d ’admi- 
n istra t ion  es t  exccuto ire .
Art. 6. —  P a r  app l ica t ion  de Larticle 2 (4 ) de la loi susvisee 
du 19 decem bre  1961, Ie m in is t re  des relations ex te r icu rcs  est 
assoeie a l ’engagem cn t .  au  d c rou lcm cn t  et a la conclusion des 
negociations visees a u  13” de Larticle 4 ci-dcssus.
29 Juin I'.'84 JO U R N A L O FFIC IEL DE LA REPUBLIQU E FRANCAISE 2 0 2 9
Art.  7. — Le president du conseil  d 'adm inis tra t ion  rep resen te  
Ie c en t re  dans tous les ac tcs de la vie civile, dans ses rapports  
avec les t iers et dans les relat ions internationales. II assure  l'exe- 
cution des deliberations du conseil  d 'administrat ion.
Sous reserve des approbations nccessaires . il a no tam m ent  qua- 
lit** p o u r :
P asser  au noin du centre  tous actes.  contrals  ou marches ;
P roceder  a toutes acquisitions, tout depot ou cession de brevet  
ou de licence :
R epresen te r  l c  centre  en  justice, t r a n s f e r  d a n s  to u s  l e s  iiti- 
g e s  et com prom ettre  on m at ie re  intei R a t io n a le  ;
II est l 'o rdonnatcur  principal des recettes  et des depenses.  
A ce l i t re  il de te rm ine  i 'emploi  des funds dispombles et le 
p lacement des r e s e r v e s : il proecde a toutes acquisitions, al ie­
nations et transfer!*  de valours ainsi  qu ’a tous achats, vcntes 
ou locations d 'immeubies : il con trac te  'ous em prun ts  et consti- 
tue nantissement on hypotheque. Le president  du conseil 
d 'adm in is tra t ion  designe les o rd o n n a teu rs  secondaires.
II peut deleguer au d irec teu r  genera l ,  pour l'execution de sa 
mission, une partie de ses pouvoirs.
Art. 8. — l.e president  du conscil d 'adm in is tra t ion  est assiste  
d un d irec teur  general  nom m e par  decret su r  proposi tion des 
m inistres  '"harees de I 'industr ie  ct de la recherche,  le p residen t  
du conseil d adm inistra t ion  ayant e tc  p realableinent  consulte .
Le d i rec teu r  general  est charge, selon les directives du pre­
sident.  de la mise en  oeuvre des p rogram m es ct ties operations 
confiees au centre,  de la p repara t ion  et de l 'execution des 
decisions concernant lo rgan isa t io n  ct le lonctionnement des 
services.
II a autori te  su r  l 'ensemble du personnel  : il conclul les 
contraLs dc travail , rec ru te  et licencie les agen ts  de toutes 
categories.
II preside le comite central  d 'e tablisscment.
II est charge de la p repara t ion  des e ta ts  annuels  de prevision 
de recettes  el de depenses. des com ples cl du bilan annuel  du 
centre.
II part ic ipc aux seances du conseil d 'adm in is tra t ion  sans 
p ren d re  par t aux votes.
Les emoluments et indem nites  du d irec teu r  genera l  sont 
fixes par  decision conjointe  des m in istres  charges de  I 'industrie,  
de la recherche et du budget.
Art. 9 — Le conseil d 'adm in is tra t ion  du Centre  national
d e ludes  spatiales est assiste d 'un  comite  des p rogram m es scien- 
t ifiques qui a pour mission :
a) Dc fairc rapport  su r  l’in te re t  sc icntif iquc des p rog ram ­
mes de recherche soumis au C entre  national d 'e tudes spatia les 
ct su r  la capacite sc icntif iquc et techn ique  des laborato ires  qui 
proposcnt ces program m es :
b )  D’em ettrc  des avis ct des proposit ions su r  les program m es 
de recherche  propres au C entre  na tional  d ’etudes spatia les :
c) De formulcr , compte tenu des moyens disponibles . toutes 
proposi tions utiles concernant le developpem cnt  de la recherche  
spatia le  en France et. con jo in tem ent.  des au tres  disc iplines 1 ices 
a cette  recherche.
Les membres de ce comite, au  nombro maximum de douzc, 
sont nommes par  a r re te  des m in is t res  charges de I 'industr ie et 
de !a recherche, apres avis du m in is t re  charge dc 1'education 
nationale.
Le president du comite est nomme par  a r re te  des ministres.  
charges de I 'industrie ct dc la recherche  sur  proposi tion du 
d irec teu r  general du Centre  national d 'e tudes  spatia les.
TITRE II
D i s p o s i t i o n s  a d m i n i s t i i a t i v e s  e t  f i n a n c i e r  e s
Art. 10. — Un commissairc du gouvernem ent ,  des igne par  
a r re te  des ministres charge dc I’indus tr ie  c t  dc la recherche, 
est place aupres du Centre  national d 'e tudes spatia les.  II peut 
a tout moment sc fairc  com inuniqucr  toutes pieces, docum ents  
ou archives ct proceder  ou fa i rc  p roceder  a toute  verification. 
En cas d 'empechcment,  il peu t  sc  fairc  rep resen to r  aux seances 
du conseil d 'adminis trat ion  p a r  un fonctionnairc  place sous 
son autor i te  ct nom m em ent  designe.
II informe les m inistres  in teresscs des questions f iguran t  a 
i ’o rdre  du jour  du conscil  d 'adm in is tra t ion  et des deliberations 
adoptees.
Art. 11. — Le C en tre  na tional d 'e tudes spa t ia le s  dispose des 
r essourcos su ivantes
Cred i ts  budge ta ires  ouver ts  no tam m ent  aux budgets  des 
m in is te re?  de i I n d u s t r i e  ct de la recherche  qui Iu: sont affectes ;
Funds des con tra ts  sur  program m e conclus avec des departe- 
m ents  m m iste r ie is  ou adm in is tra t ions  y ra t tachees  ;
P rodu i ts  des e m p ru n ts  :
R e m unera t ions  tie services rendus:
Dons et legs :
Subventions pub l iques  ou privees :
P : o d u : t '  f inanc ie rs  et au tres  produits  accessoires.
\r* 12 - -  l.e r apport  annuel s u r  1'activite du cen tre  est
adre>se p u r  l e  p res iden t  du conseil d 'adm in is tra t ion  aux minis- 
trcs  •/n.ir-e- de i I n d u s t r i e  e t  de iu recherche  qui le transm etten t
. h i  P r e - ’v r  m i n i s t r e  e t  a  t o u s  l e s  m inistres  interesses.
Ce r tp p o r t  est dgaienumt transmis par  les m inistres  charges 
de  I 'industr ie  et de la recherche,  au  P ar lem ent  conformement 
a l ar t ic le  6 do la loi du 19 decembre 1961 su»visee.
Art 13 — Un a r re te  conjoint des m in is t res  charges de
I 'industr ie .  do la rech e rch e  et de 1 economic. des finances et du 
budget  precise les modaliles de fonctionnement financier  du 
c en t re  et d e te rm in e  no tam m ent le role de I 'agent comptable. 
notnme par  a r re te  conjoint  des ministres  charges  de I 'industrie.  
do la recherche  et du budget,  su r  proposit ion du president  
du conseil  d 'a dm in is tra t ion  du centre.  L 'agent com ptable  assiste 
aux seances du conseil  d 'adm in is tra t ion  sans p rendre  part aux 
votes.
Art 14 — Le contro le  de la gestion f inanciere  du cen tre  
est exerce  p a r  un  c on t rb leu r  d 'E 'a t  place sous I 'autorite  du 
m in is t re  charge du budget.
En ta-nt quo de  besoin un a r re te  des m in is t res  charges de 
! Industr ie,  de la r echerche  el de l economie. des finances et 
du budget  precise les modaliles d 'application du present  article.
Les rapports  du c on t rb leu r  d 'E tat  au m inistre  du budget 
sont adresses aux m in is t res  charges de I 'industr ie  et de la 
tocher- he Le rap p o rt  annuel  est egalemcnt com m unique au 
conseii d ’adm in is tra t ion .
TITHE III 
D i s p o s i t i o n s  f i n a i . e s
Art. 15. — Le decre t  n' 76-104 du 27 janv ie r  1976 modifie
par  l e s  decret* n '  77-977 du 22 aout 1977 et n 79 468 du 
13 ju in  1979. r c la t i fs  au Centre  na tional d 'e tu d es  spa t ia les  et 
5 l organisation  de  la recherche  spatia le  est abroge.
Art.  16. — Lc m in is t re  de  Leconomie. des finances et du 
budget ,  le m in is t re  des  relations cx ter icurcs .  lc m inistre  dc 
la defense , le m in is t re  deleguc  aup res  du m in is t re  dc I 'industr ie  
et de la recherche ,  charge  des P. T. T.. ct le sec re ta ire  d 'E ta t  
aup res  du m in is t re  dc leconom ie ,  des f inances el du budget ,
charge  du budget,  son t  charges, chacun en ce qui  le concerne.
de l'execution du present  decret. qui se ra  public  au Journal
o ffic ie l de la Republique  francaise.
Fait a Paris.  Ie 28 ju in  1934.
PIER0.E MACKOY.
Par le Premier ministre :
Le m in is tre  de I 'in d u s tr ie  et de la recherche,
LAURENT FA B it’S.
Le m in is tre  ae I'cconom ie. des finances et du budget, 
JACQUES DELORS.
Le m in istre  des re la tions er lerioures.
CLAUDE CHEYSSON.
Le m in istre  de la d efense , 
CHARLES IIKRNU.
Le m in istre  de legue aupres du m in istre  de I'industrie  
el de la re cherche , charge des P.T.T.,
LOUIS m e x a n d e a u .
Le secre ta ire  d 'E ta t aupres du  m in istre  de I’econom ie, 
des fin a n ces e t du  budget, charge du  budget,
HENRI EMM AN U ELL I.
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D 6cr»t n° 86-129 du 28 ja n v ier  1986 portant o r g a n i­
sa tio n  da ('a d m in istra tio n  c e n tr a ls  du  m in is te r s  
d e s  P.T.T.
Le President de la Republique,
Sur le rapport du Premier ministre. du ministre dc Icco 
nomie, des finances et du budget, du ministre de I intericur cl 
de la decentralisation, du ministre tin redenloiemrnt Industrie) 
et du commerce cxtericur, du uvnistre des P. f  I et du secrc 
taire d'Etat aupres du Premier ministre. charge dc la Inmtion 
publique et des simplifications admimstratives.
Vu la loi n° 45-0! du 24 novembre 1945 relative aux attribu­
tions des ministres et A ('organisation des ministfres, inodiflee 
par lc decret n° 59-178 du 22 janvier I*)*'1) relatif aux aitribu 
tions des ministres .
Vu le decret n" 66-811 du 27 octobrc 1*766 portant translert 
au ministre des postes ct telecommunications d attributions du 
ministre d'Etat en mattere dc postes el telecommunication* 
dans les territoires d'outrc-mer .
Vu lc decret n" 82-389 ilu 10 mai 1982 relatil aux pouvoiis 
du commissairc de la Republique dans les departements. ei
notamment son article 8 .
Vu le decret nu 82-390 du 10 mai 1*782 relatif aux pnuwurs 
du commissairc dc la Republique de region, el nolammeni son 
article 7 ,
Vu le decret n" 82-6.16 du 21 luillct 1*782 precis,ml iorgarusa 
tion des services des P .T T .  pris en application de l article * ,tu 
decret n° 82-38*7 du 10 mai 1*782 et de Particle 1 du decrel 
n° 82-390 du 10 mai 1982 rclatifs aux comnnssaires de la
Republique dc departcmcnt ct de region .
Vu lc decret n° 85-1212 du 20 novembre 1985 relatil aux 
attributions du ministre des P.T.T. .
Vu I'avis en date du 18 decembre 1985 du ( nnscd superirur 
des P.TT .
, Vu I'avis en dale du 19 decembre 1985 du com tie technique
paritaire ministerte! du ministere des P f I .
Decrete
Art. I "  L'administration ccntralc du ministere dc* I* I 1 
comprend. outre le bureau du cabinet, le service dc I'lnlormu 
lion et de la communication et lc service de defense et dc sccu 
rite civile, directement rattaches au cabinet du ministre
I La delegation gtnerale a la strategic .
2. La direction des affaires communes, personnel ct ult.nres 
sociales, budget ct comptabilite .
3 La direction generalc des postes qui comprend 
La direction dc la production 
La direction de la promotion 
La direction financiere :
La direction de la logistique .
La direction de la prospective et des affaires intcrnatto
nalcs ;
Lc service du personnel .
Le service de securite .
4. La direction generate des telecommunications qui com 
prend :
La direction des affaires commcrciales et t t l imatiques .
La direction des affaires industrielles et internationales .
La direction de la production ;
La direction des programmes et des affaires financiircs ;
Le service de la prospective ct des etudes tconomiques .
Lc service du personnel ;
I e service dc securite 
x I e connte iles cnseignemcnt*. supericurs 
1 e ministre des I* I I assure enfin, pour la part qui rclfve 
de ses attributions, la tutclle dc I'etablissemenl public de diffu­
sion 11)1
I 'inspection gencrale. organe superieur de controle des ser 
vices, plaice sous l .iutoriie directc du ministre. fait organique 
meni par tie de ('administration ccntralc
Art 2 I a delegation generalc a la strategic rcievc directe- 
ment ile Pauloritf du ministre
l.a delegation generalc 4 la strategic conduit son action en 
relation avec la direction generalc des postes. la direction gene- 
rale de* telecommunications, la direction des affaires com­
munes et I D E
( lie etuilie et propose au ministre les orientations strate- 
giques ilu ministere lies I’ I I , y compris dans lc domaine 
international, et en suit la misc en iruvre I cs orientations Ver­
m o n t  dc base a (‘elaboration des chartes de gestion.
A ce litre, d ie  participe 4 I’elaboration el au s u i v i  des 
diaries dc gestmn de* directions gdiCrales, des tiliales et orga- 
nisim-s qui leur sont rattaches et de T I) E ( cs chartes de gcs- 
tion lixcnt le cadre d'action. les obicctifs de chacune des 
entiles du service public
I),iris son domaine de responsabilite. d ie  conduit une 
reflexion sur la complenicnlarite entre la poste. les telecommu­
nications et la telediff u M o n .
I lie elaborc ct fait respecter ies prmcipes gen6raux de la 
reglcrnentation des P. f I . veillc 4 leur application ct en pro­
pose revolution, notamment en function des donnCes I n t e r n a ­
tionales 1 ui sont rattaches les services charges d ’lr.struire les 
demandcs iPautorisaiion. d agremcnt et d'admission des instal- 
lulcurs l lle inters lent dans le* organisrnes gCrant le spectre des 
Irequenccs
Idle . oordonne la representation des P 1 I dans les ins­
tances nationales el internationales. notamment celles compe- 
tentes en matiere de reglcrnentation et de normes techniques 
Idle exercc la tutelle des industries du sectcur telecommuni­
cations. intormatique. bureautique. idle repartit les dotations 
en capital et subventions, dans le cadre de I'cnveloppe arretec 
par la loi de finances, et instruit les contrals dc plan des entre 
prises de ce secteur. en liaison avec la direction gCntrale de 
l Industrie du ministere du rcdeploiement industricl et du com­
merce extcrieur
I lie exerce cgalcment les responsabil.tes du ministere des 
P I I dans le* divers organisrnes du secteur telecommunica­
tions. informatlquc et bureautique
Idle participe a (elaboration des hudgets des organisrnes de 
la filiere cleetromque qui font Pobjel de llnancement par le 
ministere des P I I
Idle s'assure que Paction des filiales du ministere des P.TT. 
s invent dans le cadre des orientations stratcgiques decidecs par 
le ( iouvernement.
I n tant que dc besoin. pour I'e.xercice de ses attributions, 
elle fait appel aux services des centres de recherche des P.T. I 
Idle d6ITn11 les moyens ntcessaires 4 son fonctionrcmcnt.  
elaborc son budget et en assure l'execution.
Le dt legue general 4 la strategic est nomme en conseil de, 
ministres
Art. 3. La direction des affaires commutes reieve directe­
ment de I'autontC du ministre.
Elle est compeicnte dans les doniaines du personnel, des 
affaires sociales. du budget, de la comptabilite et de I'entretien 
des matenels de transport automobile.
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I lie .1 une mission g^ntra lc  d 'd ab o ra t io n ,  d animalion, dc 
coordinaiion. dc conscil  ct dc  controle dans les domaincs rele- 
vant de sa competence, t  ctte dernierc  mission s rxercc no tam ­
ment par I intervention des services comptables et de services 
de controle specialises
Pour son secteur de rcsponsabilite  ou pour des questions 
communes a plusieurs directions ou services, elle assure la i 
representation umtairc  du  ministere des P I L aupres des 
au tres  ad m in is t ra t ions ,  n o ta m m e n t  aupres des ministeres 
tbarges de la loncdon  publique et du budget a.nsi qu aupres 
des organisrnes ou autorites d caractere national ou interna 
tional
I He conduit son action en relat ion avec la delegation gene 
r.ile a la si atcgic et. com pte  tenu des besoms qu'eilcs expri 
mcnt. avec la direction generale des postes cl la direction gene 
rale des telecommunications.
I Lins ce cadre,  dans lc respect des dispositions statutaircs 
ipplicables a la lonct ion publique d 'E tat  et dans le respect de 
unite des P I I . elle est responsablc  du statut du personnel  et 
detirut les regies generates applicablcx en matiCrc tie rccrute 
tnent d .uaiiccment. de mutations, dc remunerations , de disci 
plinc et de pensions 1 lie s assure dc leui bonne p, 1 cation 
I a misc en iruvre de la gestion du personnel releve de la 
rcsponsabilite des directions gcnerales ou autres services utili 
• ateurs I outclois.  |.i direction des al l.ures communes go re 
dnectcment certains personnels
I lie autorise le recrutement des personnels apparten.mt a des 
corps rfpurtis de fayon non p rfponderan tc  dans l u n e  ou 
I autre des directions genfrales a partir des besoms fi*cs par les 
directions gcnerales et les services utilisatcurs
I lie conduit une reflexion sur les problernes gencr.iux dc 
politique dc personnel et de lormation  I lie a un role de coor 
dinai ion pour les questions de lormation communes a Pen 
semble iles P I !
I lie impulse et controle les actions ert maticre d hvgienc et 
de securite et dclimt I action mexlicale en liaison avec ie service 
du niedcctn en cbet ties P I I et les services de securite ties 
directions genfrales
I He a uric lonction tic docum enta tion  A cc litre elle a en 
partic niter la rcsponsabilite  ties hiblmtheques et tie la tlocu 
mentat ion luruliquc
I l le  comprend un service charge ties a l lu r e s  sociales ( e  
service impulse, conduit et controle I action sociule II a la 
tuielle >les associations tie personnel dc ce secteur Son action 
'  exerce notamment dans les dom aincs tie I assistance au per 
'" i inel  tie I .otic au logemcnt.  a l enlarice et a la icunesse ties 
rvst.iur.ints itinnnisifciiils vies l«)oper,i(ives ilu sport ri iles
liHMrv
I i ihrcitMui des .ilLnrcs v. o m n iu m s  assure l.i preparation vies 
documents hudgetuires -oumi> au Parlement et prepare les 
decisions rtglcrncntuires ntce».saircs a l'execution du huditct 
I lie est chargee tie la reglcrnentation.  tie la description et ilu 
controle ties operations hutlgetaircs et comptables a m s i  que dc 
I information ties autorites dc gestion et tie controle A ce litre 
ie directeur ties al laires com m unes  a notamment autorite mu 
I agent comptable central
I lie est responsablc ties j l l .o res  iuridiqucs et contentieuses 
pour les secteurs d activite relevant tie son tlo.oaine tie cmnpe 
teruc ct pour ties questions com m unes a plusieurs directions 
' >u serv ices ties P I \
I lie est competente pour lev princapes applicables en mutiere 
tl organisation et tie lonctionnement ties centres et atcl ic's 
.1 entretien ties matfriels de transport automobile
I lit- tlelimt et met en true re les applications mlorm atiqut  s 
l ie---,  a son tlorname tie rcsponsabilite
I de tlelimt les moyens nccessaircs a son lonctionnement.  
elatiore son butlgct ct en assure l'execution
I e directeur ties al laires com m unes a uutoritc s u r  les chels 
tics services exterieurs qui lui sont rattaches. en particulier les 
services regmnaux tic comptabilite
•'ft 4 I a direction generale ties posies releve tlirecterne.it 
tie I autorite • Icj ministre
I lie detinit la politique generale des services postuux et 
financiers ct tletermine les movens necessaires a leur lonction 
nement Pile elaborc, ncgocie et execute les chartes tie gestion 
et le budget de la poste et propose les moyens de fmanccrnent 
correspondants  f ile gere les moyens mis a s.i 1 posit ion par 
la loi de finances
l.e directeur general des postes dirige I'activite de I'ensemble 
ties directions et services dc la direction gen6rale ties postes
II a delegation du ministre ties P I T  pour I'exercicc tie s e s  
competences dans les I dudes de I f lat et ies organisrnes dont 
I'activite princinale releve du dom aine  de la poste et tics ser 
vices financiers
II a autorite sur les chefs ties services exterieurs dc la poste 
sous reserve des pouvoirs respcctivement d6volus aux commis- 
saircs tie la Republique de d tpa r tem en t  et tie region et n o ta m ­
ment tie i 'application des articles lb du  d icrc t  n° M2-.189 ct 
15 ilu d£cret n" 82 .190 du It) mai 1982 susvists.
II peut confier  .\ un directeur la mission tic coordonncr  Tac­
tion tie plusieurs directions ou services.
Art V l a direction dc la production tie la direction g£n6- 
rale ties postes est chargee, en collaboration avec la direction 
tic la promotion,  dc I organisation et ilu fonctionnement des 
services tie la poste.
Idle assuie I'e.xploiiation ties produits , gOre les centres de 
(ruilcmeni amsi que les points tie contact  avec le public et 
organise les tliverses chaincs d 'exploita l ion Idle controle la 
qualite ties prestations fourmes el suit I nvolution ties resultats 
il 'e.xploitation.
Dans le cadre tie la ~ ‘ . in lormatique tie la direction
generale ties postes. elle met en <ruvre 'cs , , cations inlorma- 
tiques liees a la production
Art 6 I a direction tie la promotion tie la direction g£n£- 
ralc des postes elabore et met en truvre  la politique de d£vc 
loppcmcnt ties prestations et tie relations avec les usagers
I n collaboration avec la direction tie la production et la 
direction Imuncierc. elle de termine la gamtnc des prestations 
ollertcs. organise les etudes tie marche ct la promotion  des 
produits
I lie tletermine, en liaison avec la direction tie la production 
ft l.i direction Imancierc. compte tenu ties orientations pro- 
posecs par la delegation generale .1 la strategic ct figurant aux 
chartes tie gestion, les principes tic la polit ique larifaire
I He est chargee tie I organisation el de f a m m a t io n  des 
rescatix t. accueil et tie contact el ties relations commercialcs 
avec lev ihverses categories d usagers
Aft I n liaison avec les autres directions tie la direction
generale tics posies, la direction fmanciere est chargee du plan, 
des programmes ilu budget, dc la comptabilite de gestion amsi 
que tics etudes economiques et stalis tiques el tics al laires jun- 
liques el contentieuses 
I lie etuilie les mesures tie nature a assurer I cquil ihre Ccono- 
nuque tie la poste
I He est responsablc des movens tie l inancetnent.  controle la 
gestion du portelcuillc et assure la gestion du londs tie roule 
merit el tics participations
I He tlelimt et met en truvre. pour I ensemble tie la po> te, 
i organisation el le controle de la gestion
I lie a  la rcsponsabili te ties al laires juritliques ,.1 conten- 
tieuscs pour les services relevant tie la direction generate des 
p o s t e s
Dans le cadre tic la politique inlormatique de la direction 
generale ties posies, elle met en truvre les ,q 1.cations informa-
liqufs liees a la gestion
Art v Sur la base ties specifications tlelinies par  les 
directions tie |.( direction generale ties posies et. dans certains 
domaincs . par les autres directions el services, la direction d ^  
la logistique tie la direction generale ties posies est chargee de 
la rnise en truvre ties programmes d 'equipement
\  la dcmandc el en collaboration avec les autres directions,  
file esi chargee de I acquisition, la construction, hi Itication.
1 imeriagemcnt et I entretien des immeubles autres que ceux 
relevant tie la direction generale ties telecommunications.
I He icquiert et met en pi.ice les materiel, el lourmtures ainsi
■ l e t i n i s
I lie assure ia maintenance ties instal lat ions et ties mattriels.
I He est o .m petente  en matit're tie legislation et de reglemen- 
’ at ion generale d o p e  rations immobilieres ct tie marches.
I He est chargee de I'etude. tie I'acquisition et Je I'entretien 
des materiels tie transport dependant  tie la direction generaledes postes
Art I n  liaison avec la direction tie la production, la
directum de la promotion et la d irectum tic la logistique, la 
direction tie la prospective et ties affaires internationales est 
responsablc ties etudes et projets tie recherche et de dcveloppe-  
ment I He e>t chargee tics relations avec les industries 
concernees
f i le  dclimt la politique inlormatique tie la direction generalc 
ties postes et coordonne sa mise en teuvre.
I lie traite. en tant que de besom en liaison avec la d£l£ga- 
tion generale .i la strategic, de toutes les questions tic coopdra-  
tion Internationale et d 'exportat ion  ties equipernents de la 
poste elle tlirige et coordonne Faction ties services competents 
dans ces domaincs.
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A n. 10. - Lc service du personnel dc la direction gEnErale 
des postes est charge de defintr  les caracterist iques fonction- 
nelles des  diffErents emplois de la poste et. A ce titre, collahore 
A E la b o r a t i o n  des statuts et des regies de personnel
II assure, dans le respect des regies definies par la direction 
des affa ires  communes, et dans  les conditions precisecs a I'ar- 
ticle 3, 7* alinea,  du present decret,  la gestion des moyens en 
personne l  dc la poste L'esseniiel  de cette rcsponsabilite est 
exerce de fa yon deconcentree.
II est responsablc de la formation  des personnels de la posic 
Pour k s  personnels  superieurs.  il cxerce cette rcsponsabilite  en 
liaison avec le comite des enseignements superieurs.
II est charge des etudes d 'o rgam sa iion  relatives jux services 
relevant de la direction generalc des postes.
Art II Le service de securite de la direction generale des 
postes definit  les controlcs ad m in is t ra tes  et techniques destines 
a garan t i r  la protection des bailments et des equipements. ainsi 
que la securi te des envois confies a la poste, des londs et des 
valeurs.  iles tichiers et des procedures
II p rocede  ou lait proceder aux etudes necessaires a l accom- 
p lissement de sa mission II propose les regies a observer et en 
con tro le  I 'application
I! definit  les mesures propres a renforcer la protection des 
p ersonne ls  de la poste et coo rdonne  fac t ion  des directions el 
services de la direction generale des postes dans ce domaine I 
lniervient.  si necessaire, aupres des mimsteres et organisrnes 
com peten ts
D ans le dom aine  de la -.ecurite, il coordonne amsi fac t ion  
Je  I 'ensemble des services de la direction generale des posies 
II est le correspondan t du service de defense et Je  securite 
civile des P F T
Art 12 l a  dire tion generale des te lecommunications 
releve directernent de . autorite  du ministre
File definit  la politique genera 'e  des telecommunications et 
de term ine  les movens necessa ires a leur lonctionnement t ile 
e labore negocie et execute les t ,har te. de gestion et le budget 
des te lecom m unications et propose  les movens de ftnancemcnt 
L iirrespondants {-11r gere les movens mis a sj disposition par 
la loi de finances
l e  dif-*cteur general des te lecommunications dirige i'activite 
de I 'ensem ble  des directions et services de la direction generate 
des te lecommunications
II a delegation du ministre des P  T I pour i'exercice d e  s e s  
com petences  dans les tlliales de I F tat et les organisrnes dont 
I'activite principale reieve du d o m a i r e  des te lecommunications 
et de la le ledilfusion
II a autori te  sur ies chefs des services exterieurs des te lecom­
m unica t ions  sous reserve des pouvoirs respectivement devolus 
aux ccimmissaires de la Republique de departement et de 
region et notam m ent de I 'application des articles in du decret 
n" 82-389 et 13 du decret n" 82-39(1 du It) mai 1982 susvises 
II peut confier  a un ou plusieurs directeurs  la mission de 
co o rd o n n e r  fac t ion  de plusieurs directions ou services
Art 13 l a  direction de la p roduction  de la direction 
generale des telecommunications est chargee de la definition 
de I’tngemerie, de la mise en iruvre  et de la maintenance des 
eq u ipem en ts  et des bailments pour lesqueis elle passe, sous 
reserve des delegations consenties et 3 I 'cxccption des marches 
d 'e tu d es  de nouveau materiel et de prototvpes. les conventions 
et les m arches necessaires F.lle est chargee de I'etude. de I jc 
quisition et de fentretien des materieis de transport dependant 
de ‘a d irection generate des te lecommunications
E:!e est chargee de I achem m em en t  du trafic et de I exploita­
tion technique,  lu tom auque  et manuelle du reseau de telecom 
m u n ican o n s
Elle regie et coordonne fac t ion  des directions regionales des 
te lecom m unications  et des services speciaux qui lui sont rat 
taches
Art 14 La direction des alfaires commerciales et teiem.i 
tiques de la direction generale des te lecommunications est 
chargee de proposer et met tre en oeuvre la politique commer 
ciale et teiematique des te lecom m unications
Elle elabore, compte tenu des orientat ions proposees par la 
delegation  generale A la strategic et figurant dans les cnartes de 
gestion.  la poh u q u e  tanfa ire  des te lecommunications.
Elle a la rcsponsabilite des affaires jund iques  ct co n ten ­
tieuses pour  ies services relevant de la direction generalc des 
te lecommunications.
Elle o n e n te  et coordonne fac t ion  des services c o m p e te n t  et 
passe, sous reserve des delegations consenties. les marches 
necessa ires a l 'execution dc sa mission
Art 15 La direction des affaires industrielles  et in tem a-  
! lionales de la direction gCnCrale des telecommunications 
definit. avec la direction de la p roduction ,  la politique d 'acha t  
des telecommunications et propose  ies elements de la politique 
industriel le des te lecommunications.
f i le  assure le controle technique des equipements  de tele­
communications
f i le  controle les prix des matiercs,  fournitures et services 
acquis par les te lecommunications
F ile est chargee de la reparti t ion des credits d eludes de n o u ­
veau materiel et de prototypes pour lesqueis elle passe, sous 
reserve des delegations consenties les marches necessaires 
Sous fau tori te  du directeur general des te lecommunications, 
elle oriente fac t ion  du Centre  national d 'e tudes des te lecom ­
munications
f i le  traite. en liaison avec la delegation generale A la s t ra ­
tegic. de loutes les questions de cooperation Internationale et 
d 'exportat ion  des equipements  des te lecommunications ; elle 
dtnge et coordonne fac t ion  des services competents dans ces 
domaincs et passe, sous reserve des delegat ions consenties, les 
marches necessaires
F ile assure fexplo ita tion  des te lecommunications avec les 
pavs etrangers
Art lb La direction des programmes el des affaires 
financieres de la direction generale des te lecommunications est 
chargee du plan, des programmes, du budget  et des affaires 
financieres
Elle etudie les mesures de nature  a realiser fequil ihre  f in an ­
cier dc la direction generale des te lecommunications
File esi responsablc des movens de financement et assure la 
gestion du fonds de roulement et des participations
File definit et met en iruvre.  pour I ensemble des te lecom m u­
nications. I organisation et le controle de la gestion
F ile definit la polit ique d ' in form atique  de gestion de la 
Jireciion generale des le lecommunications et coordonne sa 
mise en icuvre
Art I ’ l.e service de la prospective et des etudes econo- 
miques de I j  direction generale des te lecommunications est 
charge de la prospective et des etudes economiques
Art 18 L.e service du personnel  de la direction generate 
des te lecommunications est charge de definir les car.- T tns-  
tiqucs lonctionnelles des diffCrents emplois des te lecom m unica­
tions et. a ce litre, collahore A I Elaboration des statuts et des 
'fgles de personnel
II assure, dans ie respect des rCgles dCfimes par la direction 
les affaires communes, et dans les condit ions precisEes A fa r-  
isle L ' r alinea. du present decret . la gestion des moyens en 
personnel des te lecommunications l. 'essentiel de cette respon- 
'.lbilite est exerce de fayon deconcentree
II est responsable de la form ation  des personnels des tEIE- 
o im m u n ic j t io n s  Pour les personnels  superieurs.  il exerce cette 
rcsponsabilite en liaison avec le comite des enseignements 
superieurs
II est charge des etudes d 'o rgar .isation relatives aux services 
relevant de la direction generale des te lecommunications
Art 19 l.e service de securite de la direction generalc des 
telecommunications effectue les t o m m ie s  adm in is t ra tes  et tech­
niques destines A garantir la protection des bailments et des 
- luipements et la preservation des produits et des londs des 
te le .um m uni cations
II procede a u i  eludes de protection et de secunsation  du 
reseau des telecommunications et controle I application des 
mesures prises dans ce dom -ine
II definit les moyens d urgence, udministratifs  et techniques , 
a mettre en ^rucre en cas de simstre. le rccours eventue! A 
T F) F et aux autres dCpanemc't ts  mimstCnels intervenant par  
f in te rmediaire  du service de defense et de securite civile des 
P T T
II definit I;s mesure> propres A renforcer  la protection des 
personnels des te lecommunications et coo rdonne  fac t ion  des 
directions ct services de la direction generale des te lecom m uni­
cations dans ce domaine.  II intervient. si necessaire. aupres des 
mimsteres et organisrnes competents
II coordonne fac tion  de I’ensemble des services des te lecom­
munications dans le domaine de la securite.
An 20 - Le comite des enseignements  supeneurs  co m ­
prend. sous la prEsidence du ministre ou de son representant. 
le directeur des affaires com m unes ,  le directeur genEral des 
postes et le directeur general des te lecommunications. Les 
directeurs des enseignements supe neurs  participent aux travaux 
dc ce comite.
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Lc comttA des enseignements  superieurs  est charge de dAfinir 
les o n e n ta t io n s  gAnAraies des enseignements  superieurs  des 
P.T.T. et de fixer  leurs objectifs. II exam ine les proposit ions 
budge ta ires  et les p rogram m es d en se tg n em en i .
Art. 21. - Les at tr ibutions des d irections et services seront 
precisees, en tant que de besom, par  arre tes du ministre des 
P.T.T.
Art. 22 Le decret n" 71-609 du 20 juillet 1971 rrodiftA 
p o r tan t  organisa tion  de l adm in is t ra t ion  ccntrale du ministere 
des posies et te lecom m unications est abroge.
Art. 22 Le Premier ministre,  le ministre de leconom ie ,  
des finances et du  budget, le ministre de 1‘in tencur  et de !a 
decen tra l isa t ion ,  le ministre du edAploiement industriel  et du 
com m erce  exter teur.  le ministre des If T T. et le secretaire 
d 'E t a t  aupres du Premier ministre. charge dc la lonction 
p u b l ique  et des simplifications a d m i n i s t r a t e s ,  sont charges.
chacun en ce qui  le c o n c e m e ,  de l’execution  du  present decret,  
qui sera publie au Journa l officiel de la R epub lique  francaise. 
Fait Paris, le 28 jan v ie r  1986. 
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND 
Par le President de la Republique : 
l.e Premier ministre,
L A U R F N T  F AB1 US m inistre des P.T.T..
LOUIS MEXANDEAU 
l.e m m iu re  de l economie. des finances el du budget,
PIERRE HFr FGOVOY
Le m in istre  de l in ttn e u r  et de la decentralisation.
PIERRE JOXE 
l.e ministre du redeploiem ent industriel 
cl du commerce exteneur.
FOITM ( RFSSON
Im’ secretaire d 'E ta t aupres du Premier ministre. 
charge de la fonction  publique 
et des simplifications adm inistratives.
JEAN LE GARREC
M I N I S T E R E  d e  l E d u c a t i o n  n a t i o n a l e
A r r A tA  d u  20  j a n v t s r  1986 
r e l a t i f  a u x  a t a t u t a  d a  I ' u n i v a r s i t A  d a  R o u a r t
Par arrete du secretaire d l tat jupres du mimsire de I education 
nationale. chjrge des universites. en date du 2d i.invier lush |e«, 
statuts de i uniscrsiie de Ri'uen sont arretes I I i
i I )  l ev  s i d i u l s  | > c u v e n i  e i r e  c o n s u l t e - .  a u  s i e g e  J e  I e i a b l i ' s e m e n t  e l  a u  
s e c r e t a r i a l  U E t a i  c h a r g e  d e s  u n i v e r s i t e s .  M hV rue Dut o l .  a P a n s i l ' * !
A r r A t A  d u  21 j a n v i e r  1984 f i x a n t  l e a  c o n d i t i o n a  d a d m i a a i o n  
A i ’E c o l e  n o r m i l e  a u p A r i e u r e  d e  C a c h a n
I e  m i m s i r e  d r  l e d u s a t i o n  n a t i o n a l e .
W  i e d e c r e l  n  s '  1 <X d u  2 4  l u i l l e t  I 9 XS r e l a t i l  a u s  e t o l e s  n o r  
m a l e s  s u n e r i e u r e s
V u  l e  d e c r e t  n ■ s '  ’ s v  d u  2 4  j u i l l c t  I 9 XS  p o r t a n t  c r e a t i o n  d ' e t a h l i s  
- e m e n t s  p u b l i c s  a  c a r a c t e r e  s c i e n t t f i ^ u e .  c u l l u r e l  e l  p r o l e s s i o n n e l  .
V u  l e  d e c r e t  n  6 1 ) 1 2 X 9  d u  21 n o v e m h r e  I 9 6 0  r e l a t i f  a u  r c t r u t e  
m e n t  d e s  e l e v e s  e l  a  l a  d u r e e  d c  l a  s c o i u r i t e  a  I f c o l e  n o r m a l e  s u p e  
n e u r e  d e  l e n s e i g n e m c n t  t e c h n i q u e  .
V i l e  d e c r e t  n 1 ' x  I KM d u  21 n o v e m h r e  I 9 7 X r e l a t i l  a l a p t i t u d e  
p h v s  i q u e  d e s  c a n d i d a t e  a u s  c o n c o u r s  d ' e n i r e e  d a n s  l e s  e c o l e s  n o r  
m a l e s  s u p e r i e u r e s
V u  l a r r e t e  d u  7 u c t o b r e  I 9 4 X f i x a n t  l e s  c o n d i t i o n s  d  a d m i s s i o n  et  
l e s  p r o g r a m m e s  d u  c o n c o u r s  d  e n t r e e  a  I f c o l e  n o r m a l e  s u p e n e u r e  
d e  I ' e n s e i g n e m e n t  t e c h n i q u e
V u  larrete du II unvier  1961 fixant la Itste des sections de 
i'Ecole normale supeneure de I'enseignement technique ;
Vu I arretE du 9 janvier 1761 fixant les conditions d'inscnption au 
concours d admission en premiere annEe de I’Ecole normale supE- 
rieure de I enseignerritt.; i jchmque .
\ u  l arrete du 22 fEvrier 19X4 proroge relatif au recrutement a 
LF.cole normale supeneure de I'enseignement technique de candidats 
tiiulaires de la maiinsc ou d un diplome d'ingenieur .
Vu l arrete du i4 novemhre 19X5 relatif au recrutement a 1‘Ecole 
normale supeneure de I'enseignement technique (sections Bl. B2. 
B3. B4i de candidats titulaires d un brevet de technicien supeneur 
i u d  u n  diplome universnaire de technologie .
V u  l uvis du Conseil national de I'enseignement ' u^cneur et de la 
recherche en date du 9 dEcembre 1985.
Arrete
Art I"  Les eleves de I’Ecole normale supeneure de Cachan 
sont recrutEs. en 19X6. par la voic de concours. ouverts aux "an- 
didats des deux seses. dans des conditions identiques 4 celles des 
concours d entree a IFco le  normale supErteure de I'enseignement 
technique pour les memes formations
Art 2 Le directeur des enseignements supeneurs est charge da 
i execution du present arrete. qui sera publie au Journal olfiael de la 
Republique iranyaise
fail a Paris, le 21 'anvier 19X6
Pour le ministre et par delegation 
l.e directeur des enseignements supeneurs.
() SC HRAMECK
n i i n i s t E r e  d e s  a f f a i r e s  s o c i a l e s  e t  d e  l a  s o l i d a r i t y  n a t i o n a l e
D A c r e t  n ’ 86-130 du 28 j anv ie r  1988 m o d i f i a n t  le c o d e  
d e  la s e c u r i t A a o c i a l e  ( d e u x i A m e  p er t i e  : DAcre ta  e n  
C o n s e u  d ' Eta t )  e t  re lat i f  A la m e n s u a l i s a t i o n  de  
p r e s t a t i o n s  d e  v i e i i l e s s e ,  d i n v a l i d i t A  e t  d ’a c c i d e n t s  
du travai l
L.e P rem ie*m in is t re
S t  le rappcr t  du  mimsire de Leconomie. des f inances et du 
budge t ,  du mintstrc de ('agriculture et du ministre des affaires 
sociales et de la solidarite nationale, p o n e  parole du f iouverne- 
ment.
Vu le code de la -.ecurite sociale . 
v u le code rural .
Vu le decret  n° ‘'5-244 du 10 fAvrter 1955 p o n a n t  reglement 
d 'ad m in is t r a t io n  publique pour I 'application  de la loi n^ 54-806 
du I 3 aout 1954 .
Vu i'avis du comite m terminis tenel  de coordination  cn 
m at ie re  de sAcurne sociale :
Vu I'avis du  conseil  d 'adm in is tra t ion  dc la Laisse nationale 
d 'a s su ra n c e  vieiilesse des travailleurs sa laries ;
Vu i'avis du conseil  d 'adm in is tra t ion  de la ( aisse nationale 
de I 'a ssurance  maiadie  des travailleurs sa laries .
Le Conseil  d 'f  tat (section sociale) entendu.
Decrete
Art I "  Le deuxiEme alinAa de Larticle R. 341-6 du code 
le la securite sociale est remplacA par les disposit ions sui- 
. antes
■ I a matoration po u r  a ide  d une tierce personne  est versAe 
jusqu au dernier  jour du  mois civil suivant celut au cours 
duquei  l assure a ete hospita l ise  au-delA de cette date, son
service est suspendu »
Art 2 I Le prem ier  al inea de Larticle R. 341-15 du 
code de la securite sociale est remplacA par  les disposit ions sui-
■ antes
•< La pension doit etre su sp en d u e ,  en tout  ou par tie.  par  la 
caisse prtmaire d assu rance  m alad te  lorsqu il est constatA que  
I'tnteresse a joui. sous fo rm e de pension  d'invaliditA et sa latre 
ou gain cumulAs. p en d an t  six mots consAcutifs, de ressources 
superieures au salaire m oyen  de la demiAre annAe civile precA- 
dant  Larret de travai* sutvi d ’invaliditA. »
II - Le quatr iemc alinAa de Larticle R. 341-15 du code de la 
s e c u r i "  sociale est rem place  par  les d isposit ions suivantes :
•< Le m ontant  des arre rages  d ;  chaque  mots ultArieur est 
reduit a concurrence du dep assem en t  constate  au cours du tri- 
nes trc precedent.  >•
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m i n i s t E r e  D E  L ' l N D U S T R I E ,  d e s  p . e t  t . e t  d u  t o u r . s m e
D 4 c r« t  n°  86-715 d u  17 avr il  1986 r* l* tH  aux  a t t r ib u t io n *  
d u  m in la t r*  d* I ' ln d u a t r i* .  d « s  P. * t  T. a t  du  to u r i s m *
Le President de la Republique,
Sur le rapport  du Premier ministre,
Vu le decret n° 59-178 du 22 janvier 1959 relatif aux attribu­
tions des ministres ;
Vu le decret n° 70-878 du 29 septembre 1970, modifie notam­
ment par le decret n® 82-734 du 24 aout 1982, relatif au Com­
missariat k l’energie atcmique,  en particulier son article 3 :
Vu le decret n° 78-977 du 27 septembre 1973 portant organi- i 
sation de I’adminisiration centrale du ministere de la jeunesse, 
des sports et des loisirs, en particulier son article 5 ;
Vu le decret n® 79-615 du 13 juillct 1979 modifie relatif * 
l’organisstion et au fonctionnement de I'Agence nationale de 
valorisation de la recherche (Anvar) ;
Vu 1; decret n° 84-731 du 26 juillct 1984 relatif aux attribu­
tions du ministre du  commerce, de 1’artisanat et du tounsme ;
Vu le decret n° 84-749 du 2 aoQt 1984 relatif aux attributions 
du  ministre de 1'agriculture en matiere d ’industries du bois, de 
developpement et d ’am6nagement rural ;
Vu le decret n« 84-750 du 2 aoflt 1984 relatif aux attributions 
du ministre du redeploiement industriel et du commerce exte- 
rieur ;
Vu le decret n° 85-268 du 18 fevrier 1985 portant creation de 
i’etablissement public de la Cite des sciences et de I'industrie ;
Vu !e decrct n3 85-803 du 30 juillct 1985 relatif aux services 
d 'administration centrale propres au ministere du redeploie- 
ment industriel et du commerce exterieur ;
Vu le decret n° 85-804 du 30 juillct 1985 relatif aux services 
d'administration centrale communs au ministere du redeploie­
ment industriel et du commerce exterieur et au ministere de la 
recherche et de la technologie ;
Vu le decret n° 85-1212 du 20 novembre 1985 relatif aux 
attributions du ministre des P.T.T. ;
Vu l’arrete du ministre de l’urbanisme, du logemcnt et des 
transports en date du II decembre 1985 portant organisation 
de la direction de I'architecture et de I’urbanisme :
Vu le decret n® 86-129 du 28 janvier 1986 relatif k I’adminis- 
tration centrale du ministe.e des P.T.T. ;
Vu le decret n® 86-294 du 27 fevrier 1986 instituant un 
comite interministeriel relatif & Eureka ;
Vu le decret du 20 mars 1986 portant nomination du Premier 
ministre ;
Vu le decret du 20 mars 1986 portant  nomination des 
membres du Gouvernement ;
Vu le decret n® 86-693 du 4 avril 1986 relatif aux attributions 
du ministre de la culture et de la communication ;
Vu le decret n® 86-701 du 8 avril 1986 relatif aux attributions 
du ministre d'Etat,  ministre de I'economie, des finances et de 
la privatisation .
Vu le decret n° 86-714 du 17 avril 1986 relatif aux attribu­
tions du ministre de I'education nationale ;
Le Conseil d 'Etat  (section des travaux publics) entendu ;
Le conseil des ministres entendu,
Decrete .
Art. l ,r . - Le ministre de I'industrie, des P. et T. et du tou- i  
nsme exerce les attr ibution* pr6c6demment d6volues :
1° Par le decret n® 84-750 du 2 aout 1984 susvise, au ministre 
du redeploiement industriel et du commerce exterieur. k  I'ex- 
ception de celles excrcees en matiere de commerce exterieur, 
transferees au ministre d'Etat, ministre de l economie, des 
finances et de la privatisation, par le decret du 8 avril 1986 
susvise ;
2° Par le decret n° 85-1212 du 20 .lovembrc 1985 susvise. au 
ministre des P.T.T., a l 'exception dc celles devolucs au ministre 
de la culture et de la communication par le decret du 4 avril 
1986 susvise ;
3° Par le decret n° 84-731 du 26 juillct 1984 susvise, au 
ministre c.. commerce, de 1'artisanat et du tourisme, en matiere 
de tourisme.
Le ministre de I'industrie. des P et T. et du tounsme donne 
les impulsions necessaires au developpemcnt par les entrepnscs 
d 'une politique d ’innovation ct d'ameiioration de leur competi- 
tivite.
Il peut presider, par delegation du Premier ministre, le 
Comite k l energie atomique et ie comite interministeriel relatif 
k Eureka.
Art. 2. - Sont places sous I’autorite du ministre de I'indus 
trie, des P. et T. et du tounsme :
1° a) Les services enumeres par le decret n® 85-803 di
30 juillct 1985 susvise, k l 'exception de la delegation au com
merce exterieur ;
b) Les services enumeres par le decret n® 85-804 di
30 juillet 1985 susvise, sous reserve de ce qui est dit k Par 
iicle 4 ci-apres au sujet du centre de prospective et d'evalua 
tion ;
c) Le service de I’equipement naval mentionne par ie decrri 
n® 84-750 du 2 aout 1984 susvise ;
2° Les services mentionn6s par lc decrct n® 86-129 du
28 janvier  1986 susvise ;
3° a) La direction du tourisme ct I'inspection generalc du 
tourisme ;
b) Les servic / e tu d e  et d'amenagement touristique charges 
de 1'espace rural, du littoral et de la montagne ; ces services 
sont mis, en tant que de besoin, k la disposition du ministre de 
requipement,  du logemcnt, de I’amenagerrent du territoire et 
des transports et du ministre de I'agriculture.
Art. 3. - Les directions departementalcs de I'agriculture et 
de la fort t  sont, en tant que de besoin, mises k la disposition 
du min>stre de I'industrie, des P. et T. et du tourisme pour 
I'exercice de ses attributions en matiere de tourisme rural.
Art. 4. -  Le ministre de I'industrie, des P. et T. et du cou- 
risme a, conjointement avec le ministre d'Etat,  ministre de 
I 'iconomie, des finances et de la privatisation, autorite sur le 
service des chambres de commerce et d'industrie. II a, conjoin­
tement avec le ministre de (‘Education nationale, autorite sur le 
centre de prospective et devaluation
Art. 5. -  Le ministre de I'industrie, des P. et T. et du tou­
risme exerce, conjointement avec le ministre d ’Etat, ministre de 
l*6conomie, des finances et de la privatisation, la tutelle sur les 
chambres de commerce et d'industrie. 11 exerce, conjointement 
avec le ministre de leducation  nationale, la tutelle sur I'Agence 
nationale de valorisation de la recherche, le Centre national 
d ’etudes spatiales, I’Agence franqaise de maitrise de i’inergie et 
la Cite des sciences et de I’industrie.
Ait. 6. - Le premier alinea de Particle 2 du decret du 
27 rtvrie- 1986 susvise instituant un comite interministeriel 
relatif L F >r6ka est remplace par la disposition suivante : « ce 
comite interministeriel est preside par le Premier ministre ou, 
par delegation, pa r  le ministre charge de I’industrie ou par le 
ministre charge do la recherche ».
Art. 7. -  Le Prem ier ministre, le ministre d ’Etat, ministre dc 
I’economic, des finances et de la privatisation, le ministre de ia 
culture et de la com m unication, le ministre de 1’equipem ent, du 
logement, de l’ain6nagem en: du territoire et des transports, ie 
m inistre de I’education nationale, Ie ministre de I'industrie, des 
P. et T. et du tourism e et le ministre de I’agriculture son. 
charges, chacun en ce qui le conccrne, de ( execution du pre­
sent decret. qui sera publie au Journal officiel dc la Republique 
francaise.
Fait k Paris, le 17 avril 1986
F R A N C O I S  M I T T E R R A N D  
Par le President de la Republique 
Le Premier ministre.
JACQUES CHIRAC
Le ministre Je I'industrie. des P. et T. et du tourisme.
A L A I N  M A D F . L i N  
Le ministre d'Etat. ministre de I'economie.
des finances et de la privatisation.
E d o u a r d  r a l l a d u r
Le ministre de la culture et de ’» communication.
F R A N C O I S  L E O T A R D
Le ministre de I equipement. du logement. 
de lam enagem ent du territoire et des transports.
P I F R R F  M E H A I G N E R I E
Le ministre de I Education nationale.
R E N E  M O N O R Y
l.e ministre de I’agriculture 
F R A N C O I S  G U I L L A U M E
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D 6 cre t n® 88-721 du 24 avril 1988 rela tif aux a ttr ib u tio n s  
du m in istre  d 6 ltg u 6  au p res du m in istre  d e  l'6d u ca-  
t io n  n a tio n a ls , c h a r g e  de la rech er ch e  et de I’e n se i-  
gnem errt aupSrieur
Le President de la Republique,
Sur Ie rapport du Premier ministre et du ministre de ['educa­
tion nationale,
Vu ia loi n° 55-425 du 16 avril 1955 portant reorganisation 
des services des ceuvres sociales en faveur des etudiants ;
Vu la loi n° 84-52 du 26 janvier 1984 sur I'enseignement 
su p e r ic u r ;
Vu le decrct n° 47-233 du 23 janvier 1947 autorisant les 
ministres k deieguer, par arrete, leur signature, modifie par le 
decret n° 76-830 du 28 aout 1976 ;
Vu le decret n° 70-878 du 29 septembre 1970 modifie relatif 
au Commissariat k l 'energie atomique ;
Vu le decret n° 78-659 du 23 juin 1978 modifiant le decret 
n° 75-1002 du 29 octobre 1975 relatif £ la coordination de la 
politique de recherche scientifique et technique ;
Vu Ie decret n° 82-1012 du 30 novembre 1982 relatif au 
Conseil sup6rieur de la recherche et de ia technologic ;
Vu le decret n° 86-294 du 27 fevrier 1986 instituant un 
comite interministeriel relatif k Eureka ;
Vu le decret du 20 mars 1986 portant nomination du Premier 
ministre ;
Vu les decrcts des 20 et 25 mars 1986 portant nomination j 
des membres du Gouvernement ;
Vu le decret n° 86-714 du 17 avril 1986 relatif aux attribu­
tions du ministre de l‘6ducation nationale ;
Vu le decret n° 86-720 du 24 avril 1986 relatif aux attribu­
tions du secretaire d'Etat aupres du ministre de l'education 
nationale, charge de la formation professionnelle,
Decrtte :
Art. 1 -  M. Alain Devaquet, ministre deiegue aupres du 
ministre de l'education nationaie, charge de la recherche et de 1 
I’enseignement superieur, exerce, par delegation du ministre de 
l 'education nationale et s o u j  son autorite, les attributions de ce 
dernier relatives i  la recherche et k I 'enseignement supericur.
Art. 2. -  II peu t  pr6sider, par delegation du Premier 
ministre, le comite interministeriel de la recherche scientifique 
et technique, le comite interministeriel relatif k Eureka et le 
Comite 4 l'energie atomique.
V II « t  charge de I’enseignement technique et technologique 
supericur en liaison avec le secretaire d 'Etat  aupres du ministre 
>T de l’education nationale, charge de la formation profession- 
- nelle. *■.
II preside, par delegation du ministre de l'education natio­
nale, le Conseil national de I’enseignement supericur et de la 
recherche et le Conseil supericur de la recherche et de la tech­
nologic et le Comite des programmes.
Pour I’exercice de ses attributions, le ministre deiegue aupres 
du ministre de l'education nationale, charge de la recherche et 
de I'enseignement supericur, dispose de la direction generalc 
des enseignements superieurs et de la recherche, de la direction 
generale de la recherche ct de la technologic, de la mission 
scientifique ct technique, de la delegation k l’information, k la 
communication et k la culture scientifique et technique et, en 
tant que de besoin, de I'ensemble des services du ministere de 
l’education nationale.
II dispose, conjointement avec le ministre de I'industrie, des 
P. et T. et du tourisme, du centre de prospective et d ’evalua- 
tion. II fait appel, en tant que de besoin, au service d ’etude des 
strategies et statistiques industrielles, k la direction g6n6rale du 
developpemcnt regional et de l'environnement industriel et 
technologique, k la direction de l'administration generalc et k 
la delegation aux affaires internationales du ministere de I’in- 
dustrie, des P. et T. et du tourisme.
II exerce, pour Ie compte du ministre de l'education natio­
nale, la tutelle sur le Centre national des ceuvres universitaires 
et scolaires. les centres regionaux des ceuvres universitaires et 
scolaires ainsi que sur les etablissements publics et les orga- 
nismes de recherche relevant du ministre de l'education natio­
nale.
II exerce, pour le compte du ministre de l’education natio­
nale, et conjointement avec le ministre de I’industrie, des 
P. et T. et du tourisme, la tutelle sur I’Agence nationale de 
valorisation de la recherche, le Centre national d'etudes spa­
tiales, I'Agence franpaise pour la maitrise de l’energie et la Cite 
des sciences et de I’industrie.
A r t  3. -  M. Alain Devaquet refoit delegation du ministre 
de l'education nationale pour signer en son nom tous actes, 
arretts et decisions dans la limite des attributions mentionnees 
ci-dessus. II contresigne, conjointement avec le ministre de 
l'education nationale, les ’ vrets relevant de ses attributions.
II est autorise k deieguer sa signature dans les conditions 
prevues par  le decret du 23 janvier  1947 susvise.
Art. 4. -  Le Premier ministre, le ministre de l’education 
nationale, le ministre deiegue aupres du ministre de l’education 
nationale, charge de la recherche et de I'enseignement supe­
rieur, Ie ministre de I’industrie, des P. et T. et du  tourisme et le 
secretaire d ’Etat aupres du ministre de l’education nationale, 
charge de ia formation professionne'le. sont  charges, chacun en 
ce qui le concenie,  de l'execution du present decret, qui sera 
publie au Journal officiel de la Republique francaise.
Fait a Paris, le 24 avril 1986.
FRANQOIS MITTERRAND 
p.ir ie Pres ident d e  la Republ ique
Le Premier ministre.
JAl QljES CHIRAC
Le ministre deiegue aupres du ministre 
de l'education nationale. charge de la recherche 
et de I'enseignement superieur.
ALAIN DEVAQUET
Le ministre de I Education nationale.
RENE MONORY
l.e mini sire de I indusine. des P et T ei du tourisme 
ALAIN MADELIN
Le secretaire d'Etat 
aupres du ministre de l'education nationale. 
charge de la form ation professionnelle.
NICOLE CATALA
326
31 mai 1388 J O U R N A L  OFFICIEL DE LA . l £ P U B L I Q U E  F R A N C A I S E 7493
M I N I S T E R E  DE  L ' E D U C A T I O N  N A T I O N A L E .  
D E  L A R E C H E R C H E  ET D E S  S P O R T S
D 6cr«t n° 88-728 du 28 m ai 1988 relatif aux attribution*
du m in istr e  d'Etat, m in iatre d e  l'ed u ca tio n  n a tio ­
n a le , d e la r e c h e r c h e  e t  d ea  aporta
NOR NX8S0006SD
Lc President dc la Republique,
Sur le rapport  du Premier ministre,
Vu le d icret n° 59-178 du 22 janvier 1959 relat:f aux attribu­
tions des ministres ;
Vu le decret n° 79-6l5 du 13 juillet 1979 modifii relatif k 
1’organisation et au fonctionnement de I'Agence nationale de 
valoris-tion de la recherche (Anvar) ;
Vu le dicret n° 82-768 du 9 septembre 1982 relatif i  Foigani- 
sation de Padministration centrale du ministere de la recherche 
et de i'industrie, en particulier son article 1 ;
Vu le d icret n° 84-510 du 28 juin 1984 relatif au Centre 
national des 6tuder spatiales ;
Vu le dicret n° 85-268 du 18 fivrier 1985 portant creation de 
I’Etablissement public de la cite des sciences et de I'industrie ;
Vu le dicret  n° 86-691 du 3 avril 1986 relatif aux attributions 
du secretaire d'Etat aupr6s du Premier ministr ' chargi de la 
jeunesse et des sports .
V’u le dicret n° 86-714 du 17 avnl 1986 relatif aux attribu­
tions du ministre de Piducation nationale ;
Vu le d6cret n° 86-1250 du 8 dtcembre 1986 relatif k I'orga- 
nisation de Padministration centrale du ministire de I'industrie, 
des P. et T. et du tourisme, en particulier ses articles l er, 4 
et 18 ;
Vu le dicret du 10 mai 1988 portant  nomination du Premier 
ministre :
Vu le dicret du 12 mai 1988 portant nomination des 
membres du Gouvernement :
Le Conseil d ’Etat (section de Iint6rieur) entendu ;
Le conseil des ministres entendu,
Dfccr6te :
Art. 1". - Le ministre d'Etat , ministre de l’6ducation natio­
nale, de la recherche et des sports, exerce les attributions 
d6volues au ministre de I'Mucation nationale par Particle 1" 
du d6cret du 17 avril 1986 susvisi.
II exerce, en mature de recherche, les attributions dtfintes 
par Particle 2 ( l w et 3* alintas)  du dicret  du 17 avril 1986 
susvisL
II contribue k la definition et k la mise en oeuvre de la poli­
tique du Gouvernement en matiire  d ’innovation, de valorisa­
tion de la recherche et de transferts de technologies.
II exerce les attributions divolues au Premier ministre en 
matidre de jeunesse et de sports par  le dicret du 3 avril 1986 
susvisi.
i Art. 2. - Au titre de ses attributions relatives k la recherche, 
le ministre d 'Etat.  ministre de P£ducation nationale, de la 
recherche et des sports, prepare avec le ministre d’Etat, 
ministre de P6conomie, des finances et du budget, les decisions 
; cu Gouvernement relatives k Pattribution des ressouices et des 
moyens allou6s par i'Etat dans le cadre du budget civil de 
recherche et de d iveloppement technologique ; £ cet effet, les 
ministres pr6sentent au ministre d ’Etat, ministre de Ptducation 
nationale, de la recherche et des sports, leurs propositions de 
credits de recherche. Toutefois, en ce qui concerne ies cr6dits 
relatifs k Pespace, i! exerce cette competence conjointement 
avec le ministre charge de Pespace.
Au meme titre, le ministre d 'Etat.  ministre de l'education 
rationale, de la recherche et des sports, exerce, conjointement 
avec le ministre de I'industrie, du commerce exterieur et de 
Pamenagcment du territoire, la tutelle de I'Agence nationale 
pour la valorisation de la recherche et de la cite des sciences et 
| de I'industrie ei, conjointement avec le ministre des postes et 
telecommunications et de Pespace, la tutelle du Centre national 
, des etudes spatiaies.
I Au m6me titre, il a autorite sur le centre de prospective et 
d evaluation, institue par Particle 2 du decret n° 82-768 du 
i 9 septembre 1982 susvise, et dispose, en tant que de besoin, de 
la direction generale de I’industrie et de la direction de l’admi- 
| nistration generale du ministere de I’industrie, ainsi que des 
| directions r6gionales de I’industrie et de la recherche.
Art. 3. - Pour I'exercice de ses attributions en matiere de 
■ jeunesse et de sports, le ministre d'Etat , ministre de l’education 
! nationale. de la recherche et des sports, exerce son autorite ou 
i sa tutel. ,ur les services ou 6tab!issements qui relevaient du 
! secretaire d'Etat  aupres du Premier ministre, charge de la jeu­
nesse et des sports en vertu de Particle 2 du decret du 
3 avril 1986 susvise
Ait 4 Le Premie; ndnistre, le ministre d 'Etat.  ministre de 
Peducaiion nationale, de la recherche et des sports, le ministre 
d'Etat. ministre de l'6conr,mie, des finances et du budget, le 
ministre de I'industrie, du commerce extirieur  et de Pamfcnage- 
ment du territoire et Ir ministre des postes et t6I6comraunica- 
tions et de Pespace, sont charges, chacun en ce qui le concerne, 
de Pextculion du prb'.enl d tcret ,  qui sera public au Journal 
officiel de la Republique francaise.
Fait A Paris, le 28 mai 1988.
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
Par le President de la R6publique :
Le Premier ministre,
MICHEL ROCARD
Le ministre d ’Etat, ministre de l'education nationale. 
de la recherche et des sports,
LIONEL JOSPIN
Le ministre d'Etat, ministre de l economie. 
des finances et du budget.
PIERRE BEREGOVOY
Le ministre de I'industrie. du commerce exterieur 
et de I ’amenagement du territoire.
ROGER FAUROUX
Le ministre des postes 
et telecommunications et de I'espace.
PAUL QUILES
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M I N I S T E R E  D E S  P O S T E S  ET T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  
ET DE L ' E S P A C E
D 4crat n° 88-741 du 3 juin 1988 re la tif  a u x  a ttr ib u tio n a  
du m in istre  d e s  p o s t e s  e t  tA I4 co m m u n !ca tio n a  e t  d e  
I 'e sp a c e
NOR PTTX88O0064D
Lc President de la Republique,
Sur lc rapport  du Premier ministre,
Vu la ioi n° 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 modifi ie  relative 
& la liberty de communication ;
Vu le decret n° 59-178 du 22 janvier 1959 relatif aux  att ribu­
tions des ministres ;
Vu le decret n° 84-510 du 28 juin 1984 relatif au Centre 
national d ’etudes spatiales ;
Vu le decret n° 85-1212 du 20 novembre 1985 relatif aux I 
attributions du ministre des P.T.T. :
Vu le decret n° 86-129 du 28 janvier 1986 modifie portant | 
organisation de Padministration centrale du ministere des j 
P.T.T. ;
Vu le decret n° 86-1250 du 8 decembre 1986 relatif A ( 'orga­
nisation de Padministration centrale du ministere de Pindustne, j 
des P. et T. et du tourisme ;
Vu le decret du 10 mai 1988 portant nomination du Premier j 
ministre ;
Vu le decret du 12 mai 1988 portant nomination des j 
membres du Gouvernement ;
Le Conseil d ’Etat {section des travaux publics) entendu :
Le conseil des ministres entendu,
Dicrdte :
Art. l ef. - Le ministre des postes et telecommunications et 
de Pespace exerce ies attributions precedemwenr devalues par 
le decret du 20 novembre 1985 susvise au ministre des P.T.T.. & 
l'exception de celles qui ont 6t6 transferees par PefTet de la loi 
du 30 septembre 1986 susvisee.
II assure la coherence de Paction gouvernementale en | 
matiere de politique spatiale.
Art. 2. - Le ministre des postes et telecommunications et de 
Pespace a autorite sur Ies services enumeres par le decret du 
28 janvier 1986 susvise
II dispose pour Pexercice de ses attributions de la direction 
generale de I'industrie
Art. 3. -  Le ministre des postes et telecommunications et de 
Pespace exerce, conjointement avec le ministre d ’Etat, ministre 
de l’education nationale, de la recherche et des sports, la 
tutelle sur le Centre national d'etudes spatiales.
A ce titre, il exerce les attributions devolues au ministre 
charge de I’industrie par le decret du 28 juin 1984 susvise.
Art. 4. - Le Premier ministre, le ministre d'Etat , ministre de 
l’education nationale, de la recherche et des sports, le ministre 
de la defense, le ministre de Pindustne, du commerce exterieur 
et de l’amenagcment du territoire, le ministre de la culture et 
de la communication, le ministre des postes et telecommunica­
tions et de Pespace et le ministre deiegue aupres du ministre 
d ’Etat, ministre de l'education nationale, de la recherche et des 
sports, charge de la recherche, sont charges, chacun en ce qui 
le concerne, de l’execution du present decret, qui sera publie 
au Journal officiel de la Republique francaise.
Fait A Paris, le 3 juin 1988.
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND 
Par le President de la Republique :
Le Premier ministre.
MICHEL ROCARD
Le ministre des postes 
et telecommunications et de I'espace.
PAUL QUILFS 
Le ministre d'Etat. ministre de I education nationale, 
de la recherche et des sports.
L I O N E L  J O S P I N
Le ministre de la defense.
J E A N  P1FRRE OHFVpNF.MF.NT 
Le ministre de I'industrie. du commerce exteneur 
et de I'amenagement du terntoire.
ROGER FAUROUX
Le ministre de la culture et de la communication.
J A C K  L A N G  
Le ministre deiegue aupres du ministre d'Etat.
ministre de l'education nanonaie. O O Q
de la recherche et des sports, 
charge de la recherche.
H U B E R T  C U R I E N
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M I N I S T E R S  d e s  p o s t e s , 
D E S  T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  e t  d e  l  e s p a c e
OAcret n° 88-837 du 20 ju ille t 1988 rela tif aux aftribu-
tion a  du m iniatre d e s  p o s t e s ,  d a s  t e le c o m m u n ic a ­
t io n s  e t  da I 'e sp a c e
NOR PTTX8S00096D
Lc President dc la Republique,
Sur le rapport du Premier ministre,
Vu le d£cret n° 59-178 du 22 janvier 1959 relatif aux at tribu­
tions des ministres ;
Vu le decrct n° 88-741 du 3 juin 1988 relatif aux attributions 
du ministre des postes et telecommunications et de I'espace ;
Vu le decrct n° 88-838 du 20 juillet 1988 relatif aux attribu- j 
tions du ministre de la recherche et de la technologic ;
Vu le decrct du 23 juin 1988 portant nomination du Premier I 
ministre ;
Vu le decret du 28 juin 1988 portant nomination des i 
membres du Gouvernement ;
Le Co.iseil d'Etat  (section des travaux publics) entendu ;
Lc conseil des ministres entendu,
Decrete :
Art. I " .  - Le ministre des postes, des telecommunications et 
de I'espace exerce, dans les memes conditions, les attributions 
precedcmment devolues au ministre des postes el teiecommuni- j  
cations et de I'espace par le decret du 3 juin 1988 susvise.
Art. 2. - Le Premier ministre. le ministre de la defense, le 
ministre de I’industrie et de I'amenagement du territoire, le 
ministre de la culture, de la communication, des grands travaux 
el du Bicentenaire, le ministre des postes, des telecommunica­
tions et de I’espace et le ministre de la recherche et dc la tech­
nologic sont charges, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de I'execu- 
tion du present decret. qui sera publie au Journal officiel de la 
Republique franqaise.
Fait a Paris, le 20 juillet 1988
F R A N C O I S  M I T T E R R A N D  
Par le President de la Republique 
Le Premier mimsire.
MI C H E L  R O C A R D
Le ministre des posies, 
des telecommunications et de I'espace.
PAUL QUILf.S
Le ministre de la defense.
J E A N - P I E R R E  C H E V E n e . ME N I
Le ministre de I'industrie et de I'amenagement du territoire.
R O G E R  F A U R O U X  
Le ministre de la culture, de la communication, 
des grands travau.x et du Bicentenaire.
J A C K  L A N G
Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie.
H U B E R T  C U R I F N
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m s n i s t E r e  d e  l a  r e c h e r c h e  e t  d e  l a  t e c h n o l o g i e
D 6cr*t n« 88-838 du 20 ju illet 1?83 rs la tif  aux  
a ttr ib u tio n s  du m in istre  de la re c h e r c h e  e t  de  
la t e c h n o lo g ie
NOR : HESX89001060
Lc President dc la Republique,
Sur lc rapport  du Premier ministre,
Vu le decrct n° 59-178 du 22 janvier 1959 relatif aux attribu­
tions des ministres ;
Vu le decret n° 70-879 du 29 septembre 1970 modifie relatif 
au Commissariat  & l'energie atomique .
Vu lc titre I*r du decrct n® 75-1002 du 29 octobre 1975 relatif
& la coordination de la recherche scientifique et technique,
modifie par le decret n° 78-659 du 23 juin 1973 ;
Vu le decret n® 79-615 du 13 juillet 1979 modifie relatif h 
I 'organisation et au fonctionnement de i'Agence nationale de 
valorisation de la recherche (Anvar) ;
Vu le decret n° 82-768 du 9 septembre 1982 relatif k I’organi- 
sation de l'administration centrale du ministere de la recherche 
et de l 'industne, en particulier son article 2 ;
Vu le decret n° 84-510 du 28 juin 1984 relatif au Centre
national d ’etudes spatiales :
Vu le decret n° 85-268 du 18 fevrier 1985 portant creation de 
retablissement pubiic de la Cite des sciences ct de l'industne ;
Vu le decret n° 86-294 du 27 fevrier 1986 instituant un 
comite interministenel relatif h Eureka, modifie par le decret 
n° 86-715 du 17 avril 1986 ;
Vu le decret n° 86-1264 du 6 decembre 1986 relatif & l'crga- 
nisation des services d'administration centrale charges de la 
recherche mis A disposition du ministre deiegue aupres du 
ministre de l'education nationale, charge de la recherche et de 
I'enseignement superieur ;
Vu le decret n° 86-1250 du 8 decembre 1986 relatif & 1 orga­
nisation de l'administration centrale du ministere de i'industrie. 
des P. et T. et du tourisme, en particulier ses articles ler,
4 et 18 ;
Vu le decrct du 23 juin 1988 portant nomination du Premier 
ministre ;
Vu le decret du 28 juin 1988 portant nomination des 
membres du Gouvernement ;
Le Conseil d'Etat (section des travaux publics) entendu ;
Le conseil des ministres entendu,
Decrete :
Art. I«r. - Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie a 
competence pour proposer et, en liaison avec les autres 
ministres int6ress6s, mettre en oeuvre la politique du Gouverne­
ment dans le domaine de la recherche et de la technologie
II prepare avec le ministre d'Etat. ministre de I'iconomie. 
des finances et du budget, les decisions du Gouvernement rela­
tives A 1’attnbution des ressources et des moyens alloues par 
l'Etat dans le cadre du budget civil de recherche et de dtvelop- 
pement technologique ; & cet effet, les ministres pr isentent au 
ministre de la recherche et de la technologie leurs propositions 
de credits de recherche. Toutefois, en ce qui concerne les 
credits relatifs A I'espace, il exerce cette competence conjointe­
ment avec le ministre charge de I'espace.
En ce q ii concerne les etablissements publics et autres orga- 
nismes puolics de recherche, le ministre de la recherche et de 
la technologie prepare et met en oeuvre, en liaison avec les 
ministres impresses, les reformes concernant I'organisation, les 
statuts du personnel et toutes les mesures ayant une incidence 
sur la politique de I'emploi scientifique. II contresigne les , 
textes pris dans ces domaincs.
II est charge de revaluation des travaux de recherche 
conduits par les etablissements publics et les organisrnes de 
recherche dont les credits sont inscnts au budget civil de 
recherche et de developpemcnt technologique.
II est consulte sur les programmes de recherche des entre- \ 
prises nationales.
Art. 2. - Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie ' 
preside, par delegation du Premier ministre, le comite intermi­
nisteriel relatif £  Eureka. II peut presider, par delegation du j 
Premier ministre, le comite interministeriel de la recherche i 
scientifique et technique et le comite A i’encrgie atomique.
Art. 3. - Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologic a 
a u to r i te  su r  les se rv ices enum eres  par  le d ecre t  du 
6 decembre 1986 susvise ainsi que sur le centre de prospective 
et d evaluation institue par Particle 2 du decret du 9 scp- 
tembre 1982 susvise ; il dispose, en tant que de besoin, de la 
direction generate de l'industne et de la direction de ( 'adminis­
tration generalc du ministere de I'industrie ainsi que des direc­
tions regionales de I'industrie et de la recherche.
Art. 4. - Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie 
exerce, conjointement avec le ministre de I'industrie et de
I amtnagement du territoire, la tutelle de I’Agence nationale 
pour la valorisation d r  la recherche et de la Cite des sciences 
et de I'industrie et, conjointement avec le ministre des postes. 
des telecommunications et de I'espace, la tutelle du Centre j  
national d ’etudes spatiales.
Art. 5. - Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie est 
associe aux actions de cooperation scientifique internationaie.
II suit et coordonne,  en liaison avec le ministre d'Etat, ministre 
des affaires 6trang6res, et ’e ministre de la cooperation et du 
d6veloppement, les actions poursuivies dans ce domaine par les j  
organisrnes de recherche.
Art. 6. - Le Premier ministre, le ministre d'Etat, ministre dc 
I6conomie, des finances et du budget, le ministre d'Etat, 
ministre des affaires etrangercs, le ministre de l'industne et de |
I am6nagement du territoire, le ministre de la cooperation et du i 
developpcment, le ministre des postes, des telecommunications 1 
et de I'espace et le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie 
sont charges, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l’execution du i 
present decrct, qui sera publie au Journal officiel de la Repu­
blique fran9 aise.
Fait h Paris, le 20 juillet 1988.
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND 
Par le President de la Republique :
Le Premier ministre.
MICHEL ROCARD
Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie.
HUBERT CURIEN
Le ministre d'Etat. ministre de l economie. 
des finances et du budget.
PIERRE BEREGOVOY
Le ministre d'Etat. ministre des affaires etrangeres.
R O L A N D  D U M A S  
Le ministre de I'industrie et de I'amenagement du territoire.
R O G E R  F A U R O U X
Le ministre de la cooperation et du developpement.
J A C Q U E S  P E L L E T I E R
Le ministre des postes. 
des telecommunications et de I'espace.
PA:  L Q U I L E S
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M IN IS T E R E  D E S  P O S T E S ,  
D E S  T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  ET D E  L 'E S P A C E
Dtcrvt n» 88-1121 du 14 d4c«mbr« 1988 m odiflant le I 
d4cret n° 88-129 du 28 ianvier 1986 m odifit portant 
organisation de radministration centrale du minis- 
t8re d es P.T.T.
NOR: PTTC89010600
Le Premier ministre,
Sur ie rapport du ministre des postes, des teiecommunica- 
tions et de I’espace,
Vu le decret n° 84-510 du 28 juin 1984 relatif au Centre 
national d’etudes spatiales, modify par le decret n° 88-837 du 
20 juillet 1988 relatif aux attributions du ministre des postes, 
des telecommunications et de I’espace ;
Vu le d6cret n° 86-129 du 28 janvier 1986 modifie portant 
organisation de l’administration centrale du ministere des 
P .T .T . ;
Vu le d6cret n° 87-389 du 15 juin 1987 relatif k I’organisation 
des services d’administration centrale ;
Vu le d6cret n° 88-837 du 20 juillet 1988 relatif aux attribu­
tions du ministre des postes, des telecommunications et de l’es- 
pace ;
Vu I’avis en date du 3 octobre 1988 du Conseil superieur des 
postes et telecommunications ;
Vu I’avis en date du 13 octobre 1988 du comite technique 
paritaire ministdriel du ministere des postes, des tei6communi- 
cations et de I’espace ;
Le Conseil d’Etat (section des travaux publics) entendu,
Dicrtte :
Art 1". -  Lc 5 du premier alinea de 1’article 1" du d6cret 
du 28 janvier 1986 modifie susvise est modifie comme suit :
« 5. La delegation g6n6rale k I’espace.
« 6. Le comite des enseignements superieurs. »
Art. 2. - Le decret du 28 janvier 1986 modifie susvise est 
complete par un article 19 bis ainsi rtdigi :
« Art. 19 bis. -  La delegation generale k I’espace releve direc- 
tement de 1 autorite du ministre.
/ « Elle mene les etudes et prepare les actions necessaires pour 
assurer la coherence de Taction gouvemementale en matiere de 
politique spatiale. Elle prepare les reunions convoquees k cet 
eflet. Elle assure le secretariat et le suivi des decisions de ces 
reunions.
« Elle coordonne la representation du ministere dans les ins- 
inces nationales et internationales ayant competence en 
latiere d’espace.
« Elle assiste le ministre pour Texercice de la tutelle sur le 
entre national d’etudes spatiales. »
Art. 3. - Le ministre d’Etat, ministre de Teconomie, des 
inances et du budget, le ministre de la fonction publique et 
les reformes administratives, le ministre des postes, des teie- 
ommumcations et de I’espace et le ministre deiegue aupres du 
ninistre d’Etat, ministre de I’fcconomie, des finances et du 
>udget, charge du budget, sont charges, chacun en ce qui le 
:onceme, de l’execution du present decree qui sera publie au 
Journal officiel de la Republique francaise.
Fait 4 Paris, le 14 decembre 1988.
MICHEL ROCARD
Par le Premier ministre :
Le ministre des postes, 
des telecommunications et de I'espace,
PAUL QUILkS
Le ministre d'Etat, ministre de leconomie. 
des finances et du budget,
PIERRE BfcRfiGOVOY 
Le ministre de la fonction publique 
et des reformes administratives.
MICHEL DURAFOUR
Le ministre deiegue aupres du ministre d'Etat, 
ministre de l economie, des finances et du budget, 
charge du budget.
MICHEL CHARASSE
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M IN IS T E R E  d e s  p o s t e s . 
D E S  T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  ET D E  L 'E S P A C E
DAcret du 6 Janvier 1989 portant nomination  
d'un dAIAquA gAnAral A l'administration cantrala
NOR: PTTC8901123D
Le President de la Republique,
Sur le rapport du Premier ministre et du ministre des postes, 
des telecommunications et de I’espace,
Vu I’article 13 de la Constitution ;
Vu la loi n° 83-634 du 13 juillet 1983 relative aux droits et 
obligations des fonctionnaires ;
Vu la loi n° 84-16 du 11 janvier 1984 modifl6e portant dispo­
sitions statutaires relatives k la fonction publique de I’Etat, 
notamment son article 25 ;
Vu le decret n° 85-779 du 24 juillet 1985 modifie portant 
application de Particle 25 de la loi n° 84-16 du 11 janvier 1984 
fixant les emplois superieurs pour lesqueis les nominations sont 
laissees a la decision du Gouvernement ;
Vu le decret n° 86-129 du 28 janvier 1986 modifie portant 
organisation de l’administration centrale du ministere des 
P.T.T., notamment le decret n° 88-1121 du 14 decembre 1988 ;
Vu le decret n° 88-837 du 20 juillet 1988 relatif aux attribu­
tions du ministre des postes, des telecommunications et de I’es- 
pace ;
Le conseil des ministres entendu,
D ecrete :
Art. Ier. - M. Michel Petit, ingenieur general des telecom­
munications, est nomme deiegue general a I’espace.
Art. 2. - Le Premier ministre et le ministre des postes, des 
telecommunications et de I’espace sont charges, chacun en ce 
qui le concerne, de l’execution du present decret, qui sera 
publie au Journal officiel de la Republique francaise.
Fait & Paris, le 6 janvier 1989.
FRANCOIS MITTERRAND 
Par le President de la Republique :
Le Premier ministre.
MICHEL ROCARD
Le ministre des postes. 
des telecommunications et de I'espace.
PAUL QUILfcS
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M I N I S T E R E  D E S  P O S T E S .  
D E S  T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  ET D E  L 'E S P A C E
DAcnrt n* 99-77 du  « ftvrtor 1MS modiflant to dderat




Sur le rapport du ministre des postes, des t616communica- 
tions et de I’espace et du ministre de la recherche et de la 
technologie,
Vu la loi n° 61-1332 du 19 d6cembre 1%1 instituant un 
Centre national d’etudes spatiales, et notamment son article 5 ;
Vu la loi n<> 82-610 du 13 juillet 1982 d’orientation et de 
programmation pour la recherche et le d6veloppement techno- 
togique de la France ;
Vu la loi n* 83-675 du 26 juillet 1983 modifiie relative & la 
d6mocratitation du secteur public, ensemble le d6cret 
n* 83-1160 du 26 d6cembre 1983 portant application de cette 
loi ;
Vu le dferet n* 53-707 du 9 aoflt 1953 modifi6 relatif au 
coDtrdle de l’Etat sur les entreprises publiques nationales et 
certains organisrnes ayant un objet d’ordre 6conomique ou 
socia l;
Vu le d toet n* 55-733 du 26 mai 1955 modifie relatif au 
contrite 6conomique et financier de 1’Etat ;
Vu le decrct n* 59-587 du 29 avril 1959 relatif aux nomina­
tions aux emplois de direction de certains 6tablissements 
publics, entreprises publiques et soci6t6s nationales, modifie 
par le d te e t  n« 67-152 du 22 fdvrier 1967 ;
Vu le d6cret n° 62-1587 du 29 decembre 1962 portant rdgle- 
ment g6n6ral sur la comptabilite publique ;
Vu le d to e t n«* 84-510 du 28 juin 1984 relatif au Centre 
national d’etudes spatiales ;
Vu le d to e t n° 88-837 du 20 juillet 1988 relatif aux attribu­
tions du ministre des postes, des telecommunications et de l’es- 
p ace; „
Le Conseil d’Etat (section des travaux publics) entendu, 
D todte :
Art. 1*. -  Dans le d to e t du 28 juin 1984 susvisd les mots : 
« des ministres charges de I’industrie et de la recherche » sont 
remplac6s par les mots : « des ministres charges de I’espace et 
de la recherche » ; les mots : « des ministres charges de l’indus- 
trie ou de la recherche » sont remplaces par les mots : « des 
ministres charges de I’espace ou de la recherche ».
Art. 2. -  1. -  Dans le 1° de l’article l er du d6cret du 28 juin 
1984 susvis6 la mention : « un represcntant du ministre charge 
des P.T.T. » est remplac6e par la mention : « un represcntant 
du ministre charge de I’industrie ». • v  ;
IL -  Dans 1’article 11 du m6mc d6cret les mots : « credits 
budgetaires ouverts notamment aux budgets des minist6res de 
i’industrie et de la recherche qui lui sont affectes » sont rem­
places par les mots : « credits budgetaires de 1’Etat qui lui sont 
affectes ».
Art 3. -  Le ministre d’Etat, ministre de l’6conomie, des 
finances et du budget, le ministre d’Etat, ministre des affaires 
6trang6res, le ministre de la defense, le ministre de I’industrie 
et de I’amenagement du territoire, le ministre des postes, des 
telecommunications et de I’espace, le ministre de la recherche 
et de la technologie et le ministre deiegue aupr6s du ministre 
d’Etat, ministre de l’6conomie, des finances et du budget, 
charge du budget, sont charges, chacun en ce qui le concerne, 
de l’execution du present decret, qui sera publie au Journal 
officiel de la Republique francaise.
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F ait & P aris, le  6 fev rie r il989.
i MICHEL ROCARD
Par le Prem ier m in is tre :
Le ministre des postks, 
des telecommunications et de I'espace,
PAUL QUILfeS
Le ministre d'Etat, ministre de leconomie, 
des finances et du budget, 
r  PlEJtRE BEREGOVOY 
, Le minist ' d'Etat, minis e des affaires itrangires,
ROLAND DUMAS
Le ministre de la defense, 
JEAN-PIBRRE CHEVfiNEMENT
Le ministre de I’industrie 
et de I’amenagement du territoire,
ROGER FAUROUX
Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie, 
HUBERT CURIEN 
Le ministre deidgud aupres du ministre d ’Etat, 
ministre de l economie, des finances et du budget, 
charge du budget,
MICHEL CHARASSE
M I N I S T E R E  D E S  P O S T E S ,
D E S  T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  E T  D E  L ' E S P A C E
D6cret n° #9-508 du 19 juillct 1989 
portant cN otion  du com rti da i'espaca
NOR: PTTCS900494D
Le Premier ministre,
Sur le rapport du ministre des postes, des telecommunica­
tions et de I’espace,
Vu la loi n® 61-1382 du 19 decembre 1961 instituant un 
Centre national d’etudes spatiales ;
Vu le decret n® 84-510 du 28 juin 1984 modifie relatif au 
centre national d’etudes spatiales ;
Vu le decret n® 86-129 du 28 janvier 1986 portant organisa­
tion de l’administration centrale du ministere des P.T.T., 
modifie notamment par le decret n° 88-1121 du 14 decembre 
1988 ;
Vu le decret n® 88-837 du 20 juillet 1988 relatif aux attribu­
tions du ministre des postes, des telecommunications et de I’es­
pace,
Decrete :
Art. 1". -  U est cree aupres du ministre charge de I’espace, 
et sous sa presidence, un comite de I’espace qui comprend :
- le secretaire general du ministere des affaires etrangeres ;
-  le deiegue general p o u r  I’a rm em en t ;
- Ie directeur general de I’industrie ;
- le directeur general des telecommunications ;
- le directeur general de la recherche et de la technologie ;
- le directeur du budget ;
- le chef d’etat-major des armees ;
- le deiegue general A I’espace ;
-  le president et le directeur general du Centre national 
d’etudes spatiales.
Art. 2. - Pour concourir A 1’objectif de coherence de la poli­
tique spatiale, le Comite de I’espace a pour missions :
a) De preparer les decisions du Gouvernement relatives A la 
politique spatiale ;
b) Dexammer I’infiuence des programmes spatiaux sur i’in­
dustrie francaise et europeenne ;
c) De preparer, notamment sur rapport du directeur general 
du Centre national d’etudes spatiales, les orientations relatives 
A la position de la France en matiere de collaboration spatiale 
intemationale ;
d) Enfin, de proposer au Premier ministre toute action qui 
lui semble necessaire.
Art. 3. -  Le Comite de I’espace se r6unit au moins deux fois 
par an sur convocation de son president En fonction de 
l’ordre du jour etabli par le president* le comite peut s’ad- 
joindre A titre consultatif des representants des departements 
ministeriels interess6s et faire appel A des experts qualifies.
Le secretariat du comite est assure par la delegation generale 
A I’espace en liaison avec le Centre national d’etudes spatiales.
Art. 4. -  Le ministre d’Etat, ministre de l’6conomie, des 
finances et du budget, le ministre d’Etat, ministre des affaires 
etrangeres, le ministre de la defense, le ministre de I’industrie 
et de i’amenagement du territoire, le ministre des postes, des 
telecommunications et de I’espace, le ministre de la recherche 
et de la technologie et le ministre deiegue auprAs du ministre 
d’Etat, ministre de I’economie, des finances et du budget, 
charge du budget, sont charges, chacun en ce qui Ie concerne, 
de l’execution du present decret, qui sera publie au Journal 
officiel de la Republique francaise.
Fait A Paris, le 19 juillet 1989.
MICHEL ROCARD
Par le Premier ministre :
Le ministre des postes. 
des telecommunications et de I’espace.
PAUL QUILfeS
Le ministre d ’Etat. ministre de Leconomie. 
des finances et du budget.
PIERRE BfcRfcGOVOY 
Le ministre d ’Etat. ministre des affaires etrangeres,
ROLAND DUMAS
Le ministre de la defense.
JEAN-P1ERRE CHEVtNEMENT
Le ministre de I’industrie 
et de I'amenagement du territoire.
ROGER FAUROUX
Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie.
HUBERT CUR1EN
Le ministre ddldgud aupres du ministre d ’Etat. 




M I N I S T E R E  D E S  P O S T E S ,
D E S  T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  E T  D E  L ' E S P A C E
D4cr«t  n® 90-1121 du 16 dbca mbr *  1990 por tan t  org a n i­
sa t ion  da I ad m in i s t r a t i on  can t ra l a  du mini s t e r s  das
p o s t a s ,  das  t e l e c o m m u n i c a t io n *  a t  da I ' a s p a c a
NOR PTTC9000966D
Le Premier ministre.
Sur le rapport du ministre d'Ettt, ministre de la fonction 
pubiique et des reformes administratives, et du ministre des 
postes, des telecommunications et de I'espace,
Vu Ie code des postes et telecommunications ;
Vu la loi n° 90-?63 du 2 juillet 1990 relative 4 I'organisation 
du service public de la poste et des telecommunications .
Vu le decret n° 37-389 du 15 juin 1987 relatif k I’organisation 
des services d'administration centrate ;
Vu le decret n " 88-837 du 20 juillet i 988 relatif aux attribu­
tions du ministre des postes, des telecommunications et de I'es­
pace ;
Vu I’avis du comite technique paritaire ministeriel du minis­
tere des postes. des telecommunications et de I’espace en date 
du 15 novembre 1990 :
V’u l’avi3 du Conseil superieur des postes et telecommunica­
tions .n  date du 19 novembre 1990 ;
Le Conseii d’Etat (section des travaux publics) entendu.
Decrete :
Art ter. - Sous I'autoritb directe du ministre, 1'administra- 
tion centrale du minis*.b*e des postes, des telecommunications 
et de I’espace comprend :
1. L'inspection generaic ;
2. La direction de la reglementation generale .
3. La direction du service public .
4. La delegation generale a I'espace .
5. La direction de l'administration generate.
Elle comprend en outre le bureau du cabinet, le service de 
Hnfonnation et de la communication et le service de defense et 
de securite civile, directeraent rattaches au cabinet du ministre.
Art. 2. - L’inspection generale effectue. pour le compte du 
ministre et dam tous les domaines ressortissant aux attributions 
de celui-ci, les missions d'infonnation. d'enquete. de conseil. de 
representation, de contrOle et d evaluation. qui lui sont 
confiees.
Elle exerce, au nom du ministre et par delegation, le contvdle 
superieur sur tous les personnels et services qui reinvent direc- 
tement du ministre, ainsi que sur les btablrseraent!. publics 
administratifs places sous sa tutelle.
Dans le cadre des pouvoirs de tutelle du ministre. elle 
efTectue des ccntrdles portant sur la rbgularitb du fonctionne­
ment, ainsi que sur les comptes et la gestion des organisrnes du 
secteur des postes, des telecommunications et de I'espace qui 
sont ou peuvent etre soumis au contrdle de la Cour des 
comptes en vertu de I’artide 6 bis (A et B) de la loi n° 67-483 
du 22 juin 1967 modifi6e.
Elle procede 4 revaluation des politiques publiques du 
mmistete. En vertu d'otdres de mission du ministre. elle rvalue 
les actions et les r6sultats des organisrnes mentionnbs 4 I'alinta 
precedent qui mettent en ceuvre ces politiques.
Pour 1’exerdce de ces missions, les membres de i’inspection 
generale ont tous pouvoirs d'investigation sur pieces et sur 
place ; ils peuvent etre assist6s par des fonctionnaires et par 
des experts design6s par le ministre.
L’inspection gbn6rale des postes et telecommunications t t 
compos be d’inspecteurs gen6r*ux des postes et telecommunica­
tions et d’ingbnieurs gbneraux des telecommunications qui y 
sont afTectbs par arrete du ministre charge des postes et tele­
communications. Le ministre designe parmi eux, dans les 
memei formes, le chef de l’inspection generate.
335
Art. 3. - La direction de la reglementation generate definit 
et rdipte Ie cadre juridique general dans lequel s'exercent les 
act'vitbs retevant des secteurs des postes et telecommunications.
L.'e veiile au respect de la reglementation en vigueur.
Elle analyse et btudie de fa^on prospective revolution, aux 
plans rational et international, de I’environnement social, eco 
npnv^ue, technique et juridique des activit6s des secteurs des 
postes et telecommunications.
Elle prtpare les projets de loi et de reglement et elabore 
toutes directives ministbrielles relatives au regime des activitbs 
des differents acteurs bconomiques intervenam dans les se c ­
teurs des postes et telecommunications
Elle coordonne ia representation du ministere dans les dis­
cussions et negociations internationales concernant les postes et 
les telecommunications, sous reserve des attributions de la 
direction du service public. En particulier, elle assure la repre­
sentation du ministere en matiere de reglementation genbrale et 
participe, en tant que de besoin. aux reunions des comitbs, 
commissions ou groupes charges de I'etude des probtemes de 
technique d'exploitation ou de normalisation.
Elle instruit les demandes dautonsation et les declarations 
prtaiables adressbes au ministre en application du code des  
postes et telecommunications. Elle btablit les cahiers des  
charges et veiile * ce que les obligations contractbes par les 
titulaires d’autonsations soient respectbes.
En liaison avec le comite de coordination des tblbcommuni 
cations, elle prbpare la repartition des bandes de frequence et 
des frequences radioblectnques qui sont attribubes au ministre 
chargb des postes et telecommunications, pour le compte de 
l’expioitant public et des utilisateurs autorises par le ministre.
Elle met en forme et publie les specifications et procedures 
d’agrbment rbgissant les bquipements terminaux destines 4 btre 
connectba 4 un rbseau ouvert au public et les installations 
radioblectriques ; elle dblivre les agrements des equipements 
terminaux.
Elle assure le secretariat du Conseil national des postes et 
telecommunications.
Le directeur de la reglementation gbnbrale a autoritb sur te 
chef du service national des mdiocommunicatiens.
Art. 4. - La direction du service public exerce au n o m  d u  
ministre ia tutelle des exploitants publics. La Poste et France 
T61bcom, de leurs services gbrbs en commun, ainsi que des eta­
blissements publics administratifs qui sont rattachbs au minis­
tere.
Elle prbpare les projets de textes spbcifiques aux exploitants 
publics et 4 leurs services communs et veiile 6 leur application
Elle represente le ministre au sein des instances inte.ministe- 
rielles ayant k connaitre des activitbs et des questions d- per­
sonnel de La Poste et de France Telecom ; elle coordonne la 
representation de I'Etat dans les conseils d'administration des 
deux exploitants publics.
File apporte son concours au secretariat de la commission 
supbrieure du service public des postes et telecommunications . 
elle assure le secretariat de la Commission supbrieure du per­
sonnel et des affaires sociales.
Art. 5 - La dblbgation gbnbrale 4 i’espace mbne des etudes 
et prbpare les actions nbcessaires pour assurer la coherence de 
faction gouvemementale en mattere de politique spatiale. Elle 
prepare les reunions tenues a cet effet. Elle assure le secretariat
et le suivi des decisions de ces reunions.
File prepare et mbne les actions du ministere dans Ies ins­
tances nationale*. internationales et communautaires ayant 
^ompbtence en matiere d’espace. Elle prbpare et mbne faction 
du ministere en matibre de cooperation, de recherche et en ce 
qui concerne la diffusion 4 i’btranger des matbriels r.i des tech­
niques. dans le domaine de I'espace.
F.lle assiste !e ministre pour 1‘exercice de ia tutede sur le 
C e n tre  national d'etudes spatiales. notamment en mati*re bud- 
<tb:aire ; elle examine les documents et decisions soumis par le 
( en tre  national d’btudes spatiales 4 fapprobation du ministre. 
File prbpare ies p ro je ts  d e  tex te  concernant en propre les 
r i a n ism e s  ou  in s tances  c o m p e t r n t e s  en matibre spatiale et 
ei .le 4 leur app l ica t io n
Art. 6. - La d irec t ion  de  !' i d m im s i r a t io n  g t n e r t i e  a  pou. ' 
m iss ion  de  f o u m ir  a i ' r - ' s e m r . e  i e t  services du  ministere  ?es 
m o y e n s  de leur  activi te.  Eile e'-: : M ire te n te  d a n s  ies d o m a in e s  
du  b udge t ,  de  la c o m p tab i l i te  e: d:t  p e r so n n e l  d u  ministere.
F i le  assure  la p r e p a ra t io n  d es  d o c u m e n ts  b u dge ta ires  so u m is  
au Pa r lcm en t  et des  dec is ions  : .ecessaire3  a l’execu t ion  d u  
b udge t .
F ile  p r tp a r e  Ies earners Je s  charze*  Je» e .x p lc iu m s  publics  
et veiile a I 'app l ica t ion  de )e> "s d ispos i t ions ,  sous reserve des 
i t t n b u t io n s  de la d irec t ion  de .a ren t ienen ta t ion  generale.
Elle p rep a re  p o u r  !e co m p te  de  i H a t  les con tra ts  de  p lan  
d es  exp lo i tan ts  publics,  pa r t ic ip e  a leur negoc ia t ion  et en 
a s su re  le s u m
Elle e x am in e  ies d o c u m e n ts  et decis ions  soum is  p a r  Jes 
e x p lo i ta n ts  pub l ics  i  i a p p r o b a t io n  du  ministre.
Elle assure  ie suivi de  la oolitiqc e t a n fa i re  des exp lo i tan ts  et 
m et en cruvre n o ta m m e n t  ies p ro c e d u re s  relat ives aux ta n f s  
p rev u es  p a r  leurs cahiers  de* charges .
El! bo re  o r ien ta t io n s  genera les  d a n s  iesquelles  s ins- 
. n v e n t  i<a a a i  J e s  e x p io i ian ts  nuh l ics  et n o ta m m e n t  leur  
of fre  d e  service* . dans  ce bu t  r i le  j tu d ie .  en  iiaison avec le* 
e x p lo i tan ts  pub lics ,  de m a m i r e  p rospec t ive ,  les se rvices q u e  
ceux-ci  son t  suscep t ib les  d 'o f f n r  . elle p re n d  to u te  d isp o s i t io n  
uti le  de  n a tu re  a m a m te n i r  la c o m p le m e n ta r i ty  des  activity* de 
La Poste  et d e  F ra n ce  Tyiecom.
Elle assure, pour ce qui la concerne. en liaison avec la direc­
t ion  de la reglementation generale. la representation Internatio­
nale du ministere : elle prepare Taction du rvnistere en matiere 
de cooperation et de recherche et en ce qui concerne la diffu­
sion i  retranger des materiels et des techniques, dans les 
domaines des postes e; des telecommunications.
Elle a s su m e  les c o m p e te n c e s  d u  m in is tere  dans les domaines 
du  personnel et des affa ires  sociales des e x p lo i ta n t j  publics ; 
en concertation avec ceux-ci, elle prepare les statuts particuliers 
des pe r so n n e ls  f o n c t io n n a i re s  d e  La Poste  et d e  F ra n ce  
Telecom  ; elle veiile I I 'a p p l ic a t io n  des dispositions de la loi 
du 2 juillet  1990 relatives au p e r so n n e l  et aux  affa ires  sociales 
des exp lo i tan ts  publics ,  n o t a m m e n t  les p r i n d p e s  et garanties 
en u m e re s  a I 'a m c le  34 de  la loi : t l ' e  reijcit c: e x p l o r ,  les 
in fo rm a t io n s  et d o c u m e n ts  prevus a cet  effet p a r  les cahiers des 
charges.
Elle c o o r d o n n e  la ges t ion  du  c o rps  des m g em eu rs  des  t e le ­
c o m m u n ic a t io n s  et des  co rps  des a d m in is t r a te u r s  et des inspec- 
teurs  genFraux des postes  et te leco m m u n ica t io n s .
Elle e x a m in e  les c o n v e n t io n s  co .is ti tu t ives des g ro u p e m e n ts  
d ' i n t y r d  p ub l ic  et des z . -o u p em en t '  d ’interet eco n o m iq u e .  
co n s t i tu te  en tre  La Poste  et F rance  ie*ecom, p .o p o s e e s  a ( 'a p ­
p r o b a t io n  d u  ministre .
Elle p re p a re  les d ec is ions  q u e  les cahiers  des  charges  des 
ex p lo i ta n ts  pub l ics  reserven t  a ia c o m p e te n c e  du  m inistre  en  
m at ib re  d ’en se ig n em en t  su p e r ie u r
Elle p a r t i d p e  k la d e f in i t ion  des  or ient  tions et des  objectifs 
des g ro u p e m e n ts  d ' in te re t  p ub l ic  c o n - t i m i s  d a n s  Ie d c  Maine 
social  ; el le assure  le suivi de  I’e f fo r t  social de  c h a a u e  e ploi- 
tant  public .
Elle est chargee  d e  la r e g ie m e n ta t io n .  de  la desc r ip t io n  et du  
<.omrdie des  o p e r a t io n s  o u d g e ia iM i  et c o m p ta b le s  ains i que  de
* in fo rm a t io n  a e s  a u t o n t e s  d e  ges t ion  ct c e  con trd le
Elle assure !e recrutement. l'avancement, la formation. les 
affectations. la gestion des cameres. la discipline et Ie service 
Jes pensions des agents du ministere
Elle est chargee d assurer les moyens logntiqurs necessaires
• u fonctionnemem du ministere. r.otamment par I’acquitition et 
!a gestion des biens mebiliert et immooiiiers
Elle assure la concertation et la negociauon avec les organi­
sations tvndicaies representatives des personnels du ministere 
dans le cadre des nouvoirx propres du ministre en la matiere 
File est responsablc pour ! ensemble du ministere des 
affaires contentieuses et Ju recouvremen* des crtacces en litige
Art 7 Le present decret entrera en vigueur le l»* jan­
vier 1991
Art 3 Sont abroges 
le decret n* 129 du 23 janvier I9H6 modifie portant 
crgan*tation de l'administration centrale du ministere des 
P T T  ,
le decret n» IT-301 du 30 avnl 191" relatif aux missions et 
aux pnnopex dorgamtation de I inspection generale des 
postes et telecommunications
Art 9 Le mmjs?re d F'at. ministre de ia fonction publique 
et des reformes adr-’nistramet. et ie ministre des postes. des 
telecommunications et de ! espace »cnt charges, chacun en ce 
qui le concerne. de l'execution du present deem, qui *era 
pubite au Journal oiftctei de la Republique francaise
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Fait X Pans, ie 13 decemhre 1990
9 1 4 8  9 1 4 9  J O U R N A L  O F F I C I E L  D E  L A  R E P U B L I Q U E  r R A N Q A I S E  29 ju.llet 1990
ArrAtA du 20 ju ille t  1990 f ix a n t la c o m p o s it io n  at l a s  rAgles 
d a f o n c t io n n e m e n t  d e  la c o m m is s io n  d e s  m a r c h e s  du  
C e n tr e  n a tio n a l d 'A tu d es  s p a t ia le s
NOR P TTE8trjl I55A
Lc ministre d 'E tat, ministre de I'iconomie, des finances et du 
budget, Ie ministre des postes, des telecommunications et dc I'es- 
pace, le ministre de la recherche el de la t t :hno log ie  et le ministre 
deiegue aupres du ministre d 'E tat. ministre de l'£ccnomie, des 
finances et du budget, charge du budget,
Vu la loi r.® 61-1382 du 19 decembre 1961 instituant un Centre 
national  d 'e tudes spatiales :
Vu le d6cret n® 84-< 10 du 26 juin 1984 modifi i  relatif au Centre 
national  d 'e tudes spatiales ;
Vu le decret n® 86-129 du 28 janvier  1986 portant  organisation de 
l 'administrat ion centrale du ministere des P.T.T., modifie notamment 
par  le decret n® 88-1121 du  14 decembre 1988 ;
Vu I’arrdte du 20 juillet 1990 fixant les modulites de fonctienne- 
ment financier  du Centre national d'etudes spatiales. et notamment 
son article 9,
Arretent :
Art. I " .  - La commission des marches instituee aupres du Centre 
n a t io n a l  d ’e tu d e s  s p a t ia le s  p a r  I 'a r t ic le  9 d e  T a r re te  du  
20 juillet 1990 susvise comprend :
Un membre du Conseil  d 'E ta t  ou un magistrat de la Cour des 
comptes, ou  un membre de I’inspection generale des finances, presi­
dent :
Le deiegue general A I’espace ou son representant, vice-president , 
Un representant du deiegue general pour I'armemen! ;
Le secretaire general de la Commission centrale des marches ou 
son representant ;
Le contrdleur d 'E ta t  du  Centre national d 'etudes spatiales ,
L'agent comptable principal du Centre national d 'e tudes spatiales 
ou  son representant ;
Le secretaire general du Centre national d 'e tudes spatiales ou son 
representant ;
Le chef  du service t js  affaires juridiques et contraciuelles du 
Centre national d 'e tudes spatiales ou son representant ;
Le chef de la division politique industrielle du Centre national 
d ’etudes spatiales ou son representant.
Pour chaque marche examine,  le directeur qui en a pris l 'initiaiive, 
ou  son representant,  assiste avec voix consultative aux deliberations 
de  la commissu n. II peut se faire accompagner d ’un expert.
Les marches sont presentes A la commission par  un ou plusieurs 
rapporteurs chcisis soit parmi les membres du Conseil  d 'E tat,  les 
magistral* de ia C our  des comptes ou les membres de I'inspection 
generale des finances, soit parmi les membres d 'un  autre corps de 
contrdle.  Le president ainsi que le ou les rapporteurs sont d6signes 
p a r  ane te  conjoint  du ministre de I'econorme, des finances et du 
budget , du ministre charge de I’espace et du ministre charge de la 
recherche.
En cas d 'absence s;multan6e des rapporteurs designes conform6- 
ment aux dispositions ci-dessus, et A titre exceptionnel,  les fonctions 
de  rappoi eur peuvent etre confiees, par  decision du  president,  A un 
fonctionna re du ministere charge dc I'espace ou du  ministere de !a 
defense.
Les rapporteurs n ’ont pas voix deliberative.
Art. 2. -  Le* deliberations son*, prises A la majorite des voix ; en 
cas de pir tage egal, celle du president est prepond6rante.
La commission ne peut valablement deiiberer que si la moitie au 
moins de ses m trrb r t*  sont presents ou reprdsentes.
Art. 3. -  Sous reserve des amenagemcnts necessaires au respect 
des engagements contractucls internationaux pris par  le Centre 
national d ’dtudc* rpatiales dans le cadre de I’Agence spatiale euro- 
peenne,  la commission donne son avis :
I® Sur les orojets de marches qui lui sont soumis par  le directeur 
general du Centre national  d ’etudes spatiales ;
2® Sur tous les projets de marches l'etudes ou conventions 
d ’etudes d ’un montant egal ou superieur A >000 000 F hors taxe ;
3® Sur tous les autres projets dc marc ies ou conventions d 'un 
m ontant  egal ou superieur A 10 000 000 F h e ’s  taxe ;
4® ~!>r toutes les questions concernant la procedure de passation 
et ' 'execution des marches qui lui sont posecs par  le directeo: 
gdneral du Centre national  d 'e tudes spatiales.
Art. 4. - Dans le cas ou il est signaie q u ;  la passation d 'un 
marchd presente un caractdre d 'urgcnce particuh.*re, il appan ien t  au 
president de rdunir la commission dans le plus Lref ddlai A moms 
qu'i l  ne juge pouvoir donner  lui meme un avis favorable.
Le president peut, sur proposition du secretariat gdneral du Centre 
national d 'etudes spatiales, cffectuer une selection des contrats pre- 
sentds et dispenser certains d 'e n t r :  eux de l'examen par  la commis­
sion.
Pour l 'examen des projets d a v e n a n ts  aux m arches vises A Par­
ticle 3 (I®. 2° et 3°) la commission peut deieguer  sa competence a 
son president
Dans les deux cas, le president rend compte A la commission, tors 
de sa prochaine r iunion,  des avis qu'i l a forrnuies
Art. 5. L arrete du 3 decembre 1969 modifie fixant la composi­
tion et les regie* de fonctionnement de la commission  des marches 
du Centre national d 'e tudes spatiales est abrc ge
Art. 6 - Le present arre te sera publie au Journal officieI de la 
Republique francaise.
Fait A P^ris, le 20 juillet 1990.
Le m imsire des postes. 
des telecommunications et de I espace. 
Pour le m inistre et par delegation : 
Le directeur du cabinet.
G MOINE
Ije ministre d Etat. ministre de I economie. 
des finances et du budget.
PIERRE BtRtGOVOV
Le ministre de la recherche et de la technologie. 
HUBERT C U R IE N  
Le ministre d iU g u t aupres du ministre d'Etat. 




«  IU IM 0I J O U H N A L  O F F I C I E L  D E  L A R E P U B L I Q U E  F R A N C A I S E  9 i 4 7
M I N I S T E R E  D E S  P O S T E S .
D E S  T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N S  E T  D E  L ' E S P A C E
Arr#t4  du 20 juil lat  1990 re la t i f  aux m odblitA s da  
f o n c t l o n n a m a n t  du  C e n t r a  n a t i o n a l  d 'A tu d e a  
a p a t ia le e
N O R :  PTTF83011S4A
Le m inistre d 'E ta t, n.inistre de PAconomie, des finances et du 
budget, le m inistre des postes, des telecom m unications et de Pes- 
pace, le m inistre de la recherche et de la technologie et le m inistre 
deiegue aupres du m inistre d ’Etat, m inistre de 1'economie, des 
finances et du budget, charge du budget,
Vu la loi n° 61-1382 du 19 decem bre 1961 instituant un C entre 
national d 'e tudes spatia les ;
Vu Ie decret n 0 62-1587 du 29 decem bre 1962 portan t reglem ent 
general su r la com ptabilite publique ;
Vu le decret n» 64-486 du 28 mai 1964 relatif aux regies de 
recettes et aux regies d 'avances des organisrnes publics, m odifie par 
Ie decret n® 71-153 du 22 fevrier 1971 ;
Vu le decret n° 84-510 du 28 juin 1984 modifie relatif au Centre 
national d 'e tudes spatia les :
Vu ParrAtA du I "  decem bre 1982 relatif aux regies de recettes et 
aux regies d 'avances des organisrnes publics.
A rretent :
Art. I " .  - Le fonctionnem ent financier et com ptable du Centre 
national d ’6 'udes spatia les est assure dans les conditions fix6es par 
le decret du 29 decem bre 1962 susvise portant reglement general sur 
la com ptabilite publique. selon les modalitAs definies ci-aprAs.
Art. 2. - Un etat de prevision de recettes et de depenses est etabli 
pour chaque exercice annuel com m en^ant le l er janvier.
L 'etat des previsions fait apparaitre  sous deux sections disiinctes 
Ies operations relatives au fonctionnem ent et les operations en 
capital.
II est prFsente selon la nom enclature budgetaire de l'6tablissem ent 
et la nom enclature com ptable visee il Particle 216 du decret du 
29 decem bre 1962 susvise.
La presentation de l'e ta t de prevision des recettes et des depenses 
doit perm ettre un rapprochem ent avec les credits inscrits & la loi de 
finances.
Art. 3. - Les operations en capital s'execu tan t su r plusieurs 
annees font l’objet d 'u n e  presentation  previsionnelle du cout total et 
de rechelonnem ent annee par annAe des engagem ents et des paie- 
ments.
Art. 4. - L’etat des previsions des recettes et des depenses est 
ptAparA par le d irecteur gAnAral et dAlibArA par le conseil d 'adm in is­
tration  au plus tard  un m ois avant le debut de l'exercice. II est exA- 
cutoire sauf opposition  des m inistres charges de I'espace, de la 
recherche, ou de 1’econom ie. des finances et du budget dans les 
conditions decrites par Particle 5, prem ier alinea, du  decret du 
28 ju in  1984 susvisA.
Art. 5. -  Si I’Atat n ’est pas approuvA k Pouverture de l'exercice, 
les operations de  recettes et de depenses sont faites sur la base des 
prAvisions de l'exercice prAcAdent. Toutefois, s 'il est nAcessaire et 
aprAs accord du  con trb leu r d 'E ta t, ces opArations peuvent etre faites | 
dans la lim ite des prAvisions figurant A I'Atat non encore approuvA.
Art. 6. -  Les decisions m odificatives reconnues necessaires sont 
dAlibArAes et approuvAes dans les mAmes form es que I'Atat annuel 
des prAvisions.
Art. 7. -  Le prAsident du  conseil d ’adm inistration  a qualitA d 'o r- 
donnateu r principal. II peut, sous sa responsabilitA , dAIAguer une 
partie de ses pouvoirs au d irecteur gAnAral ou . aprAs avis de celui-ci,
A un ou plusieurs chefs de service placA sous I'autoritA du  d irecteur 
gAnAral. Le president du  conseil d 'adm in istration  designe les ordon- 
nateurs secondaires.
Art. 3. -  Des avances peuvent Atre consenties dans les conditions 
fixAes par P ordonnateur, avec Paccord du con trb leu r d 'E ta t, aux per­
sonnes chargees de m issions pour le com pte du  centre ainsi qu ’aux 
personnes, sociAtAs ou organisrnes m andates par le centre pour 
opArer pour son com pte. De la mAme fa^on, des avances peuvent 
Atre consenties avec Paccord du  contrb leur d ’Etat lorsque le centre 
agit pour le com pte d 'u n e  au tre  personne, d 'u n e  sociAtA ou d ’un 
organisme.
Art. 9. - Les conditions gAnArales de passation , de fm ancem ent et 
de contrble des m arches sont fixAes par le conseil d 'adm in istration . 
Elies s'inspirent de la reglem entation  des marchAs de I’Etat.
La com position et les rAgies de fonctionnem ent de la com m ission 
des marches instituAe auprAs du C entre na tional d 'e tu d es spatiales 
sont fixAes par arrAtA du  m inistre chargA de I'espace, du ministre 
charge de la recherche et du m inistre charge du  budget.
Art. 10. -  Le rble de I'agent com ptable du C entre national 
d 'etudes spatiales est dAfini par les d ispositions du  decret du 
29 decembre 1962 susvisA. La com ptabilite analy tique est tenue par 
les services de Pordonna teu r sous le contrble de I'agent com ptable.
Art. II . -  Des agen ts com ptab les se co n d a ire s peuven t Atre 
dAsignAs par le d irecteur gAnAral sur p roposition  du com ptable, 
conformAment aux d ispositions de Particle 195 du decret du 
29 decembre 1962 susvisA.
Art. 12. -  Des rAgies d 'avances et des rAgies d :  recettes peuvent 
Atre ir.stituAes selon les dispositions du decrer du 28 mai 1964 
modifiA susvisA.
Art. 13. - L’arrAtA du  7 fevrier 1984 fixant les modalitAs dc fonc­
tionnem ent financier du  C entre national J  etudes spatiales et les 
arTAtAs du 12 fevrier 1965 et du  4 octobre 1979 fixant les modalitAs 
de crAation des rAgies d 'avances et de recettes du  C entre  national 
d 'e tudes spatiales sont abrogAs.
Art. 14. -  Le prAsent arrAtA sera publie ?u  Journal officiel de  la 
RApublique francaise.
Fait 4 Paris, le 20 ju ille t 1990.
Le m inistre des postes. 
des telecommunications et de I'espace, 
Pour ie m inistre et oar dAIAgation : 
Le directeur du cabinet.
G. MOINE
Le ministre d'Etat. ministre de 1'economie. 
des finances et du  budget.
P I E R R E  B E R E G O V O Y
Le ministre de la recherche ei de la technologie. 
HUBERT CURIEN 
Le ministre d i l tg u i  auprts du ministre d 'E tat. 






This Appendix presents the CNES subsidiaries not examined in the main body of 
the thesis.
Locstar
The Locstar subsidiary w as created in October 1988 with the objective of setting 
up and exploiting a European satellite positioning and communications network for 
road, sea  and rail transport. Locstar aimed to provide a  positioning system  by 
1992 and a  communications facility with mobile vehicles by 1993. Such system s 
required two satellites produced by Matra and the necesary authorisations from 
the various European telecommunications regulatory bodies.
CNES originally held 15% of Locstar shares, a s  one of the 27 private firms, 
banks and telecommunications organisations which set up the company in its 
initial format. The initial structure of the company gave a  majority French interest, 
but in Decem ber 1989 the company attempted to increased its capital from 100 
million francs to 800 million francs by opening its sh ares  up to Daimler-Benz and 
M annessm an, GEC and British Aerospace and Olivetti, am ongst other new 
participants. The new shareholders brought the total number of shareholders to 
50, removed the French majority ownership, and saw the reduction in CNES' 
holding to 8.87% This first extension of ownership resulted in an increase of 
capital to 676 million francs in March 1990, which w as still insufficient to underwrite 
the envisaged 2.5bn franc investment in the Matra satellites and their launches by 
Ariane.
In the face of declining enthusiasm  for the project am ongst Locstar's 
shareholders and government, this ambitious investment plan w as reduced to 
1.5bn francs in April 1991, and total funds never exceeding 1bn francs, the 
company was placed in liquidation in July 1991.1
Novespace
Novespace is a  technology transfer subsidiary company set up in July 1986 by 
CNES, the Agence nationale pour la valorisation de la recherche (ANVAR), and a
1 See Le Monde 26 June 1991, 'Locstar sur la voie de la liquidation1, and 27 
April 1991. La Lettre du Cnes, Nos. 119,126, 127.
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variety of banks and financial institutions. Its primary aim is to promote the use of 
space microgravity and to facilitate the transfer of technologies developed in space 
research and development programmes to other sectors. To do this Novespace 
provides marketing, legal and financial services to companies or organisations 
wanting to transfer or to acquire space technologies.
% sh ares in N o v esp a ce
French banks
4 8 %  0 %
ANVAR CNES
4 %  4 8 %
(Source: CNES Annual Report 1986)
Until 1989, Novespace's financial details were not revealed, but since 1989 the 
published figures for turnover show a rapid increase in the use of the company's 
services from 6 million francs in 1989 to 9.5 million francs in 1990 and 16 million in
1991.
S cot Conseil
The Service de consultance en Observation de la terre was created in September 
1987 by CNES and a group of banks and financial institutions. Although the 
subsidiary was initially wholly owned by CNES, in 1992 CNES owned 75% of the 
shares and the remaining 25% were divided amongst the banks and finance 
houses. The company provides a consulting service in the engineering, finance 
and application of remote sensing systems. As with the other companies in which 
CNES has shareholdings, the turnover of Scot Conseil has increased significantly 
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